Preamble

The House met at half-past Two o'clock

PRAYERS

[MR. SPEAKER in the Chair]

PRIVATE BUSINESS

KING'S COLLEGE LONDON BILL [Lords]

STANDARD CHARTERED MERCHANT BANK BILL

Orders for Second Reading read.

To be read a Second time upon Thursday.

MILFORD HAVEN CONSERVANCY BILL (By Order)

Order for Third Reading read.

To be read the Third time upon Thursday.

LLOYDS BOWMAKER BILL [Lords] (By Order)

Order for Second Reading read.

To be read a Second time upon Thursday.

Oral Answers to Questions — DEFENCE

Nuclear Weapons (Europe)

Mr. Meacher: asked the Secretary of State for Defence whether the North Atlantic Alliance has reduced the size of its short-range nuclear battlefield weapon stockpile in Europe as a result of the review to which he referred on 29 March, Official Report, c. 168.

The Minister of State for the Armed Forces (Mr. Peter Blaker): The Alliance is committed to maintaining the number of shorter-range nuclear weapons at the minimum consistent with effective deterrence. The stockpile is being and will be kept under review to that end. NATO has already withdrawn 1,000 nuclear warheads from Europe and has announced its intention of withdrawing one additional warhead for each Pershing II or ground-launched cruise missile deployed in Europe.

Mr. Meacher: Is the Minister aware that about 1,200 short-range nuclear weapons are still deployed in Europe by NATO, and about 950 are deployed by the Warsaw Pact? As NATO will not give a "no first use" commitment for those weapons, and as, anyway, strict political control over their use cannot be guaranteed once hostilities begin, do not those weapons constitute the gravest possible threat of unleashing an uncontrolled nuclear exchange and subsequent escalation? What steps is the Minister therefore taking to respond to Soviet proposals for an extended nuclear-free battlefield zone in central Europe?

Mr. Blaker: The hon. Gentleman's supplementary contains many questions. I have explained before the disadvantages of a battlefield nuclear weapon-free zone, and those disadvantages are still valid. In answer to the hon. Gentleman's question about a "no first use" declaration, NATO has a much better policy than that of the Soviet Union, and that is no first use of any weapons, nuclear or conventional. We will never use any weapons unless attacked. On the numbers of battlefield nuclear weapons, the hon. Gentleman was approximately right when he said that the Russians were building up their nuclear capable artillery fairly rapidly, according to our assessment.

Mr. Cyril D. Townsend: Will my hon. Friend confirm that there is a perfectly respectable defence case for scaling down the number of tactical nuclear weapons that we have in western Europe, many of which are very elderly, and spending some of the money on improving our conventional capability? However, will my hon. Friend assure the House that one of the reasons why we deploy


tactical nuclear weapons in the first place is that the Soviet Union and its allies have a massive preponderance of conventional forces?

Mr. Blaker: There may be a case for reducing the number of our battlefield nuclear weapons. It is a question that we are carefully reviewing. It is a complicated question on which it will take some time to come to a conclusion. However, I should point out that if we aim at abolishing our reliance on nuclear weapons, which, I understand, is the policy of the Opposition—indeed, if they could, they would persuade NATO to abolish a deterrent policy based on nuclear weapons — all our conventional weapons, however big, would have the value of scrap metal.

Mr. McNamara: I am not quite certain what the Minister thinks he is talking about. That is certainly not Labour party policy. In view of the developments of modern technology on the changing battlefield environment, and as it could lead to a complete disavowal of all battlefield nuclear weapons, should not the Government pursue such a policy more vigorously? Has not such a policy widespread support in the whole of the Western world, from such diverse people as Monsignor Bruce Kent and the American Catholic hierarchy?

Mr. Blaker: If the hon. Gentleman is questioning what I said about Labour policy, I shall quote the Labour party policy document, paragraph 198:
We wish to see NATO itself develop a non-nuclear strategy".
On our general reliance on conventional weapons, I repeat that, however strong our conventional weapons, if we had no nuclear weapons and the Soviet Union had even half a dozen nuclear weapons, we should be in the same position as Japan in 1945.

Armed Forces Youth Training

Mr. Canavan: asked the Secretary of State for Defence whether he will list the organisations he consulted before making his statement to the House on 14 April about the armed forces participation in the youth training scheme.

The Under-Secretary of State for the Armed Forces (Mr. Jerry Wiggin): As my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence made clear in questions following his statement on 14 April, his consultations were with my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Employment.

Mr. Canavan: Is the Minister aware of the widespread concern that exists about the deliberate use of mass unemployment as an economic weapon to persuade young people to undertake a term of military training? Is the Minister not ashamed that the Government have reduced the freedom of choice for young people so that they can now choose only between joining the Army and joining the dole queue? When will the Government give unemployed young people real jobs and real training instead of insulting them with a uniform and £15 a week?

Mr. Wiggin: There is no question of conscription. The scheme is voluntary to those who take part. Contrary to the hon. Gentleman's view, many people believe that the scheme provides a wonderful opportunity to join our excellent armed services, experience what they can contribute and have a good start in life.

Mr. Buck: Does my hon. Friend agree that most people in Britain will think that the hon. Member for West Stirlingshire (Mr. Canavan) is wrong? Does my hon. Friend agree that our armed forces have unique facilities and unique personnel to undertake the role that they are given?

Mr. Wiggin: I am sure that my hon. and learned Friend is absolutely right.

Mr. Moyle: Will the young people be trained exclusively in military subjects? If so, would it not be better to call the programme a recruitment scheme rather than a youth employment scheme? If the young people are to be taught trades, what proportion of military resources will be devoted to the scheme and taken away from training our soldiers? Why did the Minister not consult the trade unions to discover their views?

Mr. Wiggin: I congratulate the right hon. Member for Lewisham, East (Mr. Moyle) on his first appearance in his new capacity.
A number of the young people will learn technical trades, but it is too early to say exactly how many or where. We must fit the scheme into our existing training programme.

United States of America (Defence Co-operation)

Sir William van Straubenzee: asked the Secretary of State for Defence whether he plans an early meeting with the United States Secretary of Defence to discuss cooperation in defence matters.

The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr. Michael Heseltine): I plan to visit the United States later this month and look forward to taking the opportunity to discuss matters of mutual interest with the Secretary of Defence.

Sir William van Straubenzee: In case my right hon. Friend discovers when he gets to the United States that opinion is influenced unduly by some of the media here, will he convey to his distinguished American colleague that although the British cordially dislike the nuclear weapon and expect the Government to press on with supervised, balanced disarmament, in the meantime they are quietly, but firmly, of the view that the weapon must be retained in defence of the Western world?

Mr. Heseltine: I shall certainly ensure that those sentiments are conveyed to my American opposite number. My hon. Friend will be aware that since they were elected the Government have made clear their commitment to the twin track policy of negotiated disarmament or the deployment of intermediate range missiles.

Mr. Crawshaw: Is the right hon. Gentleman likely to bring up the question of dual control, because many of us who are satisfied with the present arrangements know that many people wish nuclear weapons to be retained, but are genuinely concerned that they could be used without our consent? Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that we are in danger of losing the argument when we have the best case going?

Mr. Heseltine: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for the measured terms of his question. All of us who have served in the House behind Governments of various persuasions have a responsibility to make it clear that the


degree of control that we have over American weapons and bases in Britain, in respect of cruise missiles, is the same as we have had over all other similar American systems since the 1950s.

Mr. John Silkin: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the overwhelming mass of people in Britain want to be the allies of the United States, but do not want Britain to be a satellite of the United States? Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that he misleads the House when he says that the cruise missile system follows the agreement between Prime Minister Attlee and Harry Truman in 1951, and that we are dealing here not with nuclear bases but with a nuclear weapon that can be used, and will be used —if it is used at all—on the roads of Britain and from any base anywhere?

Mr. Heseltine: I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman does not want Britain to be an American satellite, but I do not know anyone in the country who does. I do not, therefore, see the purpose of the question. All that this Government are doing is to continue the nuclear policies to which the last Government were so firmly committed. I cannot see what issue of principle is at stake.

Mr. Silkin: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that he is wrong? The Government are ensuring that we become a satellite of the United States. Does the right hon. Gentleman accept that the cruise missile agreement, apart from the fact that the people of Britain do not want it and have shown that they do not, gives to the United States the power, alone, to set the missile off without consulting us in any way whatsoever?

Mr. Heseltine: The right hon. Gentleman is aware that the United States President and Britain's Prime Minister always reaffirm the terms of the 1951 agreement, which specifically provides that no weapons or bases used by the Americans under agreements with us will be used without the joint decision of the President and the Prime Minister.

Mr. Warren: When my right hon. Friend meets the American Secretary for Defence, will he impress upon him that if the United States expects to sell defence equipment to Britain there should be a completely open door for Britain to sell back to the United States? Will my right hon. Friend please ensure that Mr. Caspar Weinberger does his best to impress upon Congress the need to wipe out the specialty metals amendment?

Mr. Heseltine: I am grateful to my hon. Friend. This is a matter of concern. The Administration have persuaded Congress to pass a waiver to enable us to sell specialty metals to the United States and are seeking to extend that waiver from September this year. I shall do my best with the Secretary for Defence to confirm his enthusiasm for that and, on the Hill, to speak to appropriate Senators and Congressmen.

Trident

Mr. Roy Hughes: asked the Secretary of State for Defence what recent assessment he has made of the effect on the United Kingdom's conventional defences of the decision to buy Trident.

Mr. Heseltine: On present projections, our spending on conventional forces will be substantially higher throughout the period of Trident's procurement than it is at present.

Mr. Hughes: Does that not mean that the Royal Navy will be ill-equipped and, indeed, sorely pressed to fight any conventional war in the future? Is it not a travesty that we can engage in such lavish expenditure when reports from the Falklands indicate that our troops there suffered from trench foot and that we were unable to supply them with such basic items as boots?

Mr. Heseltine: Of course I am as anxious as the hon. Gentleman to learn the appropriate lessons from the Falklands war. It is extraordinary that the hon. Gentleman should show concern for the detail of conventional force expenditure when the policy to which he is committed would wipe out £4,500 million a year from defence expenditure.

Mr. Nelson: Will my right hon. Friend consider the proposition that an error of judgment under successive Governments in the 1960s effectively lowered the nuclear threshold by relying completely on the nuclear umbrella and giving insufficient priority to the conventional equipment programme? Will my right hon. Friend please bear in mind that many of us place the greatest reliance on this and successive Governments completing the procurement programme set out in recent White Papers?

Mr. Heseltine: I support my hon. Friend's general conclusion. We want to raise the nuclear threshold and ensure that the best possible conventional equipment is available to our armed services. That is one of the reasons why this Government have increased the level of defence expenditure as they have. As this Government know, and as the last Government knew, there is no escape from the fact that behind that conventional force we shall need nuclear deterrence if we are to provide a credible deterrence to the Soviets at every level.

Mr. John Silkin: Is the Secretary of State aware that the real umbrella for NATO is and always has been the conventional British fleet, which he and his predecessors have sought to cut? Is he aware, for example, that for the price of Trident we could obtain 24 Invincible class carriers or 21 hunter-killer submarines? Moreover, is he aware that there was no agreement in 1951 relating to weapons? He is quite wrong about that. The agreement was about bases, and bases alone.

Mr. Heseltine: If there is an agreement about bases, one cannot very well use the weapons systems on those bases unless that is covered by agreement on the weapons. If the right hon. Gentleman will cast his mind back to just before polling day 1979, 'when the Conservatives were elected, he will recall that the Labour Government's views were clearly set out in the NATO communiqué, in which the Labour Secretary of State for Defence stated the Government's views. I will quote briefly the Labour Government's views about their nuclear commitment to place the defence debate in context. The Labour Secretary of State with his NATO colleagues said:
Ministers reaffirmed that NATO could not rely on conventional forces alone for credible deterrence in Europe; and that, without increasing dependence on nuclear weapons or prejudicing long-term defence improvements in conventional forces, it would be necessary to maintain and modernise theatre nuclear forces.
That was the Labour party's policy when in power.

Defence Capability

Sir David Price: asked the Secretary of State for Defence what would be the extra annual cost of substituting conventional weapons for all nuclear weapons up to the level of the United Kingdom's current defence capability and commitments.

Mr. Blaker: Nuclear weapons are an essential element of our deterrent capability for which no amount of investment in conventional forces could provide an adequate substitute.

Sir David Price: Does not my hon. Friend's reply demonstrate clearly that if we abandoned our nuclear deterrent, modest though it is compared with that of the Americans or the Russians, we should not only weaken our defence capability but accelerate our defence expenditure?

Mr. Blaker: If we tried to rely on a build-up of conventional forces in place of our nuclear deterrent, this would be very expensive indeed. General Rogers of SACEUR has proposed that NATO should raise its sights and aim at a 4 per cent. increase in spending in real terms per annum simply to raise the nuclear threshold. If we tried to achieve parity with the Russians in conventional weapons the cost would be enormous. If at the same time we gave up our nuclear deterrent, it would also be utterly useless.

Dr. McDonald: Is the Minister aware that conventional forces can provide a credible defence without the bomb, that they are less expensive than the Government claim and that the Labour Government will be able to provide such forces from a growing economy instead of the shrinking economy bequeathed by the Conservatives, in which GDP is only 93 per cent. of what it was when Labour left office?

Mr. Blaker: If the hon. Lady regards nuclear forces as dispensable, why did the Labour Secretary of State in 1979 sign the communiqué to which my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State referred?
As for her emphasis on conventional forces, Labour policy would involve a cut of £4·5 billion in defence spending. That would mean, for example, disbanding one of the three services altogether, or cutting our forces in Germany by half, disposing of all our aircraft carriers and amphibious forces, cutting the destroyer-frigate force by half, cutting the RAF's defensive capability by half and abandoning all research and development.

Greater London

Mr. Marlow: asked the Secretary of State for Defence how many military installations there are in the Greater London council area.

Mr. Wiggin: About 70.

Mr. Marlow: Will my hon. Friend take urgent steps to tell Comrade Andropov that London is now a nuclear-free zone, so if he wishes to target missiles on the United Kingdom we should be grateful if he would target them elsewhere? If my hon. Friend receives something of a raspberry by way of a reply, will he ask his right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Environment to do something about the current monstrous and extravagant advertising campaign in the GLC area?

Mr. Wiggin: I think that my hon. Friend is straying into areas of responsibility covered by my right hon.

Friend the Secretary of State for the Environment, but I share his view of the uselessness of declaring nuclear-free zones in the modern world. He might as well declare his own house to be a thunderstorm-free zone.

Mr. Jessel: Is my hon. Friend aware that the most popular military installation in the GLC area is Kneller Hall in Twickenham, where the Royal Military School of Music trains British Army bands which are the envy of the world and whose high standard of excellence is inextricably linked with Kneller Hall, which I hope will long continue?

Mr. Wiggin: I am aware of my hon. Friend's deep interest in the future of Kneller Hall. I shall certainly bear his comments in mind. I am sure that the whole House agrees with them.

Cruise Missiles

Mr. Winnick: asked the Secretary of State for Defence what recent representations he has received concerning the deployment of cruise missiles in the United Kingdom.

Mr. Heseltine: So far this year I have received about 130 letters per month from Members of Parliament and from members of the public on matters relating to the deployment of United States cruise missiles in this country.

Mr. Winnick: Is it because the Government have clearly lost the argument on cruise that they now resort to a policy of smears, innuendo and harassment of their critics while refusing, as the Secretary of State has, to engage in open debate with their critics? As the Secretary of State is supposed to be leading the campaign against CND, why did he not attend last Sunday's demonstration, when he could have joined a handful of people and a dog? Was it because there was no glamour in it, or because it was raining?

Mr. Heseltine: As the hon. Gentleman will know, CND announced a few days ago that it intended to attack the Conservatives in the marginal constituencies, and it is its democratic right to do so. Nevertheless, I thought it right to make it clear to those judging the decision taken that the majority of the elected council of CND were from the Left—varying from the Labour party through to the Communist party. That is a matter of fact, not a smear.

Mr. Adley: Will my right hon. Friend be careful with CND? Does he agree that it would be disastrous for the Conservative party if CND collapsed, as it is most important to our chances of re-election? Does he agree that Labour Members who seem to be motivated by pacifist fantasies should watch television at the weekend to see what goes on in countries such as Poland, where tear gas and water cannon are used against people, and reflect that the reason why we need adequately to defend ourselves is to ensure that we do not have a society that descends to actions of that kind?

Mr. Heseltine: My hon. Friend eloquently makes a point that I believe will have been borne in on British people at the weekend. As for any danger to Conservative re-election prospects and the collapse of CND, I take issue with my hon. Friend. So long as the Labour party remains, we shall be re-elected.

Mr. McNamara: The Secretary of State has clearly forgotten the activities of the Royal Ulster Constabulary with tear gas and water cannon in Northern Ireland from 1969 onwards. Perhaps he will concentrate on the argument about cruise. Does he agree that the agreement covers bases and not weapons, and that once the weapons are dispersed from the bases the British Government will have no control over their use?

Mr. Heseltine: In that case, perhaps the hon. Gentleman will explain why he was content to accept such an agreement in relation to the F111 bomber?

Armed Forces Youth Training

Mr. Hardy: asked the Secretary of State for Defence how many senior non-commissioned officers will be required to supervise and train the unemployed young people who are to be taken into the armed services under the Government's recent proposals.

Mr. Wiggin: Participants in the armed services youth training scheme will train and work alongside other service men and women. It is therefore not practicable to say how many senior non-commissioned officers will be involved in their supervision and training.

Mr. Hardy: Is it not surprising that the Manpower Services Commission's staffing is tightly restricted while this gimmick is so frivolously pursued? Will the Minister re-examine the commitment of senior NCOs? Does he accept that military efficiency depends to a large extent on them and that they will be diverted from essential duties in this frivolous approach?

Mr. Wiggin: I take the view that they will be employed on essential duties. The scheme is neither frivolous nor a waste of time. The services will contribute about £1 million towards the scheme, which will be of great benefit to a large number of young people.

Sir Hector Monro: Does my hon. Friend agree that the Opposition's attitude to this excellent new scheme is entirely misguided? Does he agree that the scheme will give young men a wonderful opportunity to be involved in outward bound activities and to learn about discipline and character development, which should stand them and their country in good stead for the future?

Mr. Wiggin: My hon. Friend is absolutely right. The Opposition line reveals a patent dislike of all matters relating to defence.

Mr. Ashley: If any of the young service men are severely injured during the course of their duties, other than on military action, will they retain the right to sue for negligence that they now have as civilians, or will they lose that right, as all service men lose it under section 10 of the Crown Proceedings Act 1947?

Mr. Wiggin: Section 10 of that Act will apply to the young service men in the same way as it applies to all service men. The right hon. Gentleman makes a slightly poor point, because service men can obtain generous disability and other pensions for the remainder of their lives, which are substitutes for the right enjoyed by an ordinary civilian to sue an employer.

Falkland Islands

Mr. Hooley: asked the Secretary of State for Defence if he will estimate the cost of air defences of the Falkland Islands in 1983–84.

Mr. Blaker: Air defence is the responsibility of various elements of the garrison. It is not practicable to separate the cost of this function from that of their other roles.

Mr. Hooley: Does the Minister agree that to pour £800 million into the peat bogs of the Falklands to build yet another airfield would be a grotesque waste of taxpayers' money? Is it not time that the Foreign Secretary got on with some sensible negotiations?

Mr. Blaker: The hon. Gentleman must accept responsibility for his statement about the cost of the airfield. We have not yet received the tenders. The building of the airfield was recommended by Lord Shackleton, and we believe it to be essential for the Falklands in the present circumstances.

Sir Patrick Wall: Is not the most fundamental issue in the defence of the Falklands the provision of a new airfield? When will that decision be made?

Mr. Blaker: I expect a decision to be reached fairly soon. As I said, we have not yet received the tenders. I agree that the airfield is essential for military as well as civil purposes on the Falklands. Among other things, it will make the task of reinforcement very much easier.

Mr. Duffy: Has the Minister noticed today's press reports that the Argentine might undertake a hit-and-run raid to mark its independence day later this month? Is he satisfied with the airborne early warning facilities, the air defence ground environment of No. 23 Squadron, the maritime organic air defence and, especially, the radar facilities of both the Phantoms and Harriers?

Mr. Blaker: I congratulate the hon. Gentleman on his return to the Opposition Front Bench and wish him a long period there.
I am satisfied, in general, with the capability of the garrison to deter and, if necessary, to defend the Falkland Islands. We have both ship-borne and land-based early warning facilities. I am satisfied that they are adequate, but we intend, when we can, to improve the land-based radar.

Prestwick Airport

Mr. Foulkes: asked the Secretary of State for Defence whether there are proposals for extending the Ministry of Defence activities at Prestwick airport.

Mr. Wiggin: We are considering an extension to HMS Gannet, the Royal Navy helicopter unit at Prestwick to replace facilities which date from the second world war.

Mr. Foulkes: Quite apart from that, how does the Minister explain the contradiction between his statement to me in a written answer that there had been no discussions with the Americans about the setting up of a strategic distribution centre at Prestwick, and the statement a week later by the Secretary of State for Scotland that there had been discussions but the proposals were abandoned? What guarantee do we have that such proposals will not be resurrected by Congress without any consultation with us?

Mr. Wiggin: I understand that the United States Air Force had an internal plan to build a warehouse at Prestwick—

Mr. Foulkes: Why did the hon. Gentleman not know that?

Mr. Wiggin: The plan was not funded by Congress and therefore no formal application was put to the Government.

Lord James Douglas-Hamilton: Will my hon. Friend bear in mind that there is a strong case for restoring a flying role to the Royal Auxiliary Air Force at Prestwick, in view of the excellent facilities there?

Mr. Wiggin: As the White Paper stated last year, that matter is under consideration. I cannot say whether such a flying unit will be based at Prestwick, but I shall bear my hon. Friend's remarks in mind.

Nuclear Intermediate Range Weapons

Mr. Chapman: asked the Secretary of State for Defence if he will make a statement on the rate of change in the balance of nuclear intermediate range weapons between the Warsaw Pact and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation countries.

Mr. Blaker: The Warsaw Pact has about 4,000 intermediate range nuclear weapons, while the equivalent NATO total is under 1,000. Although these figures for weapons systems have remained fairly constant for the last few years, the figure for actual warheads has shown a marked increase for the Warsaw Pact. Since 1977 the number of Soviet warheads on systems targeted on western Europe has increased by over 700 with the deployment of the SS20 missile. NATO has no comparable system and the planned NATO modernisation programme will entail no increase in NATO warhead numbers.

Mr. Chapman: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that information. Does not his answer underline two points? First, would not anyone having a scintilla of doubt about Russia's desire to reduce tension in Europe and reduce its nuclear arsenal have his reservations utterly justified? Secondly, is not the deployment of cruise not only a replacement for our more obsolete weapons, but a direct response to the deployment of SS20s by the Russians?

Mr. Blaker: I agree with my hon. Friend that, on the basis of Soviet action, we can only be pessimistic about that country's intentions. I hope that if we remain resolute and united in NATO in our negotiating posture the Russians will, in due course, agree to some sensible arrangement to reduce the number of SS20s that they have deployed.
I agree that the cruise and Pershing II missiles are intended partly to replace out-of-date weapons systems such as the Vulcan bomber, and partly to match the very big build up of SS20s.

Mr. Frank Allaun: As American officials favouring agreement have been removed, is the Minister convinced that Washington really wants any arms negotiations to succeed?

Mr. Blaker: I do not know to which officials the hon. Gentleman is referring. He may be referring to Mr. Rostow, but he would be drawing false conclusions if he read into that change of personnel any sign of a weakening

of the American desire to reach agreement, whether in the INF or the START negotiations. The hon. Gentleman will know that the Americans have put forward bold proposals for reductions. We need a sensible response from the Soviet Union.

Mr. Maclennan: Can the Minister confirm that the Warsaw Pact intermediate range weapons are targeted not only on this country but on a number of other countries that do not have intermediate range weapons?

Mr. Blaker: I have no evidence about the targets of the Soviet weapons, but I imagine that the hon. Gentleman is correct.

American Bases

Mr. Race: asked the Secretary of State for Defence if he will now revise the published figure on the number of American bases in the United Kingdom.

Mr. Blaker: In addition to those bases and facilities listed in previous answers should be added RAF Kemble, which, as forecast in a parliamentary answer by my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for the Armed Forces on 20 January, has recently been made available to the United States Air Force for aircraft and equipment maintenance work. Poole and Wincombe should be deleted from the lists as they are no longer used by the United States forces.

Mr. Race: Why did the Minister not publish the right figures in the first place? Who is fooling who? Are President Reagan and his officials fooling the Minister, or is the Minister fooling and misleading the House by giving it misleading and untrue information about the number of American bases? Why should the British people not know how many American bases, run by foreign powers, are on British soil?

Mr. Blaker: We have published details of the number of bases and facilities used by the United States in Britain —indeed, we did so recently. One of the problems of Opposition Members is that they seem unable to distinguish between a base and a facility. They originally asked about bases, and they received an answer about bases. They subsequently alleged that there were more than 100 United States bases and facilities in Britain. I have discovered that there are two petrol stations, not one as I previously told the House. I discovered the second in Glasgow. An example of the Opposition's ridiculous accusations is the mooring in Poole harbour. It is unmanned and contains one ship.

Sir Anthony Kershaw: When will my hon. Friend give the House further information about the facilities that the Americans will reqire at RAF Kemble in my constituency? What details can he give us?

Mr. Blaker: The purpose of the United States' forces at Kemble is to maintain equipment. I do not believe that aircraft will be based there.

Mr. Marks: Does the 1951 agreement cover facilities as well as bases?

Mr. Blaker: Yes, indeed.

Mr. Churchill: Does my hon. Friend agree that the liberation of Europe from Facism would have been impossible but for the American forces based in this


country? Does he further agree that the overwhelming majority of people in this country appreciate deeply what the United States is doing, and has done for the past 35 years, to maintain the peace and freedom of Great Britain and western Europe?

Mr. Blaker: I agree entirely with my hon. Friend. United States forces have been in this country continuously since the Berlin blockade of 1948 and have helped us to ensure that we remain at peace and freedom. I was interested in a recent gallup poll which showed that the majority of people support the presence of the United States bases in this country.

MINIS

Mr. Eggar: asked the Secretary of State for Defence what progress has so far been made in the introduction of MINIS in his Department.

Mr. Heseltine: I refer my hon. Friend to the answer I gave on 1 March. The first, trial, MINIS round in the Ministry of Defence is now under way and is proceeding satisfactorily.

Mr. Eggar: Will my right hon. Friend confirm that MINIS is as important to good decision making in his new Department as it was in his old Department?

Mr. Heseltine: Yes, I certainly give my hon. Friend that assurance.

Disarmament

Mr. Dykes: asked the Secretary of State for Defence if he is satisfied with official efforts to promote the basic arguments for multilateral disarmament, both of nuclear and non-nuclear weapons.

Mr. Heseltine: I think there is now greater public understanding of the Government's policy of deterrence and multilateral disarmament; but my ministerial colleagues and I will continue to take every suitable opportunity to put the message across.

Mr. Dykes: Further to that answer, for which I thank my right hon. Friend, does he agree that there is every sign now that the CND campaign is over the top? If so, what second thoughts among the British people have turned it into the campaign for nihilistic defeat?

Mr. Heseltine: I do not believe that it is for me to think of new names for the organisation, although I appreciate my hon. Friend's constructive endeavour. The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament is against NATO, Great Britain's independent nuclear deterrence and having a nuclear deterrence behind our conventional forces. In that respect it is rejected by the overwhelming majority of British people.

Mr. Jay: When will the Secretary of State publish this year's defence White Paper?

Mr. Heseltine: I hope to do so shortly.

Sir David Price: Does my right hon. Friend agree that the simplest and most cogent reason for this country retaining a nuclear deterrent was that put to me the other day in a factory by a constituent who said, "T'other beggar's got bomb. We keep bomb."?

Mr. Heseltine: My hon. Friend must articulate his views in his own way. The single greatest reason for maintaining our nuclear deterrence is that for 38 years we

have kept the peace, and to do anything other than pursue the policies that have guaranteed that peace would be a gamble. The Government will not gamble with the nation's defence.

Mr. John Silkin: When considering the arguments for multilateral disarmament, is the reason why the Secretary of State and the Government are not present at the Geneva talks either that the Americans and the Russians do not regard us as important enough or that they regard the possession by Great Britain of nuclear weapons as utterly irrelevant to their discussions?

Mr. Heseltine: It is extraordinary that the right hon. Gentleman should have spent so much time supporting a Labour Government who attached so much importance to the British independent nuclear deterrent. He knows well, as I do, that one cannot be a member of an alliance that has many members and expect all of them to negotiate with the one country that represents a significant threat—the Soviet Union. We work in trust with our American allies, as did the Labour party when in power, and we negotiate with them in private about the terms which they present to the Soviet Union. That is the only practical way in which the Alliance can work.

Mr. John Silkin: The Minister has not answered the question. Will he explain why, if the possession of Great Britain's nuclear weapons is so importat, we are not at Geneva?

Mr. Heseltine: The right hon. Gentleman is fully aware that the present focus of attention in Geneva is on the intermediate range deployment of cruise weapons. Those are American weapons and we are consulted deeply about the negotiations. We are not, in the context of those negotiations, discussing Great Britain's independent nuclear system.

American Bases

Mr. Allan Roberts: asked the Secretary of State for Defence for what reason he failed to include the United States base in Liverpool in his list of United States bases in the United Kingdom; and what purpose the base at Liverpool port fulfils.

Mr. Blaker: There is no United States "base" in Liverpool. There is a United States army office, which handles shipping documentation.

Mr. Roberts: Does the Minister expect the people of Merseyside to believe that this facility, which is constantly in evidence in the docks, is there merely to bring in tins of salmon and condensed milk? Will he give a categoric assurance that nuclear materials and equipment are not coming into Liverpool docks? Will he state categorically that nuclear materials and equipment in connection with the siting of cruise missiles in Great Britain have not already arrived in this country?

Mr. Blaker: As the hon. Gentleman knows, we never say whether nuclear equipment and weapons are or are not present at a particular location. The staff at this installation consist of two United States army personnel and six United Kingdom civilians, including one cleaner.

Oral Answers to Questions — PRIME MINISTER

Engagements

Mr. Beith: asked the Prime Minister if she will list her official engagements for 3 May.

The Prime Minister (Mrs. Margaret Thatcher): This morning I had meetings with ministerial colleagues and others. I also spoke to Mrs. Gandhi on the telephone to mark the 50th anniversary of the opening of telephone services between this country and India. Later I attended a memorial service for Lord Boyd of Merton at Westminster Abbey. In addition to my duties in the House I shall be having further meetings later today. This evening I hope to have an audience of Her Majesty the Queen.

Mr. Beith: Will the Prime Minister tell us today, if she is not yet ready to name the day, what type of result there would have to be in the local elections on Thursday to make her believe that she could safely go to the country in June? Does she feel that waiting for the results to come out of the Conservative central office computer is an example of the resolute approach?

The Prime Minister: When I decide to seek an election it will be announced in the usual way. Until then, it is business as usual.

Sir Kenneth Lewis: When my right hon. Friend is discussing the likely policy for rates, will she bear in mind that there are two minimum requirements? The first is that rates should be kept down, or reduced, for industry and business, because high rates cost jobs. The second is that something should be done to prevent the outrageous and grossly extravagant rate rises by many Labour-controlled local authorities.

The Prime Minister: I agree wholly with my hon. Friend. It is important for jobs in industry and commerce to keep the rates down. Many businesses are suffering from high rates, which are putting some small businesses into acute difficulty. In any case, it is important to control public expenditure and it is as important for local authorities to do that as it is for the Government. The lesson is that Tory councils are much better at controlling public expenditure than Labour councils.

Mr. Foot: Does the right hon. Lady agree that under her Government tax increases have gone up eight times faster than rate increases? When she talks about "business as usual", is she referring to the latest prophecy from the European Commission about unemployment rates during the next three or four years under present policies? Does she agree with its estimate that there will be an increase of 500,000 on the present appalling total if those policies are continued?

The Prime Minister: With regard to taxes, real take-home pay for those on average earnings fell under Labour. Under us, it has risen. For the first four years of the Labour Government real take-home pay for men on average earnings fell by more than 8 per cent. Under us it has risen by 4 per cent. Real take-home pay means pay after tax has been paid.
The figures in the forecast reportedly made by the European Commission were not given by the Government. We do not forecast that far ahead.

Mr. Foot: Can the right hon. Lady tell the House from where the European Commission acquired those figures

and on what estimate they are based? Does she agree that taxes imposed by the Government have risen eight times faster than rate increases imposed by local authorities, whether Labour or Conservative controlled?

The Prime Minister: The tax burden — that is the proportion of gross income taken in all tax payments—increased more under the Labour Government than it has under the present Government.
As to the European Community forecasts, it seems that the figures were calculated from the body of the article. It seems that calculations were made of increased output and of increased productivity and conclusions were arrived at from that information, assuming that everything else would be the same. [Interruption.] It is not an assumption. The right hon. Gentleman forgets that productivity per head has risen enormously under the Government. That is why efficiency has increased and why we have a good chance in the future.

Mr. Heddle: Will my right hon. Friend find time, if not today, certainly before Thursday's local elections, to visit Prince Albert Avenue, Manchester, where two properties owned by the Labour-controlled Manchester council have been empty for eight years and 19 years respectively? Is it not outrageous that a Labour-controlled council can treat needy families with such disdain? Furthermore, is it not a scandal that those two properties are in the constituency of the right hon. Member for Manchester, Ardwick (Mr. Kaufman), who is the Opposition spokesman on such matters?

The Prime Minister: My hon. Friend is right. There are a considerble number of vacant council properties. The last count revealed that there were about 100,000 vacant council properties, of which about 19,000 had been vacant for more than a year.

Mr. William Hamilton: asked the Prime Minister if she will list her official engagements for 3 May.

The Prime Minister: I refer the hon. Gentleman to the reply which I gave some moments ago.

Mr. Hamilton: As the Prime Minister appears to be confident about winning the next election, why does she not have the guts to announce a June election?

The Prime Minister: As I stated earlier, I shall not be hustled by anyone. When I seek an election, I shall announce it in the usual way. Until then, we shall have business as usual.

Mr. Eggar: asked the Prime Minister if she will list her official engagements for Tuesday 3 May.

The Prime Minister: I refer my hon. Friend to the reply which I gave some moments ago.

Mr. Eggar: Will my right hon. Friend have a discussion today with the Secretary of State for Industry, who on Friday visited Thorn-EMI-Ferguson, which is in my constituency? Is she aware that productivity at that factory, which manufactures television sets, has increased by 500 per cent. during the past 10 years? Is she further aware that Thorn-EMI-Ferguson has created more than 500 jobs since January and that another 100 jobs are to be announced shortly in my constituency? Is that not good news for Britain?

The Prime Minister: I congratulate my hon. Friend on the magnificent response of that company to overseas


competition. It decided to invest in the latest design and production techniques and it has beaten the overseas competition. That company is not alone. Many others are doing the same.

Mr. Joel Barnett: Is the Prime Minister's forecast of an upturn in the economy based on the fact that the pound will not increase in value? If there is any chance of that happening, will she intervene to stop it?

The Prime Minister: The right hon. Gentleman is well aware of the rules of intervention and exactly how it is done. The Government intervene only to keep an orderly market or to stop sudden and volatile changes. The Government can never intervene to defend a specific rate. As to forecasts, the pound could rise a good deal yet without affecting export forecasts.

Mr. Marlow: asked the Prime Minister if she will list her official engagements for 3 May.

The Prime Minister: I refer my hon. Friend to the reply which I gave some moments ago.

Mr. Marlow: Is my right hon. Friend aware that those who voted Liberal in the previous county council elections in Northamptonshire, hoping that they would keep the Labour party out, wound up with a Labour minority council propped up by a somewhat comic and vague Liberal rump, with consequent large rate increases and great pressures on the local business community? Will my right hon. Friend use her objective authority to advise the electorate not to make the same mistake next Thursday?

The Prime Minister: For rating authorities in England, the general rate increase when Labour is in control is about 25 per cent. higher than when the Conservative party is in control. It is important to get and keep the Conservative party in control, and the only way to do that is to vote Conservative.

Mr. Race: asked the Prime Minister if she will list her official engagements for Tuesday 3 May.

The Prime Minister: I refer the hon. Gentleman to the reply which I gave some moments ago.

Mr. Race: As the House of Commons' favourite own-goal merchant, the Minister for Consumer Affairs, was warned two years ago by his own Department of the danger of contaminated blood supplies coming from the United States, will the Prime Minister rectify that deplorable and disgraceful mistake by immediately authorising the necessary expenditure within the National Health Service to make Britain independent in its blood supplies?

The Prime Minister: We first need to find out a good deal more about the incident and the causes that have been reported before coming to any conclusion.

Mr. Shersby: Will my right hon. Friend consider the splendid contribution that is being made to the provision of new jobs in Britain by the legitimate video and tape industry? Is she aware that new jobs are likely to increase as a result of the private Member's Bill promoted by my right hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth, West (Sir J. Eden)? Will my right hon. Friend encourage further reforms of the Copyright Act designed to protect the legitimate audio tape industry from home taping? Enormous job opportunities exist in this industry if the Government can further reform copyright law.

The Prime Minister: My hon. Friend is correct in assuming that although Britain has not produced many video recorders—we are just beginning to do so—their advent has created many jobs in the retail trade and in the cassette industry. I agree that it is vital to stop the pirating of cassettes, and the private Member's Bill is designed to do that. Such pirating is totally unfair to those who produce cassettes and will soon stop the business. The Government will do everything possible to ensure that the pirating is stopped.

Mr. Gordon Wilson: Does the Prime Minister approve of reports in the Scottish press that, because of a major miscalculation by the Department of Education and Science, about 4,000 qualified applicants for Scottish universities have been deprived of access to the higher institutes of learning, and does this not smack less of the resolute approach and more of the Philistine approach on the Government's part in allowing that to happen?

The Prime Minister: If we examine the number of people in the age group who qualify for degrees, we find that Britain has one of the best records in Europe. By measuring the degrees given by age group, one finds that Britain performs strongly — better than Germany and about the same as France. Britain's participation rate in full-time degree courses has improved quite markedly since we took office — from 12·4 to 13·2 per cent. [Interruption.] Scottish students come to English universities and English students go to Scottish universities. The hon. Gentleman knows that the Scottish universties come under the University Grants Committee.

Mr. R. C. Mitchell: asked the Prime Minister whether she will state her oficial engagements for Tuesday 3 May.

The Prime Minister: I refer the hon. Gentleman to the reply which I gave some moments ago.

Mr. Mitchell: Has the Prime Minister had time to read about the events in Poland during the weekend, when peaceful Solidarity marchers were brutally attacked by the Polish Communist police? Will she give an assurance that no Polish citizen will be sent back from Britain against his or her will while that state of affairs persists?

The Prime Minister: The hon. Gentleman knows that Britain has kept many Polish people for precisely that reason. My right hon. Friend the Home Secretary's record in that sphere is extremely good. The object lesson for this country, and that of the Opposition, is that Britain must defend the peace with freedom and justice.

Mr. Cyril D. Townsend: Can my right hon. Friend confirm that the United States, far from wishing to withdraw from the Holy Loch base, as has been suggested by the deputy Leader of the Labour party, for Labour party internal reasons, has recently announced that it wishes to remain there until the end of the century? Will she encourage the United States to keep its bases here in our long-term interest and that of the Atlantic community?

The Prime Minister: Yes, certainly. The American bases in this country are part of our defence, and Europe is part of America's defence. It is vital that NATO should stick together, otherwise our defence will cease to be sure.

Mr. Canavan: asked the Prime Minister what are her official engagements for 3 May.

The Prime Minister: I refer the hon. Gentleman to the reply which I gave some moments ago.

Mr. Canavan: Is the Prime Minister aware that the point made by the hon. Member for Dundee, East (Mr. Wilson) is supported by the principal of Edinburgh university and by many other academics in Scottish universities, who legitimately point out that because of an error by her Government an additional 1,000 school leavers are being denied places at Scottish universities? Will the right hon. Lady take immediate steps to rectify that error and give those young people the opportunity of higher education that they deserve, instead of inflicting her Victorian values on them by turning the clock back and trying to turn our universities into Victorian finishing schools for an exclusive, tiny, elitist minority?

The Prime Minister: The hon. Gentleman is talking nonsense, but there is nothing unusual in that. If there is any chance that an error has been made, it will be dealt with by my right hon. Friends the Secretaries of State for Education and Science and for Scotland. In the meantime, as I have pointed out, this country's record of achievement in higher education, as a percentage of the age group, is excellent.

EUROPEAN COMMUNITY DOCUMENTS

Ordered,
That European Community Documents Nos. 9551/81 and 4714/83, concerning the supervision of credit institutions on a consolidated basis, be referred to a Standing Committee on European Community Documents.—[Mr. Cope.]

Protection of Animals Act 1911 Amendment

Mr. Kevin McNamara: I beg to move,
That leave be given to bring in a Bill to amend sections 1 and 15 of the Protection of Animals Act 1911; and for connected purposes.
Despite the short and long titles of the 1911 Act, the Act protects not all animals but only domestic animals and captive or confined animals, unless released for hunting purposes and not otherwise impaired. My Bill would seek to alter the anomaly whereby, in a recent case brought by the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, it was found that to kick a hedgehog to death in a bus shelter was an offence, because it took place in a confined space, but that to do that in the open or in a field was not an offence. Again, to pour petrol over a lamb and to set it alight is an offence, but it is not an offence to do the same to a red squirrel. For hounds to hunt and tear to pieces a domestic cat is an offence, but it is not an offence for a fox to be torn to pieces in that way.
My Bill must be seen as a pro-animal, not an anti-hunting, measure. However, for the avoidance of doubt, I have included a provision in it to make hunting illegal. The Bill goes even wider than Labour party policy, as it would include all wild animals. One of the failures of other Bills that have been introduced by me, and several of my hon. Friends in the past, is that we sought to outlaw one particular practice, and thus drew attention, in an anti-hunt wat, to a particular animal, instead of to all wild animals. My Bill would introduce a new clause which would make it an offence for a person to hunt with one or more dogs wholly or mainly for the purposes of sport any wild animal with intent to kill, or take, or pursue, or knowingly permit or suffer any land to be used for such hunting.
Again, I have made an exemption for captive animals in order to avoid doubt. I have defined a wild animal as any mammal that is not domesticated. It has been put to me that the Bill is anti-Tory and not just anti-hunt. Had the Bill been passed before the selection of the Tory candidate for Cambridgeshire, South-West, Mr. Simmonds might not have had to reveal that he had shot 1,000 starlings in the morning and might now be confidently expecting to join a Conservative Opposition in the next Parliament. The Bill might have been named "Protection of Tory Candidates and their Wives Bill".
However, I would not stoop to doing that, because this is not a party measure. I have a copy of a letter from a Mr. Clive Skinner, which was sent to Tory Members of Parliament. Mr. Skinner is the secretary of the Conservative Anti Hunt Council and he has urged

Conservative Members to support the Bill. I trust that they will do so. Mr. Skinner speaks not for a small and vociferous minority of Tory voters but for a majority of them. In a recent poll carried out in March, 78 per cent. of Tory voters were found to disapprove of deer hunting, while 62 per cent. supported legislation to abolish it. For hare coursing, the figures showed that 78 per cent. of those questioned disapproved and 65 per cent. supported the need for legislation. Furthermore, 62 per cent. disapproved of hare hunting., while 49 per cent. supported the need for legislation to abolish it and for fox hunting the figures were 54 per cent. and 42 per cent. respectively. The equivalent statistics for Labour voters were 88 per cent. and 80 per cent. for deer hunting, 86 per cent. and 77 per cent. for hare coursing , 75 per cent. and 63 per cent. for hare hunting and 69 per cent. and 54 per cent. for fox hunting.
Therefore, there is considerable support for such a measure among all sections of the community and in all political parties. If the Government want to curry some favour with the electorate, they should support my Bill in all its stages between now and the October election. Even in the countryside there is massive support for such a measure, although the exception is fox hunting, for which the one figure is 42 per cent. The majority of residents in the countryside support the proposal to end hunting. If any political party in the House could be certain of 42 per cent. of the vote, it would be content to form a majority after the next election.
The Bill extends further than hunting and covers cruelty to all wild animals. The environment and its creatures are placed on earth for the benefit of man; for his use, not his abuse. One of the most wanton forms of inhumanity is the cruelty that humans perpetrate on animals for sheer pleasure. Creatures that are made by God should be treated with a degree of dignity. Although they should not be put on a par with humans—and I would never adopt the over-sentimental attitude towards animals that many people do—they are entitled to be treated humanely and with dignity. That is what my Bill seeks to ensure.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill ordered to be brought in by Mr. Kevin McNamara, Mr. A. W. Stallard, Mr. A. E. P. Duffy, Dr. Oonagh McDonald, Mr. Joseph Ashton, Mr. William Whitlock, Mr. Stanley Cohen, Mr. David Winnick, Mr. Alexander W. Lyon, Mr. Tom Clarke, and Mr. Roy Hattersley.

PROTECTION OF ANIMALS ACT I9II AMENDMENT

Mr. Kevin McNamara accordingly presented a Bill to amend sections 1 and 15 of the Protection of Animals Act 1911; and for connected purposes: And the same was read the First time; and ordered to be read a Second time upon Friday 24 June and to be printed. [Bill 144.]

Orders of the Day — Police and Criminal Evidence Bill

Order for consideration, as amended (in the Standing Committee), read.

Mr. Speaker: I have selected the recommittal motion in the name of the Home Secretary.

The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. William Whitelaw): I beg to move,
That the Bill be recommitted to a Committee of the whole House in respect of Clauses 9 and 10 and New Clauses (Power of justice of the peace to authorise entry to search for evidence of serious arrestable offence), (Meaning of 'excluded material'), (Meaning of 'items subject to legal privilege'), (Meaning of 'personal records'), (Meaning of 'journalistic material'), (Meaning of 'special procedure material'), (Access to special procedure material) and New Schedule (Special Procedure) standing on the Notice Paper in the name of Mr. Secretary Whitelaw, and New Clauses (Power to enter premises, etc., to search for evidence of serious offences) and (Evidence held on confidential basis) standing on the Notice Paper in the name of Mr. Roy Hattersley.
The Government agree that clauses 9 and 10 and the new clauses in the motion relate to a most important part of the Bill; and I have introduced the motion in response to the wishes of the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Sparkbrook (Mr. Hattersley). However, it is only fair to remind the House of the detailed and extensive scrutiny in Committee that this important and essential Bill received, as it should over four months. At no time was any proposal made to curtail debate. The Standing Committee did not pass over these clauses briefly or inattentively. On the contrary, it discussed them for the best part of three of its 41 sittings. The issues relating to the extent and procedure provisions were fully aired.
In Committee and later, on 14 April, the Government informed the House how they intended to respond to the principal points that had been made. The Government honoured their undertaking by tabling new clauses 2 to 8 and their related new schedule. They were tabled a full week ago. I accept, of course, that those new clauses, which meet what they promised to do, represent a considerable change to the Bill. That is why I thought it right to respond to the reasonable proposal of the right hon. Member for Sparkbrook and why I suggest that this part of the Bill be recommitted to a Committee of the whole House.

Mr. Roy Hattersley: It is obvious that the Opposition do not propose to vote against this motion. The Opposition originally hoped that the Standing Committee would be reconstituted to re-examine what amounts to new proposals. The House will know that as that hope was embodied in our procedural motion which still stands on the Order Paper, and because it was inherent in the question which I asked the Leader of the House last Thursday.
I still believe that by re-forming the Committee, the Government would be able to make progress without losing time. Whether that is possible if we are to reconstitute the Committee in the form of a Committee of the whole House, only the passage of the next few days will tell. We must proceed with our deliberations and see how time works out, now that the Government have proposed this substantial addition to our business.
Anxious as we all are to move on to substantive consideration of what amounts to a new part of the Bill, the House would expect a moment's examination of how the Government have got into this extraordinary situation. I shall attempt to do that. Cynics may imagine that this is all part of an election stratagem that has been thought up by Conservative Central Office, the Prime Minister making a pitch for the voters who want the obdurate approach, the Home Secretary attempting to appeal to those electors who want vacillation and indecision. Whatever the course of today's debate and this motion, one implication is absolutely clear — the procedural motion which the Home Secretary has moved is an admission that the Bill was badly thought out and badly drafted and is being rewrittten as it passes through the House.
By moving this motion, the Government are conceding that at least two clauses were so inadequately constructed that we must start all over again. If the Government are formally acknowledging that—by any standards they are —the House and the country are entitled to wonder, if two such controversial clauses have proved so inadequate, what assurances we have about the drafting of the rest of the Bill.
No one should be in any doubt about how this difficulty has arisen. The Government decided that speed was the principal requirement when they were preparing the Bill. With speed as their main motive, they produced the two clauses for which they are now apologising and are withdrawing. If the Government concede that those clauses were inadequately drafted, what about clauses on arrest without warrant, on detention without charge and on intimate body search? What faith can we have that they have been thought out as the House is entitled to expect? What faith can we have that they will be passed into law with the precision that such clauses and draconian powers ought to possess?
Although what the Home Secretary has done today is right in terms of House of Commons procedure, it must attract serious questioning of the Bill in general. The Bill has already attracted the opposition of The Sun, the Daily Mail and the Daily Express. Who knows, after today's admission, perhaps even the Daily Telegraph will turn against it. We must conclude that proposals that are intrinsically unacceptable in a free society have been embodied in a Bill which is thoroughly shoddy and wholly second rate in its drafting and preparation.
3.45 pm
It is worth considering why the Government have been forced into this humiliating retreat. I repeat—it is worth repeating — that the Bill was produced in intolerable haste. The Government committed themselves to a police Bill which the newspapers would describe, above all else, as tough. Perhaps we should not be surprised by that, as the Government were elected on a law and order ticket and then presided over the highest crime rate in the history of the United Kingdom. Their desire to be tough and to be seen to be tough has been matched only by what they believe to be the need to rush their new tough measures on to the statute book. Because of hasty preparation, the Bill was inadequately thought out, and consultations were hurried. The haste was justified by constant repetition in the newspapers that these powers could not be delayed for more than a moment as the country needed, wanted and demanded them at the first possible opportunity.
It is now clear that the Home Secretary is prepared to abandon the entire Bill in the interests of finding an election date that is most to the advantage of the Conservative party. When the drafting was being rushed through, speed was all and accuracy had to take second place. Therefore, we are now offered a second thought on two major clauses which, when they were initially drafted, typified the Government's willingness not to spend any time considering the proper balance between police powers, which the Bill includes, and the protection of civil liberties, which it omits. Because of that, the Home Secretary has come to the House and made what amounts to an admission of failure. Not only has he confessed that two clauses are inadequate but a question mark has been put against the whole Bill. That question mark is reinforced by the four pages of grouped amendments which the House is supposed to consider during three days of debate.
I do not know and precedent does not give me a clear answer to whether ever a Bill which has claimed to be so major in purpose and intention, and which has attracted so much controversy, has been subject to such amendment by a Government as it passes through the House. As a result of what the Home Secretary now proposes, the proper process of examination and amendment is bound to be impaired and inhibited. I shall explain why.
The Government must not believe that, by offering a Committee of the whole House on these controversial proposals, the Government are escaping a Report stage after consideration in Committee is concluded. I assume that, when the Committee stage has ended, it will be possible for right hon. and hon. Members to table manuscript amendments to what the Committee has decided which will be selected and grouped, or not, according to the normal procedures of the House. That must mean that, by the decision to submit this section of the Bill to a Committee of the whole House, which we are about to and must take, we are cutting out a substantial part of the time which the Government originally intended for a Report stage. Had this procedural motion been put and carried, it would have been inevitable that much of the Bill would have been discussed tonight, tomorrow night and Monday night—during the hours when the House is least well attended and our debates are least reported and it is easiest for the Government to ram their business through.
It is intolerable that a Bill that affects the liberties of the subject and that has aroused such controversy and excited such widespread condemnation should be driven through Parliament in this way. In my characteristically charitable mood, I attribute that to the Home Secretary's incompetence rather than to his malice or his tendency to publish Bills first and to read them afterwards. Whatever the cause, his motion demonstrates that the Bill was badly prepared, casually conceived and, until now, inadequately considered. We can rejoice only that it will never reach the statute book and that we shall continue to expose its weaknesses and improve them where we can.

Mr. Ian Mikardo: I have little to add to the comments of my right hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Sparkbrook (Mr. Hattersley). In Committee the Government made no fewer than 134 commitments, most, but not all, of which related to the Bill. That shows a praiseworthy willingness on the part of the Government to listen to argument. No one can say of

the Minister of State that he was not always ready to listen to and understand the force of arguments put to him. Therefore, I do not criticise the Minister who for all practical purposes was in charge of the Bill.
If in Committee 134 points are found wrong, or, at least, hon. Members must consider whether 134 points are right or wrong, the Bill must be radically wrong in the first place. That trebly underlines what my right hon. Friend said about the haste and lack of thought given to its conception.
A small proportion only of the 134 Government rethinks deals with the two new clauses now to be recommitted to the House, which leads some hon. Members to ask what will be done about the other pieces of bad drafting. I have been a Member of Parliament for a long time, not quite but nearly as long as you, Mr. Speaker, and have served on many Standing Committees, but I cannot recall a Bill which was in the least like this Bill or during the course of which a half or a quarter as many commitments were made. As we have taken from the three days allocated to Report at least one day for recommittal, how shall we cope with all the other matters in the remaining two days?
I hope that the Secretary of State or the Leader of the House will answer my right hon. Friend's question about how right hon. and hon. Members will table amendments for Report at the end of this Committee stage, because amendments will undoubtedly be required. I hope that we shall be guided on that point.

Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: Although the arguments for considering clauses 9 and 10 in Committee may be strong, it is absurd to refer them to a Committee of the whole House on the first of the days that have been allotted to Report. If clauses 9 and 10 were carried, in normal circumstances it would be possible to consider amendments to them on Report, but it is inconceivable that we shall be able to do so before tomorrow. The least that the Government should do is to confirm that their commitment to three days on Report still holds and that we shall have an opportunity to table amendments to clauses 9 and 10 before Report which should begin next week at the earliest.
The absurdity of this entire affair has been highlighted largely because the only two clauses of this monstrous Bill that have been considered have been those that affect the press. Because the press has worked up a spasm of activity with regard to its confidential records, we shall have the unique procedure of dealing with these new clauses in a Committee of the whole House. That gives too much importance to what the new clauses are about. The assumption by the press and professional organisations that this is a great incursion into the existing powers of courts with regard to confidential records is quite wrong. The courts already have powers to get hold of confidential records if they wish. We are really arguing about whether those powers ought to be altered in any way.
I am perfectly willing to have that argument, but it is nonsense to suggest that the two new clauses are a good example of the way in which the Bill extends police power in a totally unacceptable way. We ought to be considering the priority considerations that arise under the Bill, such as stop and search, which will be widely extended across the country, and the power to inspect people's orifices, by which we mean anuses and vaginas. That will now be done


in a way that is not acceptable in present law. The Bill also proposes that it will be perfectly legitimate to detain people for up to four days.
All these things will be passed over, because consideration will take place in the middle of the night when the press has got its headlines about what will happen to its journalistic records. That does not excuse the complete inappropriateness of much of the printed opposition to the Bill. There was plenty of opposition in Committee, when we made an extended assessment of its merits and demerits. Most of that was not reported. Similarly, only clauses 9 and 10 will now be reported.
If that is to be done, it should be done in a proper way so that we have an opportunity to table amendments to the new clauses on Report. That can happen only if Report is held next week and not earlier. I hope, Mr. Speaker, that you will rule that that will be possible. It will mean that hon. Members will be able to exercise their rights on Report in a proper way.

Mr. Ivor Stanbrook: I rise only because I believe that a Conservative Member should expose the ridiculous argument of the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Sparkbrook (Mr. Hattersley) that the Bill was produced in intolerable haste. It is based on a Royal Commission — [HON. MEMBERS: "No".] — which reported nearly four years ago. The essential issues that we shall be debating today and in the days that follow arise directly from the Royal commission report. One can argue that in one way or another the Royal Commission got the balance wrong, but one cannot say that the country has not had ample time in the past three or four years to argue the merits of the Bill.

Mr. Robert Kilroy-Silk: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

Mr. Stanbrook: The Bill simply reproduces the Government's view on, and in some cases additions to, that report.

Mr. Kilroy-Silk: Will the hon. Gentleman give way? 4 pm

Mr. Stanbrook: I hope that the hon. Gentleman will allow me to continue. I shall not be very long.
It is quite absurd for the right hon. Member for Sparkbrook to huff and puff about haste in the way that he does on almost every issue, thereby obscuring the merits of any argument. If there is any criticism of the Government, it is that they have given way too often and have been too ready to give way on many issues. Unfortunately, they have blurred the impression of the Bill as being one which achieves a good balance between the rights of the individual and the duties of the police. By the various amendments which have been made to both sides of that equation the whole thing has been stirred up. Special pleading has been entered on behalf of the church, doctors, journalists and goodness knows what other group. I understand that even film directors have got in on the act. All this has happened because my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary has unwisely given way to pressure and given immunities where none existed before.
Therefore, the House should get on with the Bill in the manner proposed. Let us not make any other retreats from what is essentially a good Bill.

Mr. Andrew F. Bennett: I support the procedural motion, but reluctantly, because it is the wrong one at the wrong time. The rights of the individual and of society to try to prevent crime are an important matter for Parliament to consider. Of course the Royal Commission examined it in great detail and produced a balanced report, balancing one right with one responsibility. Sadly, the Government took a selective view of the report of the Royal Commission; they brought forward some of its proposals but left out many of the safeguards.
We are all aware of the clamour from almost every source that clauses 9 and 10 were completely unsatisfactory to protect the rights of individuals. We welcome the Government's announcement that they are prepared to replace the two clauses. The procedural difficulty is that although the Government have proposed to remove the two clauses, they propose to replace them with nine new clauses which they intend to push through the House on Report. This makes it difficult for the clauses to be effectively debated and amended. It is particularly difficult since the Government published the new clauses only last Wednesday.
The Government assured pressure groups that the clauses would meet the legitimate points that had been put forward. However, as I understand it, many of the pressure groups have had no opportunity fully to consider the Government's new proposals. Certainly they have had no opportunity to consult hon. Members, to make alternative suggestions or to question what the Government are doing. They have not even had an opportunity to consider whether the Government are doing what they claimed in their press release they intended to do.
The replacement clauses should be debated adequately. The most effective way to do so would be to submit them to the Standing Committee that considered the rest of the Bill, not just so that that Committee could give them careful scrutiny but so that they might be examined carefully by bodies outside. There could then be discussion between those bodies and Members of Parliament and an interchange of ideas in the Committee. In that way, the Government would not only meet some of the still legitimate fears about the clauses, but would also improve the drafting, as often happens in Committee. Had that procedure been followed, the Government would not have lost much time. If there were to be an autumn election, the Bill could still get through Parliament.
If the Government are determined to cut and run by having a June election, all this is irrelevant. It would have been far better for the Government to have accepted the need for recommittal to a Standing Committee instead of insisting that the new clauses be considered in Committee of the whole House. If we raise legitimate points and get undertakings from Ministers that they will be considered, amendments will have to be tabled in a great hurry for the Report stage, which will follow immediately, or else we shall have to accept assurances that alterations will be made in the other place.
If the Government rush the procedure in this House then, legitimately, the other place will want to consider the new clauses long and hard, and it may take the Government just as long to get the amendments through. I hope that the Government will make it clear that this will be a genuine Committee stage and that the Minister will be prepared to examine the many detailed amendments to new clause 2. I hope the Government will accept some of the amendments or be prepared to table amendments


themselves for the Report stage so that we can improve the Bill and safeguard the rights of individuals and the freedoms that we traditionally uphold to other parts of the world.
I hope that the Government put down the motion not just to offer a sop to the Opposition, but to encourage a proper Committee stage, a proper Report stage and a genuine improvement in the legislation.

Mr. Robert Kilroy-Silk: The hon. Member for Orpington (Mr. Stanbrook), rejected the charge that the Bill had been concocted in intolerable haste. Yet that was the most charitable charge that could be directed towards his right hon. Friend. If it has not been put together under inconceivable pressure and in great haste, incompetence is the only other excuse for the fact that the Home Secretary has already had to make 134 confessions of errors and mistakes in the Bill and has had to come here with an unprecedented new procedure, to remove two major controversial clauses from the Bill and substitute others. If his right hon. Friend did not produce the Bill in great, unnecessary and intolerable haste, he certainly behaved in a highly incompetent manner.

Sir Nicholas Bonsor: I remind the hon. Gentleman that this is not the Committee stage. If it were those comments would have been appropriate.

Mr. Kilroy-Silk: The Bill alters fundamentally the balance between the police and citizens. If many of its provisions are implemented they will seriously erode that little confidence that the public still have in the police force. The credibility of the police will be substantially eroded and undermined by many of the Bill's more controversial proposals. The Government have already acknowledged that the Bill is highly controversial and important, and, moreover, that they themselves have made substantial errors in drafting and in the policy behind the Bill.
The two new clauses that we are supposed to be debating in Committee today are extremely controversial. They have been opposed bitterly outside the House by hundreds of individuals and dozens of organisations, and few people, if any, can be found to support them. Under this unprecedented procedure, we are expected to rush through the Committee deliberations on these clauses when we have had no more than five days, since the clauses were tabled, in which to consider them, consult outside organisations and draft amendments. I remind hon. Members that of those five days two were at the weekend and another was a bank holiday. There has been insufficient time for hon. Members or outside organisations to debate and analyse the major and controversial new clauses.
There is an even more important debate. If we are not allowed sufficient time between Committee and Report when the new clauses, if accepted, will be reported back to the House, we shall be unable to consult interested parties, outside organisations and individuals on the new clauses, as amended or clarified this afternoon. We have not only had insufficient time to consider and consult but we shall need additional time between the Committee stage if it takes place this afternoon and the subsequent Report stage to consult and to table further amendments to the clauses.
As my hon. Friend the Member for Stockport, North (Mr. Bennett) and others said, we welcome the fact that

the Government saw fit to bow to the enormous, almost unanimous, clamour against the clauses, that they have seen fit to remove them from the Bill and to come forward with amendments. However, there is still much to be said about the inadequacies of the new clauses. It is a strange procedure that we should continue to debate a Bill that has hosts of critics and has been opposed by about 170 eminently respectable organisations. No one has spoken out in its favour — not the Police Federation, the Association of Chief Police Officers, or the Police Superintendents Association of England and Wales. It seems to have no substantial backing or support in the House or in the country.
It would be sensible this afternoon not to debate whether to discuss the new clauses in Committee but for the Government to acknowledge that the Bill is unnecessary, that its damaging powers will further erode the public's confidence in its police force, that it will damage irretrievably the credibility of the police vis-a-vis the public and that it would be best both for the policing of Britain and for police-public relations for the Government to concede now that the Bill has no future and withdraw it immediately.

Mr. William Pitt: It is only fair to correct a mistaken assumption of the hon. Member for Ormskirk (Mr. Kilroy-Silk). In Committee the Government did not admit to 134 errors but agreed to consider 134 points. That is the reason for this debate. If the hon. Member for Orpington (Mr. Stanbrook) had read the Royal Commission's report, had paid attention to the Committee's deliberations and read the Bill, he would know that the Bill departs considerably from the Royal Commission's recommendations.
We are debating two clauses that are to be recommitted to a Committee of the whole House which have attracted attention because they affect an articulate section of the population. There are many clauses that affect the inarticulate of our population which have not been committed to a Committee of the whole House. In fairness, the Government should have reconvened the Standing Committee so that we could have dealt with matters of substance on Report.
In Committee I was presumptuous enough to say that the Bill was so woolly that we could make many Fair Isle sweaters from it, and I have not changed my mind. The Bill will be incomplete even after Report. There will have been a lack of time in which to debate it properly because we shall lose a day debating the two new clauses. I stand to be corrected, but I understand that they will be reported at the end of the Bill on Monday. How long will hon. Members have to consult outside bodies and to table considered amendments to them when they will be reported to the House at the end of our deliberations, probably when hon. Members are tired and fed up to the back teeth with the Bill?
I am inclined to associate myself in part with the remarks of the hon. Member for Ormskirk. Are the Government intent on railroading the Bill through before a general election, or do they want the general election to intervene so that they can abandon the Bill and introduce another afterwards?

Mr. Eldon Griffiths: I freely admit that I do not particularly care for this procedure. I should have preferred longer to discuss the new clauses


with, for example, the Police Federation, and others. I understand the anxieties that have been expressed by all hon. Members, but it is a little unfair to suggest that the procedure is unprecedented. In my last 10 years in the House, I remember several occasions when Bills have been subject to this procedure, not always with a great deal of time for discussion. I do not wish to raise the temperature by pointing to examples, but the procedure is certainly not unprecedented.
My right hon. Friend the Home Secretary is being somewhat unfairly abused. As I understand it, he said throughout the Committee stage, and indeed on Second Reading, that he would listen carefully to the views of the House and outside bodies. Having listened and having been convinced by some of those who made representations to him that changes to the Bill are necessary, he is now regarded as going against the wishes of the House in responding to the wishes of the House. That is rather hard on my right hon. Friend.
As a member of the Committee, I suggest to those hon. Members who laboured patiently and with great good will in a good Committee that it might be best to get on with what is proposed as the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Sparkbrook (Mr. Hattersley) has said that he does not propose to divide the House on the matter. Would it not be reasonable to see what progress can be made and, if by the end of the week there has been insufficient time to discuss the matter, I am sure that many hon. Members —I shall be one—will make representations to my right hon. Friend the Leader of the House for more time for more discussions next week? Surely today we must see how we proceed and then judge what is required.

Mr. Christopher Price: I think that I am in favour of the motion, but I am not sure. I do not know whether the Home Secretary or the Leader of the House will reply to this important procedural debate. I shall decide whether to agree with the motion when I have heard the answers to my question, even if only one of my hon. Friends tests the feeling of the House on the motion.
As I understand it, if the new clauses are accepted—the various new clauses which stand as putative amendments or de facto rather than de jure amendments to clauses 9 and 10—it is the Government's intention to place them at the end of the Bill, after citation and so on, as clauses 79 and 80. If that were the case, it would guarantee at least a few days in which to consider what amendments to them we want to table, and even perhaps some amendments to amendments, as would have been done had the Bill been committed to a Standing Committee.
The procedure has merits from that point of view, for we might then have a proper Committee stage on the new clauses, and a proper Report stage. It is curious that occasionally in Committee people such as myself find common ground with hon. Members such as the hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Mr. Griffiths). That is an unlikely event, but it did take place. In searching for common ground with the hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds, one needs time to seek out those areas and compromises where the civil libertarians and the police are

at one. There are very great difficulties, and I should like to ask the Minister of State, the Home Secretary or the Leader of the House about them.
Part II of the Bill was originally drafted very carefully in a particular order, with clauses 9 and 10 where they were because they have consequences on clauses 11 to 15. The Minister of State—I should like to pay a tribute to him for his courtesy during the Committee stage, on which I sure everybody in the Committee would agree—will remember that I went to him as a mini-delegation of one to see him about proposals on seizure, because the law on seizure must have some connection with the law on search warrants.
If, in the new suggestions of the Government, we must discuss the whole law on seizure—that is, clause 14—before the House has decided what the proper law is on power to enter premises and evidence held on a confidential basis, that may throw up very great difficulties in attempting to pass amendments about the law on seizure which will then relate to clauses which we have not reached on Report or discussed and which may be amended.
Although I am sure that it is helpful to have a motion such as this, from that point of view it could land us in very many more procedural problems than we think we are solving by proceeding in this way. I am not asking the Government to give an instant answer to this question. I am asking that, if we fall into the difficulties which I am foreshadowing, as I think we shall, they should again use their procedural ingenuity with as much force as they have used it today in putting down this fairly unprecedented and certainly highly complicated motion at the beginning of the recommittal stage. We shall then, if it turns out to be necessary as the Bill proceeds, postpone certain elements of the Report stage so that we can discuss coherently rather than incoherently the power to enter and the power to seize.
I am not saying that that is the only issue that will come up, but it is one, as the Minister of State knows, that is very dear to my heart. If we give someone the right to look for bombs, he should not be allowed to walk into a house, pick up a bit of marijuana and arrest everyone in the house for something completely different.

Mr. Eldon Griffiths: If somebody were looking for marijuana and found bombs, I hope that the hon. Gentleman would not object to his picking them up.

Mr. Price: I have never objected to such behaviour. All I am concerned with on this point—which I think may be frustrated by the process we have now—is to stop the sort of harassment about which the Home Secretary published last week a very interesting answer to my hon. Friend the Member for Norwood (Mr. Fraser), with certain correspondence from the deputy commissioner of the Metropolitan police.
If we need to link certain amendments at the Report stage which look as though they cannot be coherently discussed until we have disposed of the new clauses which emerge from the Committee stage, will the Government be helpful? If they are not, we may find ourselves raising endless points of order and getting involved in procedural wrangles, which would be counter-productive.

Mr. Alfred Dubs: I support the argument of my hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham, West (Mr. Price). When the Minister of State, in the


Standing Committee, conceded that there were 134 points which he would look at again, I felt that he did so at least partly because of the interrelationship of one clause or one possible amendment in the Bill with other clauses in other parts. Quite often the Minister of State talked to us about the structure of the Bill and its logical entity. We understood that and that was why we accepted the Minister of State's assurance that he would deal with these points on Report.
We shall he in certain difficulties, however. The logical procedure would be for us to dispose of the Committee stage today but leave a gap between the end of the Committee stage and the Report stage so that we can consider where we are, put down amendments and look again at the structure of the Bill. If we do not do that, I think that we shall get ourselves into the very difficulties which the Minister of State sought to avoid during the four long months of the Committee stage.
I therefore hope that the Government will listen to the arguments and try to meet them, since otherwise we shall be in a bit of trouble.

Mr. Arthur Davidson: The hon. Member for Orpington (Mr. Stanbrook) has repeated one of the myths that have been put about in an attempt to make the Bill more respectable—that it is based upon the Royal Commission's recommendations. The hon. Gentleman knows that that is only partially true.

Mr. Mikardo: The hon. Gentleman has not read them.

Mr. Davidson: The truth is that the Bill is based on some of the Royal Commission's recommendations, but, significantly, leaves out several of the safeguards recommended by the Royal Commission. Indeed, some of the clauses are in direct conflict with the recommendations of the Royal Commission. That is why the Government are in such a mess over clauses 9 and 10 and why we are going through this, to say the least, unusual or rare procedure.
The truth about clauses 9 and 10 is that, as originally drafted, they gave considerable new wide powers, and totally unacceptably wide powers, to search for evidence. They gave those powers without even a proper definition in the Bill of evidence itself, without proper legal process to protect the rights of the individuals affected by that search, and without even a proper definiton of "serious arrestable offence"—a phrase that occurs throughout the Bill.
I should like to pay a tribute, as several of my hon. Friends have done, to the Minister of State for his courtesy and, indeed, for the whole style and manner in which he conducted what must have been a very difficult Bill. We all feel a great respect for him.
The position now, however, is that because of the several commitments by the Minister of State and the Home Secretary himself during the passage of the Bill, clauses 9 and 10 are totally different from the clauses that were originally in the Bill and have become very complicated indeed. I find it inconceivable that the Government should have introduced two such wide, far-reaching clauses without even properly consulting the doctors, the journalists or many others.

Mr. Speaker: Order. With respect, the hon. and learned Gentleman is now arguing the case that he will argue in Committee, if we go into Committee.

Mr. Davidson: I have made the point and I do not intend to argue it one jot further. No doubt it will be argued later.
I agree with my hon. Friends that the difficulty in which we find ourselves is that if we proceed in the way in which we are recommended to — in the circumstances it is probably the best way to proceed—at the end of the day the clauses that we are discussing will be reported immediately, which will mean that there will not be the consultation that most of us would like or a proper scrutiny of the clauses. Therefore, the Opposition and perhaps Conservative Members will find themselves in difficulties about deciding on the true and proper significance of the clauses. However, I accept that it is better to go through these complicated clauses in detail rather than deal with them generally on Report.
I felt that those remarks ought to be made because there has been considerable criticism of the way in which the Government have proceeded with the clauses. The Government are in a mess because they have introduced a complicated Bill in haste which does not correspond in detail with the Royal Commission's recommendations.

Mr. Whitelaw: In proposing the motion I hoped that I was going at least some way towards meeting the proper anxieties expressed by the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Sparkbrook (Mr. Hattersley). I should point out to Opposition Members—I do not complain that they are making capital out of this—that it would have been possible for me to refuse to have anything to do with this procedure and to proceed with the Report stage. I thought that I was helping the Opposition and a proper, constructive discussion of the Bill by going along this route. I am glad that the right hon. Gentleman acknowledges that. I maintain that it was a reasonable thing to do in the House of Commons.
Some Opposition Members must have forgotten some of the things that they said. On Second Reading the right hon. Gentleman was at pains to ask that a constructive approach be adopted by the Government and that the Bill should not be rushed through. No one could suggest that a Committee of three months and 41 sittings was a rushed Committee. I am grateful for the many tributes that have been paid to my hon. and learned Friend the Minister of State for the way in which he conducted the business.
A constructive approach to the Bill must inevitably lead to meeting the Opposition's arguments where they are good. That is what we have done. If we had not done so, we would have been bitterly criticised. I expect that everyone likes having it both ways, but it is a little unreasonable to have it about five ways at the same time. That is what is being done in many cases.
There have been arguments that we have made changes without consultation. I must be careful here, because the hon. and learned Member for Accrington (Mr. Davidson) was accused by you, Mr. Speaker, of straying out of order. I shall try not to do the same in reply, except to say that there was much discussion with many people. There was much correspondence. I took part in a great deal of it. All the people concerned have thanked me for the amount of consultation and disscussion that I had with them. That is the answer to the hon. and learned Gentleman's point.
I am grateful for what my hon. Friend the Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Mr. Griffiths) said. I appreciate what my hon. Friend the Member for Orpington (Mr.


Stanbrook) thinks, that in some cases we have gone too far. Once I was convinced by those who made representations to me about the clauses, I could not believe that the House of Commons would expect that if I were convinced that the arguments were right I would reject them simply because it meant changing the Bill. That would be a bad parliamentary procedure. It is right against our parliamentary procedures. I should have been bitterly criticised if I had done that. Once I was convinced that the arguments were right, I thought that the changes should be made. That is the purpose of our parliamentary procedures. If it is not, what is the point of having a Committee stage of 41 sittings? What is the point of all the debates that we shall have now if it is not to listen to people and take account of what they say? I thought that that was what Parliament was about. If anyone wishes to tell me that it is not, it is rather too late, because I have proceeded on that basis for nearly 29 years. I cannot see on what other basis we should proceed.
The hon. Member for Lewisham, West (Mr. Price) made an important point. I have taken advice properly. If the clauses are passed in the Committee of the whole House, they will be printed at the end of the Bill. We shall proceed with the consideration of the Bill as it is printed at present.
The proper answer to the other points that have been made is a well known and tried parliamentary one. We shall see how we get on when we consider the Bill.
I hope that on that basis the House will be prepared to proceed to a Committee of the whole House to discuss the new clauses, which I maintain meet the concern that has been expressed by many responsible people in our community.

Question put and agreed to.

Ordered,
That the Bill be recommitted to a Committee of the whole House in respect of Clauses 9 and 10 and New Clauses (Power of justice of the peace to authorise entry to search for evidence of serious arrestable offence), (Meaning of 'excluded material'), (Meaning of items subject to legal privilege'), (Meaning of 'personal records'), (Meaning of 'journalistic material'), (Meaning of 'special procedure material'), (Access to special procedure material) and New Schedule (Special Procedure) standing on the Notice Paper in the name of Mr. Secretary Whitelaw, and New Clauses (Power to enter premises, etc., to search for evidence of serious offences) and (Evidence held on confidential basis) standing on the Notice Paper in the name of Mr. Roy Hattersley.

Bill immediately considered in Committee.

[MR. BERNARD WEATHERILL in the Chair]

Clause 9

POWER TO ENTER PREMISES TO SEARCH FOR EVIDENCE OF SERIOUS OFFENCES

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

The Chairman: With this it will be convenient to take the following amendments: No. 241, in page 8, line 32, after 'made', insert 'inter partes'.

No. 242, in page 8, line 32, after 'constable', insert
'and supported by an information'.

No. 235, in page 8, line 37, after 'evidence', insert
'which will enable the person or persons responsible for the commission of that offence to be identified or will enable the particulars of the offence believed to have been committed by a particular person or persons to be identified.'.

New Clause 2

Power of justice of the peace to authorise entry to search for evidence of serious arrestable offence


`(1) Where, on an application made by a constable, a justice of the peace is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing—


(a) that a serious arrestable offence has been committed; and


(b) that relevant evidence is in certain premises; and


(c) that it would be of substantial value (whether by itself or together with other evidence) to the investigation in connection with which the application is made; and


(d) that it is not excluded material or special procedure material; and


(e) that any of the conditions specified in subsection (2) below applies, he may issue a warrant authorising a constable to enter and search the premises, using reasonable force if necessary.


(2) The conditions mentioned in subsection (1)(e) above are—


(a) that it is not reasonably practicable to communicate with any person entitled to grant entry to the premises;


(b) that it is reasonably practicable to communicate with a person entitled to grant entry to the premises but it is not reasonably practicable to communicate with any person entitled to grant access to the evidence;


(c) a person entitled to grant entry to the premises or access to the evidence has unreasonably refused a constable such entry or access;


(d) that the evidence is likely to be concealed, disposed of, altered or destroyed if such entry or access is sought without a warrant.


(3) A warrant under this section may authorise persons to accompany any constable who is excecuting it.


(4) In this Act "relevant evidence", in relation to an offence, means anything that would be admissible in evidence at a trial for the offence.


(5) The powers conferred by this section are in addition to any powers otherwise conferred.'.

Amendment (a) to the proposed Government new clause, in line 1, leave out 'justice of the peace' and insert `circuit judge'.

Amendment (b), in line 3, leave out 'serious arrestable offence' and insert 'grave offence'.

Amendment (c), in line 5, after 'substantial', insert `probative'.

Amendment (d), in line 5, leave out from 'value' to end of line 6 and insert 'at the trial of the offence'.

Amendment (e), to leave out line 25 and insert—

'(a) which would be likely to be produced in evidence at a trial for that offence and which would be admissible in evidence, and
(b) which consists of—

(i) the proceeds or fruit of the offence; or
(ii) anything used in the commission of the offence; or
(iii) a material object or object which would prove the commission of the offence.'.

Amendment (f), in line 27, at end add—
`(6) An application under this section shall indicate how the evidence in question is considered to relate to the purposes of the inquiry for which it is sought".

Amendment (g), in line 27, at end add—
`(6) Except where condition (a) (b) or (d) of subsection (2) of this section is fulfilled, an application under this section shall be made inter partes.'.

Amendment (h), in line 27, at end add—
`(6) If any person in respect of whom a warrant under this section has been made applies to a circuit judge in accordance with Crown Court rules and satisfies him—

(a) that he cannot produce the evidence or give access to it; or
(b) that he ought not to be required to produce it or give access to it,

the judge may direct that the warrant or order shall be of no effect.'.

Amendment (i), in line 27, at end add—
`(6) Before issuing a warrant under this section the justice of the peace must be satisfied that the public interest in obtaining the evidence outweighs the public interest in protecting the privacy of the individual.'.

and new clause 16—Power to enter premises etc. to search for evidence of serious offences
`9.—(1) Where, on an application made by a constable, a justice of the peace is satisfied that there is reasonable ground for believing—

(a) that a grave offence has been committed; and
(b) that anything that would be likely to be produced in evidence at a trial for that offence (in this part of this Act referred to as 'evidence') other than evidence to which section 10 below applies or to which that section would apply but for section 10(3) below, is in any premises; and
(c) that any of the conditions specified in subsection (2) below applies,

he may issue a warrant authorising a constable to enter and search premises using such reasonable force as is necessary.
(2) The conditions mentioned in subsection (1)(c) above are—

(a) that it is not reasonably practicable to communicate with any person entitled to grant entry to the premises or access to the evidence believed to be in the premises; or
(b) that any such person has unreasonably refused such entry or access to a constable; or
(c) that the evidence is likely to be concealed, disposed of, altered or destroyed if such entry or access is sought without a warrant.

(3) In this Part of this Act "evidence" means anything

(a) which would be of substantial probative value at the trial of the offence in question and
(b) which consists of—

(i) the proceeds or fruit of the offence; or
(ii) anything used in the commission of the offence; Or
(iii) a material object or objects which would prove the commission of the offence.

(4) Before issuing a warrant under this section, the justice of the peace must be satisfied that the public interest in obtaining the evidence outweighs the public interest in protecting the privacy of the individual.
(5) A warrant under this section may authorise any persons to accompany any constable who is executing it.
(6) An application under this section shall indicate how the evidence in question is considered to relate to the purposes of the inquiry for which it is sought.


(7) Where an application is made under this section on the ground set out in subsection (2)(b) above, the person or persons named in the application shall be given notice of the application and shall be entitled to be heard by the justice of the peace hearing the application and to appear by solicitor or counsel.
(8) If any person in respect of whom a warrant under subsection (1) of this section has been issued applies to a circuit judge in accordance with Crown Court rules and satisfies him—

(a) that he cannot produce the evidence or give access to it; or
(b) that he ought not to be required to produce it or give access to it,

the judge shall direct that the warrant shall be of no effect.
(9) The costs of any application under this section shall be in the discretion of the judge.'.

The Minister of State, Home Office (Mr. Patrick Mayhew): It is worth reminding ourselves of the origin of clauses 9 and 10, which the new clauses with which we are about to deal are intended to replace. It was that the Philips Royal Commission recommended that there should be additional capacity for the police to investigate serious crime. It believed—and set out copious reasons for that —that the existing law on the powers of the police to investigate serious crime was haphazard, piecemeal and in need of reform. The greater part of the section of the report dealing with those matters was concerned with material held on a confidential basis. In the Bill as printed, clause 10 sets out the procedures that the Government believed to be right not only to give additional powers to the police at the investigation stage but to respect the important matter of confidentiality and the rights of individual.
The Royal Commission also believed that additional and more consistent powers were needed to enable the police to investigate serious offences where the material that was sought was not held on a confidential basis. The Government's proposals in the Bill for that category of material are to be found in clause 9.
In Committee we paid much attention to what the Committee said. I am grateful for the kind things that were said about the way in which we were prepared to respond. The only sensible way of dealing with a Committee has always seemed to me to be to pay careful attention to the arguments that are put forward.
After the Bill went into Committee a great deal of anxiety was expressed by the professions and other people about the provisions on confidentiality. I say "at that stage" because had the representations and anxieties been expressed before that when we were consulting or a little thereafter, it might have been possible to make changes earlier along the lines that we are making them now.
The grouping of the new clauses requires us to deal in this debate with new clause 2, which is intended to supplant clause 9. I felt that I would be in order, and might help the Committee, if I explained at the outset the broad framework into which new clause 2 falls. It will be seen from the wording of new clause 2 that it relates to two separate categories of material — special procedure material and excluded material which came into being as part of the scheme that the Government in subsequent new clauses have constructed to deal with confidentially held material. Without departing from the rules of order, it would be helpful if I point out that excluded material constitutes confidentially held material that is outside the ambit of the powers that it is proposed to confer on the police. In other words, excluded material will not be open to access by the police.
The special procedure material, however, constitutes the remainder of the material held on a confidential basis as defined in the clauses, and that is subject to special safeguards that include application having to be made to a second judge and the second judge having to apply, among other things, the criterion of the public interest.

Mr. Eldon Griffiths: I am grateful to my hon. and learned Friend, and am impressed that he has managed to tuck in a couple of definitions about a matter that will not arise, as a result of the selection, until we come to later clauses. However, I should like his undertaking that he will at some stage define rather more closely what exactly excluded and special procedure materials are, as that will make this clause intelligible.

Mr. Mayhew: My hon. Friend knows that new clauses 3, 4 and 5 deal with definitions of excluded material and of special procedure material, and with the definition of legally privileged material and of personal records. I am happy to justify those definitions in due course.

Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: Is my assumption correct about what the hon. and learned Gentleman said about excluded material being completely outside the capacity of the judge to rule? Does that mean that if a journalist obtained information that a bomb was to be exploded by the IRA in particular circumstances, the result of the clause would be that no order could be made to obtain that information from the journalist?

Mr. Mayhew: Excluded material is material that may not be sought and in respect of which a judge may not make an order under the terms of new clauses 3, 4 and 5. In the circumstances that the hon. Gentleman envisages, it is difficult to see how evidence that relates to such an event would not be covered by the Prevention of Terrorism Act. That Act is not touched upon by the provisions of the Bill in that respect. In other respects in which evidence would be held—of a kind relating to criminal purposes, for example—it is difficult to see how that could be held by somebody other than a person who was taking part, in one way or another, in the relevant criminal offences, and therefore that person could be arrested and a search could take place with a warrant of arrest.
New clause 2 replaces clause 9. I am explaining it to assist the Committee and make progress without reading from a detailed brief, because I think that it will help the Committee if I do so. New clause 2 restricts its application to circumstances in which a police officer has reasonable cause to believe that evidence of a serious arrestable offence is to be found in certain premises. An important feature of the new clause is that it defines "relevant evidence", and the definition is in subsection (4), which says that it
means anything that would be admissible in evidence at a trial for the offence.
I hope that the hon. Gentleman will agree that that is a clearer definition than that which was in clause 9, which relates to anything that might be given in evidence. It makes explicit what was all along implicit and is intended to relate only to matters that would be admissible in evidence at a trial for the offence.
The police officer must show that there were reasonable grounds for supposing that there was evidence of that nature of a serious arrestable offence as defined objectively in the Bill and that it would be evidence of substantial value to the investigation of that offence. That


part relates to an undertaking that I gave in Committee to write in in express terms a requirement that the evidence should be of substantial value to the investigation and not of some passing interest or minor value.
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The new clause then sets out a number of conditions in subsection (2), one of which has to apply and has to be found to apply by the justice of the peace who deals with the application before he may grant an authority to enter to search for evidence. Those are eminently sensible conditions that may be found in the existing Bill and can be summarised. Before issuing a warrant, a magistrate would have additionally to be satisfied that it was not practicable for the police to seek access to the evidence from the occupier of the premises concerned, that the occupier of the premises had unreasonably refused such access or that the evidence would disappear if the police tried to obtain it without a warrant. Therefore, there is no question of the warrants being lightly issued to enable police to search the homes of innocent people who were unwittingly in possession of evidence of a serious crime.

Mr. Anthony Beaumont-Dark: If one is not a lawyer, one always asks questions on these esoteric matters with trepidation. However, could my hon. and learned Friend explain what "reasonable grounds for believing" would be, what
not reasonably practicable to communicate with any person entitled to grant entry
might be, and what "reasonably practicable to communicate" or "unreasonably refused" mean? As far as I can see from my reading of the law, lawyers make their biggest living from deciding how many angels can dance on the head of a pin, which is determining what is meant by "reasonable"? Many of us are worried because when the police use the laws that they now have they can break into someone's house, say, "Whoops! I'm sorry" — this happened in my area—but then it can be said that the police had reasonable grounds. We should like to know what "reasonable" means to the Home Secretary.

Mr. Mayhew: I understand my hon. Friend's point and it was raised from time to time in Committee, and has been raised in every other Standing Committee dealing with any matters of the law on which I have ever had the privilege of serving. Lawyers make much more money out of law that is over-precisely tailored to every conceivable circumstance that Parliament can envisage than they do our of well-known words that are hallowed by long tradition, such as "reasonable".

Mr. Beaumont-Dark: What is "reasonable"?

Mr. Mayhew: That depends upon the circumstances and on the common sense of all concerned.

Mr. Kilroy-Silk: Almost anything one likes.

Mr. Mayhew: That may be so in the case of the hon. Member for Ormskirk (Mr. Kilroy-Silk), but the important thing is that the concept of what is reasonable is at the root of so much of our common law. It is not right to try to identify every conceivable circumstance in which the law might apply and lay it down in the rules. We set out various criteria and then leave it to the common sense of judges and magistrates. We have done this in our criminal and civil law for many years, as the hon. and learned Member for Accrington (Mr. Davidson) will confirm. It is important that the power should not be confirmed at

whim or capriciously, but that there should be power for a court, for example, to review whether there could be grounds for suspicion that there is something wrong. This is not a matter for anxiety. Those are the conditions that must be fulfilled.
Much of the criticism that has been levelled at various parts of the Bill has proceeded on the implied basis that the powers conferred by the Bill are new, that they have never been heard of before in English law, and that this is a great new code that has been invented for the first time. Over the years quite a large number of statutes passed by Parliament have conferred on police officers and others the right to enter on a search warrant premises occupied by people not suspected of complicity in an offence in order to search for evidence of that offence at the investigation stage. What is new about the clause is not the principle but the safeguards. When applying for a warrant, the police will have to satisfy the magistrate that a serious arrestable offence has been committed—and it is the magistrate, not the police, who will judge whether the offence is serious—and that substantial evidence of that offence is to be found on the premises. So the Bill already contains safeguards which go far beyond those which Parliament has thought necessary when granting similar powers in piecemeal instances in the past.

Mr. Kilroy-Silk: Taking up what the hon. Member for Birmingham, Selly Oak (Mr. Beaumont-Dark) said, will the Minister help me with a difficulty on subsection (2), which says that a person
entitled to grant entry to the premises or access to the evidence … has unreasonably refused such entry or access to a constable".
Can the Minister give some examples of what might constitute unreasonable refusal, or reasonable refusal? Here we are talking about a person who is innocent and who is not suspected of any crime, still less of a serious arrestable offence. In what circumstances can a person who is innocent and who refuses access to anyone to his premises ever be regarded as behaving unreasonably? Presumably the right of every law-abiding citizen in this country is to say, "No, you cannot have access to my premises. You cannot search my premises. I have not even been suspected of any offence." I would regard that as reasonable. When is it unreasonable?

Mr. Mayhew: All these cases turn on that fact. One could well envisage a case where someone said, "In no circumstances will I talk to any police officer. I do not mind what you say or what you do, I shall not even talk to you or listen to you when you say that you are asking me voluntarily to help the police in particular circumstances." In those circumstances it would be proper for a police officer to apply to a magistrate and say, "This is the reason I want it. This is the serious offence that has happened. This is the material. I identify it. I believe it to be there on reasonable grounds. It will be of substantial value to the investigation. I tried to persuade the holder to let me see it, but he said that he never talks to police officers and will not do so in this instance." In those circumstances, I should be very surprised and disappointed if a magistrate did not say, "Very well, I think that that is unreasonable."
It is important that the police, subject to these very strict safeguards, should have this extension to the principle that Parliament has already established in the past. This is an important element. I shall no anticipate the speech of the


right hon. Member for Birmingham, Sparkbrook (Mr. Hattersley) in support of new clause 16, save to say that the definition of evidence that it contains is in our view inadequate, in that, for example, it would exclude evidence of fingerprints that might be of substantial value to the investigation of a serious arrestable offence. He will make his own speech, and there will be an opportunity to reply to it later. Accordingly, I ask the Committee to agree that clause 9 should not stand part of the Bill.

Mr. Andrew F. Bennett: rose—

Mr. Mayhew: I was finishing my speech, and I am conscious of having taken a long time. Very well, I shall give way.

Mr. Bennett: The Minister has said nothing about the amendments to his new clause. It might save time later if he did so.

Mr. Mayhew: It was through no discourtesy on my part that I omitted to refer to the hon. Gentleman. He has tabled four or five amendments to the Government's new clause. I am afraid that I cannot accept his amendments. Indeed, I hesitate to accept amendments now, after the weight of criticism that has fallen upon my head. Suffice to say that amendment (c), which relates to "probative" value, is superfluous in our view, and adds nothing. Amendment (d), which places the focus on the "trial of the offence", rather than the investigations stage, overlooks the purpose of this part of the Bill, which is to enhance the powers of the police to investigate. That is why I am unable to accept the hon. Gentleman's amendments.

Mr. Andrew F. Bennett: rose—

Mr. Mayhew: I must leave the hon. Gentleman to argue the rest of the case for his amendments, and I can say nothing that will shorten his task.

Mr. Mikardo: Might I say a word about amendment (f). When the hon. and learned Gentleman was replying to my hon. Friend the Member for Ormskirk (Mr. Kilroy-Silk) and defining what would be an unreasonable refusal, and so on, he postulated the case of a constable going to the court and saying, "This is what I wanted to do, and this is what the chap said, and this is the reason why I want to go in and search." There is nothing in new clause 2 which obliges him to say, "This is the reason why I want to go in and search." Amendment (f) does. So if the Minister thinks that the constable should say, "This is the reason why," he should accept amendment (f).

Mr. Mayhew: With respect, I think not. Amendment (f) says:
An application under this section shall indicate how the evidence in question is considered to relate to the purposes of the inquiry for which it is sought.
The hon. Gentleman will remember that the new clause says that the police officer has to satisfy the magistrate that the evidence is of substantial value to the investigation of the offence, and he cannot explain how it is of substantial value to the investigation of the offence unless he explains why he wants it. That is in subsection (1)(c), where it says "of substantial value".
I respectfully suggest, therefore, that the Committee should agree that clause 9 should not stand part of the Bill, but should be replaced by new clause 2.

Mr. Hattersley: The great advantage of being in Committee now is that the Minister can—as he has just done — give what I am sure he regards as an interim reply to some of the points that have been made and that those of us who are critical of his proposals and have proposals of our own can advance them in perhaps a tentative way and then, having heard the Government's reactions to them, withdraw, qualify or seek to substantiate them, according to the conviction and persuasiveness with which the Government have made their case. That is what I, and I am sure some of my right hon. and hon. Friends, propose to do.
As I understand it, technically the principal motion that we are debating is whether clause 9 should stand part of the Bill. We want clarity and accuracy in this respect, and it is important to say a word about the clause before we consign it to the dustbin of the legislative process.
As this debate is about a clause which no one in the House wants to see incorporated in the Bill, it is another sign of the absurdity of what the Government have created. No one wants clause 9. Everyone believes that it should be abandoned. Nevertheless, the last word on it came in Committee upstairs as late as 22 January, from the Minister of State. I quote what he said about the clause with some trepidation, because I, like others, pay tribute not only to the courtesy with which he dealt with the Committee but to the competence with which he discharged his task. He performed his difficult duties over a long period with what I can only desbribe as remarkable distinction, and he often had the unhappy task of justifying what the Government had done, without ever saying that he was not completely convinced of the argument.
I suspect that it was in that mood that the hon. and learned Gentleman told the Committee on 27 January that he had not given an
undertaking to carry out a fundamental redrafting … of these clauses.
He meant clauses 9 and 10. He continued:
As I hoped and intended to make clear, the Government believe that the structure of this part of the Bill is correctly fashioned as it is."—[Official Report, Standing Committee J, 27 January 1983; c. 370.]
The Government no longer believe that. If we are to vote for their new clause with anything like confidence, we must be told what has happened since the Minister gave that uncharacteristically rash assurance that everything was right in the two clauses. To use a cliche, what went right? What convinced the Government that the error to which we had drawn their attention for months should be corrected?
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To accept with anything like confidence the Government's proposals to replace the inadequate clauses we must be told how these extraordinary provisions were included in the Bill in the first place. Why did the Government hang on to them for so long against the mounting tide of criticism which everyone knew would eventually engulf them?
I am speaking of the proposal that the police should be able to raid the premises of doctors, social workers, priests and journalists and seize confidential and professional records. How did the Government make such a proposal? I hope that we shall not be told, weak-mindedly, that the innocent Government were misled in that particular by the Royal Commission on criminal procedure. Perhaps we shall not be told that, as the hon. Member for Orpington


(Mr. Stanbrook) is not with us. The Royal Commission proposed something like that, but in other details the Government have not thought it necessary to follow the Royal Commission's recommendations.
The Government's error is that they always seize on draconian proposals by Royal Commissions without thinking about their propriety, and invariably water down or abandon the civil liberties safeguards which Royal Commissions propose to balance their more draconian suggestions. The Government chose to implement almost exactly the most draconian and least libertarian of all the Royal Commission's proposals. The attack on confidential records is not the responsibility of the Royal Commissions alone. It is also the responsibility of the Government, who chose to incorporate the proposal in the Bill.
I hope that the Minister will help us. We were never given a satisfactory answer in Committee. I hope that he will say how it was that in the face of the evidence, in the face of the traditions and history of Britain, the Government thought it right to make such a proposal to Parliament.
For all his abilities, the Minister cannot gloss over the old clauses as if they never existed. The old clauses are the Government's children. The Minister must say why they are to be abandoned. That is the Minister's first task when he makes his second speech. His second task is to put into perspective the two alternatives—that proposed by the Government and that offered by myself and my hon. Friend the Member for Stockport, North (Mr. Bennett) on behalf of the Opposition.
I echo the view expressed by my hon. Friend the Member for York (Mr. Lyon) that the powers in the clauses in this group and in the next have attracted far more publicity than any other part of the Bill. They have attracted more criticism and denunciation. They are the fashionably controversial clauses. I share the view that old clauses 9 and 10 are wholly unacceptable, but I do not believe that they are the uniquely bad part of the Bill. I do not even believe that they are the worst part of the Bill.
The clauses affect the most vocal and influential professions—the doctors, priests, journalists and social workers. I am not sure whether I am conceding the Minister's case, or making my own case, but the part of the Bill that worries me most is not that which affects the vocal and influential professions. I am more worried about the part that affects the uninfluential and non-vocal citizens. By that I mean the people most affected by stop and search, arrest without warrant, detention without charge, interrogation without adequate safeguard and intimate body search. We are dealing first with the part of the Bill that has attracted the most publicity, which the Government have discarded and on which they have capitulated. The fact that this part has attracted most attention does not mean that it is the only part about which there should be public concern; nor does it mean that this part will cause most disquiet if it is agreed.
Three schemes are on offer — the old discredited proposals, which will soon be abandoned, the Government's new proposals and the suggestion in the Opposition's new clause. Nobody in the Committee doubts the need for the police, on special occasions, to obtain evidence. The argument is about when that power is right and necessary and how permission to use it should be obtained. In Committee upstairs we were told time after time by lawyers of every sort, on both sides, that English law already provided the power to obtain evidence that

was really necessary for prosecution when those in possession of that evidence wilfully withheld it from the police.
We were constantly told that there was power to raid and search the premises of—if I dare use the expression —crooked doctors, although there was some ambiguity about whether the same power existed in relation to crooked lawyers, if there are any. Nobody doubted that in general the power existed to obtain information which was wilfully and unreasonably withheld either in a way intended to frustrate the prosecution or which would result in the frustration of the prosecution.
The Minister must explain why we need a change in the law. What has happened in the last 50 years, 100 years or 500 years which makes the law so inadequate that it needs to be revised?

Mr. Ivan Lawrence: The law is doubtful.

Mr. Hattersley: If that is so, I hope that the Minister will explain the areas of doubt. The Minister will forgive me for expressing mild surprise, in view of the courtesy and ability that he has shown in previous debates, that he has not already told us why the law does not meet our needs in this particular. Why and in what way is the Minister's proposed new clause significantly different from the law that operates today?
Some say that, by being dressed up with two or three terms from the Royal Commission, the new clause is no more than a restatement of the law as it operates today. They say that clauses 9 and 10 have been abandoned because for reasons connected with humiliation, the Government prefer not to admit that the old clauses have been abandoned, but to construct complicated clauses which amount to abandonment. How do the new clauses differ not only from the original proposal but from the present law, and why is the present law inadequate?
Our new clause is intended to meet the uncertainty. It is intended to fulfil the requirements of reasonable law in terms of obtaining evidence which results in legitimate prosecutions, but it supports and protects individual liberty. We have always accepted that there will be circumstances in which evidence must be, as it were, forcibly obtained. Our new clause, however, seeks to define far more precisely, and therefore far more safely, the circumstances in which such action may be taken and the procedures required to make such action justifiable in law. I know that my hon. Friend the Member for Stockport, North will wish to speak to his own amendments. The amendments are intended to represent some of the safeguards in our new clause as they might be interpreted and incorporated in the Government's new clause, which, the House being what it is and whipping being what it is, will no doubt eventually be carried into the Bill.
In the first of my speeches on this group—I hope that I shall be fortunate enough to catch your eye again, Mr. Weatherill — I wish to deal with three major safeguards which appear in our new clause 16 and could be incorporated in the Government's new clause if the Government advised against accepting our new clause but supported some of our specific points.
First, a general weakness in the entire Bill is at its most apparent and dangerous when translated into individual powers. I refer to the concept of the "serious arrestable offence". The powers that the Government propose to use


under their new clause can be invoked and discharged when, in the opinion of an officer, a serious arrestable offence has been committed. Two criticisms must be levelled at that.
The hon. Member for Orpington made certain assertions. I am sorry that he is not present to hear them repudiated. He said that the Bill merely translated the Royal Commission's recommendations into legislative effect and asked who could criticise that. My criticism, in describing our attempts to achieve the first safeguard, is that the Royal Commission's whole intention has been frustrated by making the powers of the Bill in general, and those of this clause in particular, depend, not on the commission of a "grave offence", as the Royal Commission recommended, but on the supposed commission of a "serious arrestable offence". That change in terminology was decided by the Government.
Our criticism of that is twofold. First, a serious arrestable offence, as distinct from a grave offence as defined and listed by the Royal Commission, may not warrant the intrusions on private liberty implied by provisions of this kind. Secondly, the definition of a serious arrestable offence is, in effect, whatever the officer involved cares to make it. When we last argued this, I suggested to the Home Secretary that it was a circular definition, to which I received the immortal reply that it was, indeed, but was none the worse for that. I think that we should all agree with the first part of his riposte, but the definition in the Bill could be used in such a wide variety of circumstances as to allow the powers to be used in circumstances in which, in common logic, they would be entirely unreasonable.
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The safeguards in our new clause and in the amendments to the Government's new clause which we intend to press include the re-establishment of the concept of a grave offence in place of the far weaker and more general, far more subjective and thus in my view far more capricious, definition of a serious arrestable offence.
Secondly, we believe that permission to use the powers involved in this kind of search and seizure should be obtained from an authority far more senior than a justice of the peace. In saying that I in no way denigrate justices of the peace or their work. In my experience, many justices of the peace themselves believe that powers of this kind are not appropriate to them because their task is traditionally and historically very different. The idea that the police should operate such powers on their fiat alone will, in my view, undermine the proper relationship that should exist between justices of the peace and the public. Thus, our new clause and our proposed amendments to the Government's new clause provide that a justice of the peace should not be the approving officer and that his or her authority should be replaced by that of a circuit judge.
Thirdly, and perhaps most important, we are determined that these powers should be used specifically, by which I mean two things. First, the policeman applying for or taking the powers must have real reason to believe that the evidence is necessary for a legitimate prosecution and cannot be obtained in any other way. Secondly, a specific offence must genuinely be suspected and it must be shown that the evidence to prosecute for that offence could not be obtained in any other way. In other words,

the powers must not justify fishing expeditions — a subject that will doubtless recur many times in the days and nights of the Committee and Report stages of the Bill. When we referred to the matter in Standing Committee, there was a general assertion from the Government side that although fishing expeditions were certainly as undesirable as we claimed, they were far less common than we suggested.
That assertion was made, of course, before we knew the results of the inquiry into the happenings in Brixton 18 months or so ago. We now have details of the report of the deputy commissioner on what took place, the correspondence between him and the chairman of the Police Complaints Baord — who, not insignificantly, was chairman of the Royal Commission and was critical both of the behaviour of the police and of their response to his inquiries — and the answer that my hon. Friend the Member for Norwood (Mr. Fraser) eventually elicited from the Home Secretary. That reply showed that there was a tendency on the part of some policemen of junior rank — and some policemen of senior rank who authorised the behaviour of their junior colleagues—to enter premises for one purpose and to use their entry for another purpose. [Interruption.] If the hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Mr. Griffiths) wishes to reduce the argument to absurdity, I of course agree that if the police stumble across bombs in the course of a raid for cannabis it would be right for them to remove the bombs and to arrest the persons they thought were responsible for constructing the bombs. However, that says nothing very serious or material about the Bill.
We are far more concerned about cases in which the police have grounds to suspect that on some premises there is evidence to justify a prosecution for a comparatively trivial offence but in searching for and seizing that evidence console themselves with the thought that if they do not secure a conviction on that comparatively trivial offence they may obtain information allowing them to secure conviction for another comparatively trivial offence not specifically on their minds or on their warrants at that time. Our new clause and our amendments to the Government's new clause would prevent that. They would not make such behaviour entirely impossible, but they would certainly make it a great deal more difficult.

Mr. David Crouch: The right hon. Gentleman seems to be wandering from his main point about new clause 16, under which only a "grave offence" would provide the reason for granting a search warrant, compared with the reference in the Government's new clause to a "serious arrestable offence". I was not a member of the Standing Committee, but I am here today because every Member of Parliament has been lobbied on this and every Member of Parliament is interested in increases in police powers and the effect on the liberty of the subject. I want the answer to a fundamental point. Why does the right hon. Gentleman wish to change the wording from a "serious arrestable offence" to a "grave offence"? Does he not think that by so doing he is tightening the limitation in a way that might inhibit the opportunity of the police to fight crime?

Mr. Hattersley: The hon. Gentleman described what I have done during the past five minutes as wandering from the point about grave offences. I flatter myself that I moved on from that point. I shall move back to it and


explain why I made my point. I must warn him—if "warn" is the right word—that I could make this point about clause after clause.
The Royal Commission believed that many of the new powers that it proposed should be applicable only when what it described as a "grave offence" had been committed. It described how the definition of such an offence could be made. Many of us regard that as an imprecise process. Many of us would regard the powers that the Royal Commission proposed as unjustifiable, even against stringent criteria.
The Government have abandoned even the imprecise process and the not very stringent criteria. The Government's definition, moving from "grave offence" to "serious arrestable offence", in everybody's view, gives far more opportunity for all these powers to be used on far more occasions. As they can be used subjectively according to the judgment of the constable or officer using them, as distinct from the criteria laid down by the Royal Commission, and possibly in statute, they are essentially subjective.
In the House we all agree that subjective legislation may turn into capricious legislation. I accept at once that the point can be argued in two directions: first, that by wishing to return to the Royal Commission's proposals I want the police to have their powers more limited than the Government propose. On the other hand, while that is certainly the case, I argue that by abandoning the Royal Commission's definition the Government are providing the police with powers that are wider in their application than is reasonable in a free society.
The hon. Member for Canterbury (Mr. Crouch), like me, must make up his mind whether he wants narrow powers that are carefully controlled or wider powers that could be capriciously used. I come down on the side of the narrow powers, and every hon. Member must make up his mind about the side on which he comes down.

Mr. Lawrence: The right hon. Gentleman kindly moved back to deal with the point raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Canterbury (Mr. Crouch). I ask him to move forward again to the point that he was dealing with when he conceded that if a warrant were given for the entry of premises to determine whether a serious arrestable offence had been committed, and a bomb was found, an arrest could be made or the procedure could go forward in a commonsense way.
If access is gained to premises for the purpose of investigating a serious arrestable offence and the police officer sees stolen property, is it the right hon. Gentleman's case that that should be ignored because it was not the basis on which the warrant was awarded? Would that not be an utterly absurd position, encouraging rather than preventing crime?
If that is the right hon. Gentleman's case, the police officer could ask for a warrant on the evidence of what he saw in the house. However, between the granting of the warrant and the seeing of the evidence, that evidence may be removed. Is that an acceptable position?

Mr. Hattersley: The hon. and learned Gentleman asks me to base my answer on an assumption that I do not accept—that the entire operation could be set in motion by a serious arrestable offence. Currently, if the police believe that essential evidence can be found in a certain house, and if the owners or occupiers of the house refuse

them permission to enter to obtain the evidence, that evidence can be obtained under present powers. If it were found that the material had been stolen, the police could impound it. Were there evidence to justify it, they could prosecute those whom they believed to be associated with the crime. That is reasonable. Therefore, my first answer is that, as the law stands, I support it. It substantiates my question to the Minister of why we need to change from that position.
If the police raid a house for a specific, justifiable purpose and find stolen property, I would expect them, as a matter of common sense, to impound that property and take whatever action was justified against those involved with either its theft or its receipt. What worries my hon. Friend and myself is not that there will be such a concrete example of one offence genuinely suspected and a second genuinely detected, but that—under the new clause—there will be an irresistible temptation for the police to say,
Let us get a warrant for this search and, who knows, we may be lucky enough to find something else.
I am delighted that the hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds shares that view. I know that I do him no discredit by saying so, because the Committee record shows that he has expressed similar feelings. We want a power to be included in the clause to require the police to behave in a specific way — the intention to obtain evidence about a specific offence. If, as a genuine byproduct of that, something else is revealed, it would be absurd to suggest that that should be ignored. We are concerned about the temptation to operate generally in the guise of a specific obtaining of evidence. Our new clause would avoid that temptation to a large degree.
I remind the Minister of the three essential questions that I have asked him. I am sure that he will answer them — I almost said "dispose of" them — in his usual courteous and lucid manner. First, how did the Government ever conceive that their original intentions could be accepted in a free society? Secondly, how does the law as it stands so differ from the new clause that the new clause is necessary? Why cannot we leave the law as it stands? Thirdly, if the new clause significantly differs from the present law, can we be assured that, at least in the three particulars that I have described—and in other particulars that my hon. Friends will wish to develop in detail—there are the proper safeguards that the House should require? Those safeguards are that the powers should be authorised by the officer of a court of appropriate seniority; that they should apply only to the most serious offences — what the Royal Commission describes as "grave offences"; and that they should not be used in a way that so spreads police power that they make possible what are colloquially known as fishing expeditions.
I look forward to hearing the Minister's answers to my questions, but before he answers them I suspect that many of my right hon. and hon. Friends will impose added burdens upon him.

Mr. Eldon Griffiths: The context in which the Government introduced their original new clause 9 and the context in which the debate has taken place both in Committee and in the country are important. I am sure that the House will not lose sight of the fact that the reason for both the original and the present clause is not to abuse the public's civil liberties but to make it easier—as all hon.


Members, without exception I am sure, want to see—for the police to clear up far more of the serious crimes that are being committed. If there is an attack upon civil liberties it comes, in my judgment, far more from those who rob, assault and burgle than it does from the police.
The first civil liberty should be the householder's right to live undisturbed in his or her own home, the right of old people to walk the streets without being set upon and the right of women to be safe from sexual assault. It is in that context more than any other that we must judge whether these powers enhance or take away from people's essential civil liberties.
I want to comment on some of the valuable points made by the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Sparkbrook (Mr. Hattersley).

Mr. Christopher Price: I am sure that the hon. Gentleman agrees that the residents of Railton road, about whom a report from the Police Complaints Board has just come from the Home Secretary, felt that their civil liberties and their privacy were invaded by the treatment they received from the police just as much as if they had been burgled by a common or garden burglar.

Mr. Griffiths: No one can be in any doubt about the feelings of the people of Railton road or any other part of the country where the police abuse their powers. I entirely share the hon. Gentleman's feeling about this. I am sure that my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary does also. He has virtually said as much, and so has the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis. It is intolerable when the police abuse their powers. It is a worse offence because they are given their powers by the House.
However, none of that diminishes my central point. While the police rarely abuse their powers, the abuse of the population's civil liberties by burglars, criminals and rapists is increasing all the time. We must keep our eye on the central problem and that is what I believe this clause is about.

Mr. Kilroy-Silk: rose—

Mr. Griffiths: If the hon. Gentleman had served in Committee, I should have been happier to give way, but, of course, I shall give way.

Mr. Kilroy-Silk: While I do not dispute what the hon. Gentleman is saying, does he accept that the police rely, for whatever success they have in detecting crime and apprehending criminals, on the information that they receive from the public? As the hon. Gentleman knows, the police do not detect crime unaided. They detect it with the help and information that they receive from the public. That help and information is dependent upon the good will and good relations that exist between the public and the police. Anything that may endanger that relationship, such as giving the police excessive powers which are open to abuse and which we are debating now, is in the long run likely to lead to an increase in crime rather than, as we all want and as these powers are intended to achieve, a reduction in the level of crime.

Mr. Griffiths: The short answer to the early part of the hon. Gentleman's intervention is, yes, I agree.
I want to comment upon the remarks of the right hon. Member for Sparkbrook about fishing expeditions. I hope that it will not come as a shock to him, but there are

occasions when the police go to a magistrate and seek powers to search for some specific matter which they name. However, at the back of their minds they may well have the suspicion that they will find something else. It is a practical matter. For example, it may be possible for the police to go to a magistrate with a claim, a belief or a reasonable suspicion that a person may have stolen goods on his premises. He may be notorious in the neighbourhood and the police may have been watching him for some time. They know that if they go to a magistrate they will succeed in obtaining a warrant to search for stolen goods, because that is within what could broadly be called the general knowledge or at least the apprehension of the population of that area.
The police may have other reasons, which may arise from information given to them by members of the public, to believe that that person might have stepped over the mark of merely being a receiver of stolen goods from time to time and has gone that little bit further and started to traffic in drugs, perhaps to have gone a little further and have bankrolled other persons engaged in professional robberies, and may have gone a further stage and served as a safe house or cache for firearms used in those robberies.
Justices of the peace vary considerably. The police knowledge of what I can only describe as the anthropology of justices of the peace is considerable. They may well know that if they went to the justice of the peace on what might sound to him extremely flimsy suspicion about the house containing drugs or weapons, they might not meet his criteria for a search warrant. However, they would be reasonably certain, from their practical working experience, that if they went for a search warrant in respect of stolen goods they would receive it. That happens. It is difficult, because the police occasionally have to operate on hunch and on their empirical experience built up over a long time as detectives. They will occasionally make a mistake. I freely acknowledge that there are occasions when a police officer will seek a warrant at one level where he thinks that he will obtain it and in the back of his mind he has a suspicion — no more — that he will find something else. I do not say that it happens often, but it happens occasionally. In fairness to the right hon. Member for Sparkbrook, because whatever else the Committee was, it was fairly honest, it is right that I should say that that can happen. Does he say that it is wrong?

Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: I do not know whether my right hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Sparkbrook (Mr. Hattersley) says that it is wrong, but the law says that it is wrong. The hon. Gentleman has argued for a power of general search, which has always been wrong. The law says that it is wrong. If he put his case to a High Court judge he would be told that it is wrong. The police know that it is wrong, yet he says that the police do it. That is precisely what we are arguing about in the Bill. The police continue to use powers illegally, and we are giving them more powers to use illegally. We have not yet got that point across to the hon. Gentleman.

Mr. Griffiths: If the hon. Gentleman will allow me to develop my argument—

Mr. Hattersley: The hon. Gentleman asked me a question. I believe that what he has described is wrong. I was rising, before my hon. Friend the Member for York (Mr. Lyon) did, to ask him whether he could conceivably


believe that what he described was right. He was describing not merely a breach of the law but a calculated decision by the police to confuse and deceive the justices. Does he think that that is right?

Mr. Griffiths: The right hon. Gentleman will see the point that I am coming to. The present circumstances put the police in a position where they judge that they have to do what I have just described. It is important therefore that the Bill defines more precisely what they can or cannot do. That is the gravamen and central point of the Bill which the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Sparkbrook (Mr. Hattersley) and his hon. Friends have missed. The Bill seeks to clarify and define what the police may or may not do.
It is not possible for any statute to calculate the possibilities and permutations of life and crime. Therefore, there is a limit to how far any Bill can go. This Bill, and especially these clauses, have come closer than anything previously to defining and clarifying what can and cannot be done. The right hon. Gentleman asked why there should be any change in the present law. The answer is that the present law leaves vast areas of hiatus. Therefore, it is right to attempt to define the matter more tightly, as these clauses seek to do. The question is whether they are sufficient.
The hon. Member for Ormskirk (Mr. Kilroy-Silk) asked when a refusal by a person to allow a search of his premises to take place would be unreasonable. I wish to answer that question because my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Selly Oak (Mr. Beaumont-Dark) was also worried about this matter. A search for gelignite and arms is taking place or has recently been completed at a home in Highgate. I do not know—possibly we shall learn later today — whether gelignite or arms were found. A refusal to co-operate by the owner of those premises would have been, in every sense of the word, unreasonable. Frequently it is only possible to judge that fact afterwards. The problem is that the home owner may not, in all the circumstances, know whether his premises are being used in a specific way. He may not know or he may prefer not to know. There is bound to be some dubiety in this matter. That is why consideration of the language in previous statutes as to what is reasonable is the proper approach.

Sir John Biggs-Davison: According to The Standard, gelignite was found in the premises.

Mr. Griffiths: In those circumstances, I shall leave the matter there. I was seeking to illustrate what in my judgment is an unreasonable refusal.
I generally welcome the new clause that my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary has introduced, but there are two problems. One arises from a procedural difficulty in which we are placed to some extent by the selection of the amendments. The Government new clause provides a definition of relevant evidence. Unfortunately, there is no definition within the same clause of either "excluded material" or "special procedure material."
I appreciate that the House will deal with those two subjects somewhat later. My difficulty is that hon. Members are now required to give or not to give assent to this new clause. It is difficult to do that without having been able to question the Government further about what

is meant by excluded material and how that problem is to be approached, and without understanding a little more clearly how the special procedures will work.
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That is a difficulty. No doubt, Mr. Weatherill, when you considered the selection, you formed a judgment that it was better to deal with the matter in one way rather than another. I do not wish to complain. I am in some difficulty in arriving at a conclusion on new clause 1 without more effective debate than is possible if we are to remain in order.
I turn to new clause 17 —

The Chairman of Ways and Means (Mr. Bernard Weatherill): The hon. Member said "new clause 17", but does he mean new clause 16?

Mr. Griffiths: I beg your pardon. No doubt that will not be the only confusion that we shall suffer in the course of the next few hours.
New clause 16 is attractive in many respects. First, it is far more comprehensible. Secondly, it is far simpler and would be much easier to embody into the notebooks of the police who will have to implement these powers. Thirdly, in subsection (4) the right hon. Member for Sparkbrook proposes that an effort shoud be made at a judicial level to weigh the public interest by determining whether the public interest in obtaining evidence outweighs the public interest in protecting the privacy of the individual. I like that concept.
The right hon. Gentleman turns his argument against himself because he is placing such an enormous responsibility on a justice of the peace. I am not sure that a justice of the peace is in a position to judge in such broad terms what the public interest is. In my view, that point can be judged only by a Minister of the Crown responsible to the House. Although I welcome the suggestion that there should be an attempt to weigh the two types of civil liberty or the two types of public interest, I am not sure that a justice of the peace is able to perform that function. Unfortunately, my advice is that the right hon. Gentleman's clause fails on several technical grounds, one of which has been mentioned by my hon. and learned Friend the Minister. I do not think that it is right to weary the House by examining the technical factors. I find several points in the right hon. Gentleman's clause attractive, notably its comprehensibility.

Sir Nicholas Bonsor: I think that my hon. Friend is giving credit where none is due. For my hon. Friend to read new clause 16 in direct comparison with new clause 2 he must also examine new clause 17, which is neither simple nor comprehensive. It is quite wrong to take new clause 2 as a direct comparison with new clause 16 alone.

Mr. Griffiths: If I were able to speak about new clause 17, I might have some harsh things to say. However, I must stay away from new clause 17 and stick to new clause 16. Standing by itself, new clause 16 scores by being comprehensible and relatively simple. Unfortunately, it is technically flawed and it does not go sufficiently far in enabling the investigation of crime to take place.
One of my worries about new clause 2—I trust that my hon. and learned Friend the Minister will say something about my anxiety when he replies—is how this and the other proposed changes which, generally, I support, will be embodied in force orders and in the


ordinary police officer's notebook. Most people wish to improve the ability of the police to investigate offences fairly and to achieve more convictions where assaults have been committed. At the end of the day, it is necessary to consider the position of the ordinary police officer trying to carry out his difficult, and indeed impossible, cuties, sometimes making mistakes, but generally attempting to do his duty in difficult circumstances. We are about to embark on the discussion of some immensely complicated clauses and safeguards covering many separate occupations and several groups of people, who have protested. I hope that my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary will have some regard for the police officer on the job, who must be able to tell from his notebook and his force orders how on earth he is supposed to proceed. It will take a brilliant draftsman to turn the language in the Bill into something that most intelligent policemen would be able to operate effectively.

Mr. Pitt: I should like to associate myself with the remarks of the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Sparkbrook (Mr. Hattersley) in complimenting the Home Secretary and the Minister of State on the courtesy and erudition that they showed in Committee.

Mr. Kilroy-Silk: The Minister of State is a charmer.

Mr. Pitt: I am a new boy and I found the Committee very stimulating. It was also well conducted. I was unable to attend the Committee's last sitting because of pressing constituency business and so I should like to thank the two hon. Members who chaired the Committee so patiently and who put us in our places when necessary, the hon. Members for Scarborough (Sir M. Shaw) and for Nottingham, West (Mr. English).
On 27 January—which seems almost an age ago—the Minister replied to an amendment that would have been a composite of clause 9 and clause 10. At the beginning of his first intervention, he said:
First, it is most important that the privacy of the ordinary citizen should not be wantonly invaded. Secondly, it is important that any relationship of trust should not be unnecessarily abused."—[Official Report, Standing Committee J, 27 January 1983; c. 348.]
I know that the Minister was talking, in particular, about medical records, but those words are relevant to this debate. The Royal Commission said that the existing law was in a muddle. It also said that
a compulsory power of search should be available only as a last resort. It should be granted only in exceptional circumstances and in respect only of grave offences.
The Royal Commission clearly suggested that in such a case any application should be made inter partes. Hence, my right hon. and hon. Friends and I tabled amendments Nos. 241, 242 and 235, but they have now been superseded.
We are dealing with a very complicated clause, but the hon. Member for Stockport, North (Mr. Bennett) has tabled several amendments which will assist us in clarifying it. They will also help us to accede to the Minister's words, which I have just quoted. The Royal Commission mentioned how orders for searches should be issued and said that an order should be made by a judge only if he was satisfied that other methods of investigation had failed, that the nature of the items was specified with some precision, that there were reasonable grounds for

thinking that the items would be found at those premises and that the evidence would be of substantial value in identifying those responsible for the crime or for determining the particulars of offences.
I am convinced that clause 9, as drafted, does not conform in any shape or form to the Royal Commission's suggestion, and I heartily support those who do not want it to stand part of the Bill. However, although the new clause is much better than clause 9, it is not in any way complete. It is complicated, and I agree with the hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Mr. Griffiths) that new clause 16 is much clearer. However, there may be technical problems with new clause 16, so I shall concentrate my remarks on how to amend new clause 2 so that it conforms to the desires of the majority of Opposition Members.

Mr. Hattersley: The hon. Gentleman has said that new clause 16 has some technical problems. Will he tell us what they are?

Mr. Pitt: I shall not delay the Committee by going through them, but we have been advised that there are technical problems. However, I shall come to new clause 16 later, and the right hon. Gentleman will learn that I intend to support it. In amendment (a) to new clause 2 the hon. Member for Stockport, North seeks to leave out "justice of the peace" and to insert "circuit judge".

Mr. Kilroy-Silk: This is the alliance Home Secretary speaking.

Mr. Pitt: I should like to read a quotation from the Police Complaints Board's triennial review. However, I should be grateful if the hon. Member for Ormskirk (Mr. Kilroy-Silk) would pay attention to the debate instead of heckling from his sedentary position in front of me.

Mr. Kilroy-Silk: Like other hon. Members, I am still waiting to hear from the putative Home Secretary of the Liberal/Social Democratic alliance the nature of the very serious defects that are apparently contained in new clause 16. It is an important issue and the Committee is waiting with bated breath for the hon. Gentleman's answer.

Mr. Pitt: I am flattered that the hon. Gentleman should have such a high opinion of my abilities.

Mr. Kilroy-Silk: No—the hon. Gentleman is the only prospective Home Secretary the alliance has.

Mr. Pitt: I am sure that the Committee is waiting with bated breath for my answer, but I also hope that it is waiting with equally bated breath to hear what I have to say about the point at issue, which is new clause 2.
In its triennial review, the Police Complaints Board said that it was concerned at the ease with which, on occasion, courts or individual magistrates may grant search warrants on the basis of rumour and often uncorroborated facts. I share that concern. In many circumstances, a magistrate is not the appropriate person to grant a warrant. If, in accordance with amendment (g), tabled by the hon. Member for Stockport, North, such issues were presented to a circuit judge, inter partes, all parties to the application could be protected properly.
In addition, the safeguards for civil liberties mentioned by the hon. Member for Canterbury (Mr. Crouch) might be better ensured. Indeed, the hon. Member said that the police should have proper powers. I could not agree more with him. He also mentioned the liberty of the individual,


and I believe that, although we must ensure that the police have proper powers of arrest and detention and to detect crime, we must also protect the civil liberties of those whom they serve. Amendment (b), also tabled by the hon. Member for Stockport, North, refers to the "serious arrestable offence". I had hoped that there would be a Government amendment or some other amendment— indeed, I tabled one—to define that. I still believe that those words represent a nebulous definition and that they are too subjective. I still believe that a "serious arrestable offence" is defined primarily by the officer concerned. Therefore, the words are dangerous and do not sufficiently safeguard the individual's civil liberties.
I should have preferred a tighter definition, but unfortunately that is not to be. We must therefore content ourselves with what we have. That is why I support the insertion of the word "grave". I do not want to continue the long debate in Committee about the number of definitions that can be attached to the word "grave" or about the different interpretations of the word "serious arrestable offence". The point is that "serious arrestable offence" is a nebulous definition, while the word "grave" means something. If a person is gravely ill, we know exactly how he feels. If someone has committed a grave offence, one knows its magnitude because the word "grave" implies the magnitude.

Mr. Kilroy-Silk: It is gravely serious.

Mr. Pitt: I therefore support the amendment of the Mon. Member for Stockport, North.

Mr. Lawrence: The hon. Gentleman has kindly explained what he thinks is meant by "grave offence". Will he now explain what he thinks is the difference between a serious offence and a grave offence?

Mr. Pitt: As I was saying, we must define what offence is serious and what offence is grave. Perhaps the hon. and learned Gentleman and I interpret the word differently. That is another source of confusion. That is why I hoped that the Government or someone else would have tabled a proper definition. We are in danger of talking round and round the point again. I should like to know how the Government define "serious arrestable offence". We have no idea of that. Unfortunately, I cannot agree with the definition in clause 74. We are back to the start again.
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New clause 16 is far more succinct. I shall put the mind of the hon. Member for Ormskirk at rest. The Minister has told us that there is a technical difficulty in new clause 16. I am prepared to accept his word as he is far more learned in these matters than me. The hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds also raised the point, but perhaps the hon. Member for Ormskirk was thinking of other things. New clause 16 could well replace clause 9. It would satisfy the requirement to give the police the powers that they should properly have, safeguard civil liberties and ensure that neither civil liberties nor the powers of the police were abused. Unfortunately, I suspect that we shall not be able to examine new clause 2 or new clause 16 on Report late on Monday to develop the type of clause that we need because of the timetable that we are now working to.
If pressed, I would say that I support new clause 16 or the amendments of the hon. Member for Stockport, North as they add to what the Government have proposed and adequately cover the anxiety about police powers and the safeguarding of civil liberties.

Mr. Nicholas Lyell: I support new clause 2 for the less than modest reason that the amendments come largely in response to amendment No. 267 which I advanced in Committee.
The need for a general power to search for evidence was held by the Royal Commission, after careful consideration and debate, to be necessary, subject to proper safeguards. New clause 2 follows in almost every particular the suggestions of the Royal Commission. It therefore deserves general welcome from all hon. Members. It incorporates the safeguards which Lord Denning outlined in Ghani v Jones, a leading case which dealt with the current but much more restrictive powers to search for evidence under the Theft Act. It follows the lead given in about 50 statutory cases which were identified by the Royal Commission. Consequently, and, contrary to what the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Sparkbrook (Mr. Hattersley) seems to believe, it is clear that no sufficient general power exists. It is also clear that the Royal Commission regarded such a general power as necessary and it is now clear that new clause 2 properly fulfils that overall need.
I shall now deal with the discussions that underline many of the clauses on "serious arrestable offence" and its comparability or otherwise with the expression "grave offence" which some right hon. and hon. Members seem to prefer. Here again, the right hon. Member for Sparkbrook is sadly muddled. He seems to be under the impression that the Royal Commission defined "grave offence" in a way which would prove acceptable as a statutory definition. It did nothing of the sort. If hon. Members refer to paragraph 3.7 of the Royal Commission report, they will find that it simply outlined a substantial number of serious or grave offences—I use those words in layman's terms—which it thought were sufficiently serious to justify the police in exercising or asking permission from the court to exercise a power of search. It did not attempt a definition. Anyone who gives his mind to the subject will find that it is almost impossible and, I believe, undesirable to supply a definition which does not contain any flexibility or a subjective element.

Mr. Mikardo: I appreciate that "serious" and "grave" are extremely difficult terms to define with any precision. Why, then, instead of a definition, do we not follow the example of the Royal Commission and have a list of offences? Why, when that suggestion was made in the Standing Committee of which the hon. and learned Member for Hemel Hempstead (Mr. Lyell) was a distinguished member, was it resisted?

Mr. Lyell: I think that the answer to the hon. Gentleman's serious point is that, if one analyses the definition in the Bill, one finds that it is much closer than he realises to the list that he wants. A serious arrestable offence is defined in the Bill. The hon. Member for Croydon, North-West (Mr. Pitt) is wrong to think that it is not. It is defined first as an arrestable offence. An arrestable offence can easily be listed and is definable. It is an offence for which the sentence is a maximum of not less than five years. Such an offence is potentially serious by anyone's standards. [Interruption.] I hear the hon. Member for York (Mr. Lyon) groaning. I shall give way to him soon. However, not every example of an arrestable offence is necessarily serious. I am sure that the hon. Member for York will agree that we must find a sensible


definition that will enable the comparatively trivial to be separated from the serious examples of such offences. That is where the subjective element is almost impossible to avoid.
The House and the country should realise that the subjective element is not simply the police officer's private view of the subjective element as the JP who gives the search warrant which is applied for under clause 9 must be satisfied that the case involved a serious example of an arrestable offence. I suggested that we might use the words "serious example" because it clarifies matters but it is not as easy as that, because some offences are so serious that it is misleading to suggest the use of the phrase "serious example". For example, rape or murder would always be regarded as sufficiently serious to justify a search for evidence as contemplated by new clause 2. Therefore it is not easy to provide a satisfactory definition. However, the phrase "serious arrestable offence" has been criticised far more than it deserves to be largely by people who understand it less well than they should

Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: I agree with the hon. and learned Member that the Government's definition of "serious arrestable offence" inserted towards the end of our proceedings in Committee is a massive improvement. However, I hope that his assertion that the definition contains a subjective element is not true. The definition states that the officer must have reason to believe that it is serious by reason of
(a) the nature of the offence; (b) the scale; (c) the degree of organisation;
and so on. If an officer must believe that, surely he makes an objective assessment and not a subjective one, as it was originally. To that extent, we have moved from subjectivity to objectivity, which is crucial.

Mr. Lyell: The hon. Gentleman makes an important point and is right to remind me that the definition has been further tightened by the objective element in so far as that is possible. The fact that we go down the same road so far comforts me that we have got the clause and its important underlying concept about right.
The need for a general power of search has been accepted by the Royal Commission which called for certain safeguards which are now fully incorporated in the clause. Far from being a matter of criticism, the way in which the clause has been improved shows the House in Committee working at its best. The long proceedings in Standing Committee were constructive and the new clause should receive general welcome from all those who wish to see serious crime properly investigated and justice done.

Mr. Andrew F. Bennett: The hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Mr. Griffiths) argued that it was important for the Bill to be easily understood by the police, but they do not need the provisions if they get the consent of the individuals concerned. Our primary objective should be policing by consent. If we achieve that, these provisions will be unnecessary because individuals, if they feel that the requests are reasonable, can co-operate. It should be emphasised to police officers that they need not know the details of the legislation; rather that they must behave in the best way they can to build up public confidence.
There have been too many occasions recently when police officers have not carried out searches in a way that

would build up public confidence. The first message to the police is that they must regain public confidence and always behave in a way of which everyone will approve. When the police do that, they will have few problems with the legislation.
I agree with the hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds that the police are faced with the problem of interpreting the legislation. The hon. and learned Member for Hemel Hempstead (Mr. Lyell) said that the definition of "serious arrestable offence" is in clause 74, but it is harder for a police officer, who must make decisions quickly and act efficiently, to work out whether an incident comes under that definition than for him to look down a list to see whether the crime he is investigating is on it. I suspect that, while a definition will be included in the legislation, for practical purposes the police will be given a list and told that if the incident is listed they should treat it as a serious arrestable offence. If that is done in practice, it would be better to include a list in the legislation rather than have the police interpreting the legislation.
It is also important to look at the relationship between new clause 2 and new clause 3. We have run into a possible danger. We are saying that this new clause deals with ordinary Mrs. Brown and that certain fairly limited safeguards will apply to any information or material in her home. However, if she is a journalist, doctor or member of the other professions mentioned in new clause 3, a series of other safeguards will be applied. To my mind, those safeguards should be applied to any individual. They should not be special privileges reserved for certain groups which, by their nature, could make the most fuss and gain the most attention were their rights to be invaded. The Government should think carefully about extending the safeguards on confidential or other material to all individuals.
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It seems odd that a journalist should have far more protection than other individuals. I commend all the pressure groups, such as the journalists and the British Medical Association, on their plea for special provision, but we should consider giving the same rights to all individuals rather than to groups which in some ways are more able to look after themselves.
Amendment (a) to new clause 2 is a plea to the Government to ensure that an application for a search warrant is made to a circuit judge rather than to a justice of the peace. The hon. Member for Croydon, North-West (Mr. Pitt) pointed out that the Police Complaints Board has expressed concern about the suggestion that some justices of the peace at present grant warrants without sufficient regard to whether they are justified. By increasing the level at which an application is made, we would ensure that the police must make out their case instead of taking it for granted that such a warrant will be issued.
Several magistrates have told me that if they press the police for reasons, and if the police officer has difficulty obtaining a warrant, they rarely have applications made to them, whereas a magistrate who makes perfunctory inquiries is frequently applied to. It would be disturbing if the police had an unofficial list of magistrates who were compliant as opposed to those who were not. Such an attitude may be grossly unfair, but it is a common impression about what happens in practice. Although some circuit judges may be more willing to grant warrants than others, amendment (a) would be a better safeguard.
Amendment (b) deals with the serious arrestable offence, to which we should give special attention. The Government must look at this again. As I said earlier, there is a danger that in practice a list will be drawn up. For all practical purposes the police will work from a list rather than from the definition in clause 74. If it is intended to use that definition we should consider it carefully.
The first case where a serious arrestable offence arises is when someone is liable to a prison sentence of more than five years. As my hon. Friend the Member for York (Mr. Lyon) pointed out, this includes larceny. Having taken that into account, we must examine clause 74(h),
the prevalence of similar offences".
That seems to include small criminal actions if they happen frequently. Each one in itself may not be significant but by putting (h) in the definition the Government have widened it. While it would be unlikely that an individual who had committed one offence would get a prison sentence, someone who had committed a series of similar crimes might well do so.
When the crimes are being investigated, it will not be possible to say that they were committed by one individual or that different individuals had committed a similar offence. If we are to accept the definition of "serious arrestable offence" for the whole legislation, we should make a distinction in clause 9 and make it clear that search powers should be permitted only in respect of grave offences.
If the Government insist on keeping the term "serious arrestable offence", they ought to consider the definition set out in amendment No. 252. In Committee we spent a long time discussing the definiton. All sorts of definitions were suggested. My hon. Friends seem in amendment No. 252 to have found a definition which would be a big improvement. If the Government are not prepared to accept my amendment (b), they should put in a definition of "serious arrestable offence" which individuals can understand and which the police will have little difficulty in interpreting.
In his opening remarks the Minister said that amendment (c) was unnecessary and that he was not prepared to accept amendment (d) because it altered the situation. As I understand it, the clause attempts to lay down whether this is evidence which would be material in producing a conviction and not evidence which would necessarily help the police in their inquiries. The Government should make the clause clearer. Will the police be able to search for things which will help them to go on with their inquiries, or will they merely be able to search for things which they will then produce in evidence? The Minister seemed to say that amendment (c) was not necessary and then that it was not acceptable to the Government. Those two things go together.
It is important that the material which is being searched for is material that will be produced at the trial — in other words, material to be argued about or accepted by the courts rather than merely information which may help the police to form an opinion about further investigation. If the Minister insists that amendment (c) is not necessary, I cannot see how he can argue that amendment (d) is not acceptable. If he says that amendment (d) is not acceptable, I should have thought that he could hardly argue that amendment (c) was not necessary.
Amendment (e) sets out a definition of what material can actually he produced. Finding evidence will obviously be difficult. The major case history is Ghani v. Jones, in

which Lord Denning laid down a set of conditions. It would be reasonable to put those conditions in the Bill. Amendment (e) sets out the definition that Lord Denning used in that case.

Mr. Christopher Price: As my hon. Friend knows, I am keen on putting Ghani v. Jones into the law. Can he tell us what the difference is between the proceeds and fruit? Is that Lord Denning's definition or is it my hon. Friend's?

Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: It is Lord Denning's.

Mr. Bennett: My hon Friend the Member for York has come to my rescue. I think it was in the judgment. Although I concede that there could be arguments about the fruit or the proceeds, if this was good enough for Lord Denning it is certainly good enough for me. [f the Government were willing to accept the amendment, no doubt they would want to redraft it.
Amendment (f) proposes to insert:
An application under this section shall indicate how the evidence in question is considered to relate to the purposes of the inquiry for which it is sought.
It is important that the police should put forward an explanation of why they want to make a search. That is not clear in the Bill. My amendment seeks to put back a subsection which was originally in the Bill. There was no argument about this in Standing Committee. Therefore, the Government should explain why they think it unnecessary to include this subsection. The Government have modified the Bill to meet objections. Why should they remove a subsection about which there does not appear to have been any objection?
In regard to amendment (g), the police first have to find out whether a person is prepared to allow a search to take place. If the individual refuses, surely it is reasonable for the refusal to be tested. What is the point of going to a magistrate or to a circuit judge, as I propose, and saying, "We went to Mr. X and he said we could not search," when the individual is not in a position to show why he did not want the search to go on?
My original premise was that the police should have the co-operation of individuals. If an individual does not want to co-operate, there should be a test of whether it is reasonable or unreasonable to grant a warrant and the individual should be in a position to say why he refused permission. If he has to do that he will consider whether it was an off-the-cuff answer that he had not thought about clearly and, with a little more consideration, might grant permission and save the whole of this procedure. If individuals have a genuine reason, they should he prepared to put it forward and argue the case. If it is reasonable for the professional — journalists, professional advisers and others—to make representations against a search for a document or the entering of premises, why is it not reasonable for the individual?
I am not suggesting that the individual would want to do it on many occasions, but it is a reasonable safeguard and the Government should be prepared to accept amendment (g). The next question is whether the individual should have the right of appeal against a decision that has been made, and there is a strong argument for accepting that.
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I apologise for the time that I am taking, but it is one of the problems of taking a long list of amendments that


have been selected for discussion together. It would have been better for the Bill to have been referred back to the Standing Committee so that the amendments could be taken individually. No doubt many of my hon. Friends will want to go over the same ground and the Minister will be expected to reply fully. This is not the most helpful way to develop arguments.
There would have been advantages in including a public interest test as set out in amendment (i). If we remove an individual's right to privacy, it is important that there should be such a test. It has been argued that the difficulty of such a test is that it can be exercised only by Ministers accountable to Parliament, but that is not the only group. Clearly there could have been a role for justices of the peace or circuit judges. I hope that the Government will consider this matter further and that the Minister will answer some of the points that I have made on amendments (a) to (i).

Mr. Lawrence: I agree with the hon. Member for Stockport, North (Mr. Bennett) that public confidence in the police is vital. I agree also that there have been lapses in police behaviour which have resulted in less confidence in the police. How do we in the House create or restore confidence in the police? The one thing that undermines confidence in the police is a rise in serious crime that is not being properly dealt with, whether because of inadequate sentences, inadequate procedure in the courts, or inadequate policing. In so far as the measures we are discussing are thought to be ways of reducing crime—I think that they are—they will do more than anything to restore public confidence in the police.
New clause 2 helps to restore or create public confidence, but the amendments so laboriously and meticulously prepared by the hon. Gentleman do not. Obviously, one can make a long speech about this difficult and important subject, but I do not propose to do so. I want to confine my remarks to one or two generalities and leave it to the Minister to deal death blows to the hon. Gentleman's amendments if necessary.
To some extent new clause 2 restores confidence in the police because although we all believe that excessive powers should not be given to the police, sufficient powers should be given. It is clear that although the power to issue a search warrant appears in some 50 statutes it is an insufficient power if it does not enable the police to search for evidence of murder, rape, fraud or corruption. Therefore, the extension of the power of a search warrant is important in extending the capability of the police and, therefore, in restoring an element of public confidence in the police's ability to deal with serious offences.
The merit of new clause 2 is that it clarifies and codifies for all to see. Where now the law enables searches to take place, it sometimes happens that they take place outside the law because it is vague and uncertain. Those who wish to resist a search do not know whether they are within their rights to do so and some police officers wanting to search do not know whether they are within their rights to do so. That is unsatisfactory and the sooner that that aspect of the law is clearly set out—I would codify the whole of our criminal law if it were possible but it would take time—the better it will be. If the police are doing wrong it is because the law is uncertain about whether they are getting away with it. The new clause clearly defines the limits of

police powers and makes them less likely to offend because it will be more obvious to everyone if they do. Therefore, it is a protection, not a destroyer, of civil liberties and it is a confidence-building measure.
I welcome the changes on confidentiality which previously caused unnecessary alarm and undermined confidence. The right hon. Member for Birmingham, Sparkbrook (Mr. Hattersley) asked why the Minister had been so confident in making those confidentiality proposals when he was now reversing them with equal confidence. The answer is that, in practice, confidential notes and records—those which everyone was worrying about— almost certainly would not and could not be admissible in evidence except to refresh the memory of a witness.

Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: Rubbish.

Mr. Lawrence: That may be rubbish but it is the law as the hon. Gentleman ought to know, because he sits as a Recorder. Even then, they can be used only if they are contemporaneous.
We have agreed—and I think happily agreed—that those factors should be dropped. There does not seem to be a great deal of point, therefore, in going over the old ground, because I think that what has been done is a substantial contribution to the confidence-building factors in these clauses.
I hope that the hon. Member for Stockport, North will forgive me if I come to grips with one common point in some of his amendments and explain why I think that they would reduce confidence, not increase it. Some of them are really a plea for more substantial legal proceedings than are proposed in new clause 2—for example, before a circuit judge instead of a justice of the peace. What, in reality, does that invoke? It invokes lawyers. Many is the time that I have stood here and been laughed at by Opposition Members because, as a lawyer, what I seem to be trying to do is make more work for lawyers. That is a particularly unfair and cruel attack to make upon me because practically everything that I have ever said in this place has been designed to reduce the work of lawyers. Nevertheless, it is clear that if we deepen, extend and complicate the proceedings, we shall require more solicitors, more barristers and more circuit judges.
There is one element which, perhaps more than any other but certainly substantially, reduces people's confidence in the system of justice. It is the delay in the legal process; the time people have to wait before they go for trial, which means that witnesses may forget their evidence, or may die, and that — as the hon. Member for Ormskirk (Mr. Kilroy-Silk) is quite rightly for ever saying—people languish in prison awaiting trial. Justice denied — that is what delay is. What would be the practical effect of more lawyers, more solicitors, more barristers, more circuit judges? One effect of having more circuit judges would be more courts, more procedures, more processes, and a factor which seriously undermines public confidence in the operation of the law would be aggravated, not diminished.
There are three possibilities, are there not? The first is to give the police a general power of search; the second is to put a brake on that general power by making it subject to an independent authority—the justice of the peace; and the third is to go through the full criminal process of lawyers and judges. Is it not sensible, since the first is


unthinkable and the third undesirable, to strike a balance by retaining the justice of the peace system as a practicable, reasonably sensible, reasonably democratic check on the excesses of the police? If so, many of the amendments suggested by the hon. Member for Stockport, North are less desirable.
There is one matter—this may be just my stupidity—that undermines my confidence, at any rate at present, in new clause 2. I am not quite sure that I understand what subsection 1(d) means with relation to new clauses 3 and 4. They have been ruled outside the ambit of our discussion and I only mention this because, until I am completely confident that I understand the meaning of new clause 2, obviously I have less confidence than I would wish to have.
There has been a great deal of hoo-ha — perhaps rightly: I was never in favour of those confidentiality clauses — about the interference with confidentiality. Now, however, that the principle of confidentiality has been conceded, now that what we are talking about is the protection of the rights of the individual consistent with the detection of crime and the maintenance of public confidence in the system, now that we are talking about new clause 2, which is precisely what is recommended by the Royal Commission, surely we should accept it and welcome it, not least because it does the very thing that the hon. Member for Stockport, North really wants—that is, increase public confidence in the behaviour and the work of the police.

Mr. Mikardo: As we all know, the hon. and learned Member for Burton (Mr. Lawrence) moves in exalted and refined circles. If he really believes, as he says, that when the police abuse their powers it is only because they are not clear about what their powers are, I invite him to descend from Olympus into the foothills, do a few walkabouts somewhere between Aldgate Pump and Stratford market and talk to a few of the citizens. He will be rapidly disabused of the hallucination from which he suffers.
I desire to refer to only two passages in new clause 2. The first is:
Where, on an application made by a constable, a justice of the peace is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds",
and so on. How does the justice of the peace satisfy himself? He is hearing one voice. He is hearing a constable who comes along and applies for a warrant. He has no other source of information. He has only two options open to him: either to believe the chap who is talking to him, or not to believe him. He has no way of checking what is said to him. He has no way of adducing any other evidence. He has no way of getting either corroboration of or challenge to what is being said to him by the chap on the other side of the table. He has either to believe him or not to believe him and of course he has no special grounds for not believing him.
I can just imagine the sort of conversation that goes on, and I use the text of new clause 2 to help me to envisage it. Justice of the peace to constable applying for warrant, "Are you satisfied that a serious arrestable offence has been committed?" "Yes, Sir."
"Constable, are you satisfied that relevant evidence is in the premises you want to search?" "Yes, Sir."
"Are you satisfied that it will be of substantial value, whether by itself or together with other evidence, to the investigation in connection with which you are making this application?"
What is he expected to say? No? He says "Yes, Sir."
"Are you satisfied that it is not excluded material or special procedure material?"
As the constable does not know what that means, he says, "Yes, Sir."
Finally, "Constable, are you satisfied that any of the conditions specified in subsection (2) of new clause 2 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Bill apply?"
As the constable does not know what that means, he again says, "Yes, Sir", and before he has got it out the justice of the peace has reached for the rubber stamp and used it.
Will the Minister be good enough to tell us whether he has any information on that, and whether his Department bothers to collect information? What percentage of applications made for search warrants are refused? Is it about 1 per cent.? Is it about 2 per cent.? Is it about 3 per cent.? I shall not go beyond that, because I very much doubt whether the figure is anywhere near 3 per cent. If the Minister tells us that his Department does not collect such information, I suspect that it is because it knows that it is not worth collecting, as the incidence of refusals is so low as to produce a figure that is not statistically significant.
My hon. Friend the Member for Stockport, North (Mr. Bennett) made a great contribution to our proceedings in Committee and he has added to it today. He always translates what is in the Bill into reality and what really happens on the ground. He did it over and over again in Committee, as he has done today. That was a valuable contribution to our proceedings. That is why, of all the valuable members of the Committee, he was the most valuable. Much of the Bill is far removed from reality. It bears all the hallmarks of having been drafted by a double first in Greek prosody and the history of the Aztecs. It is far away from what happens in our cities, especially in our inner cities.
I shall tell the House what happens in east London a lot. My example will show where the hon. and learned Member for Burton was wrong in at least one of his assumptions. Officers knock on people's doors and say, "Please let us in. We want to search your place." Many of the people on whose doors they knock do not even know that there is such a thing as a search warrant and that an officer should have one. They let the officer in. However, some people know that and ask, "Do you have a warrant?" The chap will say, "No, but if you insist on it I shall leave two uniformed men outside your front door for all your neighbours to talk about while I go off and get a warrant." He does not say, "while I go off and apply for a warrant"; he says, "while I go off and get a warrant." It never occurs to him that his application form has the least chance of being refused. He knows that it does not have the least chance of being refused.
I shall tell the Committee another reality of life. From where do the police get the hunch that they should go and search a particular place because there might be stolen goods in it? Nine times out of 10 it is from a criminal who grasses or from a police informer. Why does the criminal give the police that information? Sometimes it is for money, but more often it is to do down somebody else. The most inaccurate proverb in the whole of the English


language is that there is honour among thieves. There is no honour among thieves. There are all sorts of little gang feuds, with people taking it out on each other in many different ways. If I had a dislike for the hon. and learned Member for Burton, which is exactly the opposite of my feelings, I could say, "That fellow has some cannabis at his place." Along would come some bods who would kick in his front door looking for cannabis. That is a nice way of scoring off someone whom one does not like, and it happens not infrequently.
Why should we have this purely one-sided presentation? Why do we not ask the chap whose house it is proposed to search, sometimes with the use of force, as the new clause provides, what he thinks about it? It might save a lot of trouble. He might say, while he was sitting with the police officer applying to the justice of the peace for the warrant, "I know what you are after. You are after some stuff that my lodger, Joe Snooks, had, but he skipped last night. It is no good getting a warrant and coming today. He is not there. You will not find what you are looking for."
Alternatively, he might establish that the application is based on mistaken identity. There might be a chap with the same name or of the same appearance. After a heist from a shop, the witness might say, "He was a tall fellow, about 6ft, with red hair. I think he lives somewhere up Cephas avenue." Someone else may say, "There is a tall fellow with red hair who lives at the far end of Cephas avenue. Perhaps it is him." The police will say, "Let's go round and search his place." Perhaps the tall chap with red hair can establish that he could not possibly have done the heist from the shop and so could not have stolen goods on his premises because at the time he was serving with the police in Surrey.
Why are the Government resisting the right of a person whose premises are to be searched to challenge the application? People who are guilty will not do so because they know that they will get themselves further into trouble if they try. Only people who are innocent or who genuinely believe themselves to be innocent will do so. I appreciate that those two things are not precisely the same. Would it not be of benefit to the justice of the peace who is hearing the application if he were able to hear two opinions instead of one?
I have asked my questions and I look forward to the Minister's reply.
The other phrase to which I propose to refer is in line 10, which states that
he may issue a warrant authorising a constable to enter and search the premises, using reasonable force if necessary.
That contains the word "reasonable", which is one of those dreadful, indefinable terms similar to "serious", "grave", and "unreasonable". Those highly subjective terms mean what any individual wants them to mean. What is reasonable to me may not be reasonable to any other hon. Member, and vice versa. Who is the judge of what is "reasonable force"? It could be nobody other than the bod who is using the force. Is he the best judge? There is no one else to make the judgment.

Mr. Lawrence: indicated dissent.

Mr. Mikardo: The hon. and learned Gentleman shakes his head. If that chap does not decide, who does? Is it a superior officer who gives him guidance?

Mr. Lawrence: The test is not in the mind of the person who does the thing. It arises afterwards in considering whether, in all the circumstances, what is done is sensible. The hon. Gentleman may think that he disagrees with others over the definition of the word "reasonable", but common sense is common to the hon. Gentleman and everybody else in the House.

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Mr. Mikardo: That is absolutely great. It is not a matter of what is reasonable. The policeman can do anything that he likes, and only afterwards will it be judged whether it was reasonable. That is a great consolation to those in Railton road who have their doors kicked in, their china cabinets smashed and their television sets booted. It is a great consolation to them to know that—

Sir Nicholas Bonsor: rose—

Mr. Mikardo: I shall give way in a minute. I am very old-fashioned and I do not like to finish on a preposition. It is a great consolation to the people in Railton road who have had all that done to them to know that afterwards, when it has all happened, someone may say to the officer concerned, "Naughty, naughty, you were unreasonable."

Sir Nicholas Bonsor: Does the hon. Gentleman agree that no one, not even the officers kicking in the door and smashing the cabinets in the illustrations that he chose, would consider that to be reasonable? The remedy afterwards is when the unreasonableness of it is confirmed and damages should be awarded.

Mr. Mikardo: The proof of the pudding is in the eating. The law as it stands requires that officers shall use only such force as is reasonable, so the officers who did that must have thought that what they were doing was reasonable. I am sure that the hon. Gentleman is not suggesting that they knew that they were wrong. They were misjudging, were they not, what they thought was reasonable?
It might be said that they were given guidance from superior officers. I do not want to anticipate a later debate, but there will be another new clause on Report that will remove any such safeguard, because any superior officer can delegate to any inferior officer his functions in respect of the Bill, so guidance may come from a low level officer.

Mr. Norman Atkinson: On the interpretation of the word "force", surely it is not a matter of semantics to say that there is no such thing as reasonable force, because force itself is not divisible, and cannot be subject to any dilution. Force in these circumstances was force, because the people entering must either have removed the obstacle—that is the door—or shifted the people who were resisting the entry. Therefore, force is force and cannot be divisible.

Mr. Mikardo: I do not often disagree with my hon. Friend, but I disagree with him about this, because he is not being reasonably practical. I can quote an example of what I mean by the difference between reasonable and unreasonable force; an example that I gave the Committee. A flat in my constituency was searched on the suspicion that there were some explosives there. One of these grasses had given a tip-off that hidden in a cupboard were explosives that were to be used for a highly illegal purpose, and the police officers went along. I should have


thought that it was reasonable to go along, and if the cupboard was locked to kick it in. This is where I disagree with my hon. Friend the Member for Tottenham (Mr. Atkinson). However, it was unreasonable of the officers to go in and without even trying the handle of the cupboard to see whether it was locked to kick it in anyway. That was unreasonable force, because there was no reason for doing it.
I bet that the Minister of State felt very sick about the report on the Railton road incident. With all respect and in all friendship, I must point out to the hon. and learned Gentleman that the report of the Police Complaints Board, and all that has come out of it, made a complete nonsense of much of what he was saying during many of our debates in Committee — I am sure in good faith, I am not accusing him of deception—about police behaviour. It was a pity that the report was suppressed for a few months. Had we had it at the beginning of our Committee proceedings, much of what was said would not have been said, much time and effort would have been saved and the Minister would have not been put in the embarrassing position, in which I believe he is, of knowing that many of his fine words in Committee were reduced to ashes by the publication of this report.
I do not like to entertain unfair suspicions. I hope that it is not the case that the report was kept under wraps for six months or so—no reason has yet been given—to get the Bill through the Committee stage before it was published.
I listened the other day to an interview given on the radio by Assistant Commissioner Geoffrey Dear. I thought that it was one of the best, most frank, open, straightforward and decent interviews that I had heard given by any police officer or any other official of his rank of seniority in any other service. However, there was one bit that left me breathless. Apparently, a number of police officers were involved in this thuggery. It was uniformed thuggery, and mindless violence, carried out by police officers. That was unquestionable, and Assistant Commissioner Dear admitted that. However, only two officers had been identified, perhaps because they confessed and the others had lied when they were asked about it and did not confess.
Mr. Dear was asked what had happened to these two chaps and he said that they had been spoken to. When he was asked whether that was all, and why, as he admitted that what they had done was indefensible, they had not suffered a worse penalty than being spoken to, his almost incredible answer was "Well, those were the only two who were discovered. As there were others who had got away with not being discovered, we think that it is not right to punish those two."
I agree with the hon. and learned Member for Burton, who said that abuses by the police destroy public confidence in them. What is even worse is abuses by the police condoned by the police, and that destroys confidence even more. Here was a flagrant abuse by the police, who were supposed to have exercised a reasonable amount of force in searching. However, they get away with it.
I shall try to experiment with the law. I do not know anything about the law and I have to learn about it the hard way. Late tonight, at say about 3 o'clock in the morning when the Home Secretary is, against his will, imprisoned here listening to tirades from the Labour Benches, I shall nip along to his residence and do a small burglary.

Tomorrow morning I shall go into court and plead guilty but say that nothing more should be done than giving me a caution or a wigging because there are many burglars in London who are never discovered. As they are not punished, I cannot be punished. Nearly all the burglars in London are never discovered, although in the provinces a reasonable proportion are discovered.
That example makes nonsense of the whole idea that the police are just people. We want to foster the idea that the people and the police are one. We want that to become more and more true. However, it makes nonsense of such a concept when policemen get away with what is agreed to be a quite horrible offence, thuggery as I called it, mindless vandalism, on the sole ground that others who had committed the same offence were not proceeded against. How can there be confidence in the police in such circumstances?
Before we accept new clause 2, I want to know from the inhabitants of the Government Front Bench what they understand by the phrase
using reasonable force if necessary".
What definition can they give? What sort of practices will there be within the police forces to establish standards and to prevent more Railton roads? Unless we get something along those lines, this new clause is buying a pig in a poke.

Sir Nicholas Bonsor: I shall say a few words arising out of what has already been said, mostly by the Opposition. First, I question their assumption that anything in this Bill will make the fishing expeditions that have been carried out by the police in the past more likely or more condoned by the authorities than they have been. I share the horror that has been expressed by the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Sparkbrook (Mr. Hattersley) and the hon. Member for York (Mr. Lyon) at the way my hon. Friend the Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Mr. Griffiths) chose to put his case and the examples he gave of police abuse in the past in connection with the right of search. It is not right for the police to misguide the justices to whom they make an application for a warrant about the true purpose of their entry to a house, and I am quite certain that my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary would not condone it.
The Committee has to decide whether Government new clause 2 or Opposition new clause 16 will make that more or less likely. I submit that the Government new clause will neither permit it nor condone it, and that therefore the question whether fishing expeditions will arise in the future, as in the past, is not relevant to this debate. A time may come when such expeditions should be debated, when we are considering disciplinary procedures against police officers who abuse the powers that they are given, but new clause 2 will not make it any more likely or easier for the police to abuse their powers should they choose to do so.
7.15 pm
I much enjoyed the examples that were given by the hon. Member for Bethnal Green and Bow (Mr. Mikardo) about how the police might set about abusing their power and how they might put their case to the magistrates. All of us who have practised in criminal law know that the exchanges that the hon. Gentleman outlined can occur. Perhaps I might tell the Committee about one of my experiences some years ago, when I was defending a gentleman in the east end of London, with which the hon. Gentleman is well acquainted.
I was charged with the rather difficult task of asking the bench to acquit my client who was accused of carrying a cosh, because the hammer without an end, wrapped in material to make it easier to hold, was quite blatantly a cosh. Inadvertently, in the course of my rather stumbling defence, I referred to it as such on several occasions, so when I sat down at the end of the case I was quite convinced that the members of the bench would convict my client. When they came back after a short retirement and acquitted him I was astonished, until I turned round and saw in the public gallery 36 large gentlemen who were his friends and who were well known to the justices of the peace who were trying the case. I then understood, as the right hon. Gentleman rightly says, how one cannot always legislate to obtain perfect justice—and that can work both ways.
We have to try to give the police the powers that they need, so that they can catch the criminals. In new clause 2, the Government have set out — admirably, in my view—to achieve a balance between what it is right to allow the police to do, provided they abide by the letter of the law, and what it is necessary to do to preserve the liberty of the individual against undue police harassment.
I ask the Committee to look at the two new clauses — Nos. 2 and 16—and see whether anything that the right hon. Member for Sparkbrook has claimed for the latter clause is there. I have scanned it with care, and I find no safeguards in new clause 16 that are not already in new clause 2 to prevent the fishing expeditions that we all hold in abhorrence. The only two ways in which there conceivably might be a claim for new clause 16 arise, first, in subsection (7) which sets out, in certain very limited applications, the right of the person against whom the warrant is sought to apply to a court and challenge that application. However, that arises only when a person has already unreasonably refused entry to the officer. The second is in subsection (8), where a right of appeal is given against a warrant that is issued by the magistrate. I cannot see that that will have any practical effect whatever, because when the police arrive on the doorstep of the house that they wish to search there is nothing in the clause to prevent them from entering immediately and searching it — unless Labour Members can see something there that I cannot see. Indeed, if they could so prevent the search, the statement in the original clause that the warrant can be sought ex parte when
the evidence is likely to be concealed, disposed of, altered or destroyed",
if notice is given of the search, would of course become entirely irrelevant. It is vital that the police should have the right of entry without giving the person who is to be searched the opportunity of disposing of the stolen goods. Otherwise, the whole purpose of the clause is lost.
It is clear that new clause 16 falls between two stools: either it gives no additional safeguard to a person whose premises might have mistakenly or wrongly been searched; or it gives a safeguard that would be used by criminals to escape from the natural consequences of their crime by disposing of the evidence. None of us wants that.
New clause 2 takes the place of clauses 9 and 10. Much of the discussion so far has related to clause 10, although that does not come under the heading of the clauses that we are now considering, and will arise under later new clauses. Therefore, I shall not make the comments that I

shall hope to make later, except to say that it seems to me extraordinary that the right hon. Member for Sparkbrook pressed so hard in Committee on clause 9 for precisely the kind of amendments that are now being put in new clause 2, yet attacks the Government for putting them in at this stage. He said in one breath that he could not see the need for new legislation because the present law was perfectly adequate, in the next breath he wondered why the Government were putting forward the new clause, and in the third breath, despite the fact that he said that the present law was perfectly adequate, he moved a new clause, which is at least as deficient—if deficient it be — as the Government's clause. So, in my view, the Opposition have put forward no case for refusing to vote with the Government on new clause 2.
My final point arises from the request of the hon. Member for Bethnal Green and Bow and other Opposition Members for a list of offences to be included in the definition of serious arrestable offences. In my view, any such list must be a serious handicap to the proper course of justice when we are trying to pursue those who have committed, to use their own words, grave offences. Perhaps I might illustrate this by taking the case of theft. The general definition of theft under the 1968 Act is extremely wide, as all right hon. and hon. Gentlemen know. It does not define the value or extent of the theft. One might be guilty of theft, an arrestable offence, if one had stolen tuppence.
I am sure that Opposition Members will agree that it would be undesirable to use new clause 2 and its powers of search for someone who was guilty of theft. At what point does theft become serious? The hon. Member for York suggested that there should be an objective test to decide what is serious. I suggest that that would be wrong and, in many cases, unjust. The subjective facts of each case must be examined before we can decide whether a case is serious.
We must ask whether theft is serious if it involves £5, £100 or £5,000. Do we really wish to legislate like that? Someone might have stolen a lot of money in circumstances which made the offence less serious. The operation of the clause would not then be appropriate. Alternatively, someone may have stolen in such a manner or in such a series of ways a small amount of money which would justify using the clause's provisions.
We are talking about the right of search, not a penalty. We are talking not about sending people to prison, fining them or punishing them, but about the police exercising their power of search to look for evidence on which a case can be brought. That is not a penalty.

Mr. Mikardo: Does the hon. Member really think that there is no penalty for someone who lives in a block of flats with an open balcony when a police car draws up and five coppers enter his flat, perhaps kicking in the door? Does not the reputation of the person suffer sufficiently to constitute a penalty?

Sir Nicholas Bonsor: Such an event would not involve a legal penalty, but in lay terms I concede that it would constitute a penalty. When I say that no penalty is involved, I mean that in legal terms we are not questioning the level of penalty or how someone should be punished. We are examining how action can be taken which is necessary to bring lawbreakers to justice.
So long as the police follow the letter of the law, no penalty would be inflicted. I agree that if excess force is


used, if a search is carried out when it should not be or in a way that it should not be, that would involve a penalty. If that happens, a civil law remedy exists for assault, trespass or damage to goods.
I admire the wisdom of the hon. Member for Bethnal Green and Bow, but we must not confuse the letter of the law with what we do about the police if they break that law and exceed their powers. That is the subject of separate but immensely important discussion. We must not fail to pass necessary laws on the ground that some policemen will break them. That would be failing in our duty to protect the majority of people who need the vast majority of honest policemen to exercise proper powers in their defence. I hope that the Committee will back the Government on new clause 2 and its attached provisions so that we can provide the public with that safeguard.

Mr. Kilroy-Silk: The current issue of Police Review, issued on 29 April, in an editorial entitled "Poor Old Bill" states:
If the Police and Criminal Evidence Bill were a ship, most of the crew would have already taken their places in the lifeboats. As it was launched with light showing through every second plank, its builders at the Home Office may never have intended it to float.
There is, perhaps, substance in the suspicion that some hon. Members on the Government Benches who apparently supported the Bill, having been shown some of its disadvantages, are not now supporting it.
The Police Review is a cautious and respectable journal. It reminds its readers that last November it commented:
Any Act based on this Bill will be the source of greater dispute than the faults it seeks to remedy".
That is our major argument. Whatever merits the Bill may have in many respects, the consequences of its enactment will be far more serious in terms of the relationship between the police and the public and the increase in the incidence of crime than the problems that the Government intend to eliminate.
The controversy in which the Government have been involved and the way that they constantly have had to backtrack on parts of the Bill does not give us confidence that the Government are clear about their objectives or that they have considered them clearly. We are not confident that the Government are certain about the means by which they can achieve their objectives or that they have any certainty about the likely consequences of the Bill for the police and the public. It is extraordinary that the Government ever seriously considered giving the police the power to search for confidential documents in the premises, homes or work places of doctors, lawyers, social workers, priests, journalists or probation officers.
The legitimate outcry from such individuals and their professional organisations has led the Government to attempt to delete clause 9 and to replace it with new clause 2. Even though the Government have clearly given way to the weight of authoritative representation on behalf of various professional organisations, the new clause is highly objectionable. The power to search the homes and work places of innocent persons for evidence that may be of use in a criminal case is unnecessary and wrong. It is certainly wrong to give a constable the power to search on a warrant from a single magistrate when he suspects that there may be evidence of a "serious arrestable offence" in the home of an innocent person.
The whole burden and efficacy of the new clause rests upon the definition of "serious arrestable offence." Earlier in our consideration of the Bill that definition was derided by the Criminal Bar Association. The definition in clause 74, tightened up though it is, is still a circular definition. A "serious arrestable offence" is that which the officer making an application for a warrant determines it to be. I concede that an objective qualification becomes necessary if the officer is subjected to a judicial review of his decision and his actions but police officers in relation to applications and magistrates in relation to the granting of those applications are rarely, if ever, properly subjected to judicial review. Although clause 74 states that the officer must have "reason to consider", which suggests that there must be objective factors that he can call in evidence, that reason and the evidence for it will seldom, if ever, be tested in the courts.

Mr. W. R Rees-Davies: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

Mr. Kilroy-Silk: The hon. and learned Gentleman has not been here for the debate so I shall not give way to him.
If we are to have a clause like this and the powers that go with it, hinging upon the concept of "serious arrestable offence" it would be practical to issue a list of offences, as outlined in our amendment No. 252. It would be even better to accept amendment (b) to new clause 2 tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Stockport, North (Mr. Bennett) and hinge the clause on the word "grave' instead of "serious".
Again, I take exception to the application being heard and endorsed by a single magistrate. The Minister of State himself acknowledged in the Standing Committee that a single magistrate is not sufficiently trustworthy to give power to extend detention for 24 hours. In refusing such power, he said that everyone knew that the police had favourite magistrates who would quickly endorse whatever the police requested. He acknowledged that in the real world, about which we are supposed to be talking, there are magistrates who for one reason or another were susceptible to requests and to pressure from individual policemen and who in many cases merely rubber stamped the applications that came before them.
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If the Minister found it inappropriate for a single magistrate to give power to extend detention in a police station for more than 24 hours, how much more highly inappropriate it would be for such a magistrate to be able to grant powers to search the premises, homes or workplaces of people who are not alleged, charged or suspected of having committed an offence — serious, grave or otherwise—but who may have in their home or workplace material relating to the commission of a serious arrestable offence by a third party.
Where important matters of individual privacy and civil liberties are at stake, it is important not to allow a single magistrate to make the decision. That view was expressed not only by the Minister of State but by the Police Complaints Board, which pointed out in its recent report that warrants were too easily obtained when the decision was made by a single magistrate. Again, therefore, it seems preferable to accept amendment (a) in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Stockport, North which would replace the single magistrate by a circuit judge.
I also dislike intensely those parts of new clause 2, and the contingent new clauses that we are not permitted to


discuss at this point, which in effect implement the Government's concessions to the various professional associations. I do not like the idea of setting up special categories of individuals who will be exempt from the provisions of the legislation. The Government's new clauses contain no safeguards for the ordinary citizen who is not a doctor, a lawyer, a journalist, a priest, a social worker, a probation officer or whatever. Ordinary people can have their houses ransacked and their doors kicked in, as happened in Railton road and elsewhere. As my hon. Friend the Member for Bethnal Green and Bow (Mr. Mikardo) said, these things not only can but do happen. Mistakes are made, not only in Railton road and, more recently, in the west midlands, but in every other force area, not to mention greater and graver occurrences such as the shooting of Stephen Waldorf rather than David Martin or, indeed, of either. Such mistakes are not rare. They are everyday occurrences.
It is simply rare that they receive the prominence in the media that some of them have received recently. They happen every day in every police area. None of the protection for the professional associations under new clause 3 is given to the ordinary citizen.
Unlike the hon. Member for Nantwich (Sir N. Bonsor), we believe that it is unnecessary to give the police additional powers and that if such powers are given they will be abused. The history of the police and their relations with the public in this and in every other sector shows that every time they are given increased powers in relation to individual citizens the powers are not just used but frequently abused.

Sir Nicholas Bonsor: Had the hon. Gentleman been present earlier in the Committee stage, he would have noted that every Opposition speech and indeed every Conservative speech in favour of the exemptions now being made stressed that the protection is aimed not at the doctor, the priest or the lawyer but at those who need to confide in such people with security.

Mr. Kilroy-Silk: I trust that the hon. Gentleman was referring to the proceedings in Standing Committee and not to the earlier debates today when he referred to my not being present. I accept the point that he makes, but he will acknowledge that, as my hon. Friend the Member for Bethnal Green and Bow said, whether we are protecting doctors, lawyers or journalists or those who confide in them the person who pays the penalty is the person whose home or workplace is searched. That is where the real degradation, humiliation and destruction of property occurs, and the protection afforded to the professionals does not apply to the ordinary citizen. We should not be introducing special categories and special privileges of that kind.
In taking that view, I am in remarkable company. My right hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Sparkbrook (Mr. Hattersley) said earlier that every national daily newspaper bar the Daily Telegraph was against the Bill. My right hon. Friend was uncharacteristically mistaken, as the Daily Telegraph is against it as well, and especially against the setting up of special categories. Its editorial of 22 April states:
There is something, in principle, unsatisfactory about general laws which except special groups of people from their provisions.

It continues later in the article:
One's instinct is that a Bill which has to give special treatment to so many people is not rightly conceived in the first place, or else that the safeguards given to some should be extended to all.
That is precisely my point about new clause 2 and the clauses that depend upon it.
The major question here is what evidence, if any, can be found for the need for more draconian powers. No one of any substance outside the House has been prepared to speak in favour of increased powers for the police to search the premises of innocent citizens. There has certainly been no vociferous police demand. Whether it be Association of Chief Police Officers, the Police Federation or the Police Superintendents' Association, they seem to have been remarkably unwilling publicly to support and to justify the proposal, and remarkably inhibited in defending the powers that the Government seek.
What serious problems have arisen to give rise to a demand from the police or whomever for such powers? In what specific cases have the police experienced obstacles? What crimes have gone undetected or criminals unconvicted due the absence of these powers? The Minister may have provided such evidence in Standing Committee but he has not publicly given it to those debating the matter in other forums and he certainly did not provide it in the very limited defence that he gave in moving his proposals today. The Home Secretary himself, in a recent incursion into print with an article in the Daily Express, gave a point by point defence of the controversial elements of the Bill—the powers to stop and search, to set up road blocks, and so on—but he made no mention of the powers to search premises for confidential documents or information. It is remarkable that, on his own initiative, he wrote an article for a newspaper defending the controversial aspects of the Bill, yet without making any reference to these clauses. No doubt he finds them, as they clearly are, indefensible.
Whether or not we can find anyone who can speak clearly and cogently in favour of the clauses, there is no doubt that numerous organisations and inviduals are bitterly opposed to them. No fewer than 170 organisations have made representations to the Home Secretary. In the light of that, and in the light of our debates, if the Government are sincere in wanting to get the matter right —rather than simply defending a dogma—they should accept the new clauses tabled by my right hon. and hon. Friends and many of the amendments put forward by my hon. Friend the Member for Stockport, North. That certainly applies to amendments (a), (b), (f) and (i). In particular, amendment (i) imposes the test of whether the public good is served by either the issuing of a warrant or the protection of an individual. Such a test, injected into the legislation, would be a highly desirable innovation. It would require a justice or circuit judge to think about, and openly debate, whether the public good is served by giving the police powers, or whether it is served by protecting individual liberty. Of course, the public good involves the relationship that exists and must be sustained and encouraged between the police and the public.
As many hon. Members on both sides of the House have said, we all want an effective police force. We all want the police to have the powers necessary for it properly and successfully to carry out its duties. We want it to be able to detect crime, catch criminals and produce the evidence necessary to secure convictions in court. But


the Opposition also want a police force that has the respect, confidence, good will and co-operation of the public. Apparently, we have always had such a police force. But if that confidence ever existed, it is now seriously in jeopardy. Such instances as those in Toxteth, Brixton, Moss Side and in parts of my constituency prove that. There was thuggery and vandalism by some members of the Metropolitan force in Railton road last year. Thugs were present at the annual conference of the Police Federation—the Prime Minister used the word "thugs" —when they heckled the Home Secretary and made it impossible for him to speak at the conference. Yet we are actually asking such thugs to be the custodians of our cherished civil liberties.
If we are to protect the confidence that the public are supposed to have in our police force, and if we are to sustain that, we must be careful to ensure that police officers only have the powers necessary for the proper performance of their duties, and that those powers are not abused.
I find it extraordinary that the hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Mr. Griffiths) can say that the need for these powers arises because the police do not have them but, in practice, use and abuse them—and, therefore, that we need to bring the law into line with practice. Such a statement is extraordinary and indefensible—albeit that similar remarks were implicit in the Home Secretary's article in the Daily Express.
Whatever we decide, it is clearly important that we have an effective and successful police force—and that depends on the consent, co-operation and confidence of the public. We must do nothing that will in any way erode or destroy that confidence. It is my fear that by these proposals, and by many other measures in the Bill, we shall embark not upon measures to reduce the level of criminality and sustain law and order, but upon measures that will create a greater distance between the public and the police, to the detriment of both and to the benefit of none.

Mr. Crouch: When the Bill first appeared on the scene and some voices around the country were raised in protest against it—the concern was nationwide—I was asked by a journalist in my constituency what I thought about the Bill and whether I was concerned about some of the protests from the Church, the medical profession and journalists. I told him that the Bill was necessary to give greater hope to the police in their fight against crime. However, I said to him, "You can rest assured that, where the liberty of the subject is concerned, it will be defended to the last in the House of Commons." I am convinced that that will always be so, and we have seen evidence of it in the debate today.
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It is not a waste of time to spend a long time discussing this issue. It is not a waste of time to listen to the views of individual hon. Members, however emotively, passionately, subjectively and strongly expressed—about the giving of additional powers that might be harmful to the relationship between the police and the public and might put in jeopardy, by however small a part, the liberty of the individual, in the hope that we might gain some advantage in the fight against crime.
I did not serve on the Standing Committee, but I have been impressed by the serious voices raised this afternoon, on both sides of the House, expressing either concern

about or welcome for the Bill. As we have proceeded today, some matters have been clarified that needed a great deal of clarification for those of us who are not lawyers —for example, the interpretation of words. One of the best aspects of the House is that we are not all lawyers. I do not say that in any derogatory sense about hon. and learned Members.
By not all being lawyers, we can get down to the street level referred to by the hon. Member for Bethnal Green and Bow (Mr. Mikardo). It is important that we pause and ask just what, for example, "reasonable" means. We all know that lawyers have debated in courts over the years the interpretation of that word and have no doubt earned great fees for doing so. Be that as it may, it is important that we try to understand the meaning of words in a clause to which we give our assent.
The new clause being offered by the Government is very much better than the original clause 9. As a non-lawyer, I felt that the original clause could have been misinterpreted, perhaps to the detriment of the freedom of the individual. The police would not want such an advantage. Above all, they want to succeed without infringing or allowing Parliament to infringe the liberty of the individual. However, there must be some give and take —even some give of liberty. That is what is making it so difficult for the House to interpret both sides of the coin in such a difficult matter.
I have looked carefully at new clause 16 tabled by the Opposition as an alternative to new clause 2. Like my hon. Friend the Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Mr. Griffiths), I thought that it had a great deal to offer. During an intervention I queried with the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Sparkbrook (Mr. Hattersley) whether his word "grave" was better than "a serious arrestable offence." I have listened to the debate and I am prepared to accept that "a serious arrestable offence" is sufficiently strong for the magistrate to consider when he receives an application for a warrant to search for evidence. We should not make the definition of the condition too difficult and put "grave" in place of "a serious arrestable offence."
I have already commented on the word "reasonable". I understand what the hon. Member for Bethnal Green and Bow is saying. I am a little worried that "reasonable force" can be used. It is a latitude that can be given. When the warrant is issued, the police officer will know that he can use reasonable force to gain entry into the house where, as we are reminded, an innocent person may be sitting on some essential evidence. I paused a little when I saw the words "reasonable force". The Bill enables society, rather than the police, to make a decision. The only decision that the police have to make, as I understand it, is that they want to gain access to some premises because they believe that there is some pertinent evidence on those premises.
If it is practicable, the police have to ask the owner of the premises whether they may have access. It might not be practicable. The request for entry might mean a refusal and the destruction of the evidence. The police must be given the opportunity to make such decisions, because that is how we must fight the crime war. The police must be given that latitude.
I am worried that the police might use reasonable force where it is not necessary. We cannot define "reasonable force". We have to trust the police, the senior officers, and the chief constables. We must trust the Commissioner of the Metropolitan police to ensure that senior officers and


the force under his command appreciate that how they act under the law — the Bill will give them new strength under the law — will determine how they are seen in relation to society. Their behaviour must be reasonable. I believe that we can trust the police in this regard. I trust them, and have the highest regard for them. The more strength that we can give them, not just in the law that we allow to proceed but by what we say in the House, the better it will be for them.
The Bill needs a great deal of explanation to satisfy those of us who feel some anxiety about it. I have been here throughout the debate because I have received a great deal of correspondence, as my hon. and learned Friend the Minister knows. I was not in Committee with him, but I compliment him on the way in which he has treated hon. Members who were not on the Committee. He has kept them informed about the intentions of the Government and the Home Office. I have received a letter of explanation from him today. It includes notes on the Bill, which he has let me have because of the correspondence that I have received from my constituents.
I am sure that my hon. and learned Friend will not mind if I quote from the letter. It is quotable, because it is to be sent to my constituents. The letter runs to seven pages, which illustrates that the Bill is complex and needs a great deal of explanation. What is contained in the clauses is one thing, but the explanation behind them is another. I shall quote from paragraph 7:
When applying for a warrant the police will have to satisfy the magistrate that a serious arrestable offence has been committed"—
the next part is emphasized—
(and it is the magistrate who will judge whether the offence is serious, not the police) and that material evidence of that offence is to be found on the premises concerned. Before issuing a warrant the magistrate would have in addition to be satisfied that it was not practicable for the police to seek access to the evidence from the occupier of the premises concerned, that the occupier of the premises had unreasonably refused such access or that the evidence would disappear if the police tried to obtain it without a warrant.
Those words are not legal; they are words of explanation. In some ways it is better to have that than the legal way in which the Bill is written. I understand that explanation. From that explanation, I do not believe that the liberty of the subject is being infringed. The Government have recognised the complaints that have been made and have done much to protect the liberty of the subject.
My hon. and learned Friend's explanation continued:
There is therefore no question of warrants being lightly issued to enable the police to search the homes of innocent persons who were quite unwittingly in possession of evidence of a serious crime.
I hope that such explanations will be available to magistrates, circuit judges and the legal profession when the Bill becomes law. Such explanations are vital for the interpretation of words in the Bill.
Towards the end of new clause 2, "relevant evidence" is another phrase that has disturbed me. The clause contains an explanation of "relevant evidence". It states:
In this Act 'relevant evidence,' in relation to an offence, means anything that would be admissible in evidence at a trial for the offence.
One cannot complain about that. I feel that a simple explanation of that type would be valuable in an earlier part of the clause.
I have some sympathy for amendment (e) tabled by the hon. Member for Stockport, North (Mr. Bennett), which seeks to add an explanation of "relevant evidence". His explanation seems to come from none other than that learned and distinguished judge Lord Denning. I notice that the explanation is also included in new clause 16 tabled by the Opposition.
I believe that new clause 2 safeguards the liberty of the subject and provides additional help to the police to seek evidence that is vital to obtain convictions, but I believe that the Bill requires extra explanation. I believe that the explanation of "relevant evidence" would have been a valuable addition to new clause 2. Perhaps it is now too late to ask my hon. and learned Friend to do more than comment on my observation and to tell me that the words
anything that would be admissible in evidence at a trial for the offence
are sufficient and that the Bill will be accompanied in due course by an explanation of what that means. I should have thought that an explanation of "relevant evidence" could be provided in the clause.

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Mr. Norman Atkinson: I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Stockport, North (Mr. Bennett). Warrants are issued far too easily. It seems that warrants for forced entry are given under all circumstances whether or not guns are to be carried or not. I am worried that what has been described as a "trigger and stamp happy" state of affairs applies today. No expert has said what proportion of warrant applications is refused. I was interested to hear my hon. Friend the Member for Bethnal Green and Bow (Mr. Mikardo) define what he thought was the rejected proportion. I have met three deputations in my constituency recently, and each was of the opinion that warrants were issued far too easily.
New clauses 2 and 16 have no accountability written into them. Democracy is non-existent when there is no accountability for such practices. It is possible to argue that some form of accountability exists in the complaints procedure, but that operates on only a few occasions. If an innocent person has his property damaged in the process of a forced entry, he can seek accountability or damages only through the courts, and that is seldom successful. A positive statement about accountability is missing from the clause.
My comments apply equally to "reasonable force". If it is unreasonable for a person to refuse the police entry, the opposite must also apply. Opposition Members have spelt out the meaning of "unreasonably refused". They do not actually say that there is no such thing as "reasonable force", but they argue that whenever there is a refusal to give entry it is "reasonable" to use force whatever the circumstances. However, if, as I claim, there is no such thing as reasonable force—it is either force or nothing—the argument about reasonableness is rejected. The term "reasonable force" has little meaning. I accept that on occasions force is necessary. If the police force is to function at all and to enter premises, force will be used. Therefore, the word "reasonable" is superfluous. At the end of line 10, in new clause 2, the words,
he may issue a warrant authorising a constable to enter and search premises, using force if necessary
should appear. That is all that is needed if we are to afford the individual some protection against force being used to enter premises. That is an important point.
I wish to mention the attitude of some Conservative Members about the use of reasonable force when entering premises. I was the chairman of a sub-group of the national executive of the Labour party and members of the TUC who came together to discuss the necessity of a wealth tax which I opposed. [Interruption.] Hon. Members seem to be worried by the smoke although I do not think that there is a problem. I appreciate that I am not a passionate speaker, but I do not think that I am setting fire to the House. I think that it is steam and not smoke.
The wealth tax was rejected because it was feared that it would bring with it the necessity of the police and the Customs and Excise authorities having the right of entry, using force if necessary. If a wealth tax was introduced, a person who possessed great wealth, whether in the form of pictures, pottery or jewellery, might be subject on occasion to the authorities forcibly entering his premises. That idea was thus rejected by the members of the TUC and by the leading members of the Labour party because it would mean allowing forced entry to premises to search for property.
The interesting point is that Conservative Members object to giving a right of entry because of the necessity of using force to do so. Conservative Members have argued against the wealth tax because they object to Customs and Excise and police officers having the right, of entry, if necessary using reasonable force. Conservative Members say that there is no such thing as reasonable force in those circumstances. Therefore, they reject the argument for a wealth tax. It is interesting how the opposite arguments are now being used by Conservative Members who say that it is perfectly reasonable for police officers to have the right of entry using a reasonable amount of force. I reject that argument.
I am sorry that hon. Members do not seem to support the amendments that have been tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Stockport, North. Most of those who have lobbied hon. Members have demanded that where permission is granted for the police to enter premises with a warrant stringent conditions must be attached to the methods used. More accountability should be written into the Bill, particularly with regard to the behaviour of police officers who enter property and perhaps cause damage in the process.

Mr. Kenneth Warren: I shall be brief, because we are either being gassed or slowly sunk by fumes that are entering the Chamber. Indeed, my speech may be terminated even faster than I had intended.
I welcome the definitions in new clause 2, which reflect the sensible and realistic way in which the Committee's 41 sittings were conducted and the responsible and responsive way in which my hon. and learned Friend the Minister consistently listened to and acted on any representations made to him. The clause takes into account those representations and reflects the way in which the Bill can be operated practically and sensibly.
The five requirements under new clause 2 that have to be fulfilled in order to satisfy a justice of the peace provide a fair and reasonable safety valve, in contrast with the suggestion about going to a circuit judge. All of us have constituency experience of justices of the peace and of the way in which they carry out their functions. I should have thought that it was the general opinion of the House that

they are sensible people, who know their areas and who would know, in considering an application, whether the constable's requirement was reasonable.
The hon. Member for Bethnal Green and Bow (Mr. Mikardo) is one of the most honourable and certainly the most colourful characters in the House. Tonight, he pursued a course that was somewhat akin to that which, to my enjoyment, he pursued in Committee. He tended to try to convince me that all cops were robbers and that all robbers were innocent. He took me a long way along that path, but I managed to survive. However, I recognise that by mentioning places such as Railton road, he was proving that there are exceptions to the rule that the police force —as I generally accept—is made up of honourable men and women. No doubt my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary, who has responsibility for the Metropolitan police, will take action, and I am sure that the case will not be left in the way that the hon. Member for Bethnal Green and Bow believes.
At times, the hon. Member for Bethnal Green and Bow casts doubt on the reasonableness and soundness of all those in authority, and that it is unfair. I hope that he will reflect on that. There is major concern about the crime wave. The level of crime has given rise to considerable fear in our society. However, our authority to combat that crime wave will be considerably enhanced both by the clause and by the whole Bill.

Mr. Mikardo: The hon. Gentleman listened to me ad nauseam in Committee and therefore he must recall that whenever I criticised the police, I always included the caveat that I was talking about a minority, and probably a small minority at that. Therefore, the hon. Gentleman's remarks about my views are manifestly wrong. I have always worried not about the chaps who abuse their powers, but about those who let them get away with it. That is the real problem.

Mr. Warren: I am delighted to have my education completed at this stage of the Bill.
New clause 2 establishes the sort of balance of power that we want to maintain between the police and the public. It will be to the benefit of the public and will fulfil their expectations about the protection that they hope to receive from the police. One feature that shines out is the recognition that the police and the public must have confidence in each other.
During our eleventh sitting I asked for a definition of "serious arrestable offence". Clause 74 provides the sort of distinctions that it is only right and proper to include in the Bill. However, there are eight requirements in the definition of a "serious arrestable offence". Perhaps my hon. and learned Friend the Minister will tell us whether all eight requirements have to be satisfied, or only one. That is not clear at present. Perhaps he will also look with some good humour at the statement that the eighth item is
(h) the prevalence of similar offences; and "vessel" includes any ship, boat raft or other apparatus constructed or adapted for floating on water.
No doubt that small misprint can be put right later.
The five requirements that have to be satisfied before a justice of the peace, and the several requirements involved in the definition of a "serious arrestable offence" take us substantially forward. As a result, new clause 2 is realistic and gives the police a workmanlike ability to act on behalf of the public. The Bill should be considered as


a whole. Often small criticisms have been put to the press weeks after the debates have taken place. However the Bill seeks to, and, I am convinced, will, protect the public.

Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: Earlier, the hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Mr. Griffiths) argued that the Bill provided a proper balance between the liberties of the subject and the powers of the police to defend the public from crime. He argued that if we were to support the police offences should be rationalised. However, the basic difficulty with the Bill concerns exactly the dispute about the balance to be held between the two.
Those who oppose the Bill most frequently argue that the balance has not been kept. It was not kept by the Royal Commission, and even some of its major defences for the citizen have been eroded or simply neglected in the Government's preparation of the Bill. The clause is about as sanctimonious as it could be in seeking to appease the Bill's vociferous critics, who have cottoned on to one area in which power is being rationalised or extended. They have completely neglected the other aspects of the Bill that represent serious intrusions into civil liberties.
The press has now deserted us, yet again on the Bill. However, its members will no doubt tomorrow write learned editorials, saying how pleased they are with the concessions made to them about journalistic information. Members of the press will not pay any attention to what is likely to happen to young blacks on the street when the stop-and-search powers are extended all over the country. They will not pay any attention to what is likely to happen to an individual who is stopped by the police and taken into custody because he has refused to give his name and address, or because the police believe that the information is in some way inadequate or inacurate. Such individuals can be arrested in circumstances in which they could not be arrested under the present law. The Government intend to interfere in all sort of ways with the liberty of those who are not journalists, doctors, priests or part of the caring professions. However, the press is happy to say that the Bill was bad but has been made a lot better because the press will be able to keep its journalistic records.
What I find so sanctimonious about the way in which the Government have tabled their amendments is that they are saying that they have been very reasonable, have listened to all the criticisms of the Bill and have conceded two major clauses. However, in some respects I do not approve of the way in which the Government have given way to some pressure groups. For example, a journalist will now be able to acquire information about a serious arrestable offence, and the police will be unable to take any action because of the exemption given under subsection (1)(d) of new clause 2.
If that is the case, information about someone acquiring explosives to carry out a bombing raid could be passed to a journalist. The Explosives Act 1923 provides power for someone to get that information. It will be impossible to do that under this Bill. I cannot pretend that that is the right balance between the liberties of the individual and police powers.
All the interested organisations are making their case for greater protection of their confidential information. That has consistently been denied to them in law until now. The Home Office has conceded such protection

because they have managed to arouse a violent campaign in the run-up to the general election. If we were to do justice to the people who will be affected by the powers in the Bill, we should have listened to those who are usually voiceless in the press. We should have listened to the blacks on the street and those who are arrested and searched for drugs which they do not have at London airport. We should have considered people who are shoved into police stations and kept there for a long time—it is now to be four days. We should have considered the people who, it is suggested, might be interested in Irish terrorism. They are arrested under the Prevention of Terrorism Act 1974 but will now be arrested under this Bill for up to four days although they may not be prosecuted.
Those people are voiceless in the mass media, yet the Bill affords them no serious protection. The serious protection is given to journalists, priests and social workers.

Mr. Christopher Price: And lawyers.

Mr. Lyon: I have had this argument with my hon. Friend before and I am happy to have it again. It is an interesting point in relation to the concessions that the Government have made.
The privilege is not that of lawyers but of their clients. The client has the privilege to protect information, even if he has divulged it to a lawyer. The press, social workers or doctors can acquire information, put it into their confidential records and then decide whether to divulge it. A doctor does not tell me, "This is your information. I cannot divulge it unless you say so." He decides whether it is right to divulge it. So do journalists. A journalist can say—and probably would say in reply to the argument that I have just made—that if he acquired information about explosives for terrorism, he would think that it was his duty, despite the journalistic ethic, to give that information to the police. A journalist is entitled to make that decision but a lawyer is not. A lawyer is not entitled to say that a man has given him information about a murder that he plans to commit and give it to the police.

Mr. Christopher Price: If I were to pursue this argument with my hon. Friend he might win. When many doctors, citizens advice bureau workers and Samaritans receive confidential information, they believe that they are keeping that information confidential in a sense which is solely to do with their responsibility to a client. Although they are not in the same legal position as my hon. Friend, which he understands and explains better than me, they are on all fours with a lawyer. It is good that they have been moved a little nearer to the lawyer in regard to the protection which the Government are willing to concede.

Mr. Lyon: Before my hon. Friend sidetracked me, I was about to say that we should keep a balance in confidential information and consider seriously the lines that should be drawn. The line which ought to be drawn is not that which has been drawn in these amendments —which is that confidential information in files that are held by people in certain privileged occupations is exempt. It does not matter how serious the offence is or what the consequences will be if the police do not get that information: the Government say that that material will be exempt. That is not a fair balance. It is one of the rare issues in this Bill where the balance has been drawn


against the police to an unacceptable extent. That has been done because the Government have given in to the campaign that was engineered by the press.
The press should examine the rest of the Bill and find a way of achieving a better balance. I am prepared to agree with editorials which say that the Bill is bad because of the treatment of journalistic records and that we should now get rid of it all. That is an acceptable argument. We could start to think about the issue again. If it is true that the Prime Minister will go for a June election, this Bill will never get through anyway. By the time that we have a new Government we might be able to consider the proper balance, but no one who listens to the debate or who reads our proceedings should think that, merely because the Government have made a concession on two clauses, this is no longer pernicious legislation. It is bad in many ways — not because it tries to rationalise police powers; I favour that. It is bad because there is no adequate check.
There are some aspects of the amendments of my hon. Friend the Member for Stockport, North (Mr. Bennett) which the Government should consider seriously. During our debate on clause 10, the Government were willing to make an amendment with regard to doctors because, apparently, only they were being considered then. The Government were prepared to accept that the application should always be inter partes unless the police said that the doctor was implicated in the offence. If that was good for doctors, it ought to be good for other people. Most of the applications, when the holder of the information is thought to be innocent, ought to be inter partes. However, there seems to be no provision for that. What could be wrong with asking the police to inform someone that they are about to make an application so that he can object if he wishes? My hon. Friend's amendment (g) limits that to subsection (2)(c) but I should have thought that it was possible to make an argument on subsections (2)(a) and (2) (b).
Such an argument would not hold good only in respect of subsection (2)(d). Even if under subsection (2)(a) it is not thought
reasonably practicable to communicate with any person entitled to grant entry to the premises
the person about whom the information is obtained should be warned that a warrant might be issued. I do not understand those words to mean that it is impossible to get hold of the holder of the information. If that were so, surely the person concerned should have the right to make his case. My hon. Friend the Member for Stockport, North made that point in relation to subsection (2)(c), which seems perfectly acceptable.
I am not as worried about the definition of "serious arrestable offence" as some hon. Members, but the amendment made in Committee was a considerable advance. I want an assurance from the Minister that the Government intend that there will be an objective assessment of whether there were reasons for allowing the police to regard it as a "serious arrestable offence". The hon. Member for Nantwich (Sir N. Bonsor) misunderstood my point. I thought that the Government had injected that objectivity, of which I approve. The Minister nods, but I should like a specific assurance on that later.
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This is a vital matter. It is one thing to say that a serious arrestable offence is such because of the nature of the offence or circumstances, but it is quite different to say

that it is such only when the officer considers the offence or circumstances to be serious or grave. In the light of all the evidence, it should be open to the court to review whether the officer had made an objective assessment of the reasons for believing the offence to be serious and arrestable. That is the only way in which the provision will work.
We cannot define this simply in terms of particular offences. One hon. Member said that rape would always be a serious arrestable offence, but I disagree. I have known of rape cases that were on the border line, in which the girl had ultimately said "No" although in every other way until then she had said "Yes". I do not regard that as quite the same serious criminal offence as that of a woman beaten up in the street, put up against a wall and raped. The difference between the two lies in the seriousness of the offence. The first case is not a serious arrestable offence, and the same is true of many other offences which at first sight might be said to be serious.
It is possible to make that argument even in respect of some murders, and certainly in respect of manslaughter, fraud, forgery, and other offences that some hon. Members have sought to catalogue as serious. Within each category some circumstances make an offence serious and others not. In most circumstances I do not regard larceny as a serious arrestable offence, but some cases are and should be considered as a serious arrestable offence. If someone were to steal heroin from a hospital medicine cabinet with the intention of distributing it on the streets, it would be a serious arrestable offence, whereas in most cases larceny would not. Therefore, we are left to judge serious arrestable offences only in relation to criteria that apply to a large number of offences.

Mr. Andrew F. Bennett: Does my hon. Friend agree that the policeman's remarks will be crucial in the granting of a warrant? If the policeman is describing a rape, he will not include the other circumstances which my hon. Friend believes make it a less serious offence. Such an offence will simply be described under one all-embracing title. Is not that a grave weakness?

Mr. Lyon: It makes a stronger case for the inter partes application. It makes the case for someone being there to argue against the police interpretation, but "serious arrestable offence" is used throughout the Bill in relation to a series of powers. We could not make the case in relation to every clause. The definition of "serious arrestable offence" is difficult to resolve. I am not sure that it is properly resolved by adopting the words "grave offence" proposed by my hon. Friend.
I am much attracted to amendment (i). There should be a provision which says that a balance should be struck between privacy and the need for the police to have evidence. That is what it is all about. The police should have to justify their intrusion into privacy. That factor should be brought to the attention not only of a justice of the peace but of a circuit judge. As I understand it, that is not so under the Bill. It ought to be possible to consider the effect upon the privacy of the individual who is holding the information.
Although I have never thought that clauses 9 and 10 were as serious an intrusion as some people suggested, and although there has been a certain amount of humbug about the concession the Government have made, the Government might consider seriously some of the


amendments put forward by my hon. Friend the Member for Stockport, North because they improve the concessions and do not in any way diminish the powers of the police.

Mr. Rees-Davies: It is clear that there has been a large increase in crime. In Kent, we have been anxious during the last year about the crime rise, particularly in serious offences such as robbery and burglary. The new clause gives a power which has never existed—the power for a justice of the peace to authorise entry to search in respect of a serious offence. This has not been stressed in the debate.
There has been a range of search warrants under many Acts; they have been haphazard and have never been brought together properly. For the first time this legislation does that. Hitherto there was no provision for the police to obtain search warrants for evidence of serious offences against the person, as in murder or rape, or of the offences of fraud or corruption. Altogether they have been unable to obtain entry to get the evidence, not the information, behind doors which are usually locked.
New clause 2 achieves the principal purpose of solving the problem of obtaining the evidence of crime to enable a conviction to be made. We must consider whether that is fairly balanced with the libertarian issue. The Government have made a remarkable achievement in putting together the new clause. It is many months since I, among many of his colleagues, had a word with my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Royal Tunbridge Wells (Mr. Mayhew). I said that I did not know how he would be able to achieve a reasonable definition of "serious arrestable offence". The one which was being considered was woefully inadequate. The Government have got down to it. It is worth drawing attention to the fact, because I disagree profoundly with the hon. Member for Ormskirk (Mr. Kilroy-Silk) who attacked the definition in the Bill.
There is an objectivity here. It is clear that under the new definition in clause 74 there is the power to be able to treat a matter as a serious arrestable offence
having regard to the nature of the offence; the scale; the degree of organisation; the degree of violence used or likely to be used; the gain derived or likely to be derived
whether large or small;
the harm caused or likely to be caused to persons; the harm caused or likely to be caused to the security of the state, the administration of justice or public order; the prevalence of similar offences.
Of course they cannot all apply but the person applies the appropriate one in order to see whether it justifies the right to regard it as a serious arrestable offence.
It is no mean achievement on the part of my right hon. Friend and his colleagues in the Home Office to come up with such a definition which, after 30 years of experience of the criminal law, crime and criminals of all kinds, I believe to be the best possible definition that could have been obtained, and I congratulate my right hon. Friend on it.
The matter does not end there. It was essential to ensure that other tests were applied. The first was that the justice of the peace, before giving the warrant, must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that a serious arrestable offence has been committed. But it is most important that there should be relevant evidence in the premises — not just information or tittle-tattle but solid evidence. That evidence must be of substantial value

to the investigation and it must be in connection with the application itself. That is the only way in which we can fill a gap in the law to ensure that the police are entering for the purpose of obtaining evidence which is necessary to secure a conviction for a serious offence.
The clause goes on to deal with excluded material. Whether or not I agree with the arguments, I can appreciate them. In particular, the clause excludes confessions made to priests. I have never heard of a case in a British court where a priest has been asked to give the outcome of a confession that was made to him in private. Home Office Ministers may know of one, but I do not.
Then there is the difficult position of journalists. The clause excludes not what the journalists know but the material in their possession, and we shall deal with other arguments about that. It is a nice point, but it is impracticable, and I think that it is wrong, to force a journalist to give information that has been given to him in strict confidence in circumstances that are virtually the same as a confession. It is the last thing that a journalist should be forced to do and there are many journalists who would rather go to prison than disclose the source of their information. It is for that reason that the clause is worded as it is. It is purely to exclude a tiny proportion of what might be the relevant evidence that is discovered in the premises searched. It goes somewhat wider to exclude certain other categories that also regard themselves as being entitled to special consideration.
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It is not for the lawyers to decide these matters. That is the privilege of the client. The client may well raise the question of privilege if he is seen, in which case the solicitor is perfectly able to give the disclosure, which may be of value. It by no means follows that privilege will be claimed.
New clause 2 provides that the evidence must be relevant—and I stress that—in relation to an offence, anything that would be admissible in evidence at the trial for the offence. That goes a long way towards answering one of the matters I have been concerned with—the libertarian issue. Having spent most of my professional life at the Bar defending people—although I have done a certain amount of prosecuting—I have always been very much concerned with what are called fishing expeditions by the police. I recognise that they exist and I think that this new clause, far from encouraging them, will clarify the position. It will make it plain to the police that they can enter only if they have a warrant from a justice of the peace. I do not believe that they will be able to give the magistrate a false account. They will have to show the nature of the evidence, and it must be evidence which can be heard in court.
There is, therefore, no way in which they can go in, go through papers and private correspondence and then take them. It can still happen, I concede, but there is a balance which we have to maintain with the essential need to get the evidence.
Nowadays there are many important computer frauds. Serious fraud is increasing all the time, both in the City and elsewhere. I know of many cases and could give many examples in which, if the police had been able to obtain a warrant of entry, they could have obtained corroboration from the documents on the premises which would have given all the evidence necessary both of the false accounts


and of the frauds which were being perpetrated. I believe that without this power the opportunity to defeat serious crime would be much reduced.
In view of this great increase in crime, which is worrying us, particularly in Thanet very much indeed, I am strongly of the opinion that the Government's new clause, which has been carefully drafted and very much improved and has given reasonable concessions to journalists, members of the citizens advice bureaux and priests, is not wrong. I think that the Government, far from being ashamed, should be very pleased with the efforts that they have made to improve the Bill and to get it right and to say, openly and honestly, "We have had another look at it. We thought we could improve it, and this is the way that we have sought to do so."

Miss Jo Richardson: I have been listening carefully to the debate because I was not on the Committee and I have been very anxious to hear all the arguments. In spite of my original intention not to speak I should like to make a short contribution.
I begin by referring to something that the hon. Member for Canterbury (Mr. Crouch)—who is not now in the Chamber — said when he talked about trusting the police. It seems to me that the whole thrust of debate in the Committee, as I have read the reports, and in the House tonight indicates that the Government are saying that this Bill will ensure that there is greater trust in the police. In my opinion—and, I think, in the opinion of my hon. Friends and perhaps other hon. Members too, and certainly of the public outside—the reverse is true. In other words, it will enlarge the already disturbing divide between the police and the public.
I agree with my right hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Sparkbrook (Mr. Hattersley) that the present powers of the police should be sufficient as they are, without the new powers in the Bill, including those in the clause and one or two others that will be discussed later. Faced with the choice, I would prefer either new clause 2 with the amendments of my hon. Friend the Member for Stockport, North (Mr. Bennett) or, even better, new clause 16. It seems to me, the more I read it, if I understand it correctly, that it lays down much more clearly the guidelines that would assist the magistrate to put properly the questions that were mentioned by my hon. Friend the Member for Bethnal Green and Bow (Mr. Mikardo). He described graphically an exchange between a police constable and a magistrate. If magistrates had the nous as well as the power and the duty to put the questions much more firmly, they would be able to give a much better judgment on whether such a warrant should be issued.
The Bill and this new clause remind me of so much legislation that contains words that are unquantifiable. Many hon. Members have referred to "reasonable" or "reasonable force if necessary". The words "reasonably practicable" as well as "unreasonably refused" also appear in the new clause. Someone's judgment will be required on all those words. Everyone's judgment is not exactly the same. I appreciate that it is difficult for us in the House to lay down a definition of the word "reasonable", but just to leave it at that leaves the whole issue open to doubt. I remember that when we discussed at length the last onslaught on the Abortion Act 1967 we had difficulties in trying to define "grave" and "serious". In a sense, the same thing applies here.
Perhaps the Minister will be good enough to answer a specific question. It is not clear to me from the clause whether the constable is to be uniformed. In clause 8, the constable is to be uniformed. In clause 13(7), there is a reference to the possibility of a constable not being uniformed. New clause 2 says neither one thing nor the other. Clause 8 states:
The power of entry and search conferred by this section is only exercisable for the purposes specified in subsection (1)(c)(ii) above by a constable in uniform.
We need some clarification of that.
A police officer who has a warrant may go to the house where he will interview or get the evidence from the person who is the subject of the warrant, but that person is not in. However, his mother might be in. When she hears the knock at the door, she looks through the spyhole. I do not know how many hon. Members have spyholes in their doors. I do. I live on my own and it is vital that I have one. I would not open the door unless I was absolutely certain that I knew who was on the other side. I would not let in a person who was not in uniform, who flashed a warrant card or identification card in front of the spyhole.
I have been burgled three times. The second time the police suggested that I should have a spyhole put in and a chain put on the door, and they said that I should never let anybody in unless I was absolutely certain that it was the person whom he or she claimed to be. I live in a large block of flats where it is easy to get burgled. It is all very well for us to encourage people, particularly the elderly, to be careful about whom they admit, but in the example that I am using it might be art elderly person who is obliged to open the door.
What happens if the constable is not in uniform? Does he simply break the door down and presumably trample over whoever has refused to open it? Does that action of refusing entry to a non-uniformed policeman constitute an unreasonable refusal to allow the constable to enter? That is not clear, and I should like to hear from the Minister assurances that if the clause goes through the constable will be plainly a uniformed constable.
I must cross swords with my hon. Friend the Member for York (Mr. Lyon) about serious arrestable offences. I shall not go down that road too far but I was a little surprised—somewhat shocked—to hear him say that he could envisage some cases of rape that were not serious arrestable offences, and that there might be circumstances in which one party concerned had led the other to believe that she would be willing. I maintain, as I think that most people would maintain, that rape, in whatever circumstances it begins, whether it is a mugging or whether it is between two people who know each other and have had some conversation beforehand, is a serious offence and would be regarded as such by most women.

Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: I interject because my hon. Friend has raised this issue before and it is pertinent to the wider debate. To say that rape is a serious offence which in about 90 per cent. of the cases receives a prison sentence straight out is to recognise that one cannot say, "You have said yes so far and now I shall forget about the fact that you have said no." The police, the community and everybody else recognise that rape is an offence and a serious offence. I am arguing that if one is talking about the definition of serious arrestable offences, which comes within an extra category of powers in the Bill, it is possible to take a view of that kind of rape and say that it is not a serious arrestable offence in the way that a mugging is a


serious arrestable offence. There is a difference. My hon. Friend and I may continue to disagree, but I do not want her to go away with the view that I do not regard the lesser offences as offences. I do, and I accept her case that rape should be considered by the law as a serious offence. However, that is different from the argument that we are having at the moment about the category of powers that attaches to a serious arrestable offence.

Miss Richardson: I am not sure that I accept that. I know that we are straying a little off the subject, but I can envisage circumstances where there has not been a mugging but the woman concerned has simply accused the man of rape. One can envisage many such circumstances where it might be necessary for the constable to get a warrant to go in and arrest the man and take evidence from him. I accept my hon. Friend's view of the seriousness of the effects of rape, and I am glad to know that that is his view.
Like others of my hon. Friends, I would rather not have the Bill, and I do not see that this new clause, improvement though it is on the old clause 9, is necessary in this day and age. In my view, it will not add a dot or comma to the trust that we all hope for between the police and the public.

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Mr. Christopher Price: I do not want to delay the Committee for long, because I know that others want to speak, but I want to make one or two comments following those of the hon. and learned Member for Thanet, West (Mr. Rees-Davies).
New clause 2 needs many more safeguards if we are to prevent its becoming simply a vehicle for the police to continue to behave as they do at present. I know that my hon. Friend the Member for Lambeth, Central (Mr. Tilley) will say a word about the Railton road revelations a few days ago when the Home Secretary answered a question from my hon. Friend the Member for Norwood (Mr. Fraser) and the attitude of the Metropolitan police, particularly that of Deputy Commissioner Patrick Kavenagh, who has now retired, which even the Police Complaints Board realised was offhand and casual in the extreme. The board was rather unhappy that he had not taken the matter seriously.
If new clause 2 is to be worth anything at all, we must ensure that when the police go to a magistrate and ask for the right to enter someone's house they do so on proper evidence, wanting to get something specific, rather than out of a general desire just to go in and comb the house, the area if necessary, for any evidence that they can pick up. From all the evidence of the behaviour of the Metropolitan police —I cannot speak for other police forces, as I said again and again in Committee—it is clear that we need stringent safeguards, much more stringent than those that we have at present, if we are to get it right.
I hope that the Minister will say something helpful about amendment (e), in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Stockport, North (Mr. Bennett). The amendment may not be absolutely right, but it tries to put Gahni v. Jones, the Lord Denning judgment that we discussed endlessly in Committee, into statutory form. The amendment tries to say, "Look, the police cannot just

do what the clause says they should do" which is to look for relevant evidence, meaning just evidence that would be admissible at a trial for that offence, but to say a great deal more about the evidence for which the police are looking.
There is often considerable argument in court about what is admissible evidence. In new clause 2 we are handing over to a magistrate in each area of the country the right almost to decide in advance of the trial what will be admissible evidence and what will not be admissible evidence. We all know that there are magistrates and magistrates. It would be wrong for me to make pejorative remarks about magistrates, since that is probably ruled out in "Erskine May". I shall say nothing against magistrates in London, except that some magistrates have the reputation of doing absolutely anything that the police want them to do. The police do not have to prove anything. The magistrates just sign on the dotted line. Other magistrates take their jobs more seriously. If we accept that the police will not find it difficult to convince magistrates that they want to go in, we must write much more into the Bill.

Mr. R. C. Mitchell: If that is so, is not amendment (i), tabled by the hon. Member for Stockport, North (Mr. Bennett), meaningless, because it requires magistrates to make a subjective judgment, balancing the evidence and the public interest? Surely the police will quickly discover which magistrates will come down on one side rather than on the other and go to some magistrates and not others?

Mr. Price: My erstwhile hon. Friend, the Member for Southampton, Itchen (Mr. Mitchell) is right. The police will shop around. They will know which are Tesco magistrates and which are Sainsbury magistrates. In terms of quality and shoddy goods, they will go to Tesco magistrates every time in search of their warrants.

Mr. Mikardo: They do that now.

Mr. Price: I agree. They have done that for years. It is a well-known sport in London.
I support amendment (i), not because I think that the magistrates or police will take much notice of it, but because if the provision were tried in the High court, Lord Donaldson—against whom I must say nothing, because in the House I am not allowed to criticise judges—the Master of the Rolls or even Lord Wilberforce might be able to take the provision in amendment (i), pronounce in clear terms exactly what it means and convince the police and magistrates that it is serious.
I urge the Minister to consider amendment (e) seriously. Lord Denning took the Ghani v. Jones case seriously, and I take it seriously, particularly because of my 10-year relationship with Detective Chief Superintendent Alan Jones, whose name was given to that law case. If the provision were written in black and white and each magistrate had to address his mind to amendments (e), (a) and (b) carefully, would the evidence be admissible and would the evidence be produced? The magistrate would have to consider whether the evidence was used in an offence or was an object that might prove the offence. That sums up what the Court of Appeal said in the important case that I have mentioned. If we wrote that into the Bill, I might be given confidence that some of the magistrates, whom I might call third division


magistrates, or even Tranmere Rovers magistrates—the kind of magistrates who might some day find themselves up for re-election—

Mr. R. C. Mitchell: Or re-selection.

Mr. Price: If such magistrates had to apply their minds to the provisions of amendment (e), some progress might be made.
I ask the Minister also seriously to consider amendment (g). What is the point of alerting people, asking permission to enter and search their homes and following all the procedures in new clause 2 if, when they refuse, perhaps for perfectly good reasons, they are denied the right to explain their refusal to the magistrate? I could understand it if the Government had taken a wholly authoritarian attitude and said that the police merely needed to get a warrant from a magistrate and then they could bash the door down. Essentially, that is the present position. The number of door jambs in my constituency that the receiver of the Metropolitan police has repaired at public expense is almost beyond counting. But we are now changing all that. We are bringing in a new law and people will be asked first whether they wish their homes to be entered, but if refusal on their part means that a secret judicial hearing will take place at which they cannot be represented, the whole procedure becomes pure nonsense.
The substitute for clause 10, which will be dealt with in the next debate, involves class discrimination between professionals and the public. The big, tough, rich professionals—the journalists and the doctors—will be told that they have won their little campaign, so their doors will not be bashed down. Indeed, with regard to certain information the authorities will entirely deny themselves the right to obtain that evidence. I agree with all that, but as Members of Parliament we are not elected only by doctors, journalists and priests. Certainly, comparatively few, if any, such people seem to vote for me. As a democratically elected Member of Parliament, I am expected to make all those concessions to rather well-to-do professional people, who I suspect vote Tory in any case, but no concessions at all to the ordinary citizen who bears the brunt of the door smashing in my constituency.
I believe that that is wrong. We should try to behave in a relatively evenhanded way as between professionals and ordinary folk. It seems that the doctors, the lawyers and the priests have led the fight. The Archbishop of Canterbury has, as it were, padded a way towards Downing street, everyone has followed and the Government have been miraculously converted. Even the journalists have received soft soap treatment from the Minister of State. If there is any truth in the stories that one hears about his recent encounter with them—I am sure that there is not — this is certainly the softest Government towards journalists in the history of this country.

Sir Raymond Gower: I follow the hon. Gentleman's argument, and I have much sympathy with some of his comments, but is not the big difficulty the fact that journalists and other professionals are unlikely to have evidence concealed in their dwellings, whereas the major difficulty facing the police occurs in cases in which they have to act fairly quickly to have any chance at all of obtaining evidence that may be concealed in premises?

Mr. Price: rose—

The Second Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means (Mr. Paul Dean): Order. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will resist the temptation to stray into the debate that we will have on the next clause.

Mr. Price: I shall resist that temptation, Mr. Dean, but new clause 2(1)(d) states
that it is not excluded material or special procedure material".
There is no way in which I cannot incidentally put the odd toe into the water on the other side of the fence, but I assure you that I shall not dive in.
Frankly, the Government's concession to the professionals surprised me. However, they made their decision and it is their responsibility and privilege so to do. But surely it would be logical for them to make a concession for inter panes hearings before magistrates for other groups. I agree that the police believe that villains are found slightly more readily among the nonprofessional classes. However, some of the accountants that I have come across in my life, and, indeed, one or two lawyers, have not differed massively from some of the villains who come to my surgery and ask for my aid.
I have never believed that crime is the monopoly of one or other of the classes in our society. Every class has its little grouping. It is wrong for Parliament to be seen to enact what appears to others to be class legislation. That is why I plead the case for amendment (g), which, in the majority of cases, would enable an inter partes hearing to be held.
I shall listen carefully to the Minister when he replies to the debate. He was generous in Committee and properly receptive of certain arguments. I hope that he will recognise that we are rot yet on Report, but still in Committee. If he could put on his Committee hat and wear his Committee persona, it might assist our progress.

Mr. John Tilley: I wish to speak about one matter that has been raised by some hon. Members, and especially by my hon. Friend the Member for Bethnal Green and Bow (Mr. Mikardo), that being what will happen in reality if certain powers are given to and used by the police. We must address ourselves to the questions whether, first, the powers are likely to be abused, and, secondly, whether they will reduce current abuse.
A major gap in the clause is that while it clearly gives accountability in advance — a magistrate must be satisfied about the nature of the search and the evidence — there is no accountability after the event. A policeman may be over-zealous in urging the magistrate to issue the warrant or, perhaps more important, overzealous in its use. On the matter of excessive zeal in the use of warrants, I, like other hon. Members, wish to refer to the Police Complaints Board report on the events in Railton road in July 1981. I do not represent that part of Brixton — it is represented by my hon. Friend the Member for Norwood (Mr. Fraser)—but several of my constituents were involved on the night in question.
The report of what happened in the large police raid does not show merely undue violence by individual policemen, it contains a much deeper accusation of things going wrong and of abuse of the use of warrants, which is what we are talking about tonight. I shall therefore quote briefly from the August 1982 report from the Police Complaints Board which went to the deputy commissioner at Scotland Yard. It stated:


The Board's primary concern is about the extent to which searches were conducted which were not authorised by the warrant. The Board understand that for a search to be lawful, the warrant should be in the hands of the officer conducting the search, and it is not difficult to come to the conclusion that every senior officer in possession of a warrant regarded it as a licence to enter premises and, once having gained entry, to search for evidence of any crime. The Board find it difficult to believe that this can be attributed entirely to ignorance of the law.
The key words in the report are:
every senior officer involved in the very large raid.
We are not talking about individual policemen overstepping the mark, although there is no doubt that they did with regard to damage. The accusation is broader, deeper and more serious than that. At the end of its report the Board says that in its view
The reports of the investigation revealed at best ignorance or misunderstanding of their powers on the part of a great number of officers, or at worst institutional disregard of the niceties of the law. There is also evidence, which has been acknowledged, of lack of supervision and lack of care in recording to whom sledge hammers and crow bars were given and evasiveness on the part of some of the officers who were interviewed about their parts in the raid.
Those were the serious accusations made by the board. It reported them to the deputy commissioner and, what is important, in the next letter that the board sent to the Home Secretary, it makes it clear that the board was not satisfied with the deputy commissioner's response. The board states:
The board take the view that the letter accepts the validity of their criticism, but they are disappointed that it was not more specific about the remedial steps which have been taken to prevent further abuses of a similar nature.
It was only after the Home Secretary intervened that the Metropolitan police were able to spell out in detail what more they had done.
A suggestion has been made by several hon. Members that further disciplinary charges will follow what has been reported by the Police Complaints Board. The opposite is true. It says that there should be no further disciplinary charges.
We are faced with a concrete example where warrants were abused, not just in the sense of excess force, although there was that, but where every senior officer searched way beyond the scope of the original warrant. We must have an answer from the Minister tonight as to how this new clause will ensure that this does not happen again or that it will be more difficult for it to happen again. It is not an isolated case. Many senior officers overstepped their powers in several different ways in what I am sure the Committee will recognise were the most sensitive circumstances—Brixton a few days after the riots of 1981.
It has taken two years for the report to become public and it became public by accident as a result of a parliamentary question. Earlier reports of the Police Complaints Board dealing with individual complaints seemed to suggest that there was nothing wrong. The Minister should tell us whether the same haphazard accountability as to how the police use their warrants when they have them will apply under new clause 2. If it does, the clause and the Bill will make things worse rather than better with regard to public confidence in the law and the police. Unless overstepping the mark can be publicly and quickly revealed and put right, the people of Brixton and other inner city areas such as those mentioned by my hon. Friend the Member for Bethnal Green and Bow (Mr.

Mikardo) will feel that police — community relations have been made much worse by the Bill and that new clause 2 provides new powers for the police and no safeguards for the people whose homes will be raided.

Sir Raymond Gower: A warrant under new clause 2 may authorise persons to accompany any constable who is executing it. Is the hon. Gentleman saying that that is quite inadequate for his purpose?

Mr. Tilley: No. I have no idea what subsection (3) means. I do not think that it meets the point. Perhaps the hon. Gentleman would make his speech and explain to the Committee what subsection (3) means.

Mr. James Wellbeloved: I have listened to a fair amount of the debate and two aspects of it need to be considered. The hon. Member for Lewisham, West (Mr. Price) referred to the professionals — to journalists, lawyers, the clergy and doctors—and said that the Government had taken care of them in new clause 2, but had ignored the ordinary folk at the receiving end. The hon. Gentleman has got it wrong. Praise must go to the Government for conceding the quite genuine apprehensions of the professionals, and for attempting to do something about the ordinary people who are on the receiving end of burglary, violence, mugging and all other crimes that occur in working-class areas, in Thamesmead, and in Erith and Crayford in my constituency.
In considering the amendments and the new clause, it is important that the House should fully consider the apprehensions of ordinary people. There is no point in Members of Parliament and political parties visiting constituencies, making speeches and trying to make political capital out of the current crime wave when they deny the law enforcement authorities the weapons and armoury that they need.
I support new clause 2. A significant step forward is being made, but many of the points raised were no more than nitpicking. They do not contribute one little bit towards the real battle that must be waged if my constituents and other ordinary people are to be protected from the crime wave.
I trust that the Minister will direct his mind to two points when he replies. In Committee he said that he would look upon inter partes hearings more favourably. He would do much to meet the few remaining worries of myself and other hon. Members if he moved a little further in that respect.
It is suggested that the issuing of warrants should be taken away from magistrates courts and justices of the peace and put into the hands of circuit judges. The Minister must make a substantial case if he is to answer my remaining doubts on that point. I trust that he will make some moves in those two directions, but even if he does not I shall support the new clause as it stands.

Mr. Dubs: The hon. Member for Erith and Crayford (Mr. Wellbeloved) has, of course, got things wrong. Our approach to the Bill and to the debate is quite simple. The crime rate can best be tackled by improving co-operation between the public and the police. Anything that makes such co-operation less likely will help the criminal and hinder the police in the long run. Therefore, I have some misgivings. I fear that the effect of many of the provisions will be to lessen the public's willingness to co-operate and


will therefore make the task of the police more difficult. In turn, that means that the provisions will not protect the average citizen, although that is the stated intention. That is why the hon. Gentleman was wrong in his intitial point.
We have spent some time on the new clauses and amendments and that is only right, because they go to the heart of the Bill. One of the many concerns expressed about the Bill is that innocent people and their homes may be subject to raids by the police in the search for evidence. Surely we should not deny anyone the right to speak up on behalf of innocent people and to demand the maximum safeguards before their homes are attacked in this way.
I shall comment briefly on two aspects of the new clauses and amendments. Throughout the Bill — and particularly in the new clause — justices of the peace have an important part to play. If any justices of the peace have listened to the last four hours or so of debate, they may have decided that it will be difficult to know how to use the powers in the Bill. Does the Minister intend to give justices of the peace any guidance on how they are to exercise their powers under the new clause? In the absence of an inter partes hearing, justices of the peace will have a great deal of power. I wonder whether the Home Office will issue them with guidance, or whether they have some other basis on which they can decide how to act uniformly. If they do not act uniformly, we shall be in the very position that the Minister described in Committee, when he spoke about the way in which the practice of one magistrate might differ from that of another.
When speaking about how long suspects might be held, the Minister said that the decision of one magistrate would not be sufficient. If that is so for the length of time that people may be held in detention before being charged, it should also apply to searches of innocent people's homes. I listened to the Minister in Committee for about four months and I am rather concerned about the inconsistency between what he said in that context and his apparent view of the new clause.
The recent triennial review of the Police Complaints Board talks about variations in practice from one magistrate to another. I am concerned about that. An inter partes hearing would be a safeguard that would make the provision more workable. If we could have an inter partes hearing, amendment (i), in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Stockport, North (Mr. Bennett), would go to the heart of striking a balance between the public interest in securing evidence and the protection of individual privacy. The amendment is well expressed and the Minister would do well to consider accepting it, or something like it, as a necessary safeguard.
I regret that we have not found a better way of obtaining the views of the various bodies that will be affected by the Bill. By adopting the Special Standing Committee procedure we could have called justices of the peace and police officers before us in investigative session before proceeding on a line by line, clause by clause, discussion. We would thus have learnt from them directly how they saw their conduct in relation to the powers to be given to them. We are all speculating, and in the absence of direct evidence of that sort we must depend on our judgment of how justices of the peace and police officers will interpret these powers.
While the Committee was sitting, I had a discussion with the team of police officers from Scotland Yard who were dealing with this legislation. I very much regret that the Standing Committee did not have the chance of

listening to their views before considering clauses 9 and 10. Had we done so, our discussion would have been shortened and the Bill would have been significantly improved.
I am still unhappy about the definition of a serious arrestable offence. I accept that the amendments made in Committee and now incorporated in clause 74 are a significant and important improvement. Nevertheless, in view of the Royal Commission's report, I still wonder whether we have got it right.
In paragraph 3.7, on page 24, the Royal Commission states that
a particular coercive power should be made available in respect of a particular offence".
I believe that the Royal Commission got it right when it referred to "a particular coercive power" and suggested that there should he important safeguards before such powers could be exercised.
In paragraph 3.9, it stated:
Parliament will wish most carefully to scrutinise the offences that would warrant the application of the enhanced powers to them, since here the balance between the liberty of the citizen and the interests of society is at its most delicate.
It would be difficult to find more apposite words than those. The Royal Commission went on to say that
society's perception of 'seriousness' may well change over the years",
and that
means of prescribing it should be flexible and capable of ready review by Parliament.
In his many references to the Royal Commission, the Minister failed to take note of the warnings that I have quoted. Therefore, I view the definition of a serious arrestable offence with greater misgivings, because, notwithstanding the improvements made in Committee, I feel that we have given the police wide powers that may not be used in the wisest possible way.
I much prefer the approach of the Royal Commission, which used the definition of a grave offence. In reply to my hon. Friend the Member for York (Mr. Lyon), I would merely say that because a series of offences comprised the definition of a grave offence, that does not mean that the police would use their powers in every instance, particularly those in the new clause. Such a definition, would, however, set the limits in the same way as the definition of a "serious arrestable offence", which we now use, sets the widest limits, although we would not in all cases expect the police to use the powers given to them when they believe it is a serious arrestable offence. They would wish to do that only in some cases. The same would apply if, as the Royal Commission suggested, we used the term "grave offence". I regret that we have not done that. New clause 2 would be much better and have more safeguards if we had done that. That is another reason why I prefer new clause 16 to new clause 2.

Sir Raymond Gower: No Conservative Member has said that it is undesirable to scrutinise and question severely every word in new clause 2 or, for that matter, any new clause. That is always the case in legal drafting, perhaps even more so in matters that carry criminal penalties.
The hon. Member for Bethnal Green and Bow (Mr. Mikardo) made an acceptable, often amusing and effective comment on .some parts of new clause 2. However, he appeared to underestimate the knowledge, experience and skill of most of our magistrates. What he said would have had greater veracity 20 years ago but today, as he knows,


great care is taken to ensure that newly appointed magistrates go through fairly intensive study, exchange ideas and attend conferences to ensure that they acquire a knowledge of their duties and of what magistrates in other parts of the country think.

Mr. Mikardo: The hon. Gentleman is completely misquoting me. I said nothing about the quality of magistrates or anything adverse about them. I had better not, as I have a daughter who is a magistrate and if I said anything against her I should have a bad time. I said that a magistrate who is faced with a constable who is applying for a warrant has no method, however clever he may be, of checking the accuracy of what the constable says. That is undoubtedly true.

Sir Raymond Gower: The constable must answer for what he says later on. He is not an irresponsible person who works in a vacuum. Such a constable will not be new to those duties and will perform them again and again. He gives the magistrate information and must convince him. The magistrate is not a tyro and he has spoken to other constables and assessed what they have told him. The magistrate must be sure that there are reasonable grounds.
There is always criticism when the word "reasonable" is used. I understand that, but the hon. Gentleman must know that legal drafting is not facile. No word has been more tested in courts of law. Some of my hon. Friends who have more experience than me in courts of law will agree that few words have been more tested than "reasonable". A word which has a long and respectable heritage is being used.
The hon. Member for Battersea, South (Mr. Dubs) quoted from the Royal Commission report and its use of the word "grave". It is not for me to draw an easy distinction between the words "gravity" and "seriousness". They are given as synonyms in the Oxford English dictionary. They are accurate words which set premises that can be identified.
9.45 pm
The problem, which I sought to establish in an intervention, when we are dealing with this kind of thing is that often, unfortunately, speed and quick action are of the essence. The evidence being sought may be moved or hidden. Unless the search is carried out fairly expeditiously it is bound to fail. That is why we can draw a distinction between these offences and cases involving professional people. These offences are in a special category. They are serious offences where the evidence may be of such a nature that it can be concealed or removed quickly from the premises. A legal trial or a long legal inquisition, although desirable, would surely defeat the object of trying to defeat crime.
Conservative Members would object strongly to different laws for people living in the crowded inner cities and for those who are fortunate enough to live in the countryside or in the more spacious suburbs. Nothing would be more repulsive. The same law must apply to all. We are dealing not with a different kind of person but with a different kind of offence. The professional person might have certain evidence, but on examination my right hon. Friend has decided that the arguments against incorporating such cases is greater than the arguments for inclusion.

To exclude this provision would destroy the efficacy of the kind of system we want to establish to defeat increasing crime.
A point made several times was that an officer obtaining such a warrant will be accompanied by senior officers who will jointly exercise the warrant. Subsection (3) of the new clause says:
A warrant under this section may authorise persons to accompany any constable who is executing it.
That means that those persons would have to be specified. Surely that is the safeguard which hon. Members desire. In other words, if the magistrate believes it necessary he will authorise certain persons to accompany the officer who will exercise the warrant.
Like the hon. Member for Erith and Crayford (Mr. Wellbeloved) I take the view that the new clause should be included in the Bill. When these things are tested in the courts imperfections may be revealed but generally this is a good clause. It may prove to have some fallacies but it is the best that the draftsmen can achieve at this stage before it is tried in the courts.

Mr. R. C. Mitchell: Like the hon. Member for Barry (Sir R. Gower), I am a strong supporter of the lay magistrate system. I declare an interest, in that my wife is a magistrate. I should be reluctant to place extra duties upon magistrates which might bring them into political or other controversy.
I do not know what the normal procedure is throughout the country when a policeman applies to a magistrate for a search warrant. In my area the magistrate will probably contact the clerk to the justices before granting the warrant, or may ask the constable to contact the clerk to the justices before approaching him. In many cases the magistrate may ask the police constable to take an oath on the Bible before granting a warrant.
On the whole, the new clause is a good compromise and an improvement on what went before, but I have two brief questions. Has the Magistrates Association been consulted on the drafting of the clause and will the Lord Chancellor be issuing any guidance to magistrates on its operation? It would be a great pity if magistrates were brought into some form of political controversy because of their operation of the clause.

Mr. Mayhew: For those hon. Members who served on the Standing Committee for three, or possibly even four, months, this has been a somewhat nostalgic occasion, because a great many old favourites, with which we became particularly familiar as the weeks and months went by, have been revived. I am grateful for the seriousness and the perspicacity of the speeches that have been made. They have put into sharp focus the serious considerations with which clause 9 and the group of new clauses deal.
I agree with what has been said by several hon. Members about the real purpose of this part of the Bill. It reflects—as I said at the outset about four or five hours ago—the intention to give greater powers to the police to investigate crime. My hon. Friend the Member for Barry (Sir R. Gower) has just made that point. The hon. Member for Erith and Crayford (Mr. Wellbeloved) and my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Thanet, West (Mr. Rees-Davies) said that there was grave concern about the increase in crime, not just in our county of Kent where there has been a serious increase but among most of the


people on whose behalf many Labour Members have sought to speak during the debate. They are deeply anxious about the increase in crime.
I agree with those who have said that it is the people living in the small houses in the small streets who have most to fear, and who do fear most, from muggings and street violence. That is the origin of all this. We have tended, for reasons that I completely understand—they derive from our traditional and proper concern for individual liberty—to discuss this part of the Bill rather to the exclusion of the anxiety about crime that lies at its root. We have tended to discuss it almost exclusively in terms of its impact upon individual liberty.
The Police Complaints Board has been referred to during the debate, perfectly relevantly, but there is one observation that I should like to make about one of its recent reports. The Police Complaints Board report of its triennial review said, in paragraph 4·6, that it had for a long time recognised that ignorance and uncertainty of the law relating to police powers make for bad relations between the police and the community. It therefore supported the clarification and codification of the law in the Police and Criminal Evidence Bill. That is extremely important. One of the Bill's principal objects—certainly of this part of the Bill—is that the law relating to police powers should be clarified and codified, not least because, as the Police Complaints Board said, where there is uncertainty and ignorance there are bad relations between the police and the community, either because the police do something which is within their powers but which the community do not believe or know to be within their powers, or because the police do something that is outside their powers, believing that it is.
I come to the first of the questions which the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Sparkbrook (Mr. Hattersley) asked me. He said that it was all very well to come along with our new clauses, but we should say a word about why what we started with was no longer satisfactory. I thought that we had done that, but I am perfectly prepared to put it shortly again.
The bulk of the criticism of this part of the Bill centres on the provisions of the Bill giving the police access to confidentially held information at a time when they are investigating a serious arrestable offence. That was the guts of the opposition.
We sought to allay that anxiety by pointing out that it was, of course, never the intention of the Government that the police, when investigating any offences, let alone serious arrestable offences, should be able to go through personal medical records, which are obviously of a confidential nature, in order to see whether they could narrow down the scope of their inquiry. It was never the Government's intention that police notebooks, for example, should be able to be examined in order to see whether they contained evidence of some crime. We sought to make that clear by the wording of clause 9 as it stands in the Bill—namely, that any material to which these powers extend should be material that might be given in evidence. We said that, because of the laws of evidence, none of this particularly sensitive material would, save in a very rare case, be get-at-able under these provisions, because the rule against hearsay evidence would prevent it.
It was not until the Bill was printed and was, I believe, in Committee that the anxieties of the doctors were first raised with us, and after that those of the journalists. It got

to the stage at which we were being told that we [night be right in what we said about the laws of evidence but the doctors' patients were not going to believe it; they believed that their medical records would be able to be examined by the police and this would have a very bad effect upon the openness of the relationship between patient and doctor and would affect the diagnosis and possibly the treatment.
There comes a time when it is what people believe a Bill achieves that becomes more important than what a Bill does achieve. Therefore, since there was no divergence in policy between what the Government intended and what was being said to us, it became clear to all of us that it was more sensible to state expressly and openly what previously we had said in the Bill implicitly and by reference to the laws of evidence.
That was why we thought it was sensible to recast this part of the Bill and to say in terms that this class of material should not be able to be examined in any circumstances, and that other confidentially held material should be able to be examined but only on the application of a particular procedure, which is called in these new clauses the "special procedure". That requires application to be made to a circuit judge, and various other matters with which we shall be dealing in the next group of amendments.
The next question that the right hon. Gentleman asked was why we needed any change in the law at all, and what had been happening to make any revision necessary. We did go into this pretty exhaustively in the course of the Standing Committee, but for members of this enlarged Committee it might be helpful if I refer briefly to one or two passages in the report of the Royal Commission, which considered these matters for something like a year at the invitation of the former Home Secretary, the right hon. Member for Leeds, South (Mr. Rees).
The Royal Commission said:
We are here concerned with other premises. Evidence of crime in such places can cover a very wide field; it extends beyond the mere subject matter of an offence to items which may constitute only a remote link in the chain of proof. As well as more obvious objects such as murder weapons or blackmail notes, it may include personal diaries or papers, business records, or other sorts of stored information. This kind of evidence may be property belonging to quite innocent individuals or organisations, and its removal might cause serious interference in their personal or commercial lives.
The Royal Commission states in paragraph 3.41:
It is only rarely that the police do not receive consent to enter when looking for evidence, since people are often anxious to cooperate and allow the police every facility. However where property or information is held on a confidential basis the holder may be unwilling to disclose it for fear of being sued for breach of duty by the person from whom he received it.
The Royal Commission dealt not only with confidentially held information but with other information that the police need to examine when investigating a serious offence.
It went on to say:
We consider that there will be rare circumstances"—

It being Ten o'clock, The CHAIRMAN left the Chair to report Progress and ask leave to sit again.

Committee report Progress.

Ordered,
That, at this day's sitting, the Police and Criminal Evidence Bill may be proceeded with, though opposed, until any hour. —[Mr. Lang.]

Again considered in Committee.

Question again proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Mr. Mayhew: The Royal Commission went on to say:
We consider that there will be rare circumstances where a compulsory power is needed, and should be available to the police before charge.
That is the reason why there is a need. We agree with the views of the Royal Commission. As my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Hemel Hempstead (Mr. Lyell) said, the provisions of new clause 2 accurately reflect not only the power that the Royal Commission recommended but the safeguards with which it recommended it should be hedged about. The right hon. Member for Birmingham, Sparkbrook (Mr. Hattersley) said that the Royal Commission's entire intention was frustrated by the Government not making the powers dependent upon grave offences. That charge cannot be sustained.
In this lengthy debate we have gone over the question of the Government's preference for the concept of "serious arrestable offence", defined as it is now in clause 74. It was amended in Committee. I very much agree with what was said by the hon. Member for York (Mr. Lyon) about the massive improvement that that definition in clause 74 achieves. I shall not weary the Committee by reading it, because people are familiar with it. If they are not, it can easily be seen in the clause. The important point, which I readily confirm, is that it now provides an objective test for the serious arrestable offence. It does so by saying that the constable must have reasonable grounds for believing that it is a serious example of an arrestable offence, an arrestable offence itself being one that carries maximum imprisonment of not less than five years. Not just the constable but the magistrate or the circuit judge who has to apply those jurisdictions must do that having taken account of a number of sensible criteria, of which there are about eight—the nature of the offence, whether violence was used, the degree of organisation, how much gain has resulted from it, and so on.
The hon. Gentleman was absolutely right when he took issue with his right hon. Friend the Member for Sparkbrook and said that he believed that the serious arrestable offence as now defined was a very great improvement. I agree with my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Thanet, West that it was about as good a definition as one could achieve. I am grateful to him for that comment.

Mr. Hattersley: Will the Minister confirm that in clause 74, the amended clause which he described as an improvement, the criteria as he described them —although some of us would not regard them as criteria—are considerations that the person contemplating the exercise of the power must judge to be appropriate in the circumstances? The clause is wholly subjective in that the person exercising the power has the right imposed on him to judge whether (a) to (h) are appropriate. That makes them not criteria but subjective suggestions.

Mr. Mayhew: The object of the criteria is that they have to be reasonable, and the person has to have grounds for coming to the conclusion that this a serious example of an arrestable offence—itself an objective definition, defined according to maximum term of imprisonment—and that he has to take into account the matters that are there set out. There were legitimate criticisms of the original definition that the criteria were not identified and

the person was not told that he had to take anything into account, and that there was not any provision that there should be grounds for coming to that conclusion.
It is a great mistake to suppose that the Royal Commission came to the conclusion that it was possible simply to provide a list. Paragraph 3·7 of the report says that it should be called a "grave offence" and the commission sets out a number of offences that it says would normally be included. When it comes to dishonesty, the report gives the categories of dishonest offences but says that a "grave offence" occurs only when "major amounts are involved". At the end of the day, the Royal Commission does not say that there can be a cut-and-dried list of offences, and for good reason. If one did, there would then be the application of these coercive powers more widely than under the formula that the Bill adopts. The difficulty about taking a list of offences is, as the hon. Member for York, who is no longer here, said—

Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: I am here.

Mr. Mayhew: I am sorry. The hon. Gentleman is here. He has advanced to the Front Bench, albeit below the Gangway. He made his helpful speech from the farthest Bench back. As the hon. Gentleman said, it is not possible to distinguish between various gradations of severity that any particular offence may present. Therefore, the Government are right, for reasons that we set out at great length in Committee, to go for the serious arrestable offence concept. It is wrong to say that the Royal Commission's entire intention was frustrated.

Mr. Pitt: I take the hon. and learned Gentleman's point, but can he tell the House whether, on the definitions as set out in clause 74, we are to wait for a considerable amount of case law to define the definitions or whether we are to go on stumbling from one to the other until the Bill has to come back to the House to be more tightly defined?

Mr. Mayhew: I should be surprised if the Bill will have to come back here to be more tightly defined. It sets out such common sense matters to be taken into account that there will be little case law, but we shall have to see.
The right hon. Member for Sparkbrook then said that there should be a more senior member of the judiciary, a circuit judge not a magistrate. However, there are a considerable number of statutes that have already given the police the power to obtain a search warrant to look for evidence, not from people who are thought to be accomplices or involved in a crime but innocent people, of offences that they are investigating. The powers are set out in appendix 5 to the first volume of the report. In following the recommendations of the Royal Commission, the new clause does not set up a new principle. That has been established over many decades by Parliament in a number of piecemeal statutes. It applies a general criterion or code, and limits it to serious arrestable offences. That is an important point.
Clauses 12, 13 and 15 write into statute law for the first time a comprehensive code of safeguards covering applications for the issue of and execution of search warrants. This code in clauses 12, 13 and 15—it applies to the new power that we are setting up in new clause 2, old clause 9 in the Bill as printed—will apply to all search warrant powers. It is therefore a mistake to look at


new clause 2 in isolation from clauses 12, 13 and 15, which in future govern the application of all search warrant powers.
I say to those who have properly pointed to the Railton road affair in July 1981 that the defects in execution that were revealed emphasise the great need for this Bill, for the tighter safeguards that are contained in clauses 12, 13 and 15, and for the very tight safeguards that are included in new clause 2. To the extent that we now know that there have been shortcomings, it is most important that in future the police should have to comply with these extremely tight safeguards.
At present, there are powers to obtain search warrants for certain articles — for example, stolen goods, controlled drugs, and articles used to commit criminal damage—but there are no powers for other kinds of material — for example, weapons used in serious assaults, or evidence of serious fraud in the form, for instance, of trading accounts or bank records. There is no power for the police to obtain a search warrant in the course of investigating rape, for example, in respect of bloodstained clothing worn by victims, or to look for equipment used in an armed robbery, for example pickaxe handles, masks, or for blackmail notes or fingerprints left at the scene of serious assaults, and so on. I do not need to read all the areas in which the police should, in my opinion, have powers to look for these items, to point out the extraordinary hotchpotch of the law at present and to justify the Royal Commission's recommendations in that regard.
Let us take the instance to which the right hon. Member for Sparkbrook referred, section 26 of the Theft Act. All that one has to do at present is to go to a magistrate and say, "I have reason to believe that some stolen property is in so-and-so's house". There is no question of any safeguards. One goes along and one can use reasonable force if it is not possible to enter. So this is not a new principle. It is a much tigher application of a principle that has been properly but not consistently applied hitherto.
The last question that the right hon. Gentleman asked related to the use of the powers specifically, rather than general activity following a specific power. He said that there should not be fishing expeditions. I entirely agree with all those who have spoken on that matter. It is important to remember that the safeguards in clause 12, 13 and 15 are extremely tight. All applications must be on oath. The grounds must be stated to the magistrate to whom the application is made. The nature of the articles sought and the premises have to be specified. Execution has to take place in a month, and has to be undertaken normally at a reasonable hour. A copy of the warrant must be produced and given to the occupier, and if he is not there it has to be left in a prominent place. A search that does not comply with those provisions will be unlawful. All warrants have to be returned to the justices who issued them, and endorsed with the outcome so that magistrates can gauge the effectiveness and the police gauge their performance. These safeguards are highly relevant to the issues that have been raised in this debate.
My hon. Friend the Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Mr. Griffiths) need not fear that this will be all too much for the police to master. With training and guidance, I believe that it will be perfectly possible for them to grasp it.
The hon. Member for Stockport, North (Mr. Bennett) spoke to his amendments in a most helpful speech. To the extent that I have not done so already, I shall deal with them briefly. Amendment (a) would increase the level of

authority required for the issue of search warrants for evidence not held on a confidential basis from a magistrate to a circuit judge. I have already said why I do not believe that it would be right to do that. It would give rise to strange anomalies. On each occasion when Parliament, over many decades, has authorised search warrants it has done so through the medium of a magistrate. That is right. The provision for circuit judges is appropriate for the confidentiality of information, but not subsequently.
10.15 pm
Amendment (b) recommends that we use the words "grave offence" with which I have already dealt. In relation to amendments (c) and (d), I do not think that it would be appropriate to provide that a magistrate has to be satisfied that evidence of a "serious arrestable offence" should be of "substantial probative" value because we are dealing with the investigative stage, not a trial. The issues would not have crystallised. We are dealing here with investigation, and a policeman applying to a magistrate must prove that the evidence would be of substantial value to the investigation.
In amendment (e) the hon. Member for Stockport, North suggests a restricted definition of evidence along the lines of Lord Denning's judgment in the case of Ghani v. Jones. In that case, Lord Denning was giving guidance to the police on existing law; he was not drafting a statute.
An example might show why it is undesirable to place artificial limitations on what can constitute evidence. Let us suppose that a person suspected of murder claims that he has an alibi and the police seek evidence to confirm or disprove that alibi. The evidence might consist of a hotel register and there may be reason to believe that it would be tampered with if access to it were sought without a warrant. the register could not be said to prove an offence, although it might be vital evidence in supporting or explaining an alibi. Another example is a fingerprint left at the scene of a murder. That falls into none of the three categories set out in the amendment.
Amendment (f) suggests
An application under this section shall indicate how the evidence in question is considered to relate to the purposes of the inquiry for which it is sought.
That question is answered if one asks "Is it substantial?"
Amendment (g) suggests an inter partes hearing. I understand why attention has been paid to that in the debate. The amendment is unnecessary. It is unprecedented for an inter partes hearing to take place in any jurisdiction for a magistrate to grant a search warrant. A case is not being made out for making a special exception. Umpteen statutes—about 50—give power to the police to obtain a search warrant to examine even innocent people's homes for evidence relating to an offence which they are investigating. We suggest that application for access to evidence held in confidence should normally be made inter partes precisely because confidential relationships involve the public interest upon which both sides should be heard. If the furore in the last few weeks and months proves anything it is that the public put confidentiality in a separate category.

Mr. Andrew F. Bennett: Does the Minister agree that in all cases on which magistrates have had to give decisions so far, asking an individual for permission and reporting to the magistrates when he refuses permission is not involved? The first thing that the police should do is to ask the individual for his permission without going to


the magistrate. If the person says "No" it is relevant to the magistrate to know why he said that. Unless there is a hearing, how does the person put his case to the magistrate so that the magistrate can test the police requirement against the individual who says that he has good reason for not wanting to co-operate?

Mr. Mayhew: This is a good example of the maxim that the more one does the more one may do. The new clause provides for the first time that the police must comply with this criterion and show, among various alternatives, that the householder had unreasonably refused. Unless they can do that, they cannot satisfy the judge. To do that, they have to ask. That safeguard is being introduced for the first time. If we then say that when the police explain all that to the magistrate the householder must have the right to put his side of the story, what happens next? Presumably if the householder receives an unsatisfactory answer from the magistrate, he will have to have the right to appeal to a circuit judge, and so on. I do not believe that the difficulties and sensitivities with which we are here concerned warrant an inter pastes hearing at this stage of all cases in which there is jurisdiction for a magistrate to grant a search warrant. I do not think that I can add anything to that. I simply do not believe that the case has been made.
Amendment (h) provides for appeal to a circuit judge against the issue of a warrant. That has not been much discussed today, and I do not think that the problem really arises. There is, of course, an application to the Divisional Court for a judicial review, but I do not believe that it would be right to provide for appeal as the amendment suggests.
Amendment (i) provides that the public interest test shall be imposed. In the next group of amendments, relating to confidential information, we require that the judge shall be satisfied that the public interest requires that the application be granted and, as it were, overrides the importance of maintaining confidentiality, but I cannot believe that that would be appropriate in the case of non-confidentially held information. There is really no comparison with applications for the disclosure of evidence held on a confidential basis. It is precisely the existenc of the confidential relationship that raises the question of where the balance of interest lies.
The hon. Member for Bethnal Green and Bow (Mr. Mikardo) entertained us with a dialogue illustrating how the magistrate might go about the business, but I do not believe that many magistrates now model themselves on Justice Shallow, who might well have conducted a dialogue with Dogberry on the lines that the hon. Gentleman suggested. I doubt whether many magistrates would do that. Certainly, they would be quite wrong to do so, because it is not a matter of asking the policeman whether he is satisfied that a serious arrestable offence has been committed. The magistrate himself must be satisfied.
The hon. Member for Southampton, Itchen (Mr. Mitchell) asked whether the Magistrates Association had been consulted. One of the reasons why we went for an inter pastes hearing on the detention procedure was that the Magistrates Association had asked for it. The association, however, distinguishes between that jurisdiction—the far

more serious matter of keeping a person in detention—and the power to grant a search warrant. I believe that that is a proper distinction. Certainly, the association has been consulted on these matters. I hope that the hon. Member for Bethnal Green and Bow, too, is reassured about that.
As for reasonable force, I venture simply this. Everyone knows that for donkey's years the police have been able to exercise reasonable force in executing a warrant, which means that they can use such force as is necessary to enable them forthwith to execute the warrant given to them by the magistrate. The question of whether it is reasonable must be considered in the light of the circumstances prevailing at the time, and not, as it were, clinically at some later time when all the pressures and circumstances of the moment no longer apply. But there is nothing new in any of that.
The hon. Member for Ormskirk (Mr. Kilroy-Silk), who is no longer here, asked what problems and cases had arisen. I have already dealt with the circumstances in which there should be power for the police to search but in which, paradoxically and anomalously, there is at present no such power.
I am grateful for the comments of my hon. Friends the Members for Canterbury (Mr. Crouch) and for Hastings (Mr. Warren).
The hon. Member for Barking (Miss Richardson) asked about reasonableness, which I have explained. As for whether the officer must be in uniform, there is no requirement for him to be in uniform, but clause 13(7) requires that if the officer is not in uniform he must produce documentary evidence to show that he is a constable, and under subsection (6) a constable executing a warrant is required to identify himself, so there is nothing new in that. A policeman does not have to be in uniform to execute a warrant. The only new aspects are the two safeguards represented by the two subsections. The hon. Lady made important points, and any sensible police officer will take them seriously.
It is tempting to seek to answer each and every point, but it would be wearying to the Committee. I hope that I have satisfied the Committee that the new clause has been carefully thought out in response to the anxieties that have been expressed. Many hon. Members have acknowledged that. It seeks to meet the recommendation of the Royal Commission that the police should have greater power to investigate serious offences. The safeguards that hedge about the new power are important. The public can be assured that they will be safeguarded by the new clause and that the police, at the same time, will get the powers that they need.

Mr. Andrew F. Bennett: It would not be helpful to the Committee to go around the arguments again. I am aware that, fairly soon, we shall move on to a further debate before we have an opportunity to vote on new clause 2. I wonder whether, when we vote on new clause 2, it will be possible to vote on amendments (a) (e) and (g).

The Second Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means: I shall certainly consider the hon. Gentleman's request. It may be helpful if I remind the Committee that the question that I shall now put is that the existing clause 9 stand part of the Bill.

Question put and negatived.

Police and Criminal Evidence Bill

Clause 10

EVIDENCE HELD ON CONFIDENTIAL BASIS

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

The Second Deputy Chairman: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

New clause 3

Meaning of 'excluded material'


`(1) Subject to the following provisions of this section, in this Act "excluded material" means—


(a) items subject to legal privilege;


(b) material of either of the following descriptions which a person has acquired or created in the course of any trade, business, profession or other occupation or for the purposes of any paid or unpaid office held by him and which he holds in confidence—


(i) personal records;


(ii) human tissue or tissue fluid taken for the purposes of diagnosis or medical treatment;


(c) journalistic material which consists of documents or other records and which a person holds in confidence.


(2) A person holds material other than journalistic material in confidence for the purposes of this section if he holds it subject—


(a) to an express or implied undertaking on his part to hold it in confidence; or


(b) to a restriction on disclosure or an obligation of secrecy contained in any enactment, whether it is in an Act passed before or an Act passed after this Act.


(3) A person holds journalistic material in confidence for the purposes of this section if—


(a) he holds it subject to such an undertaking, restriction or obligation; and


(b) it has been continuously held (by one or more persons) subject to such an undertaking, restriction or obligation since it was first acquired or created for the purposes of journalism.


If by virtue of any enactment other than section [Access to special procedure material] and Schedule [Special procedure] below a justice of the peace or judge, upon the application of a constable, may issue a warrant to him authorising him to enter premises and search for anything in them for the purposes of a criminal investigation, the things for which a search may be authorised are not excluded material.'.

Amendment (b) to new clause 3, in line 21, leave out paragraph (b).

New clause 4

Meaning of 'items subject to legal privilege'

`(1) Subject to the following provisions of this section, in this Part of this Act "items subject to legal privilege" means—

(a) communications between a professional legal adviser and his client or any person representing his client made in connection with the giving of legal advice to the client; and
(b) communications between a professional legal adviser and his client or any person representing his client or between such an adviser or his client or any such representative and any other person made in connection with or in contemplation of legal proceedings and for the purposes of such proceedings,

when they are in the possession of a person to whom this subsection applies.
(2) Subsection (1) above applies to the professional legal adviser, his client and any person representing his client.
(3) Documents or other articles enclosed with or referred to in such communications as are mentioned in subsection (1) above

New Clause 5

Meanings of 'personal records'


`In this Part of this Act "personal records" means documents and other records concerning an individual (whether living or dead) who can be identified from them, and relating—


(a) to his physical or mental health;


(b) to spiritual counselling or assistance given or to be given to him;


(c) to social work or similiar activities involving counselling or assistance given or to be given to him; or

are not items subject to legal privilege if they were not made in connection with the giving of legal advice or in connection with or in contemplation of legal proceedings and for the purpose of such proceedings.
(4) Documents or articles held with the intention of furthering a criminal purpose are not items subject to legal privilege.'.

(d) to other activities relating to his personal welfare and involving counselling or assistance given or to be given to him—


(i) by any voluntary organisation; or


(ii) by any individual who by reason of his office or occupation has responsibilities for his personal welfare.'.

Amendment (f) to new clause 5, in line 10, after 'any', insert 'lawful'.

New Clause 6

Meaning of 'journalistic material'

'(1) Subject to subsection (2) below, in this Act "journalistic material" means material acquired or created for the purposes of journalism.
(2) Material is only journalistic material for the purposes of this Act if it is in the possession of a person who acquired or created it for the purposes of journalism.'.

New Clause 17

Evidence held on confidential basis

'10. — (1) Subject to the following provisions of this section, this section applies to evidence which is in the possession of a person who—

(a) has acquired or created it in the course of any trade, business, profession or other occupation in which at the time he acquired or created it he was engaged or employed or for the purposes of any paid or unpaid office then held by him; and
(b) holds it subject to an express or implied undertaking on his part to hold it in confidence,

and to evidence consisting of material acquired or created for the purposes of journalism.
(2) The evidence to which this section applies includes evidence subject to a restriction on disclosure or an obligation of secrecy contained in an enactment other than this section.
(3) Subject to the following provisions of this section, the evidence to which this section applies does not include—

(a) communications between a professional legal adviser and his client made in connection with the giving of legal advice to the client; or
(b) communications between a professional legal adviser and his client or between such an adviser or his client and any other person made in connection with or in contemplation of legal proceedings and for the purpose of such proceedings; or
(c) any document, record, human tissue or fluid in the possession of a health authority or a registered medical practitioner brought into existence or held in connection with the clinical treatment of a patient; or
(d) any document or record in the possession of a social worker, probation officer, priest or other member of a caring profession or its voluntary counterpart and brought into existence or held for the professional purposes of the person possessing the document or record; or
(e) any document or record held in confidence for the purposes of journalism, other than a record or document which could be the subject of a warrant under any other enactment

(4) Documents or other articles enclosed with or referred to in such communications as are mentioned in subsection (3)(a) and (3)(b) above are not exempted from this section by that subsection if they were not made in connection with the giving of legal advice or in connection with or in contemplation of legal proceedings and for the purpose of such proceedings.
(5) Nothing in subsection (3) or (4) above shall be taken to exclude from the application of this section documents or articles held with the intention of furthering a criminal purpose.
(6) Subject to subsection (14) below, where, on an application made by a police officer of the rank of inspector or above, a circuit judge is satisfied—

(a) that there are reasonable grounds for believing—

(i) that a grave offence has been committed; and
(ii) that there is evidence which relates to that offence and to which this section applies; and


(b) that other methods of obtaining the evidence—

(i) have been tried without success; or
(ii) have not been tried because it appeared that they were bound to fail,

he may issue an order under subsection (8) below or a warrant under section 9(1) above.
(7) Before any order is made under this section the person or persons named in the application shall be given notice of the application and shall be entitled to be heard by the judge hearing the application and to appear by solicitor or counsel, and any such proceedings shall be in Chambers.
(8) An order under this subsection is an order—

(a) requiring that a person—

(i) shall produce the evidence specified in the order to a constable not later than the end of the period of seven days from the date of the order; or
(ii) shall give a constable and any person accompanying him access to that evidence not later than the end of that period; and

(b) prohibiting him from parting with the evidence to any person except—


(i) with the leave of a judge; or
(ii) with the written permission of a constable.

(9) Where the evidence in question consists of data contained in a computer an order under subsection (8)(a)(i) above shall have effect as an order to produce the evidence in a form that can be teken away.
(10) In subsection (9) above "computer" has the same meaning as it has for the time being in section 54 below.
(11) Before making an order or issuing any warrant under this section, the judge must be satisfied that the public interest in obtaining the evidence outweighs the public interest in protecting the privacy of the individual, the confidentiality of the relationships referred to in this section or the full and free reporting of events.
(12) An application under this section shall indicate how the evidence in question is considered to relate to the inquiry for the purposes of which it is sought.
(13) A judge shall not issue a warrant unless he is satisfied that the issue or service of an order under subsection (8) above is likely to result in the concealment, loss, alteration or destruction of anything that might be used in evidence and that the person or persons named in the application is connected with the offence under investigation.
(14) An application for a warrant under this section may be made ex parte.
(15) An order under subsection (8) above may be served on a person either by delivering it to him or by leaving it at his proper address or by sending it by post to him in a registered letter or by the recorded delivery service.
(16) Such an order may be served—

(a) on a body corporate, by serving it on the body's secretary or clerk, or other similar officer; and
(b) on a partnership, by serving it on one of the partners.

(16) For the purposes of this section, and of section 7 of the Interpretation Act 1978 in its application to this section, the proper address of a person, in the case of a secretary or clerk or other similar officer of a body corporate, shall be that of the registered or principal office of that body, in the case of a partner of a firm shall be that of the principal office of the firm, and in any other case shall be the last known address of the person to be served.
(17) If any person in respect of whom a warrant or order under subsection (8) of this section has been issued applies to a High Court judge in accordance with the rules of the High Court and satisfies him—

(a) that he cannot produce the evidence or give access to it; or
(b) that he ought not to be required to produce it or give access to it,



the judge shall direct that the warrant shall be of no effect.
(18) In any application by a constable for a warrant under any other enactment to search premises in order to obtain evidence held on a confidential basis by a professional legal adviser or for the purposes of journalism, the provisions of this section (with the exception of subsection (11) above) shall apply to that application, as if the application were an application for an order or warrant under this section.
(19) The costs of any application under this section and of anything done or to be done under an order under this subsection (8) above shall be in the discretion of the judge.'.

Mr. Peter Snape: Inevitably, many of the arguments that were rehearsed on the last group of amendments apply equally to this group. Both sides of the Committee will be relieved to hear that I do not intend to deploy those arguments a second time tonight, other than where that is inevitable because of the necessarily complicated nature of the replacement clauses.
The subjects that we have been discussing today are of major constitutional importance. The rights of innocent individuals not to have their homes forcibly entered and their possessions searched and seized by the police concern both sides of the Committee. The Opposition believe that the original clauses and, to a certain extent, their welcome replacements represent a massive extension of existing powers to enter and search private premises and private possessions.
Hon. Members on both sides of the Committee must agree that before such additional extensive powers are granted it is our duty to determine whether there is any alternative. Before the powers are granted, there should be the fullest possible debate in Committee. There has been no justification offered either by the police who initially sought the powers or by the Royal Commission which, in a limited form, endorsed the granting of such powers.
When evidence was taken by the Royal Commission, the then Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis said in evidence that
the present powers to obtain search warrants where they do exist usually relate to searches for the proceeds of crime rather than extending to a search for the evidence of crime.
10.30 pm
The Royal Commission observed briefly in paragraph 3.36:
Present police powers are said to be too limited, particularly when compared with the vast number of powers of entry which other officials have been given by Parliament … There is no power, even under warrant, to enter and search the scene of a murder or kidnap.
That is something that exercised the mind of the Minister considerably during the last debate. The Royal Commission added:
Most of the powers to search under warrant relate to the proceeds of crime rather than evidence of offences. Another gap is identified in relation to fraud offences; the power to inspect bank accounts arises only after a charge has been preferred or summons issued.
During the four months that we were incarcerated in Standing Committee, the Opposition remained unconvinced by the Government's argument. It was even beyond the considerable power of the Minister to persuade us to change our minds. Perhaps the police require the power, with a warrant, to search premises where a murder, kidnap or some other grave offence has taken place, but there is no evidence of particular cases where police investigations have been hindered by the absence of such a power. As the commission observed, most people will readily cooperate in investigations of such grave importance.

Mr. Lawrence: What has this to do with clause 10, interesting though it may be?

Mr. Snape: If the hon. and learned Gentleman had been in Committee during most of its deliberations, he would be well aware of the relevance of my remarks to the clause. I await hearing your displeasure, Mr. Armstrong, if I stray beyond the bounds of order. I have no doubt that you will tell me in your customary courteous way, Mr. Armstrong, if I so stray.

Mr. Lawrence: If the hon. Gentleman had been in his place during the discussions on clause 9, he would know that the issue which he is raising has already been dealt with.

Mr. Snape: I am trying to be polite, Mr. Armstrong. That is difficult in the circumstances, but the hon. and learned Gentleman probably finds it even more difficult to be helpful. If he had taken the trouble to study both clauses, he would know that they are interwoven. If he tells me every two minutes that what I am saying has already been dealt with under clause 9, I fear that our deliberations, which have been necessarily protracted so far, will be prolonged. Hon. Members on both sides of the Committee might decide that the delay is due more to the hon. and learned Gentleman's interventions than to my contribution.
The new clauses and amendments are necessarily complicated. I have no doubt that those who represent the legal profession on both sides of the Committee will tell us that new clause 17 is imperfectly drafted, but in the Opposition's view it brings together the many strands that clause 10 originally possessed. It is our view that new clause 17 should be directly compared with the Government's new clauses, which are connected with other Government new clauses which we are not debating now.
I shall attempt not to relate directly to those inadmissible matters and I am sure that the hon. and learned Member for Burton (Mr. Lawrence) will be delighted about that. If I do, I can, once again, Mr. Armstrong, only crave your understanding and indulgence.
The new clause in the name of my right hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Sparkbrook (Mr. Hattersley) contains one improvement compared to the Government's proposals. Subsection (3)(d) of our new clause suggests that any document or record held for professional purposes should be covered by the Bill. I choose an example at random, but it could be a psychiatrist's report referring to a patient which may or may not be covered by the Government's new clauses. The likeliest equivalent seems to be new clause 5, line 1 of which refers to "personal records". We believe that the definition in the new clause tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for Sparkbrook is a more detailed way of expressing the same thing. I hope that I can persuade the Minister of that. We believe that the drafting of the new clause enables its fairly technical and complicated content to be more readily and easily understood than the multiplicity of new clauses, some of which are relevant to this debate and some of which are not, which cover the same subject. A further example is clause 17(6), which refers to the lowest rank of police officer who can apply for an order under the clause and states that it should be an inspector. The new schedule in amendment No. 153, which unfortunately is not covered


by this group, suggests a constable. We prefer the higher rank, but we believe that it is more sensible to draw all these matters together in one new clause.
The Government's definition of offences covered by this group of new clauses and amendments refers to "serious offences". I have no intention of repeating the arguments used in Committee and during today's deliberations about such a definition or indulge in a protracted debate about the Opposition's alternative definition. In new clause 17, we have specified a "grave offence" instead of the serious offence of which the Government appear to approve.
Subsection (12) of new clause 17 provides that the evidence must have direct relevance to the inquiry that the police are making. We included such a subsection because a provision that was accepted in Committee does not appear in the Government's new clause. I trust that the Minister will tell us why it was thought necessary to remove that provision, especially as it was debated and accepted in Standing Committee. We suggest provision for appeal to the High Court. However, no mention is made of such an appeal in the Government's new clauses. The Opposition feel that that aspect of our new clause is a great improvement.
Reference was made in the previous debate to the vexed question of warrants and their signature and to the propensity of justices of the peace to be rather more eager to sign warrants placed before them by police officers than some Opposition Members like. I do not wish to embark on a blanket criticism of justices of the peace, if for no better reason than that one or two are members of my general management committee in West Bromwich. The 1983 triennial review of the Police Complaints Board made some comments on this aspect of the work of a justice of the peace. Under the sub-heading "Search warrants" in paragraph 49 on page 15, it concluded:
We have seen a number of cases in which we were, frankly, surprised that justices granted warrants on the information provided".
That is not carping criticism from the Opposition. It is a quote from an eminently respectable body. As some justices of the peace are too ready to sign warrants that are placed before them — that is the view of the Police Complaints Board and of the Opposition — we have proposed amendments to the new clause.

Dr. Brian Mawhinney: Line 11 of new clause 17 mentions "an obligation of secrecy". Later the clause refers to
any document or record held in confidence".
What is this "obligation of secrecy" and what does "in confidence" mean?

Mr. Snape: Again, I am in some difficulty. If I pursue that point I shall be greeted by groans from my hon. Friends and wrath from the hon. and learned Member for Burton and, far more importantly, I might incur your displeasure, Mr. Armstrong. I do not attack the hon. Gentleman for saying that, but I would have thought that those words are fairly plain and understandable. I cannot for the life of me see why the hon. Gentleman feels it necessary to embark on a debate that is likely to be out of order.

Dr. Mawhinney: It is difficult to see why it is out of order to probe some of the words in the clauses under discussion. I hope perhaps later to ask similar questions of my hon. and learned Friend the Minister. Who imposes an obligation of secrecy? What is the obligation? How should we decide whether a document is "in confidence"? If a professional adviser has documents, are they all confidential regardless of the contents? How should we decide whether they are confidential for the purposes of the new clause that the hon. Gentleman is presumably advancing for our acceptance?

Mr. Snape: There is a short and simple answer. I think that the hon. Gentleman is a doctor. Both sides of the Committee would probably agree that the doctrine of confidentiality is immediately involved. If the hon. Gentleman feels that that is not so, I am glad that he is not my general practitioner. I should have thought the onus of secrecy lay with the general practitioner, and that is the reason for the wording of the new clause. Before the hon. Gentleman, or any of his hon. Friends, returns to the attack on the drafting of the new clause, I should say that when covering such a wide area it is difficult to get the drafting exactly right. I understand the reasoning behind the hon. Gentleman's point, but it was not necessarily valid or meant as a criticism of the drafting. Indeed, new clause 17 was drafted in consultation with virtually every interested party. Many of the views expressed have now been belatedly accepted by the Home Office.
In drafting the new clause, we were anxious to ensure that the views of the organisations that had expressed such violent concern— in the most peaceable sense—were taken into consideration. No doubt experts on both sides of the Committee could find many things wrong with the drafting of the new clause, but I hope—perhaps in vain —that the Minister will understand the reasoning behind it and have some sympathy with the Opposition's attempt to put all these complicated matters into one clause, instead of scattering them prolifically round the Bill as the Government have done in their belated, although praiseworthy, attempt to replace an extremely controversial clause.

Mr. Eldon Griffiths: I admire the way in which the Opposition have tried to comprehend all of these issues in one clause rather than have them scattershot through the Bill in the rather complicated way in which the Government have found it necessary to proceed. If there comes into the possession of a doctor or other medical authority, such as a hospital, evidence that a person has been involved in a gun fight, and bullets have been extracted from his arm or stomach, does new clause 17 provide that such a case should be governed by absolute confidentiality or would the police have the right in those circumstances to obtain the bullets that have been extracted to trace the gun and, therefore, the criminal who has fired it?

Mr. Snape: In the circumstances that the hon. Gentleman has outlined, the police would have the right to take the bullets once they have been removed from the victim. We would not envisage the police going into the operating theatre and standing over the surgeon while he removed the bullets. That evidence would be available once the immediate and urgent medical treatment had been completed. I am sure that the hon. Gentleman will agree


that such a clause which takes those circumstances into consideration is preferable to, as he put it, their being scattershot through the Bill.

Sir Raymond Gower: How does the hon. Gentleman relate subsection (3)(c) of new clause 17—
any document, record, human tissue or fluid in the possession of a health authority or a registered medical practitioner brought into existence or held in connection with the clinical treatment of a patient"—
to the answer which he gave to my hon. Friend the Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Mr. Griffiths)?

Mr. Snape: Such matters are excluded by new clause 3 and clause 10. The hon. Gentleman's question might be better addressed to the Minister of State. I am always anxious to help the Committee, and if he would like me to address that question to the Minister I shall do so now.

Sir Raymond Gower: The wording of new clause 3 is slightly different.

Mr. Snape: It is marginal. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will agree that it is much the same.
The tabling of amendment (b) shows that I am not alone in not understanding what the additional element in the definition of journalistic material held in confidence means. Perhaps the Minister can help the Committee in that regard. It appears that the Government are trying to restrict the category of confidential journalistic material which is exempt from the new search powers of subsection (3). Such a restriction is not mentioned in the Minister's memorandum of proposals to the National Union of Journalists and other press bodies following their recent meeting with him.
We doubt whether the restriction that my hon. Friend the Member for Stockport, North seeks to remove is either necessary or justified. Indeed, given the extraordinary complexity of the Government's replacements for clause 10, the fewer the additional factors argued over by judges and lawyers, let alone by we laymen, the better.
I apologise for the time that I have taken. I also apologise if my explanation of the Opposition's amendments bored, wearied or annoyed Conservative Members. This is an eminently complicated part of an eminently controversial measure, and as such deserves the fullest consideration before the new clause is read a Second time.

Mr. Mayhew: I hope that I can deal with this group of amendments a good deal more shortly that it was possible to deal with the last group, because we were able to extend our previous debate to much of what we are now discussing.
Here the Government are putting forward their proposals to replace clause 10, which deals with material held on a confidential basis. Such a volume of anxiety was expressed to us by doctors, although not exclusively, and journalists—that so delicate were the relationships with which they were concerned that it was important that in some cases confidentially held information should not be looked at by the police at an investigation stage—that we thought it right to introduce these new clauses.
I should make it perfectly clear that for a long time the law has provided no exemption at all for confidentially held information, be it by doctors or priests, at the time of trial. I entirely agree with what was said by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Thanet, West (Mr. Rees-Davies), that at no trial has a judge ever asked a priest to

breach the confessional, and nothing in the new clauses changes the law relating to disclosure at trial. They deal exclusively with disclosure at investigation.
The Committee is now aware of those matters that we believe it right to exclude from the ambit of the new clause at investigation. They can be found in new clause 3 and are:
legal privilege;
personal records;"—
as later defined—
human tissue or tissue fluid taken for the purposes of diagnosis or medical treatment; journalistic material which consists of documents or other records and which a person holds in confidence.
Legal privilege is defined in new clause 4 and I take no more time over that. That merely reflects existing law as it has been for many years. The only reason why legal privilege exists is that in an adversarial system such as we operate one cannot work it if one side can get at the advice that the other side receives. That is why legal privilege is limited to communications between lawyers and their clients. No other material is legally privileged under our law.
Personal records are defined in new clause 5 as widely as we can to meet the objective that anyone who, by virtue of a relationship with someone else, affords counselling or assistance and receives confidential information, should be confident, and so should his client or patient, that that confidentiality will not be breached. Certainly the relationship of a psychiatrist to his client, which was referred to by the hon. Member for West Bromwich, East (Mr. Snape) is embraced in new clause 5.
In new clause 6 journalistic material is defined as
material acquired or created for the purposes of journalism.
But it is only journalistic material for the purposes of the legislation if it is in the possession of a person who has acquired or created it for the purposes of journalism. That will be understood.

11 pm

Mr. Christopher Price: I think the Minister will agree that the journalism clauses and definitions which he has proposed are new both to the discussions that have been taking place in Committee and, indeed, to English law. He will agree that nowhere in the Bill is the word "journalism" defined. Can he tell the Committee now—because it is important to do it the first time we discuss the point—why he has not tabled a clause defining the meaning of "journalism"? If he cannot do that, can he tell us what journalism is? I have been doing it for 20 or 30 years, but I still do not know.

Mr. Mayhew: Fervent representations were made to us by journalists about the importance of journalism and of the confidentiality inherent in it. Over many years journalists have insisted that their sources should remain confidential, and on rare occasions they have been prepared to go to prison rather than disclose the source at trial. Therefore, I believe it to be entirely right in seeking to meet those anxieties that we should limit to journalism the changes that we propose.
In the context of the procedure set out in the schedule, which will have to be followed, it will be open in a contested case for a person who is asked to disclose information to say that it has been acquired or held by him for the purposes of journalism. It will be for the police to satisfy the circuit judge that the material is able to be got at and is not excluded material as defined in the Bill.
We are wise not to seek to define journalism. In the circumstances of this jurisdiction the safeguards that the Government seek to extend are best extended and expressed as set out in the Bill.

Dr. Mawhinney: As I understand it, a legal privilege exists already between a client and his legal adviser. That is the only area in which a confidential relationship has been enshrined in law. In the new clauses that legal privilege is being extended to other confidential relationships. I should be grateful if my hon. and learned Friend could help the Committee by saying what constitutes a confidential relationship and who determines whether it is confidential. Is anything that I say to my doctor confidential? If a Lobby correspondent cares to note in his notebook something that I say to him, is that by definition in confidence? In new clause 5, documents from voluntary organisations are excluded. Would Shelter, for example, be included as a voluntary organisation offering counselling? Would any document held by Shelter be excluded under the definition of "in confidence"? Can my hon. and learned Friend help the Committee on this issue?

Mr. Mayhew: My hon. Friend is right to say that hitherto the only example of legal privilege was the communication between a lawyer and his client. That remains the case. Material held in confidence is dealt with in new clause 3(2), which says:
A person holds material other than journalistic material in confidence for the purposes of this section if he holds it subject—

(a) to an express or implied undertaking on his part to hold it in confidence; or
(b) to a restriction on disclosure or an obligation of secrecy contained in any enactment, whether it is in an Act passed before or an Act passed after this Act."

We are talking about material
which a person has acquired or created in the course of any trade, business, profession or other occupation or for the purposes of any paid or unpaid office".
The Government were moved to make that special category because we were impressed by what was said both on behalf of what are loosely called the caring professions on the one hand and journalists and representatives of the journalist profession on the other about the importance of maintaining confidentiality.

Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: rose—

Mr. Mayhew: Not being an Irishman I cannot be in two places at the same time, so I shall deal with one intervention first and then I shall be glad to deal with any others.
The new clause says that a certain narrowly defined category of confidential information shall not be get-at-able at all. The remaining confidentially-held information within the definition of the clause can be seen and disclosed to a police officer investigating a serious arrestable offence at the time of the investigation only if the special procedure of applying to a circuit judge is gone through.
I agree that that represents a change in the law, but we are changing the law in making a general power for the police to see material at the time of investigation. Hitherto, as I explained to the Committee recently, there have been only a number of piecemeal powers. We are now making a general power to enable the police, subject to the

safeguards, to see material with a search warrant during investigations into a serious arrestable offence. If we are persuaded that there are special considerations of confidentiality affecting a particular class of material, it is perfectly proper to make exceptions to that new power and that is what we are doing.

Sir Raymond Gower: If a person with criminal intent had an implied confidential relationship with a chartered accountant, would that be included in this exemption?

Mr. Mayhew: No, it would not, because chartered accountants are not included in the categories of persons whose personal records form a special category.
Anybody holding material with criminal purpose is almost always guilty of at least conspiracy and is therefore liable to arrest and, in right of that arrest, liable to have his premises searched. I say that to allay certain anxieties.

Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: Are Members of Parliament included in such professions in relation to confidential information that is not covered by the privilege of Parliament?

Mr. Mayhew: If the hon. Gentleman looks at the definition clause of personal records in new clause 5, he will see that
'personal records' means documents and other records concerning an individual … who can be identified from them, and relating—

(a) to his physical or mental health;
(b) to spiritual counselling or assistance given or to be given to him;
(c) to social work or similar activities involving counselling or assistance given or to be given to him; or
(d) to other activities relating to his personal welfare and involving counselling or assistance given or to be given to him—

(i) by any voluntary organisation; or
(ii) by any individual who by reason of his office or occupation has responsibility for his personal welfare."

I suppose that there are very few Members of Parliament nowadays who do not offer advice to their constituents from time to time that would fall within those categories. Depending entirely, of course, upon what the relationship is, I should be very much surprised if he were not able to bring himself within those categories.

Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: Am Ito understand from the hon. and learned Gentleman's definition that, if I have on my files the address of an illegal immigrant and the Home Office ask the police to get that file, they are not entitled to get it? Is that included in counselling?

Mr. Mayhew: All these cases turn upon their own facts and it would depend upon the circumstances in which the hon. Gentleman had this information. The hon. Gentleman, as a Member of Parliament, holds an office which involves receiving, from time to time, information which he is asked to hold in confidence. Whether he was or was not holding it in confidence would be a matter for the judge to decide and a matter for the hon. Gentleman himself to decide. If he were holding it in confidence, it would be protected.
People cannot have it both ways. They cannot say it is essential that their confidential relationship with their patients, their clients, their sources as journalists, or whatever it may be, be protected, and then say that there are circumstances in which it might be better, all in all, if the police were able to make them disclose it. The


Government have to do their best to balance conflicting obligations and interests, and the clause that we propose does that.
My hon. Friend the Member for Peterborough (Dr. Mawhinney) asked about the obligation of secrecy. An example is the statutory obligation of, for example, the Police Complaints Board and similar bodies, which are often in possession of confidences obtained by the exercise of compulsory powers to obtain information for the public —the sort of relationship that sets up an obligation of secrecy.

Mr. Clinton Davis: I think that my hon. Friend the Member for York (Mr. Lyon) made a very pertinent point, which the Minister has scarcely answered. Because of the ambiguities and the difficulties of Members of Parliament, why not simply exclude them from the ambit of this provision?

Mr. Mayhew: I do not think there is any need to do that. I think that the way in which I have answered the question deals with the actualities and realities of the position.

Mr. Lawrence: Does my hon. and learned Friend agree that it would appear that the Opposition's new clause 17 is far more restrictive than the provision which the Government are advancing, since subsection (3)(d) refers to
any document or record in the possession of a social worker, probation officer, priest or other member of a caring profession or its voluntary counterpart".
If Members of Parliament are not social workers, probation officers or priests, and if, as some allege, we are not even members of a caring profession, Members of Parliament would be excluded from the protection of the Opposition's clause.

Mr. Mayhew: My hon. and learned Friend makes a very important point and I think that it is one of the matters which the Committee should consider.
Just to take the point of the immigration offence, that is not an arrestable offence, and certainly not a serious arrestable offence. It is very important that this jurisdiction exists only for serious arrestable offences. If a Member of Parliament gives advice about personal welfare, he will be covered.
11.15 pm
New clause 17 does not, in many respects, differ from the scheme that is proposed in the clauses to which I have already spoken. The major aspect on which it differs from the new clause tabled by my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary is that it provides the right of appeal to the High Court. As the House will know, clause 10 as presently drafted includes in subsection (18) a right of appeal. However, we accepted the argument that a right on the part of the holder of the evidence to be heard would be a far more useful safeguard if it were advanced to the initial hearing of the application. That is what we have done. We have made it an inter partes hearing at first application to the circuit judge.
Our amendments, therefore, replace the right of appeal by a provision that an application should normally be heard inter partes. In view of that change we do not consider that an express right of appeal would be necessary. It should also be remembered that a person who is the subject of a production order under the new

procedure will be able to seek a judicial review of the decision to grant the order in the normal way and that if he did so his application would be heard by a High Court judge.
I hope that in those circumstances the Committee will agree that clause 10 should not stand part of the Bill. I hope also that it will agree that new clause 17 is not to be preferred to new clauses 3, 4, 5 and 6.

Mr. Andrew F. Bennett: I am a little disappointed by the Minster's reply. He did not refer to the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for West Bromwich, East (Mr. Snape) about new clause 3 and amendment (b). I hoped that the Minister would explain why the words in subsection (3)(b) were essential. It seems to me that they add little to the new clause. Perhaps the word "continuously" is important. We have all had evidence recently about diaries. If people can show that they have held them continuously, it is important. I am puzzled by the wording that the Government have chosen to put into the new clause. I hope that when the Minister replies he will explain why subsection (3)(b) is essential. It adds nothing to the clause.
The major requirement is that the Bill should be easily understood. Unfortunately that requirement is not met by the Government's new clause. It does not give us clarity. The Minister said that it was not necessary to give us a definition of "journalist" because the circuit judge would recognise a journalist when one appeared before him. The Minister should realise that not necessarily the circuit judge will have to do the recognising but the magistrate, because the definition is linked to new clause 2. If the police are arguing that the material is not covered by new clause 3, it is at new clause 2 that the definition has to be argued, not when we come to this clause.
The Minister should give us some idea of what he thinks a journalist is. Is he someone who receives money for his writing or someone who sends in articles only to get rejection slips from newspapers, or something else? Is he someone who contributes to a letter column regularly for a newspaper? Is he someone who holds an NUJ card? What is the definition of a journalist? There should be some clarity in the clause of what is meant by "a journalist."
Many groups and organisations have their own newsletters and an editor for them. Some of them would be concerned about whether material that they are shown for preparing a newsletter came into this category. Thai is one of the major problems. I hope that when the Minister replies he will give clear guidance to magistrates about how he defines journalists and will tell us why it is necessary for subsection (3)(b) to remain in the Bill.

Mr. Eldon Griffiths: I do not feel particularly easy about the Government's new clauses. They will not greatly assist in the prevention of crime. I much preferred clause 10 as it was.
Essentially, clause 10 allows—for it is still part of the Bill—the police to have access at the investigation stage, subject to an order by a court, to material that would assist them in bringing to light serious arrestable offences. It is a serious departure from the broad intention of the Bill if the ability of the police to achieve that result is impaired. I test the new clauses against that criterion. Will they, taken together, impair the ability of the police to get, at the investigation stage, material that is essential to the discovery of serious crime? That is what we are about.


As the Government have proceeded, they have in effect set up a number of new privileges. The legal privilege is a known one, and one need say no more, save only that, once again, the lawyers have won. They usually do in this place, so I suppose no one should be surprised.

Mr. Lawrence: The privilege is to the client's benefit, not to the lawyers'.

Mr. Griffiths: That is the point. The lawyers always maintain that they are engaged in an eleemosynary activity, solely for the benefit of their clients. I beg leave to doubt that. There is a certain amount of personal as well as charitable interest. However, I do not want to talk about legal privilege because it always has been with us and I suspect that it always will be.
I come to the items that are to be excluded from police investigation, bearing in mind that an investigation can take place only when the police have satisfied a court that they have good grounds for believing that there is specified information directly relevant to a serious crime that could involve five years' imprisonment, that it is admissible in a court, and that they have been able to make the case at an inter partes hearing at which both sides were present, and the person who does not want his records searched was able to say why they should not be.
Once the police have proved all that, they were to have had access to the material—but no longer. We now find that they may not have access to something called "personal records". I can understand that, but the definition of "personal records" goes rather wide. There are to be many matters that, in investigating serious crime, and subject to all the requirements that I have outlined, the police may no longer have access to. They will not be able to get at anything that is regarded as being part of social work. I can think of many agencies that call themselves social agencies but that can and do have material available to them that should be able to be brought before a court if it relates to a specified and serious arrestable offence —but no longer. That is to be excluded.
We then have the incredibly broad definitions that personal records will be excluded if they concern matters involving "counselling" or assistance given by any voluntary organisation. I am bound to say, without, I hope, raising any hackles, that when I consider some of the organisations that can describe themselves as voluntary, some of them to the far Right, some of them to the far Left, and some of them engaged in what I would describe as a subversion of our system of parliamentary democracy, I am surprised. Of course they call themselves voluntary organisations, and of course they are engaged in activities relating to counselling and assistance to individuals. They might be sending people to the Soviet Union or South Africa or Chile. In the words "any voluntary organisations", "social work", "counselling" or "assistance", "spiritual counselling" and so on, the Moonies or the loonies might be included. Now, apparently, with all the safeguards that the House has previously discussed, the police will not be able at the investigation stage to get any of these organisations or their information. In my view, we are going a little wide in creating new privileges for people who will not be subject to the investigation of serious crime. We are taking some of the teeth out of the Bill.
I come to the definition of "excluded material". There is to be no access for the police to something described as
human tissue or tissue fluid taken for the purposes of diagnosis or medical treatment".
Here I want to put one or two specific questions. At the end of the clause defining excluded material there is the interesting phrase:
If by virtue of any enactment other than section [Access to special procedure material] and Schedule … a justice of the peace or judge, upon the application of a constable, may issue a warrant to him authorising him to enter premises and search for anything in them for the purposes of a criminal investigation, the things for which a search may be authorised are not excluded material.
There appears to an enormously important distinction, on which I think the House should concentrate, between "things" which the police may search for and documents or information which they may not search for. I can identify the problem by putting precise cases to my hon. and learned Friend. He will recall the examples that were given in Committee when we discussed this matter. One was of a man who had been shot twice in the stomach. He was taken to hospital. The two bullets were removed from his abdomen. The police went to the hospital and asked for possession of the bullets, because only in that way could they trace the pistol and thereby possibly the criminal who had shot the man. The bullets were denied them on the ground of medical ethics, because the man in a state of trauma was unable to give what was described as informed consent. As I understand it, the bullets, being "things" under the clause, would still be able to be sought and obtained by the police, and it is essential that we understand that they are things for which the police may search, even though they might not search documents for words.
That is an easy and clear-cut problem. Now I come to the mentally handicapped child who was poisoned. The police were informed and went to the hospital. The child was saved by the stomach contents being pumped out. The police asked for samples of the stomach contents, and were refused on the ground of medical ethics. It was therefore impossible for the police at the investigation stage to establish whether the poison that had been administered was strychnine, rat poison, or something of that nature, and thus were prevented, by not being able to obtain a forensic sample of the stomach content, from pursuing the investigation and finding out who the poisoner was.
Is the content of the stomach a "thing"? My hon. and learned Friend may reply that it is, in which case I shall be content. However, what about the hospital record, once the content had perhaps been thrown away, stating the nature of the poison? Is that to be excluded from police investigation? As I read the Bill, it would be excluded. In my view, that would greatly handicap the course of justice.
Let us take an even more difficult case — again, a real one. It is the case of a woman who had been brutally assaulted, beaten up, and appallingly raped. She was rushed off to a hospital—or it may have been a doctor's surgery. The police were informed of the occurrence by her flatmate. They went along and asked for the clothing. They wanted the forensic evidence of the blood, semen and hair because that was the only way to trace the poor woman's assailant. They were denied that evidence on the ground of medical confidentiality.
11.30 pm
Am I right in thinking that, if the police ask for the clothing, that is one of the "things" and that under the new clause they would be able to obtain it? I suppose that a sample of semen, if taken from the clothing, would also come under the category of "things" and they would be able to obtain it. Suppose the clothing has been destroyed but a medical record at the hospital states the blood group and other information. Does the proposal mean that the police can obtain the "things" but not the records which relate to them?
I have another example. The police searched all over the north of England for the Ripper. They received hundreds of reported sightings a day, most of which were wrong because people have fanciful reactions to news stories and imagine that they see things. Each clue had to be checked painstakingly by hundreds of police officers at enormous cost of time and money.
Some of the sightings hypothetically could have been of a man with a deformity of the jaw, for instance. If the police had been able to check that lead they would have had the advantage of being able to exclude a large number of people who had to be investigated because of the sightings. If the police went to the local dentists or hospitals and asked for all the dental records showing men with that peculiar form of declivity of the lower jaw, would they be refused under the new clause, or would it be a "thing" which the police could obtain? There is no clear definition in any of the new clauses.
I declare an interest in my next argument because for many years I was editor of Time magazine and managing editor of News Week. I have had experience of hiring and firing journalists over about 18 years. Journalists hold dear the need to protect their sources. Honourably, journalists have been willing to go to gaol rather than disclose information which they believe to be given to them in confidence. That is true of the majority of decent journalists. But not all people in journalism are men of integrity. Occasionally the great cry about protecting sources is heard, largely because the journalist has invented something, and when asked where he obtained some load of old tripe he invents a fictitious source and is willing to go to prison to protect it. It is only a minority of journalists who do not observe the scruples and the honour that the whole of the profession rightly claims.
The Bill has been so amended as to create an almost absolute privilege for someone who merely has to say, "I am a journalist," My hon. and learned Friend will probably say that the court will examine the matter and say "This chap has withheld evidence. He claims to be a journalist but he is not." The court may decide that the claim to be a journalist is bogus. In the real world, however, police officers dealing with a difficult crime will sheer off getting involved in arguments in the courts as to whether a person is a journalist. I agree, therefore, that we must ask ourselves exactly what is the definition of a journalist. I believe that the term is incapable of definition.
I cite another personal example. When I was a correspondent for a major news magazine a man came to see me in London claiming to have obtained the order of battle of the Soviet army. This was in the days of the cold war, so it was fascinating stuff. He asked for money and I asked to see some of his wares. He brought an interesting document showing in great detail the state of the rifle divisions of the Soviet army in East Germany, the number of tanks, and so on. It had silhouettes, numbers and

statistics. He had torn the document in half so that I could see only one half and asked for a substantial sum of money for the missing half.
At that time, there was no doubt that it was a story of considerable importance. But I was sceptical and I took advice. At this long remove, after 20 years, I can say that I consulted British intelligence, to which I had access. It turned out that the man had illegally obtained a document which indeed showed the order of battle of the Soviet army, but it was in fact the British intelligence estimate of the Soviet order of battle which the man had stolen from the flat of a member of the Commonwealth chiefs of staff who was on a course at Aldershot.
I was, therefore, in a moral dilemma. Should I, as part of my journalistic responsibility, send the information to the United States for my then employers to publish, where it would assuredly have been added to the long list of British intelligence failures at a time when delicate negotiations were taking place between the United States and the United Kingdom which I did not wish to compromise? Or should if have greater care for what I conceived to be the interests of my country? In fact, I shopped the informant and I told the intelligence service how he had come to me with the information.
I tell that story simply to illustrate that journalists frequently have to make difficult decisions. We should not confer upon them an absolute privilege. We should look to them to behave honourably and responsibly. In a sense, it is an insult to the good profession of journalism to suggest that its members need an absolute legal privilege when in my experience most of them are prepared to behave honourably in the first instance.
I put the question directly to the Minister. If a journalist obtains information about a likely IRA strike, as has happened in television journalism, and although members of the editorial staff have no absolute knowledge they have reason to believe that they have come across information which may lead to the destruction of men, women and children in parts of this country, should they have the absolute legal privilege not to disclose that information?
I believe that the position under the original clause 10 was preferable. If the police went to the court and stated that they had reason to believe that not general but specific information was in the possession of a journalist, which was admissible in a court and was likely to lead to a serious arrestable offence, an inter panes hearing had been held and a judge had been satisfied that they needed the information, that information should not be placed beyond the reach of the police, as the new clauses seem to provide.
The hour is late and I have detained the Committee on an important matter. We must see how, under the schedule, the whole matter of special procedure will be pursued. Under the new mechanism, ways and means may exist within the Bill, as amended, to enable most of my fears to be put at rest. Unfortunately, due to the nature of the selection of amendments, I cannot debate that at this stage because it comes under the next group of amendments.
It is important to the police service, the country and Conservative Members who gave an undertaking at the last election to strengthen the powers of the police to investigate serious offences that the Minister should answer my direct questions.

Mr. Ian Wrigglesworth: The hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Mr. Griffiths) was


anxious about any journalist who might turn out to be a rogue—or, indeed, a member of the medical and other professions who are excluded by the new clauses. The hon. Gentleman and the House must set against that possibility the restrictions on the freedom of the members of those professions if the clauses are not included in the Bill. Most Opposition Members felt in Committee that the freedom of the vast majority of the professions as embodied in the new clauses should be protected from the police, as should all fundamental freedoms and rights in our society.
It is unfortunate that the Minister, both in Committee upstairs and again this evening, said that the evidence being excluded from police investigation under the clauses could still be brought before the courts. We are not debating the power to bring confidential information before the courts, under subpoena. No one in the House would resist the right of a court to subpoena confidential information to be debated before the court, in public. That has always been a right of the court. However, tonight we are debating whether the police should have the power to search for confidential information in confidential files.
I wish to welcome the movement made by the Government since Committee in response to the pressure put upon them. I declare an interest as a member of the National Union of Journalists. I, on behalf of journalists, pressed the Government for such a move. However, I was surprised—as, I suspect, were some Opposition Front Bench spokesmen — when the Government excluded certain categories. We thought that they might exclude doctors and ministers of religion, but we did not think they would exclude journalists, social workers and other categories.
It would be churlish of those who pressed the Government to move in that direction if we did not thank them for doing so. The way in which the Government have arranged matters is slightly complicated, but the amendment tabled by the Opposition is even more complicated. With great respect to the hon. Member for West Bromwich, East (Mr. Snape), I must say that he demonstrated that in his speech when he sought to explain the amendment to the House.

Mr. Snape: Perhaps one reason why the hon. Gentleman could not follow my train of thought was that he was so concerned about these matters in Committee that he went off to Japan for four weeks.

Mr. Wrigglesworth: The hon. Gentleman knows that that is a gross exaggeration. A number of the hon. Gentleman's colleagues did exactly the same thing. At least I was not earning my bread while doing another job, as some Opposition Members were. Let us not start debating that sort of thing.
I wish to express my enthusiasm for the way in which the Government have moved but I hope that the Minister can provide some clarification when he replies. There is doubt about some of the definitions and I hope that it will not be left to the courts to determine them. If the Minister cannot provide clarification when he replies, I hope that it will be possible in another place to provide the definitions that have been sought by hon. Members on both sides of the Chamber.

Mr. Pitt: Like my hon. Friend the Member for Thornaby (Mr. Wrigglesworth), I welcome the new clauses. However, I ask the Minister to provide some clarification when he replies, especially on new clause 5, which I welcome from a personal standpoint. I worked for six and a half years in an occupation that is now being described as caring.
My hon. Friend the Member for Colne Valley (Mr. Wainwright) has received a communication from the Westminister Pastoral Foundation, which is an ecumenical foundation and cannot be described as a church per se. We must also consider the elders of Quaker movements and others who, although unordained, are spiritual counsellors for members of their religious communities. I understand that ordination will not necessarily be a specific criterion of a spiritual counsellor. In other words, a person may hold a position within his church or religious community which is a position of counselling, although not that of an ordinant.
I share the consideration and concern of the hon. Members for Bury St. Edmunds (Mr. Griffiths) and for Stockport, North (Mr. Bennett) about new clause 6 and the definition of "journalist". It is capable of wide interpretation and I hope that the Minister will tell us what is a "journalist".
New clause 16 was lucid, but new clause 17 is opaque. I had hoped that the hon. Member for West Bromwich, East (Mr. Snape) would make it at least translucent. Instead, he gave it a specular quality. The new clause merely reflects light and we cannot see through it.
My colleagues in the Liberal and Social Democratic parties and I will be supporting the Government's new clauses. They do not go all the way, but they go considerably further than original clauses 9 and 10.

Mr. Mayhew: The amendment of the hon. Member for Stockport, North (Mr. Bennett) seeks to delete the provision which defines confidential journalistic material as material held continuously in confidence
since it was first acquired or created for the purposes of journalism.
We have recognised in the new clause the importance of a free and healthy press and of protecting journalists' confidential sources. The evidence which is to be exempted is that which is held in confidence from the time when it is first acquired.
Without the paragraph which the hon. Gentleman's amendment would delete, journalistic material would count as confidential for the purposes of the new clause even if it were acquired by a journalist on a non-confidential basis, provided only that at some later point he entrusted it to someone else to hold. That would be far too broad and I can think of no justification for it. It would go way beyond the aim of protecting confidential sources, bearing in mind that we are talking about substantial evidence in the most serious of crimes. It must be remembered, too, that the new clause does not limit exemption to those who are professional journalists. It is the activity rather than the occupation per se that is protected. It is plainly right that bona fide continuity should be required, lest those who are not professional journalists should be tempted to abuse the standards of conduct that professional journalists ordinarily uphold.
I come to the points made by my hon. Friend the Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Mr. Griffiths). He said that the only test that he applied to any changes in the Bill


was whether they would make law enforcement easier and facilitate the work of the police. I hope that I do not need to say that that is important.

Mr. Eldon-Griffiths: I did not say that.

Mr. Mayhew: If I have misquoted my hon. Friend, I apologise. I thought that I heard him say that that was the only criterion by which he looked at it. Although it is an important criterion and forms a great deal of the Bill's policy, it is not, and cannot be, the only one. We have to see also that the rights of the individual are not wantonly or unwarrantably infringed.
My hon. Friend said that "personal records" seem to be defined too widely. Confidential personal records would not have been caught by the Bill as drafted, save in the most exceptional case. It was only because it was represented to us that, whatever the laws of evidence may say, doctors' patients would come to believe that their records could be investigated that my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary determined that the matter should be made express and clear, where previously it had been implicit.
If that is the case, we might as well reassure as many people as possible that it is so, as reassurance is the order of the day. We are not, therefore, limiting the exemption to doctors. We are expressing it as widely as this to make it clear to anyone who may have these anxieties that he has nothing to fear. He would not have been get-at-able by the police in any event, save in the rarest of cases.
On the second point that my hon. Friend raised about—

Mr. Eldon Griffiths: The definition is clear. It is still a crime to procure sexual intercourse with a minor. The Paedophilia Information Bureau falls within all the definitions of "personal records". It is social work by its own definition; it is a voluntary organisation; it gives counselling and it is concerned, as it judges, with personal welfare. Would that type of organisation fall within the confidentiality that is provided under the "personal records" definition?

Mr. Mayhew: If such an organisation were proved to be in the business of inciting a criminal offence, those who took part could be arrested and their premises searched in right of that arrest. That is the practical answer to my hon. Friend's question.
We were pressed by the medical profession to include in the exemption of this power of search human tissues and tissue fluids that were obtained as part of diagnosis or in the course of medical treatment. When the medical profession says, "If you do not exempt these we shall have people saying that they do not want us to take a blood sample, or whatever it may be, and that will interfere with diagnosis" we have to take it seriously. We have taken equally seriously the assurance of the president of the General Medical Council that the profession takes seriously the obligation to co-operate with the police. It does not view its duties exclusively in the light of its relationship with its patients.
We agreed that these minor extensions should be included in the exemptions that we proposed originally. I believe that to be right. I believe that we can rely on the doctors' co-operation in that respect.
My hon. Friend referred to bullets, and he knows how important we regard the fact that the police should be able

to obtain from a hospital bullets that have been taken from the body of someone who has been shot in some incident. That was at the forefront of our case, and they would remain subject to a search warrant.
I believe that stomach contents would almost certainly constitute human tissue or tissue fluids. To the extent that they did not, they would not be exempt. To the extent that they do, they will be. Bloodstained clothing will rightly be able to be obtained, because it is extremely important that the police should be able to obtain and examine clothing from a rape victim, for all the reasons that my hon. Friend mentioned.
But that does not apply to a medical record. It is important that there should be reassurance that, if the medical profession says that a medical record is of particular importance, it will not come within the powers of the police anyway, because of the rules of evidence. Dental records will be excluded.
For the reasons that have been given by hon. Members, it is important that the position of journalists and the freedom of the press should be recognised. However, it is not right to say that the police will sheer off any case in which that might arise. An application will be made to the circuit judge and he will determine whether the exemption applies.
I was asked whether a journalist who had infomation about a likely IRA strike would be exempt. The answer is that he would not be, because paragraph 4 of part II of schedule 3 to the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1976 makes it a criminal offence to conceal that information. The powers of search and anything else that goes with them will apply.

Mr. Pitt: I think that the Minister might wish to answer a point that I made. I know that there was a counterveiling noise on my left, but I asked whether non—ordained members of a religious community were considered to be spiritual advisers.

Mr. Mayhew: I am sorry that I omitted to answer that question. Clause 5 deals with personal records. I do not want to go into the benefits of ordination, but such a person would plainly be a person who by reason of his office or occupation had responsibility for the personal welfare of somebody else.

Question put and negatived.

New Clause 2

POWER OF JUSTICE OF THE PEACE TO AUTHORISE ENTRY TO SEARCH FOR EVIDENCE OF SERIOUS ARREST ABLE OFFENCE

`(1) Where, on application made by a constable, a justice of the peace is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing—

(a) that a serious arrestable offence has been committed; and
(b) that relevant evidence is in certain premises; and
(c) that it would be of substantial value (whether by itself or together with other evidence) to the investigation in connection with which the application is made; and
(d) that it is not excluded material or special procedure material; and
(e) that any of the conditions specified in subsection (2) below applies,

he may issue a warrant authorising a constable to enter and search the premises, using reasonable force if necessary.
(2) The conditions mentioned in subsection (1)(e) above are—

(a) that it is not reasonably practicable to communicate with any person entitled to grant entry to the premises;


(b) that it is reasonably practicable to communicate with a person entitled to grant entry to the premises but it is not reasonably practicable to communicate with any person entitled to grant access to the evidence;
(c) a person entitled to grant entry to the premises or access to the evidence has unreasonably refused a constable such entry or access;
(d) that the evidence is likely to be concealed, disposed of, altered or destroyed if such entry or access is sought without a warrant.

(3) A warrant under this section may authorise persons to accompany any constable who is executing it.
(4) In this Act "relevant evidence", in relation to an offence, means anything that would be admissible in evidence at a trial for the offence.
(5) The powers conferred by this section are in addition to any powers otherwise conferred. '.—[Mr. Whitelaw.]

Brought up, and read the First and Second time.

Amendment (a) proposed to the proposed new clause 2, in line 1, leave out 'justice of the peace' and insert 'circuit judge'.—[Mr. Andrew F. Bennett.]

Question put, That the amendment be made:—

The Committee divided: Ayes 212, Noes 276.

Division No. 137]
[11.57 pm


AYES


Abse, Leo
Dewar, Donald


Adams, Allen
Dobson, Frank


Allaun, Frank
Dormand, Jack


Anderson, Donald
Douglas, Dick


Archer, Rt Hon Peter
Dubs, Alfred


Ashley, Rt Hon Jack
Duffy, A. E. P.


Ashton, Joe
Dunnett, Jack


Atkinson, H.(H'gey,)
Dunwoody, Hon Mrs G.


Bagier, Gordon A.T.
Eadie, Alex


Barnett, Guy (Greenwich)
Eastham, Ken


Barnett, Rt Hon Joel (H'wd)
Ennals, Rt Hon David


Beith, A. J.
Evans, loan (Aberdare)


Bennett, Andrew(St'Kp't N)
Evans, John (Newton)


Bidwell, Sydney
Field, Frank


Booth, Rt Hon Albert
Flannery, Martin


Boothroyd, Miss Betty
Ford, Ben


Bradley, Tom
Forrester, John


Bray, Dr Jeremy
Foster, Derek


Brown, Hugh D. (Provan)
Foulkes, George


Brown, Ronald W. (H'ckn'y S)
Fraser, J. (Lamb'th, N'w'd)


Brown, Ron (E'burgh, Leith)
Freeson, Rt Hon Reginald


Buchan, Norman
Garrett, John (Norwich S)


Callaghan, Jim (Midd't'n &amp; P)
George, Bruce


Campbell, Ian
Gilbert, Rt Hon Dr John


Campbell-Savours, Dale
Golding, John


Canavan, Dennis
Graham, Ted


Cant, R. B.
Grant, John (Islington C)


Carmichael, Neil
Hamilton, W. W. (C'tral Fife)


Carter-Jones, Lewis
Hardy, Peter


Clark, Dr David (S Shields)
Harman, Harriet (Peckham)


Clarke.Thomas (C'b'dge, A'rie)
Harrison, Rt Hon Walter


Cocks, Rt Hon M, (B'stol S)
Hart, Rt Hon Dame Judith


Cohen, Stanley
Hattersley, Rt Hon Roy


Coleman, Donald
Haynes, Frank


Concannon, Rt Hon J. D.
Heffer, Eric S.


Conlan, Bernard
Hogg, N. (E Dunb't'nshire)


Cook, Robin F.
Hooley, Frank


Cowans, Harry
Howell, Rt Hon D.


Craigen, J. M. (G'gow, M'hill)
Howells, Geraint


Crawshaw, Richard
Hoyle, Douglas


Crowther, Stan
Hughes, Mark (Durham)


Cryer, Bob
Hughes, Robert (Aberdeen N)


Cunliffe, Lawrence
Hughes, Roy (Newport)


Cunningham, G. (Islington S)
Hughes, Simon (Bermondsey)


Dalyell, Tam
Janner, Hon Greville


Davidson, Arthur
Jay, Rt Hon Douglas


Davis, Clinton (Hackney C)
John, Brynmor


Davis, Terry (B'ham, Stechf'd)
Johnston, Russell (Inverness)


Deakins, Eric
Jones, Barry (East Flint)


Dean, Joseph (Leeds West)
Kaufman, Rt Hon Gerald





Kerr, Russell
Roberts, Gwilym (Cannock)


Kilroy-Silk, Robert
Robertson, George


Lamond, James
Robinson, G. (Coventry NW)


Leadbitter, Ted
Rooker, J. W.


Leighton, Ronald
Roper, John


Lestor, Miss Joan
Ross, Ernest (Dundee West)


Lewis, Ron (Carlisle)
Ross, Stephen (Isle of Wight)


Litherland, Robert
Rowlands, Ted


Lofthouse, Geoffrey
Sandelson, Neville


Lyon, Alexander (York)
Sever, John


Lyons, Edward (Bradf'd W)
Sheerman, Barry


McCartney, Hugh
Sheldon, Rt Hon R.


McDonald, Dr Oonagh
Shore, Rt Hon Peter


McElhone, Mrs Helen
Short, Mrs Renee


McGuire, Michael (Ince)
Silkin, Rt Hon J. (Deptford)


McKay, Allen (Penistone)
Silkin, Rt Hon S. C. (Dulwich)


McKelvey, William
Silverman, Julius


MacKenzie, Rt Hon Gregor
Skinner, Dennis


McNamara, Kevin
Smith, Cyril (Rochdale)


McTaggart, Robert
Smith, Rt Hon J. (N Lanark)


McWilliam, John
Snape, Peter


Magee, Bryan
Soley, Clive


Marks, Kenneth
Spearing, Nigel


Marshall, D.(G'gow S'ton)
Spellar, John Francis (B'ham)


Marshall, Jim (Leicester S)
Spriggs, Leslie


Martin, M.(G'gow S'burn)
Stallard, A. W.


Mason, Rt Hon Roy
Steel, Rt Hon David


Maxton, John
Stoddart, David


Maynard, Miss Joan
Stott, Roger


Meacher, Michael
Straw, Jack


Mikardo, Ian
Taylor, Mrs Ann (Bolton W)


Millan, Rt Hon Bruce
Thomas, Dr R.(Carmarthen)


Mitchell, Austin (Grimsby)
Thorne, Stan (Preston South)


Mitchell, R. C. (Soton Itchen)
Tilley, John


Morris, Rt Hon A. (W'shawe)
Tinn, James


Morton, George
Torney, Tom


Moyle, Rt Hon Roland
Varley, Rt Hon Eric G.


Newens, Stanley
Walker, Rt Hon H.(D'caster)


Oakes, Rt Hon Gordon
Warden, Gareth


O'Brien, Oswald (Darlington)
Watkins, David


O'Halloran, Michael
Welsh, Michael


O'Neill, Martin
White, Frank R.


Palmer, Arthur
Whitlock, William


Park, George
Wigley, Dafydd


Parker, John
Williams, Rt Hon A.(S'sea W)


Parry, Robert
Williams, Rt Hon Mrs(Crosby)


Pavitt, Laurie
Wilson, Rt Hon Sir H.(H'ton)


Pendry, Tom
Wilson, William (C'try SE)


Penhaligon, David
Winnick, David


Pitt, William Henry
Woodall, Alec


Powell, Raymond (Ogmore)
Woolmer, Kenneth


Prescott, John
Wrigglesworth, Ian


Price, C. (Lewisham W)
Wright, Sheila


Radice, Giles
Young, David (Bolton E)


Rees, Rt Hon M (Leeds S)



Richardson, Jo
Tellers for the Ayes:


Roberts, Allan (Bootle)
Mr. James Hamilton and


Roberts, Ernest (Hackney N)
Dr. Edmund Marshall.


NOES


Adley, Robert
Blackburn, John


Alexander, Richard
Blaker, Peter


Ancram, Michael
Body, Richard


Arnold, Tom
Bonsor, Sir Nicholas


Aspinwall, Jack
Boscawen, Hon Robert


Atkins, Rt Hon H.(S'thorne)
Bottomley, Peter (W'wich W)


Atkins, Robert(Preston N)
Boyson, Dr Rhodes


Atkinson, David (B'm'th.E)
Braine, Sir Bernard


Baker, Kenneth(St.M'bonej
Bright, Graham


Baker, Nicholas (N Dorset)
Brinton, Tim


Banks, Robert
Brittan, Rt. Hon. Leon


Beaumont-Dark, Anthony
Brooke, Hon Peter


Bendall, Vivian
Brotherton, Michael


Benyon, Thomas (A'don)
Brown, Michael(Brigg &amp; Sc'n)


Benyon, W. (Buckingham)
Browne, John (Winchester)


Berry, Hon Anthony
Bruce-Gardyne, John


Best, Keith
Buck, Antony


Bevan, David Gilroy
Budgen, Nick


Biffen, Rt Hon John
Bulmer, Esmond


Biggs-Davison, Sir John
Burden, Sir Frederick






Butler, Hon Adam
Irvine, RtHon Bryant Godman


Carlisle, John (Luton West)
Jenkin, Rt Hon Patrick


Carlisle, Kenneth (Lincoln)
Jessel, Toby


Chalker, Mrs Lynda
Johnson Smith, Sir Geoffrey


Chapman, Sydney
Joplmg, Rt Hon Michael


Churchill, W S
Joseph, Rt Hon Sir Keith


Clark, Hon A. (Plym'th, S'n)
Kaberry, Sir Donald


Clark, Sir W (Croydon S)
Kellett-Bowman, Mrs Elaine


Clegg, Sir Walter
Kershaw, Sir Anthony


Colvin Michael
Kitson, Sir Timothy


Cormack, Patrick
Knox, David


Corrie, John
Lamont, Norman


Costain, Sir Albert
Lang, Ian


Cranborne, Viscount
Langford-Holt, Sir John


Critchley, Julian
Latham, Michael


Crouch, David
Lawrence, Ivan


Dorrell, Stephen
Lee, John


Douglas-Hamilton, Lord J
Lennox-Boyd, Hon Mark


Dover, Denshore
Lester, Jim (Beeston)


du Cann, Rt Hon Edward
Lewis, Sir Kenneth (Rutland)


Dunn, Robert (Dartford)
Lloyd, Ian (Havant &amp; W'loo)


Dykes, Hugh
Lloyd, Peter (Fareham)


Eden, Rt Hon Sir John
Lovendge, John


Edwards, Rt Hon N (P'broke)
Luce, Richard


Elliott, Sir William
Lyell, Nicholas


Eyre, Reginald
McCrindle, Robert


Fairgneve, Sir Russell
Macfarlane, Neil


Faith, Mrs Sheila
MacGregor, John


Fell, Sir Anthony
MacKay, John (Argyll)


Fenner, Mrs Peggy
Macmillan, Rt Hon M


Finsberg, Geoffrey
McNair-Wilson, M. (N'bury)


Fisher, Sir Nigel
McNair-Wilson, P (New Fst)


Fletcher, A (Ed nb'gh N)
McQuarne, Albert


Fookes, Miss Janet
Major, John


Forman, Nigel
Marland, Paul


Fox, Marcus
Marlow, Antony


Fraser, Rt Hon Sir Hugh
Marshall, Michael (Arundel)


Fraser, Peter (South Angus)
Marten, Rt Hon Neil


Fry, Peter
Mates, Michael


Gardiner, George (Reigate)
Mather, Carol


Gardner, Sir Edward
Maude, Rt Hon Sir Angus


Garel-Jones, Tristan
Mawby, Ray


Gilmour, Rt Hon Sir Ian
Mawhinney, Dr Brian


Glyn, Dr Alan
Maxwell-Hyslop, Robin


Goodhart, Sir Philip
Mayhew, Patrick


Goodhew, Sir Victor
Mellor, David


Gorst, John
Meyer, Sir Anthony


Gow, Ian
Miller, Hal (B'grove)


Gower, Sir Raymond
Mills, Iain (Meriden)


Grant, Sir Anthony
Mills, Sir Peter (West Devon)


Green way, Harry
Miscampbell, Norman


Grieve, Percy
Mitchell, David (Basmgstoke)


Griffiths, E(B'y St Edm'ds)
Moate, Roger


Griffiths, Peter (Portsm'th N)
Monro, Sir Hector


Grist, Ian
Montgomery, Fergus


Grylls, Michael
Moore, John


Gummer, John Selwyn
Morris, M. (N'hampton S)


Hamilton, Hon A
Morrison, Hon C. (Devizes)


Hamilton, Michael (Salisbury)
Morrison, Hon P (Chester)


Hampson, Dr Keith
Mudd, David


Hannam, John
Murphy, Christopher


Haselhurst, Alan
Myles, David


Hastings, Stephen
Neale, Gerrard


Havers, Rt Hon Sir Michael
Needham, Richard


Hawkins, Sir Paul
Nelson, Anthony


Hawksley, Warren
Neubert, Michael


Heddle, John
Newton, Tony


Henderson, Barry
Normanton, Tom


Hicks, Robert
Onslow, Cranley


Higgins, Rt Hon Terence L.
Oppenheim, Rt Hon Mrs S.


Hill, James
Page, Richard (SW Herts)


Hogg, Hon Douglas (Gr'th'm)
Parkinson, Rt Hon Cecil


Holland, Philip (Carlton)
Parris, Matthew


Hooson, Tom
Patten, Christopher (Bath)


Hordern, Peter
Patten, John (Oxford)


Howell, Rt Hon D (G'Idf'd)
Pawsey, James


Howell, Ralph (N Norfolk)
Percival, Sir Ian


Hunt, David (Wirral)
Pink, R Bonner


Hunt, John (Ravensbourne)
Pollock, Alexander


Hurd, Rt Hon Douglas
Prentice, Rt Hon Reg





Price, Sir David (Eastleigh)
Stradling Thomas, J.


Proctor, K. Harvey
Taylor, Teddy (S'end E)


Rathbone, Tim
Tebbit, Rt Hon Norman


Rees, Peter (Dover and Deal)
Temple-Morris, Peter


Rees-Davies, W. R.
Thomas, Rt Hon Peter


Renton, Tim
Thompson, Donald


Rhodes James, Robert
Thorne, Neil (llford South)


Rhys Williams, Sir Brandon
Thornton, Malcolm


Ridley, Hon Nicholas
Townend, John (Bridllngton)


Ridsdale, Sir Julian
Townsend, Cyril D, (B'heath)


Rifkind, Malcolm
Trippier, David


Rippon, Rt Hon Geoffrey
Trotter, Neville


Roberts, Wyn (Conway)
van Straubenzee, Sir W.


Rossi, Hugh
Vaughan, Dr Gerard


Rost, Peter
Viggers, Peter


Royle, Sir Anthony
Waddington, David


Rumbold, Mrs A. C. R.
Wakeham, John


Sainsbury, Hon Timothy
Waldegrave, Hon William


St. John-Stevas, Rt Hon N.
Walker, B. (Perth)


Shaw, Giles (Pudsey)
Walker-Smith, Rt Hon Sir D.


Shelton, William (Streatham)
Wall, Sir Patrick


Shepherd, Colin (Hereford)
Walters, Dennis


Shersby, Michael
Ward, John


Silvester, Fred
Warren, Kenneth


Sims, Roger
Watson, John


Skeet, T. H. H.
Wells, Bowen


Smith, Tim (Beaconsfield)
Wells, John (Maidstone)


Speed, Keith
Wheeler, John


Speller, Tony
Whitelaw, Rt Hon William


Spicer, Jim (West Dorset)
Whitney, Raymond


Spicer, Michael (S Worcs)
Wickenden, Keith


Sproat, Iain
Williams, D.(Montgomery)


Squire, Robin
Winterton, Nicholas


Stanbrook, Ivor
Wolfson, Mark


Stanley, John
Young, Sir George (Acton)


Steen, Anthony
Younger, Rt Hon George


Stevens, Martin



Stewart, A.(E Renfrewshire)
Tellers for the Noes:


Stewart, Ian (Hitchin)
Mr. John Cope and


Stokes, John
Mr. Alastair Goodlad.

Question accordingly negatived.

Amendment (g) proposed to the proposed new clause, in line 27, at end add—
`(6) Except where condition (a) (b) or (d) of subsection (2) of this section is fulfilled, an application under this section shall be made inter partes.'.—[4r. Andrew F. Bennett.]

Question put, That the amendment be made:—

The Committee divided: Ayes 208,Noes 273.

Division No. 138]
[12.10 am


AYES


Abse, Leo
Carter-Jones, Lewis


Adams, Allen
Clark, Dr David (S Shields)


Allaun, Frank
Clarke, Thomas (C'b'dge, A'rie)


Anderson, Donald
Cocks, Rt Hon M. (B'stol S)


Archer, Rt Hon Peter
Cohen, Stanley


Ashley, Rt Hon Jack
Coleman, Donald


Ashton, Joe
Concannon, Rt Hon J. D.


Atkinson, N.(H'gey,)
Cook, Robin F.


Bagier, Gordon A.T.
Cowans, Harry


Barnett, Guy (Greenwich)
Craigen, J. M. (G'gow, M'hill)


Barnett, Rt Hon Joel (H'wd)
Crawshaw, Richard


Beith, A. J.
Crowther, Stan


Bennett, Andrew(St kp't N)
Cryer, Bob


Bidwell, Sydney
Cunliffe, Lawrence


Boothroyd, Miss Betty
Cunningham, G. (Islington S)


Bradley, Tom
Dalyell, Tam


Bray, Dr Jeremy
Davidson, Arthur


Brown, Hugh D. (Provan)
Davis, Clinton (Hackney C)


Brown, Ronald W. (H'ckn'y S)
Davis, Terry (B'ham, Stechf'd)


Brown, Ron (E'burgh, Leith)
Deakins, Eric


Buchan, Norman
Dean, Joseph (Leeds West)


Callaghan, Jim (Midd't'n &amp; P)
Dewar, Donald


Campbell, Ian
Dobson, Frank


Campbell-Savours, Dale
Dormand, Jack


Canavan, Dennis
Douglas, Dick


Carmichael, Neil
Dubs, Alfred






Duffy, A. E. P.
Morris, Rt Hon A. (W'shawe)


Dunnett, Jack
Morton, George


Dunwoody, Hon Mrs G.
Moyle, Rt Hon Roland


Eadie, Alex
Newens, Stanley


Eastham, Ken
Oakes, Rt Hon Gordon


Ennals, Rt Hon David
O'Brien, Oswald (Darlington)


Evans, loan (Aberdare)
O'Halloran, Michael


Evans, John (Newton)
O'Neill, Martin


Field, Frank
Palmer, Arthur


Flannery, Martin
Park, George


Ford, Ben
Parker, John


Forrester, John
Parry, Robert


Foster, Derek
Pavitt, Laurie


Foulkes, George
Pendry, Tom


Fraser, J. (Lamb'th, N'w'd)
Penhaligon, David


Freeson, Rt Hon Reginald
Pitt, William Henry


Freud, Clement
Powell, Raymond (Ogmore)


Garrett, John (Norwich S)
Prescott, John


George, Bruce
Price, C. (Lewisham W)


Gilbert, Rt Hon Dr John
Radice, Giles


Golding, John
Rees, Rt Hon M (Leeds S)


Graham, Ted
Richardson, Jo


Grant, John (Islington C)
Roberts, Allan (Bootle)


Hamilton, James (Bothwell)
Roberts, Gwilym (Cannock)


Hamilton, W. W. (C'tral Fife)
Robertson, George


Hardy, Peter
Robinson, G. (Coventry NW)


Harman, Harriet (Peckham)
Rooker, J. W.


Hart, Rt Hon Dame Judith
Roper, John


Hattersley, Rt Hon Roy
Ross, Ernest (Dundee West)


Haynes, Frank
Ross, Stephen (Isle of Wight)


Heffer, Eric S.
Rowlands, Ted


Hogg, N. (E Dunb't'nshire)
Sandelson, Neville


Hooley, Frank
Sever, John


Howell, Rt Hon D.
Sheerman, Barry


Howells, Geraint
Sheldon, Rt Hon R.


Hoyle, Douglas
Shore, Rt Hon Peter


Hughes, Mark (Durham)
Short, Mrs Renée


Hughes, Robert (Aberdeen N)
Silkin, Rt Hon J. (Deptford)


Hughes, Roy (Newport)
Silkin, Rt Hon S. C. (Dulwich)


Hughes, Simon (Bermondsey)
Silverman, Julius


Janner, Hon Greville
Skinner, Dennis


Jay, Rt Hon Douglas
Smith, Cyril (Rochdale)


John, Brynmor
Smith, Rt Hon J. (N Lanark)


Johnston, Russell (Inverness)
Snape, Peter


Jones, Barry (East Flint)
Soley, Clive


Kaufman, Rt Hon Gerald
Spearing, Nigel


Kerr, Russell
Spellar, John Francis (B'ham)


Kilroy-Silk, Robert
Spriggs, Leslie


Lamond, James
Stallard, A. W.


Leadbitter, Ted
Steel, Rt Hon David


Leighton, Ronald
Stoddart, David


Lestor, Miss Joan
Stott, Roger


Lewis, Ron (Carlisle)
Straw, Jack


Litherland, Robert
Taylor, Mrs Ann (Bolton W)


Lofthouse, Geoffrey
Thomas, Dr R.(Carmarthen)


Lyon, Alexander (York)
Thorne, Stan (Preston South)


Lyons, Edward (Bradf'd W)
Tilley, John


McDonald, Dr Oonagh
Tinn, James


McElhone, Mrs Helen
Torney, Tom


McGuire, Michael (Ince)
Varley, Rt Hon Eric G.


McKay, Allen (Penistone)
Walker, Rt Hon H.(D'caster)


McKelvey, William
Wardell, Gareth


MacKenzie, Rt Hon Gregor
Watkins, David


McNamara, Kevin
Welsh, Michael


McTaggart, Robert
White, Frank R.


McWilliam, John
Whitlock, William


Magee, Bryan
Wigley, Dafydd


Marks, Kenneth
Williams, Rt Hon A.(S'sea W)


Marshall, D.(G'gow S'ton)
Williams, Rt Hon Mrs(Crosby)


Marshall, Dr Edmund (Goole)
Wilson, Rt Hon Sir H.(H'ton)


Marshall, Jim (Leicester S)
Wilson, William (C'try SE)


Martin, M. (G'gow S'burn)
Woodall, Alec


Mason, Rt Hon Roy
Woolmer, Kenneth


Maxton, John
Wrigglesworth, Ian


Maynard, Miss Joan
Wright, Sheila


Meacher, Michael
Young, David (Bolton E)


Mikardo, Ian



Millan, Rt Hon Bruce
Tellers for the Ayes:


Mitchell, Austin (Grimsby)
Mr. Walter Harrison and


Mitchell, R. C. (Soton Itchen)
Mr. Hugh McCartney.





NOES


Adley, Robert
Gardiner, George (Reigate)


Alexander, Richard
Gardner, Sir Edward


Ancram, Michael
Garel-Jones, Tristan


Arnold, Tom
Glyn, Dr Alan


Aspinwall, Jack
Goodhart, Sir Philip


Atkins, Rt Hon H.(S'thorne)
Goodhew, Sir Victor


Atkins, Robert(Preston N)
Goodlad, Alastair


Atkinson, David (B'm'th.E)
Gorst, John


Baker, Kenneth(Sr.M'bone)
Gow, Ian


Baker, Nicholas (N Dorset)
Gower, Sir Raymond


Banks, Robert
Grant, Sir Anthony


Beaumont-Dark, Anthony
Greenway, Harry


Bendall, Vivian
Grieve, Percy


Benyon, Thomas (A'don)
Griffiths, E.(B'y St. Edm'ds)


Benyon, W. (Buckingham)
Griffiths, Peter (Portsm'th N)


Berry, Hon Anthony
Grist, Ian


Best, Keith
Grylls, Michael


Bevan, David Gilroy
Gummer, John Selwyn


Biffen, Rt Hon John
Hamilton, Michael (Salisbury)


Biggs-Davison, Sir John
Hampson, Dr Keith


Blackburn, John
Hannam, John


Blaker, Peter
Haselhurst, Alan


Body, Richard
Hastings, Stephen


Bonsor, Sir Nicholas
Havers, Rt Hon Sir Michael


Boscawen, Hon Robert
Hawkins, Sir Paul


Bottomley, Peter (W'wich W)
Hawksley, Warren


Boyson, Dr Rhodes
Heddle, John


Braine, Sir Bernard
Henderson, Barry


Bright, Graham
Hicks, Robert


Brinton, Tim
Higgins, Rt Hon Terence L


Brittan, Rt. Hon. Leon
Hill, James


Brooke, Hon Peter
Holland, Philip (Carlton)


Brotherton, Michael
Hooson, Tom


Brown, Michael(Brigg &amp; Sc'n)
Hordern, Peter


Browne, John (Winchester)
Howell, Rt Hon D. (G'ldf'd)


Bruce-Gardyne, John
Howell, Ralph (N Norfolk)


Buck, Antony
Hunt, David (Wirral)


Budgen, Nick
Hunt, John (Ravensbourne)


Bulmer, Esmond
Hurd, Rt Hon Douglas


Burden, Sir Frederick
Irvine, RtHon Bryant Godman


Butler, Hon Adam
Jenkin, Rt Hon Patrick


Carlisle, John (Luton West)
Jessel, Toby


Carlisle, Kenneth (Lincoln)
Johnson Smith, Sir Geoffrey


Chalker, Mrs. Lynda
Jopling, Rt Hon Michael


Channon, Rt. Hon. Paul
Joseph, Rt Hon Sir Keith


Churchill, W. S.
Kaberry, Sir Donald


Clark, Hon A. (Plym'th, S'n)
Kellett-Bowman, Mrs Elaine


Clark, Sir W. (Croydon S)
Kershaw, Sir Anthony


Clegg, Sir Walter
Kitson, Sir Timothy


Colvin, Michael
Knox, David


Cope, John
Lamont, Norman


Cormack, Patrick
Lang, Ian


Corrie, John
Langford-Holt, Sir John


Costain, Sir Albert
Latham, Michael


Cranborne, Viscount
Lawrence, Ivan


Critchley, Julian
Lee, John


Crouch, David
Lennox-Boyd, Hon Mark


Dorrell, Stephen
Lester, Jim (Beeston)


Douglas-Hamilton, Lord J.
Lewis, Sir Kenneth (Rutland)


Dover, Denshore
Lloyd, Ian (Havant &amp; W'loo)


du Cann, Rt Hon Edward
Lloyd, Peter (Fareham)


Dunn, Robert (Dartford)
Loveridge, John


Dykes, Hugh
Luce, Richard


Eden, Rt Hon Sir John
Lyell, Nicholas


Edwards, Rt Hon N. (P'broke)
McCrindle, Robert


Elliott, Sir William
Macfarlane, Neil


Eyre, Reginald
MacGregor, John


Fairgrieve, Sir Russell
MacKay, John (Argyll)


Faith, Mrs Sheila
Macmillan, Rt Hon M.


Fenner, Mrs Peggy
McNair-Wilson, M. (N'bury)


Finsberg, Geoffrey
McNair-Wilson, P. (New F'st)


Fisher, Sir Nigel
McQuarrie, Albert


Fletcher, A. (Ed'nb'gh N)
Major, John


Fookes, Miss Janet
Marland, Paul


Forman, Nigel
Marlow, Antony


Fox, Marcus
Marshall, Michael (Arundel)


Fraser, Rt Hon Sir Hugh
Marten, Rt Hon Neil


Fraser, Peter (South Angus)
Mates, Michael


Fry, Peter
Mather, Carol






Maude, Rt Hon Sir Angus
Shepherd, Colin (Hereford)


Mawby, Ray
Shersby, Michael


Mawhinney, Dr Brian
Silvester, Fred


Maxwell-Hyslop, Robin
Sims, Roger


Mayhew, Patrick
Skeet, T. H. H.


Mellor, David
Smith, Tim (Beaconsfield)


Meyer, Sir Anthony
Speed, Keith


Miller, Hal (B'grove)
Speller, Tony


Mills, Iain (Meriden)
Spicer, Jim (West Dorset)


Mills, Sir Peter (West Devon)
Spicer, Michael (S Worcs)


Miscampbell, Norman
Sproat, Iain


Mitchell, David (Basingstoke)
Squire, Robin


Moate, Roger
Stanbrook, Ivor


Monro, Sir Hector
Stanley, John


Montgomery, Fergus
Steen, Anthony


Moore, John
Stevens, Martin


Morris, M. (N'hampton S)
Stewart, A.(E Renfrewshire)


Morrison, Hon C. (Devizes)
Stewart, Ian (Hitchin)


Morrison, Hon P. (Chester)
Stokes, John


Mudd, David
Stradling Thomas, J.


Murphy, Christopher
Taylor, Teddy (S'end E)


Myles, David
Tebbit, Rt Hon Norman


Neale, Gerrard
Temple-Morris, Peter


Needham, Richard
Thomas, Rt Hon Peter


Nelson, Anthony
Thompson, Donald


Neubert, Michael
Thorne, Neil (Ilford South)


Newton, Tony
Thornton, Malcolm


Normanton, Tom
Townend, John (Bridlington)


Onslow, Cranley
Townsend, Cyril D, (B'heath)


Oppenheim, Rt Hon Mrs S.
Trippier, David


Page, Richard (SW Herts)
Trotter, Neville


Parkinson, Rt Hon Cecil
van Straubenzee, Sir W.


Parris, Matthew
Vaughan, Dr Gerard


Patten, Christopher (Bath)
Viggers, Peter


Patten, John (Oxford)
Waddington, David


Pawsey, James
Wakeham, John


Percival, Sir Ian
Waldegrave, Hon William


Pink, R. Bonner
Walker, B. (Perth)


Pollock, Alexander
Walker-Smith, Rt Hon Sir D.


Prentice, Rt Hon Reg
Wall, Sir Patrick


Price, Sir David (Eastleigh)
Walters, Dennis


Proctor, K. Harvey
Ward, John


Rathbone, Tim
Warren, Kenneth


Rees, Peter (Dover and Deal)
Watson, John


Rees-Davies, W. R.
Wells, Bowen


Renton, Tim
Wells, John (Maidstone)


Rhodes James, Robert
Wheeler, John


Rhys Williams, Sir Brandon
Whitelaw, Rt Hon William


Ridley, Hon Nicholas
Whitney, Raymond


Ridsdale, Sir Julian
Wickenden, Keith


Rifkind, Malcolm
Williams, D.(Montgomery)


Rippon, Rt Hon Geoffrey
Winterton, Nicholas


Rossi, Hugh
Wolfson, Mark


Rost, Peter
Young, Sir George (Acton)


Royle, Sir Anthony
Younger, Rt Hon George


Rumbold, Mrs A. C. R.



Sainsbury, Hon Timothy
Tellers for the Noes:


St. John-Stevas, Rt Hon N.
Mr. Archie Hamilton and


Shaw, Giles (Pudsey)
Mr. Douglas Hogg.


Shelton, William (Streatham)

Question accordingly negatived.

Clause added to the Bill.

New Clause 3

MEANING OF 'EXCLUDED MATERIAL'

`(1) Subject to the following provisions of this section, in this Act "excluded material" means—

(a) items subject to legal privilege;
(b) material of either of the following descriptions which a person has acquired or created in the course of any trade, business, profession or other occupation or for the purposes of any paid or unpaid office held by him and which he holds in confidence—

(i) personal records;
(ii) human tissue or tissue fluid taken for the purposes of diagnosis or medical treatment;


(c) journalistic material which consists of documents or other records and which a person holds in confidence.

(2) A person holds material other than journalistic material in confidence for the purposes of this section if he holds it subject—

(a) to an express or implied undertaking on his part to hold it in confidence; or
(b) to a restriction on disclosure or an obligation of secrecy contained in any enactment, whether it is in an Act passed before or an Act passed after this Act.

(3) A person holds journalistic material in confidence for the purposes of this section if—

(a) he holds it subject to such an undertaking, restriction or obligation; and
(b) it has been continuously held (by one or more persons) subject to such an undertaking, restriction or obligation since it was first acquired or created for the purposes of journalism.

(4) If by virtue of any enactment other than section [Access to special procedure material] and Schedule [Special procedure] below a justice of the peace or judge, upon the application of a constable, may issue a warrant to him authorising him to enter premises and search for anything in them for the purposes of a criminal investigation, the things for which a search may be authorised are not excluded material.'. —[Mr. Whitelaw.]

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 4

MEANING OF 'ITEMS SUBJECT TO LEGAL PRIVILEGE'

`(1) Subject to the following provisions of this section. in this Part of this Act "items subject to legal privilege" means—

(a) communications between a professional legal adviser and his client or any person representing his client made in connection with the giving of legal advice to the client; and
(b) communications between a professional legal adviser and his client or any person representing his client or between such an adviser or his client or any such representative and any other person made in connection with or in contemplation of legal proceedings and for the purposes of such proceedings,

when they are in the possession of a person to whom this subsection applies.
(2) Subsection (1) above applies to the professional legal adviser, his client and any person representing his client.
(3) Documents or other articles enclosed with or referred to in such communications as are mentioned in subsection (1) above are not items subject to legal privilege if they were not made in connection with the giving of legal advice or in connection with or in contemplation of legal proceedings and for the purpose of such proceedings.
(4) Documents or articles held with the intention of furthering a criminal purpose are not items subject to legal privilege.'.[Mr. Whitelaw.]

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 5

MEANING OF 'PERSONAL RECORDS'

`In this Part of this Act "personal records" means documents and other records concerning an individual (whether living or dead) who can be identified from them, and relating—

(a) to his physical or mental health;
(b) to spiritual counselling or assistance given or to be given to him;
(c) to social work or similiar activities involving counselling or assistance given or to be given to him; or
(d) to other activities relating to his personal welfare and involving counselling or assistance given or to be given to him—

(i) by any voluntary organisation; or


(ii) by any individual who by reason of his office or occupation has responsibilities for his personal welfare.'.—[Mr. Whitelaw.]

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 6

MEANING OF 'JOURNALISTIC MATERIAL'

'(1) Subject to subsection (2) below, in this Act "journalistic material" means material acquired or created for the purposes of journalism.
(2) Material is only journalistic material for the purposes of this Act if it is in the possession of a person who acquired or created it for the purposes of journalism.'.—[Mr. Whitelaw.]

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 7

MEANING OF 'SPECIAL PROCEDURE MATERIAL'

'(1) In this Act "special procedure material" means—

(a) material to which subsection (2) below applies; and

New Clause 8

ACCESS TO SPECIAL PROCEDURAL MATERIAL


'(1) Subject to subsection (2) below, a constable may obtain access to special procedure material for the purposes of a criminal investigation by making an application under Schedule [Special procedure] below and in accordance with that Schedule.


(2) Where by virtue of any enactment not contained in this Act a justice of the peace, on the application of a constable, may issue a warrant authorising a constable to enter premises and search for anything in them for the purposes of a criminal investigation—


(a) an application relating to a search for anything other than documents or other records which are special procedure material may not be made under Schedule (Special procedure) below; and


(b) an application relating to a search for documents or other records which are special procedure material may only be made under that Schedule.'.


Amendment (a) to new clause 8, in line 7, leave out 'documents or other records which are'.


Amendment (b), in line 10, leave out 'documents or other records which are'.


Government amendment No. 153, new schedule—Special procedure:


Preliminary conditions


1. The power to make an order or issue a warrant under this Schedule is only exercisable if one or other of the preliminary conditions is fulfilled.


2. The first preliminary condition is that a circuit judge is satisfied on the application of a constable that there are reasonable grounds for believing—


(a) that a serious arrestable offence has been committed; and


(b) that there is special procedure material in certain premises; and


(c) that that material is relevant evidence.


3. The second preliminary condition is that a circuit judge is satisfied on the application of a constable—


(a) that there are reasonable grounds for believing that there is special procedure material in certain premises;


(b) that but for section (Access to special procedure material) (2) above a justice of the peace would have power otherwise than by virtue of this Schedule to issue a warrant to search the premises for the material; and


(c) that it would be appropriate for a justice of the peace or judge to issue such a warrant.


Order to produce or give access to material


4. The circuit judge may make an order under paragraph 6 below if—


(a) the first preliminary condition and the conditions specified in paragraph 5 below are fulfilled; or


(b) the second preliminary condition is fulfilled.


5. The conditions mentioned in paragraph 4(a) above are that the circuit judge is satis-fied—


(a) that the special procedure material would be of substantial value (whether by itself or together with other material) to the investigation in connection with which the application is made; and


(b) that other methods of obtaining it—


(i) have been tried without success; or


(ii) have not been tried because it appeared that they were bound to fail; and


(c) that it is in the public interest, having regard—


(i) to the benefit likely to accrue to the investigation if the material is obtained; and

(b) journalistic material, other than excluded material.

(2) This subsection applies to material, other than excluded material, in the possession of a person who—

(a) acquired or created it in the course of any trade, business, profession or other occupation or for the purpose of any paid or unpaid office held by him; and
(b) holds it subject—

(i) to an undertaking such as is mentioned in paragraph (a) of section (Meaning of "excluded material") (2) above; or
(ii) to a restriction or obligation such as is mentioned in paragraph (b) of that subsection.'. —[Mr. Mayhew.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Mr. Mayhew: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

The First Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means (Mr. Ernest Armstrong): With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:—

(ii) to the circumstances under which the person in possession of the material holds it,


that the material should be produced or that access to it should be given.


6 An order under this paragraph is an order requiring that a person—


(a) shall produce the material specified in the order to a constable not later than the end of such period not exceeding 7 days from the date of the order as the order may specify; or


(b) shall give a constable access to the material not later than the end of that period.


7. Where the material consists of data contained in a computer, an order under paragraph 6 above shall have effect as an order to produce the material in a form in which it can he taken away.


8. An application for an order under paragraph 6 above shall be made inter partes.


9. Where notice of an application for an order under paragraph 6 above is served on a person, he shall not conceal, destroy, alter or dispose of the material to which the application relates except—


(a) with the leave of a judge; or


(b) with the written permission of a constable, until—


(i) the application is dismissed or abandoned; or


(ii) he has complied with an order under paragraph 6 above made on the application.


Service of notices of application for orders


Notice of an application for an order under paragraph 6 above may be served on a person either by delivering it to him or by leaving it at his proper address or by sending it by post to him in a registered letter or by the recorded delivery service.


11. Such a notice may be served—


(a) on a body corporate, by serving it on the body's secretary or clerk or other similar officer; and


(b) on a partnership, by serving it on one of the partners.


12. For the purposes of this Schedule, and of section 7 of the Interpretation Act 1978 in its application to this Schedule, the proper address of a person, in the case of a secretary or clerk or other similar officer of a body corporate, shall be that of the registered or principal officer of that body, in the case of a partner of a firm shall be that of the principal office of the firm, and in any other case shall be the last known address of the person to be served.


Warrants to enter premises and search for special procedure material


13. A circuit judge may issue a warrant under paragraph 14 below where, on an application made by a constable, he is satisfied—


(a) as mentioned in paragraph 4 above; and


(b) either


(i) that service of notice of an application for an order under paragraph 6 above is likely to result in the concealment, destruction, alteration or disposal of the material; or


(ii) that the material is subject to a restriction or obligation such as is mentioned in sub-paragraph (ii) of section [Meaning of "special procedure material"] (2)(b) above and is likely to be disclosed in breach of it if he does not issue the warrant.


(18) In any application by a constable for a warrant under any other enactment to search premises in order to obtain evidence held on a confidential basis by a professional legal adviser or for the purposes of journalism, the provisions of this section (with the exception of subsection (11) above) shall apply to that application, as if the application were an application for an order or warrant under this section.


(19) The costs of any application under this section and of anything done or to be done under an order under this subsection (8) above shall be in the discretion of the judge.'.

Amendment (a) to the new schedule, in line 27, after `substantial', insert 'probative'.

Amendment (b), in line 27, leave out from 'value' to `in' in line 28 and insert at the trial of the offence'.

Amendment (c), in line 34, leave out 'investigation' and insert 'trial for offence'.

Amendment (d), in line 37, at end insert
'and, in particular, to any duty of confidentiality under which the evidence in question is held and to the public interest in the free and full reporting of events.'.

Amendment (e), in line 71, leave out paragraphs 13 to 16.

Amendment (f), in line 78, leave out subparagraph (ii).

Amendment (g), in line 83, at end insert—
`14A. Nothing under paragraph 14 above shall authorise the seizure of any excluded material or any special procedure material except that which is specified in the warrant.'.

Mr. Mayhew: New clauses 7 and 8, together with the new schedule introduced by amendment No. 153, restate in revised form the main provisions of clause 10. They also

apply the relevant safeguards of clause 10 to existing search warrant provisions for confidential documents. In other words, as I have already explained, the clauses not only provide a means, as recommended by the Royal Commission, of enabling the police to obtain access to evidence of the most serious crime which is held on confidential bases and which those holding that evidence may therefore be unwilling voluntarily to disclose to the police, but ensure that the police, in obtaining access to stolen or forged documents which may be held in good faith on a confidential basis, may do so without unnecessary recourse to a search of the premises concerned in which they may inevitably see confidential papers relating to innocent individuals.
New clause 7 accordingly defines "special procedure material". The definition is taken from clause 10 of the Bill as printed. The definition is cast in general terms, but that is a protection for the individual rather than the reverse.
The procedure under which a judge orders the production of evidence to the police after an inter partes hearing should not be confined to the members of the established professions with formal disciplining codes and professional ethical codes. Its benefits should be available in all cases where there are genuine considerations of confidentiality and so competing considerations of public interest as between the detection of crime and the preservation of confidences. Those who have tried to draw up a select list of those entitled to the protection of the production order procedure are, therefore, missing the point and unjustifiably narrowing the scope of these provisions of the Bill.
The definition of special procedure material also includes journalistic material constituting evidence of a serious arrestable offence other than journalists' confidential records, which are, of course, now excluded material. In other words, if there were, say, a photograph constituting evidence of a serious arrestable offence—say, a photograph of a particular incident during a riot — under the Bill as printed that evidence would fall under clause 9.
We have accepted, however, that it is right that such material, even though not acquired in confidence or from a confidential source, should nevertheless attract the additional protection of the special procedure. This is not to say that we are trying in the Bill to define journalists. It is not necessary to do so, and even if we succeeded in such a problematical exercise the only result would again be to narrow the scope of the special procedure to an excessive degree. The point is that not everything that is published constitutes journalism and not everything that is obtained for the purpose of journalism is intended for publication.

Mr. Christopher Price: I realise that the Minister is engaged upon a 100-yards sprint through his material, and I hesitate to stop him at the 50-yard point. I was listening with such care as I was able to apply to what he was saying. Is he saying that journalistic material which is not obtained in confidence is always going to be photographic material, because he only gave examples of photographic material? If that is not what he is saying, could he give some extra examples of the sort of journalistic material that is not obtained in confidence and that is not photographic material?

Mr. Mayhew: I do not think that I have to produce an inventory. It is enough, I think, for the hon. Gentleman and, indeed, for the profession, if I say that journalistic material as defined which is not held in confidence or acquired in confidence, none the less, in order to avoid unnecessary searches of journalistic premises, is subject to the special procedure. In other words, a police officer who wishes to obtain production of it must go to a circuit judge and ask for it. The sole objective is to avoid unnecessary searches of journalists' premises with the dangers thereby involved.
New clause 8 paves the way for the new schedule. It requires the police to employ the special procedure set out in the schedule in respect of documents held in confidence which are now liable to seizure under a magistrate's warrant issued under the present law. The new schedule sets out in what I am certain is a clearer and more

satisfactory way the relevant procedural provisions of clause 10, as modified by the additional safeguards to which I have already referred.

Mr. Arthur Davidson: The Minister read his brief interestingly. I am sorry that he read it, because he always does so much better, as he proved throughout in Committee, when he does not stick strictly to his brief. He always explains things very much better and much more comprehensibly when he does it on his own.
The new clauses deal with the strange phrase, peculiar to the Bill, of "special procedure material", and explain the procedure for gaining access to special procedure material. That procedure is contained in a massive and lengthy new schedule. I do not complain about the provisions in the schedule, but I think the Minister would be the first to admit that it is exceptionally complicated, containing more than 100 lines.
The difficulty is that there are three new clauses. It has taken two new clauses and a schedule to set out something that was previously contained in one clause, which, admittedly, we sought to change. We are glad that the Minister has changed it.
The arguments against the powers in the original clauses 9 and 10 were made at length in the previous debates. I assure the House that I do not have the slightest intention of going over those arguments again, nor would you allow me to, Mr. Armstrong, if I tried. However, it is a matter of some comment at least that in the Government's attempt to satisfy the various criticisms that were made in Committee in an attempt to improve the Bill, they have come up with three clauses, all of which contain some complications.
The main criticism of the new clauses, which follow from the previous new clauses, which we have now discussed in great detail, is that there are still two separate procedures laid down by the Government for obtaining evidence that the police seek. There is the section 9 procedure and the new special procedure, which is carried out by a complicated mechanism before a circuit judge. We feel that it is wrong that there should continue to be two separate procedures and that a circuit judge should be the proper tribunal to hear all cases where the police seek to obtain evidence, whether the evidence is held on a confidential basis or is special procedure evidence. We have adduced the arguments about that already.
Not only is the ordinary citizen who does not have the advantage of being in a profession or holding evidence on a confidential basis put at a disadvantage because the nature of the material that he holds and whether it is handed over or not, will be decided by a magistrate, but the procedure is confusing. The Government will face the following difficulty. In practice, a superintendent or senior police officer has to make a decision. He says to himself, "I have got this case on its feet, but I want some extra evidence." Will he really go through this elaborate procedure of deciding whether it is special or confidential material, whether to go to the magistrate or the circuit judge, and if he goes to the magistrate and has it wrong, whether to make a fresh application and go to the circuit judge? It will be a great burden and will make it difficult for the police officer to decide to go through all that complicated procedure. It will make it difficult for the superintendent to advise his officers that they should go through this new complicated procedure.
At present, if there is some evidence that eludes the police, but there is a fair amount of evidence against the person being investigated, the officer will charge him. Alternatively, the police may go to look for the evidence. If they know where the evidence is, they will ask for it to be handed over, and in most cases it will be handed over. In the rare cases where it is not, and there is a refusal, the police will do the best that they can. The Royal Commission, as the Minister knows, pointed out that in the overwhelming number of cases, if the police searched for evidence, there was not usually a refusal.
A police officer will now have to decide whether the evidence is excluded material or special procedure material, or whether it comes into neither category. He will have to decide whether to go to a magistrates' court or to a circuit judge, or whether to bother at all. The practicalities of the elaborate new clauses will not be helpful or sensible. I can see textbooks written on the special procedure material. Perhaps we shall have "Mayhew on Special Procedures", and no doubt it will be a fascinating textbook. Considering the rarity with which the procedure is likely to be asked for, and its complications, I wonder whether it is worth the Government's time coming up with such a complicated and technical procedure.
The procedure is somewhat improved by the amendments of my hon. Friend the Member for Stockport, North (Mr. Bennett). No doubt he will speak to those at some length. His amendments limit the evidence sought to probative evidence for the trial in case, rather than evidence that is helpful to the investigation, which is much wider. In all those circumstances, I was anxious to hear what the Minister had to say. I was grateful for his explanation, but I cannot help feeling that although the new clauses are an improvement on the clauses that the Government first came up with — clauses that were severely criticised by almost every professional body and received a great deal of criticism in Committee—and despite what the draftsmen have attempted to do, they have come up with something that is so complicated and confusing that very few police officers will take advantage of them, which might be a mercy.

Mr. Eldon Griffiths: I am sure that my hon. and learned Friend the Minister will be glad to hear that it should be possible for me to be fairly brief. Given that we have determined to create this special category of persons —the new privileged elite arising from the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1983—the police will have to treat these people as special. There will be a treatise on the special category people.
In Committee, the hon. Member for Lewisham, West (Mr. Price) entertained us all—himself, in particular—with copious references to the 1,000 page manual of the Metropolitan police. He quoted some marvellous passages, showing how the police tried to spell out matters. Indeed, my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary was finally persuaded to publish the material. When it comes to writing the special procedure and all that goes with it into the Metropolitan police handbook, it will take at least another 1,000 pages, and I hope that the House is aware of what it is doing to the paperwork of the police.
In the circumstances that the House has created, so be it. Therefore, my comments will be brief. I say with affection to my hon. and learned Friend, although I do not think that he feels much affection for me at the moment,

that I was surprised that, in introducing this group of amendments, he made no reference to the schedule. It may have been an omission or oversight on his part. Perhaps he did not wish to open up an area that was better left closed.

Mr. Mayhew: I did refer to it.

Mr. Griffiths: In that case, I must have missed it. My right hon. and learned Friend must have slipped it in at the speed of light. I merely ask whether at an early stage he will ask his Department to produce a simple and clear-cut guide to the special procedure for the benefit of the police service and the general public? That is not too much to ask. With advisers from the Police Federation, I spent many hours tracing the ways in which it will work in practice. We had to keep cross-referencing and looking up clauses and exclusions here, there and everywhere. It is a most complicated procedure. However, in the circumstances, I see no alternative to it. Therefore, I shall gladly vote for it, and I ask my hon. and learned Friend to try to produce a simplified version.

Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: This procedure, which has been devised for particular forms of information, is a nonsense born of the original draft of the Bill, with the concessions—first in Committee, and now—leaving a residue of information which certainly should not receive any special privilege.
At present, if there is power under a statute for a warrant to be issued—for instance, under the Forgery Act—for a police officer to get information, that is issued, whatever the nature of the information and whoever has it. Under the original draft of the Bill that was contained in a general search clause, clause 9, with only one special exemption, which was for confidential information, in clause 10. Confidential information related to particular relationships and the evidence that had been divulged in confidence within those relationships. Following the Committee stage, as a result of pressure from a number of professional groups, that confidential information has been exempted. Under clause 10 it was possible to obtain it under the special procedure. Now it is totally exempt material.
If that were all, we should not need new clause 7 on "special procedure material". The result of the conversations between the Minister and the various interest groups is that, in addition to exempt material—confidential material that was divulged to the person in an atmosphere of confidence — there is now to be other material that will be given a special procedure merely because these people belong to certain professional occupations. It is material which, if held by someone else, a dustman or an author, will come under the general procedure contained in the original clause 9, as amended by new clause 2.
That is nonsense. If a journalist obtains information from someone who is committing a criminal offence and keeps it in his notebook or, better still, is given a document by a criminal, that is exempt material. The police cannot get at it under the new clause. However, if the journalist has undertaken research and picked up material, not in confidence, such as a notebook or some other property that is relevant to an offence, the police do not have to attend an inter panes hearing.
12.45 am
If I got hold of such information as a private individual, the police could go to the magistrate, ask for a warrant and get one. If a journalist has such information the police must go to a special inter panes hearing before a circuit judge.
We are creating not simply special privilege involving confidential information, but special privilege for particular types of people—journalists in particular. I do not think that that is right. Journalists have always argued that they are no more privileged than any other member of the community; that they do not have any particular rights. They thrust that down our throats when we talk about the power of the press.
The Minister, by a side wind, has created for particular types of people a special privilege which does not apply to anyone else, not because of confidentiality, not because of safeguarding the public; but simply because of the nature of an occupation.
There are two ways to get rid of the anachronism. The first is to decide that everyone should have an inter partes hearing unless there is reason to believe that they themselves are criminals and that the hearing would provoke the destruction of the material. The second is to decide that nobody should have such a hearing and that the privileged occupations should be left with their privilege only in relation to confidential information.
The Government have not seriously considered the nonsense that they are creating. I hope that they will reconsider, not now perhaps, but before Report on Monday, or in the Lords.

Mr. Timothy Smith: I welcome new clauses 7 and 8 and the new schedule which together provide a way of dealing with special procedure material. Despite what the hon. Member for York (Mr. Lyon) said, they constitute a major improvement to the procedures in clause 10 for dealing with evidence held confidentially.
I pay tribute to my hon. and learned Friend the Minister of State for listening with care and patience to representations by various organisations and for seeking to allay their anxieties.
My interest is as parliamentary consultant to the consultative committee of accountancy bodies. A number of that body's original worries about clause 10 have been disposed of satisfactorily. It was concerned that "serious arrestable offence" was not specified and not confined, in relation to clause 10, to those categories for which such a power could be justified. That point has been met because there is now a new definition of a serious arrestable offence in clause 74, which is a marked improvement on the original definition.
Secondly, the consultative committee was concerned that an application by the police for an order under clause 10 was to be made without giving the professional adviser concerned an opportunity to be heard in reply. That, too, has been met because the new schedule dealing with the special procedure provides in paragraph 8 that
An application for an order under paragraph 6 above shall be made inter partes.
Thirdly, the consultative committee was concerned that confidential material might relate to the affairs of an innocent third party client of a professional adviser who not only had no opportunity to be heard in reply but might not even be aware of the inquiry taking place. Although

that is no longer so in the case of a production order, it remains so in the case of a search warrant, as provided by paragraphs 13 to 16 of the new schedule.
Fourthly, the consultative committee was concerned that if such a power was introduced it should be available not at the instance only of a circuit judge but rather of a High Court judge. That point has not been met, but I accept that the level of authority required by the Bill is already higher than that required by almost all other statutory powers enabling the police to obtain evidence.
Therefore, there is no doubt in my view but that the new schedule goes a long way to meet the anxieties expressed about the original clause 10, so much so that I now have only one major reservation about the new schedule. It relates to paragraphs 13 to 16, which my amendment seeks to delete. Those paragraphs empower a circuit judge to issue a search warrant where service of notice of a production order
is likely to result in the concealment, destruction, alteration or disposal of the material".
The chairman of the consultative committee of accountancy bodies wrote to my hon. and learned Friend the Minister on 4 March, saying that
The power to issue a warrant, ex parte, in circumstances where it is considered that evidence may be destroyed by issuing a production order is a matter of great concern to the accountancy profession. The issuing of a warrant under clause 10, subsection 10, presupposes that the person on whom the warrant is served will suppress evidence whether this is true or not. The serving of a warrant on a professional adviser could therefore destroy the professional reputation of that adviser, even though subsequently no evidence may be found incriminating him in the offence under investigation, because the very fact that a judge considered the professional adviser capable of being linked with the offence, would destroy his reputation with his clients and with the public. We cannot believe that it is the intention of Governmen to legislate in this way, which would not allow the professional adviser an opportunity to protect his professional reputation.
I appreciate that it is the view of the Government and of the Philips commission that a reserve power of this nature is essential to take account of cases in which the holder of evidence is himself implicated in the offence and would therefore have a strong motive to destroy the evidence if the interest of the police in the matter became known.
In reply to the letter that I have quoted, my hon. and learned Friend gave two assurances which I shall place on record. First, the Bill creates
a presumption in favour of the issue of a production order rather than a search warrant.
I appreciate that the search warrant procedure will be used only in extreme and exceptional circumstances. Moreover,
The onus will be on the police to satisfy the judge that this presumption should be overridden. Judges will … bear in mind that they have heard only one side of the story, and accordingly require solid grounds before concluding that a search warrant is necessary.
Secondly, the consequences for a person's professional reputation of the issue of a search warrant
would … ensue only if the fact that a warrant had been issued became generally known.
The way in which the police deal with the matter in practice will therefore be crucial.
In his letter my hon. and learned Friend said:
I therefore undertake to consider the issuing of guidance to the police, stressing the sensitivity of Clause 10 warrants and that they should be executed with the utmost discretion. The Home Secretary has in fact already undertaken to give guidance, circulated to chief officers recommending that senior officers should always take charge of such searches; and I am confident that senior officers will appreciate the need for discretion.
I very much appreciate that reassurance because it is absolutely crucial that such cases be treated with the


utmost discretion. Nevertheless, on balance, I should prefer that paragraphs 13 to 16 of the new schedule be omitted from the Bill, which is what amendment (e) seeks to achieve.
I welcome the changes to be made to the procedures. The new clauses and the new schedule constitute a major improvement on what was previously in the Bill.

Mr. Mikardo: The hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Smith) spoke with gratitude on behalf of one of the groups that have been placed in a privileged position by new clauses 2 to 8. But, as has been said several times in Committee—notably by my hon. Friend the Member for York (Mr. Lyon) and the hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Mr. Griffiths)—while we all agree that the special, delicate positions of some groups, such as priests, should be protected, we have provided some civil liberties protection for groups which amount to a relatively small minority of the population.
In achieving the balance that we all want between effective policing and the maintenance of individual rights, what we have done partially to correct the gross imbalance in the original clauses 9 and 10 has meant that we have leaned in the direction of individual rights for certain categories of people. I have made a rough calculation, which shows that in my constituency there are between 600 and 800 people whose position will be improved by new clauses 2 to 8. I am worried about the remaining 50,000 or 60,000 in my constituency.
While I understand hon. Members such as the hon. Member for Beaconsfield throwing their caps in the air with joy—although the hon. Gentleman's enthusiasm was a little muted and he wants even more privilege for the group that he represents—I wish that we could do more for ordinary people. Until we do, the Bill will still be a very bad Bill.
The hon. Member for Beaconsfield received an assurance that only senior officers would be authorised to take charge of searches. I wonder whether he received that assurance before or after the Home Secretary tabled new clause 1, which we shall consider on Report. Under that new clause, a senior officer can delegate his powers under the Bill to any other officer. The assurance that the hon. Gentleman has received will give him some comfort for the moment, but I think that his comfort will evaporate quite quickly when we debate new clause I on Report.
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I hope that the way in which the Minister performed a cavalry charge through his brief when introducing the new clauses does not indicate that he thinks that they are less important than those in the two groups which we discussed earlier. The same problems arise partially when considering this group. A justice of the peace will have to decide whether he should issue a search warrant. He will have to make that judgment in the absence of any evidence apart from what he is told by the officer who is making the application for the warrant.
In the course of making that judgment, the justice of the peace will have to take many factors into account. One of the factors will be whether the material that the officer is chasing and wants a warrant for is excluded material. If it is not, the justice of the peace will have to assess whether it is special procedure material. I do not know how he will make that judgment. In many cases, the officer involved will dig a nugget out of the ore. If he finds some material, he will not know its nature until it is in his hands. He will

not know until that moment whether it is material which falls within the defintion of excluded material, whether it falls within the defintion of special procedure material or whether it was material obtained on a seal of confidence which was held from that moment by one or more persons on that basis.
The poor justice of the peace will have to take eight or 10 factors into account, and he will have an extremely difficult judgment to make. When I put this argument to the Minister—perhaps I did so in a way that was too baroque for his taste — he dismissed it in a flippant manner with a reference to Justice Shallow. I have known and admired the hon. and learned Gentleman for many years, and it is the first time that I have known him fail to treat a serious argument seriously and to seek seriously to answer it. His flippant reference to Justice Shallow paid a greater tribute to his literary erudition than to his perception of my argument, which obviously he did not cotton on to.
In all cases where there is no interpartes procedure, the justice of the peace will have to form an opinion on the evidence of the officer who has applied for a warrant. What information will he get from that officer? He will get information from him that will be conducive to the success of the officer's application. I do not suggest that the justice will ask the officer what view he takes, but he will ask him some questions. But it does not matter what question he asks the officer who makes the application, because the officer will only give answers that are conducive to the success of the application, otherwise he would not be making it.
There would be many cases in the group of clauses about which we are talking in which the justice might ask the constable—when we have dealt with new clause I it will probably be a constable—"Have you any evidence to suggest that this is not excluded material? Have you any evidence to suggest that this is not special procedure material? What is the chap going to say? If he were absolutely honest he would say "I am blowed if I know whether it is excluded or special procedure material because I am not a prophet and I am not an astrologer and I have no means of knowing what shape the material is in until I see it." If he were honest he would say, "I do not know." He will not say that, because he might not get his warrant. If he goes back without his warrant it will not be good for him.
That person will give all the nice answers. He will say, "I should not think, Sir, that this would be excluded or special procedure material." He will get his warrant. He will return and tell his mates at the station, "I have got my warrant out of old Bloggs. Next time you want a warrant, don't go to him. He asks a lot of awkward questions. Old Snooks is much easier." It is a serious, not a shallow, point. The Minister has loaded a virtually impossible task upon justices of the peace.
If all the hearings were inter partes there would be an opportunity to weigh one submission against another. After all, justices of the peace, circuit judges and all other judges are trained to weigh one piece of evidence against another. One cannot weigh one piece of evidence against thin air. That is what the poor justice is being asked to do. I believe that that is the essential defect in this series of clauses.
I hope that the Minister will think about it again and realise that he was rather superficially dismissive of what is a genuine difficulty and a cause for anxiety.

Mr. Tilley: As we are all declaring interests, may I say that I speak as a card-carrying member of the National Union of Journalists, which at the moment is not a sign of a profession or an activity. I believed that with the last group of amendments we had scored a considerable triumph for journalists or journalism, although it had been branded as an uncaring profession.
I am rather worried when I see the special procedures that follow from new clause 7. Some journalistic material is not protected as well as that which is excluded. I echo the question asked by my hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham, West (Mr. Price), who I think is a carrier of a similar union card, and ask the Minister what "journalistic material" means. He said that the Government had been wise not to define "journalism". That was a remark of wisdom stemming only from caution. By not giving a definition of "journalism", "journalist" or "journalistic", the Government are creating far more confusion than they need to do. The Minister added to that confusion, because, on this and on the previous set of amendments, he dropped worrying hints as to the Government's thinking.
Before I analyse those hints, I wish to shoot down the canard from the hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Mr. Griffiths), who suggested that not all journalists were honourable and that they might invent fictitious sources. I do not understand how that can be relevant to these proceedings. I do not understand how a police officer could or should have the right to consult or examine a nonexistent file or notebook. If such journalistic activity occurs, it cannot be suggested that it is of any concern to the Committee.
When defining journalism, the Minister said that it was the activity and not the profession that really mattered. He referred to a photograph taken during a riot and gave that as an example of what would come under the new clause. The point was that the photograph might well be evidence of a serious arrestable offence having been committed by one of the rioters.
Many people take pictures. My experience in Brixton was that many people photographed the riots. Some were fully-fledged newspaper and television photographers. They were collecting journalistic material. Others were amateur photographers or people who happened to have a camera with them. I assume that some of those people, seeing a riot in progress, thought that it would be a good idea to take pictures because they might be able to sell some of them to newspapers. The common sense interpretation of that—hon. Members have had common sense pushed down their throats as the only method of interpretation—is that such a person would be engaging in creating journalistic material. Equally, their friends and neighbours could be taking pictures without any thought in their minds of selling the photographs to the press. That is not the creation of journalistic material. They could, after discussion, realise what fine photographs they had taken and try to sell them to the newspapers. Does that count as journalistic material? Does the journalistic purpose have to follow the creation or collection of the material?
Those are examples of the mess that the Government are getting themselves into. Far from suggesting, as did my hon. Friends below the Gangway, including my hon. Friend the hon. Member for York (Mr. Lyon), that journalists have too many privileges, we may be giving them fewer privileges, thereby enabling many others to

claim journalistic privileges—which is a new concept in English law — for material that the Government never intended to be introduced when they put forward this legislation. I thought that the only interpretation was to talk about journalistic materials as being that produced by professional journalists. I accept that the Government might not want a professional journalist to be defined as a member of the National Union of Journalists or even of the Institute of Journalists. The definition would have to be a little wider than that.
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The Government have not considered whether the provision should include all the material held by a journalist, regardless of whether it is in his or her special field. Apparently, such issues do not matter, because the Minister has told us that the profession of the individual is not the key factor. Non-journalists, or those who are not professional journalists but who create or collect material for journalistic purposes, cover a wide range. Those hon. Members who are or have been journalists will be aware that a wide range of people, including taxi drivers, policemen and sometimes even Members of Parliament, are well aware of the news value of bits of information or documents, and will keep an eye open for them. They will have journalistic contacts to whom they can pass the information, and those contacts may or may not accept it. At every stage, the information or document is surely a piece of journalistic material, and confidences may also be involved at every stage.
The new clause, and those that precede it do not guide us about how that point would be covered. They do not offer any guidance about how the police would deal with an individual who said that the document or set of notes that he had about something that he had witnessed or discussed had been compiled for journalistic purposes, in the hope that he could obtain some money from the newspaper if it was passed on. The Minister has hinted that that would come under the definition. If there is a distinction between amateur and professional journalists, there must be a distinction between staff journalists and freelances. What happens to the freelance who writes books and magazine articles? Half of his or her work will be covered by the clause, and half of it will not be.
Therefore, I have pointed out the anomalies and problems that the Government have unfortunately created for themselves by trying to cover the important question of journalistic confidence. In the process, they have not only covered the area embraced by the clauses dealing with excluded material but have raised many more questions than they thought existed by bringing all other journalistic activity into new clause 7. I know that new clause 6 is grouped separately, but it involves the definition of journalistic material, which recurs in new clause 7. Therefore, it is important to consider it. Subsection (2) states:
Material is only journalistic material for the purposes of this Act if it is in the possession of a person who acquired or created it for the purposes of journalism.
Does that mean that it must be exclusively in the possession of that person? Are the Government saying that if the material has been passed on in any way by the journalist who first acquired or created it, it loses its cover of what I shall term absolute journalistic privilege? If that is what the Government are saying, I should point out that


they are providing very little cover for the sort of material that journalists, particularly journalists on major newspapers, will want to protect.
If we are considering serious arrestable offences, we are dealing with large or widespread crimes. It is in the nature of that type of reporting activity that information is pooled. Information may be passed on by a journalist to a news editor or there may be a team of reporters—it does not matter whether they have a fancy title — who pool information. Newspapers also have branch offices which send material to a head office to see whether a major news story exists.
My understanding from what appears on the face of new clause 6 and hints that the Minister has given is that such material would lose the protection of being excluded once it had been passed on although, in my experience, most journalists would regard the confidentiality to the original source to remain and be binding on them. I am worried lest, when the information has been collated, the newspaper will tell the police that it thinks it has information and that it would like police help to confirm that something is happening. That is the point, especially in Fleet street, when the police become aware that the information that they want might be in a journalist's notebook or a newspaper file.
It might also be the point at which the protection that the Government are rightly and, I am sure, in the right spirit trying to give is lost. The Government should reconsider what they think they are doing or explain to the Committee at greater length what they think they are doing to protect journalists. It is clear to me, as a former working journalist and perhaps a future working journalist, that the Government do not understand the process of news gathering as it happens, today. Nor do they understand that many people are occasionally, spasmodically and amateurishly involved in what they regard as journalistic activity. These and earlier new clauses do not meet the Government's intention to protect professional journalists.
I am saying the opposite of what my hon. Friend the Member for York said. It is a pity that he is not here, but I am always glad to contradict him. These new clauses will achieve the very opposite of what the Government say that they intend to do. That is putting the best interpretation on the gaps in the new clauses as they stand and what the Minister has said. The less charitable interpretation is that the Government were determined, given the furore that there has been on this issue and the anxiety from the press, to include some new clauses that include the word "journalism" which appeared to give journalists all the freedom that they were rightly demanding.
Perhaps the Government intended merely to keep the press quiet by telling it that all was well but then, much later, to tell it that special cases, as the Minister never fails to tell us, must be judged on their merits. The press would then learn to its cost how many loopholes exist in this apparent protection of its privileges.
I do not know which interpretation is right, but, whichever is, I do not believe that this group of new clauses and the ones that we discussed earlier are adequate to protect journalistic material and other confidential material about which there has been such a public outcry.

Mr. Christopher Price: I take issue with some of the things that my hon. Friend the Member for Lambeth, Central (Mr. Tilley) has said. Although we appreciate their motives in bringing forward this mass of new clauses and

this enormous new schedule, it is clear that the Government are in the most appalling mess. That certainly justifies their decision to have the Recommittal now, followed by Report, because it gives us an opportunity to get these matters right.
In the context of these new clauses, I see developing a sort of alliance between Opposition Members, the hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Mr. Griffiths) and the important folk in the Police Federation, which he represents and with which the Government must come to terms. Indeed, they did so in Committee.
One interpretation of the mess that we are in is that given by my hon. Friend the Member for Lambeth, Central. According to that view, the Government said, "We shall have a June election and we cannot possibly go into an election campaign with the bishops, doctors and the press against us. Only a lunatic and psychotic Government would do that. Therefore, let us make our peace with the bishops, doctors and the journalists. The Bill will not go through anyway, and at least we shall then sail into an election with a favourable atmosphere from the press, the medical profession, the Church and our pastoral masters. We shall then get some nice programmes on the Sunday before the election instead of some criticial ones."
I do not take that view, because, having listened to the Minister of State throughout the Committee stage, I take him to be a man of his word. However, the way in which the Government have behaved in the last few weeks is calculated to persuade a rational man of the view that I have just described. As a result, the Minister will have to say something to persuade me and other Opposition Members that that is not the case.
I have crossed swords from time to time with the hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Smith) since he returned to this place from his new, lush, home counties base, which seems somewhat safer—

Mr. Tilley: Jealous.

Mr. Price: I am very jealous indeed. The BBC-ITN computer has now recalculated my majority to be exactly 870 over my Conservative opponent. Of course I am jealous. The hon. Member for Beaconsfield has returned to us from advising the accountants.
Throughout the Committee stage, every time I went to certain Home Office functionaries with whom I drank socially they put their arms around my shoulder and said, "My dear Christopher, we have nothing against these citizens advice bureaux people or the Samaritans. The bishops are our best friends. We love the vicars. It is the accountants. Those are the crooks we want to get hold of, and that is why we must get hold of some confidential material in a hurry, because accountants' fraud is big business which involves millions of pounds." I have much sympathy with those who said that to me. That is why I am in favour of paragraphs 13, 14, 15 and 16 of the new schedule which the hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Smith) wishes to cut out. There is a distinction between accountants who are into big money — Parliament is about money and about stopping people getting away with massive tax fraud—and the caring professions and the journalists.
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I am happy that a circuit judge can send the police in to get the evidence ex parte, without consulting the accountant, whether he is a grubby little accountant on the


fringe of the city, in Finsbury or somewhere like that, or whether he is a partner in Deloitte Haskins and Sells, Peat Marwick Mitchell and Co. or Price, Waterhouse and Co. —I must make it clear that that is no relation of mine—or one of the great and grand accountants to whom the Government give £500,000 for the Serpell report or some other report.
Whether it is a minnow or a large, fat salmon, I am in favour of a circuit judge having the right, in appropriate circumstances, if he is convinced that the relevant accountant is a crook and liable to bury the evidence, to send the police in to get that evidence. The authorities are not always lucky. A few years ago the Inland Revenue took all the books away from a large road construction firm, but failed to get a conviction at the end of the day.
The point of special pleading of the hon. Member for Beaconsfield was interesting. He said that if it were known that a circuit judge had said that it was proper for a firm such as Peat Marwick Mitchell and Co. or Price Waterhouse and Co. to be raided because it might bury the evidence, that might destroy its reputation for ever. That might be so, and it might be tough on that firm of accountants, but I could take the hon. Member for Beaconsfield to a number of houses in my constituency where the police have smashed down the door and broken in and where the reputation of those families has been destroyed for ever.
In principle I am not in favour of making one law for the professions, whose reputation should not be destroyed for ever, and a totally different law for ordinary constituents whose reputation can be destroyed for ever on the say-so of a magistrate who makes a decision ex parte. That is at the nub of the group of amendments which we are discussing and at the nub of the unsatisfactory situation that we are reaching.

Mr. Andrew F. Bennett: Does my hon. Friend agree that often, when the houses of his constituents are raided, the damage to their property forms the greater part of their total assets? It is harder for them to replace what has been damaged and they are caused more inconvenience if they have to spend time and effort getting the damage repaired by the police.

Mr. Price: I agree with everything that my hon. Friend has said. We all get these cases at our surgeries. Apart from having the door broken down, which is not uncommon in my constituency, the family knows that all the neighbours, who have been peering through their net curtains, have seen the police car arriving. The effects of the police visit remain for a long time.
I take the point made by the hon. Member for Beaconsfield about his rich and powerful friends in the accountancy profession, but the logic of the point applies to every constituent of every hon. Member. If we are to pass, not hybrid Bills, but Bills which deal fairly with every British citizen, we must make an effort to be evenhanded to both the powerful and wealthy and the poor simultaneously.
I suspect that I am not wholly at one with my hon. Friend the Member for Lambeth, Central on journalists. As a working journalist and a member of the National Union of Journalists—I have my card here and it may look like year's, but it is not—I have never wanted any special privileges that ordinary members of the public do

not possess. Journalists should not claim such privileges. Sensible journalists lock confidential material away in a place where the police are unlikely to find it. Indeed, some of my journalist friends who feel that their files are liable to seizure have given me one or two, foolishly thinking that as a Member of Parliament that material is safer in my filing cabinet than in theirs.
Most journalists that I know look after their confidential material as carefully as possible and are perfectly happy for the courts to decide, at an inter panes hearing if necessary, whether it is proper that they should divulge it, knowing that if they feel strongly that they should not, they can appeal against any decision up to the highest level and, if necessary, go to prison for not doing so at the end of the day.

Mr. Tilley: Is my hon. Friend saying that he and his journalist friends are happy with a system where journalists can be sent to prison fr contempt of court, not for refusing to produce material, but for refusing to name sources?

Mr. Price: No, I am not happy with that situation, from Mr. Mulholland in the Vassal case onwards. Courts are foolish to allow matters to proceed that far. But I am happier for Mr. Mulholland and some of his successors to go to prison rather than divulge their sources, than I am for certain journalists—it is always certain journalists—to be given some special privilege which is not available to other members of society.
I want to illustrate that by the various legislative efforts in recent years to divide the journalist profession into the priviliged and the underprivileged, because that is what the clause will inevitably mean. In the Harman judgment which has now gone to Strasbourg, the Appeal Court attempted to say that there were two sorts of journalists — court reporters who could be trusted and feature writers such as David Leigh of the Council who could not.
When we discussed the Contempt of Court Bill in Committee two years ago, the hon. Member for Putney (Mr. Mellor), who has now reached the heady heights of Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, was almost a rebel on the Conservative Benches. I am sure that his failure to rebel fully on that occasion bore its full reward. We had to decide on that Bill what was the nature of a journalist who could bring a tape recorder into court. We are constantly put in this position in the House of Commons of trying to say "This person is a journalist with special privileges and that person is not."

Mr. Tilley: Surely the point about this piece of legislation on which we can all agree is that it is not trying to define a journalist. It is saying that practically anyone who wants to dabble in journalism or even thinks about dabbling in journalism is covered. So, far from cutting down the number of journalists who are protected, it is extending the privilege to anyone who wants to have a go.

Mr. Price: I do not think that we are quite so far apart, because I approved the National Union of Journalists' attempt to get the Bill changed. A delegation went to see the Minister of State and asked for a few amendments. The Minister said, "Yes, and would you like some more?" They scratched their heads and said they would like a few more. The Minister said, "Surely that is not enough. Would you not like some more?" Thus we arrived at the present state of the Bill. There is no secret about the fact


that the NUJ delegation was astonished at the positive avalanche of concessions given to it, and nobody looks a gift horse in the mouth, so of course they accepted all those concessions. I do not think, however, that the journalists necessarily wanted any privileges for themselves that were not extended to everybody else.
This is not a problem in a country that has a written constitution which says that there shall be freedom of the press or something like that. In the United States of America, where journalists have very substantial legislative protection, they get that protection from a clause entrenched in the constitution. We do not have that in this country.

Mr. Tilley: Is my hon. Friend saying that if he were an American legislator he would oppose those special privileges that the members of the American press have?

Mr. Price: Not at all. I am saying that if I were an American legislator I would defend the constitution, which entrenches those freedom of information privileges, which, as my hon. Friend says, extend way beyond journalists into a basic right of freedom of expression and of the dissemination of information. That is the right way to put it and it is put correctly in the American constitution.
The Government, it seems to me, have got themselves into a difficulty. Hon. Members on both sides of the House agree that by giving privileges to this, that and the other group we have in a sense created in this country a new race of privileged clerics. Certain people are privileged before the law and others are less privileged. That is a situation from which I instinctively recoil, because, as a democrat, I like being in a country in which everybody is as equal as possible before the law.
I am certain that the solution to this problem is to give to everybody, not just to those privileged people, the right of an inter partes hearing, whether it is before a magistrate or a circuit judge, so that the matter can be argued out — subject only to the exception, which is in the schedule, that, if the police honestly believe that an inter partes hearing would frustrate everything that they wanted to do and lead to the destruction of evidence, they could go for an ex parte hearing.
In my view—and I have reached this view by the sort of process by which one reaches views in Committee, starting off with one view and moving by circuitous methods sometimes to a rather different view — the decision whether the hearing to permit the entering and searching of a house should be inter partes or ex parte should depend, in principle, not on the sort of person one is or the particular role one plays in society, but on whether the police can convince a magistrate or a judge that someone is a fundamentally unreliable person who would destroy the evidence in some way, as set out in the schedule in paragraphs 13, 14. 15 and 16.
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I am not saying that in this contribution to this set of amendments, at this stage of the Committee, at this time in the morning, I am offering the Minister of State an exact solution to the problem, but I think that both sides of the House, in the three debates that we have had, have identified a real danger about the road down which the Government are moving. That is the danger of separating the professionals from the people in terms of the privileges that they have with regard to the confidentiality of the information that they hold.
Whatever stage we have reached in the process, I am convinced of one thing—that we have not got it right yet. I suppose that these clauses are scheduled for about 5 am on Tuesday morning next week, so long as the Prime Minister has not pricked the balloon and announced that we are going to the country and we can forget about the Bill until another Government have a go at it.
I plead with the Government not to feel that it is all over bar the shouting. Much more consultation is needed to get it right. It is much more crucial than the delegations of doctors, priests, bishops and journalists. It is central to equality before the law in our society. That equality should not depend on the accident of the job that one happens to do. I very much hope that in some way it can be done. That way should be to give an inter partes hearing to everybody unless the police can in some way convince the people that we should not have it.

Mr. Tilley: I understand what my hon. Friend is saying about the clause, but does he think that the same principle should apply to those that we have already discussed? Should every member of the public have a right not to divulge material gained in confidence? Surely his egalitarian principles should apply to that as well. He did not mention that on the previous set of amendments.

Mr. Price: In principle, I would say yes, for this reason. The Government have said that for the police to walk in and seize doctors' records, citizens advice bureaux' records or the Samaritans' records would make the practice of that profession so difficult and be such an invasion of privacy that they are willing to exclude them. My constituents have experienced the police walking in and taking — sometimes not because the police knew that they were taking it but because they were scooping up evidence—confidential material, perhaps personal letters with personal information in them.
The invasion of privacy and the fracture of social relations in society is just as great where the police pick up confidential information that belongs to the individual as it is if they pick up confidential information that belongs to a professional such as a doctor, social worker or priest. That is why I hope that between Committee and Report, although there is not much time, we shall think about the privileges that we give to the ordinary person.
The Government have bowed to professional pressure, which is right. They have made the correct decision in the concessions that they have given to the professions. However, they must think very much harder over the next week about equal privileges and redressing the balance by giving ordinary people privileges in matters that are confidential to them. I cannot see why we should legislate different rules for different people.

Mr. Lawrence: I wish to make two points, one that ends in a question and the other that ends in a suggestion.
The hon. Member for Lewisham, West (Mr. Price) waxed long and eloquent about journalists not getting special privileges, and said that if they did have them' hey should not claim them. Certainly they should not claim or have the privilege of being immune to the consequences of being party to a crime.
In the legal privilege section of new clause 4, subsection (4) provides:
Documents or articles held with the intention of furthering a criminal purpose are not items subject to legal privilege.


Why should the journalist be privileged and immune from any of the consequences of those communications being the subject of crime?
In the Contempt of Court Act, section 10 provides:
No court may require a person to disclose, nor is any person guilty of contempt of court for refusing to disclose, the source of information contained in a publication for which he is responsible, unless it be established to the satisfaction of the court that disclosure is necessary in the interests of justice or national security or for the prevention of disorder or crime.
The journalist cannot seek immunity on the basis that the source of his information is not protected, if the information concerns disorder or crime. In the particular privilege and immunity claimed here by journalists, and given here to journalists by the Government, they are given complete immunity from the consequences of that material being concerned with a criminal act. Why?
My suggestion also arises out of section 10 of the Contempt of Court Act. There have been many arguments about the definition of journalistic material. Shrewdly, the Government avoided all such arguments in the Contempt of Court Act because no reference is made anywhere to journalism or being a journalist. The section that protects the sources of information is section 10. My suggestion, therefore, is that if the Government wish to avoid the criticism that has been levelled against the formulation of the phrase "journalistic material" and journalism,
subsection (1)(c) of new clause 3 should read:
Any document or record which a person holds in confidence and which forms or may form the basis of a publication for which he is responsible.
I put that to my hon. and learned Friend in the hope that it may be considered and that time might be saved in the other place.

Mr. Andrew F. Bennett: First, I want to raise a general point on the new clauses, to remind the House that probably our most important privilege is that of living in a law-abiding society. It is important to remember that, and that it is the duty of any individual to do all that he can to co-operate with the police. In talking about these so-called privileges, we should remember that it is a privilege not to divulge information to assist the police when another reason is considered to be more important at the time. For a legal adviser, the important thing is to ensure that an individual gets a fair trial. That may be more important than divulging certain information. Again, there is the problem for the doctor, that patients may fail to give him essential information if they do not believe that it is confidential. All those individuals who receive information have a duty to try to pass it on to ensure that crime is cleared up as quickly and as efficiently as possible. So we are talking about the minority of cases where that will not be possible because of another problem. We must get that matter into perspective.
I come to new clause 8 and amendments (a) and (b) to it standing in my name. I hope that when the Minister winds up he will answer some of the points that I shall raise. New clause 8 says that the police may seek disclosure of evidence held in confidence or evidence consisting of journalistic material, that is, special procedure material, by making an application under the schedule "Special procedural material", and that the special procedure shall also apply to applications for search warrants under other enactments when the application relates to special procedure material. In other

words, the clause is a welcome restriction on present Acts of Parliament—for example, the Theft Act, the Official Secrets Act, the Prevention of Terrorism Act and the Forgery Act — which at present allow journalistic material and confidential records held by professional advisers to be the subject of a search warrant granted by a justice of the peace after an ex parte hearing.
However, the new clause seeks to complicate matters quite unnecessarily by providing that, where a search warrant is being applied for under another enactment, the special procedure will apply only to some special procedure material—for instance, documents and other records. The consequences are quite absurd. A police officer wanting to search a lawyer's office, for example, for stolen goods consisting of a title deed and stolen money would have to apply to a justice of the peace under the Theft Act for a warrant covering the stolen cash and to a circuit judge under the special procedure for a warrant covering the stolen title deed, because it is a document or record held in confidence by a professional adviser. Subsection (2)(b) of the new clause forbids the police from the convenience of using the special procedure in such a case to cover both the stolen money and the title deed. That seems absurd.
Let me give another example. If someone makes a search in connection with the eggs of protected birds, a justice of the peace would need to issue the warrant for the stolen eggs, but a circuit judge under the special procedure would have to authorise a search of documents relating to the stolen eggs if those documents were held in confidence by a professional adviser.
I understand that the position is even more absurd for journalistic material. Under the Government's new clauses, journalistic material would be divided into four categories. First, confidential documents and records held for journalistic purposes and not subject to search under other enactments are wholly exempt. Secondly, non-confidential material held for journalistic purposes and not subject to search under any other enactments is covered by the full-scale special procedures.
The third category deals with documents or records, whether confidential or not, held for journalistic purposes and covered by other Acts. That is covered by the lesser special procedure. The fourth category applies to non-documentary material held for journalistic purposes and covered by other Acts. No special procedure applies and a JP can issue a warrant as provided for under other Acts. That is complicated.

2 am

Mr. Mikardo: I cannot work out in which of the four categories falls a a criminal who has been given £100,000 by the Sunday Express to write three pieces and who uses his own material as a basis for writing the articles. Does that person become a journalist? Does the material that he uses fall under the provisions of one of the subsections, and if it does, which one?

Mr. Bennett: I shall not attempt to answer that question. Perhaps the Minister will.
It would be better to have one category covering all the incidences, but at least the amendment goes some way by reducing the number of categories from four to two.
I have tabled a series of amendments to the schedule. At this time of night it would not be helpful if I described the purpose of amendments (a) or (b) in detail because we


dealt with them when discussing new clause 2. Amendment (d) is probably the most useful to explain because it takes a slightly different approach from that used in new clause 2.
It is important to consider the whole question of public interest because that must be balanced against the need to disclose. In some circumstances it may not be in the public interest to disclose information. It should be made clear that when applying the new procedure, the interest of the public must be the test. We must decide whether it is in the public interest to maintain the confidence between a doctor and his patient or whether it is more important that a crime is solved by the disclosure of information. The concept of public interest must be firmly in the legislation. I hope that the Minister will view the amendment with sympathy.

Mr. Christopher Price: Amendment (d) does not concentrate on giving any special privileges to any group of pepole, but it deals with the public interest and confidentiality. If it were necessary to divide the Committee on an amendment, amendment (d) would merit serious consideration.

Mr. Bennett: I shall listen with interest to what the Government say.
Why is a new concept introduced — I refer to amendment (f)? Why do the Government want double protection?
Finally, we have been greatly concerned to discourage fishing expeditions. If the Government are serious in insisting that searches are for material about which there is already some information rather merely than in the hope of finding something, they should have no difficulty in accepting amendment (g), which provides that
Nothing under paragraph 14 above shall authorise the seizure of any excluded material or any special procedure material except that which is specified in the warrant.
That would be a simple safeguard against fishing operations.
I wait with interest to see how many of the amendments the Government will accept.

Mr. Mayhew: I am grateful for the way in which hon. Members have addressed themselves to these issues at this late hour.
It is important to realise that the purpose of providing immunity for certain categories of confidentially held information is to protect the persons on whose behalf the confidentiality is observed. It is not, as the hon. Member for Lewisham, West (Mr. Price) suggested, a matter of protecting people's professional status or class but of having regard to the nature of the confidentiality that they guard.
Just as doctors made it clear that they sought protection not for themselves but for their patients, so the other professional people — those engaged in "any trade, business, profession or other occupation", to use the words of the new clause—hold information that is confidential for the protection of those with whom they have a relationship. In the case of journalists, the relationship is with those who have communicated information to them. In the case of social workers, citizens advice bureau workers and the like, it is with the people who seek their advice. It is important that the Committee recognises the answer to the claims of more than one Opposition Member, and notably the hon. Member for Lewisham,

West, that the Government have acceded to the articulated representations of the professional classes and care nothing about people who do not have that kind of clout.
If the inter panes procedure were extended to an application to obtain disclosure of any material held on a confidential basis by any person, that would greatly and unnecessarily extend the burdens upon the courts. I do not believe that the fact that A holds something in confidence for B in a private capacity is sufficient to warrant an inter partes procedure. In my view, that procedure, and certainly the exclusion provisions, are warranted by the need in the public interest to maintain the confidentiality that exists in the relationships that I have described.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Smith) for his comments about the moves that we have been able to make to meet the concerns of the accountants. It remains only for me to deal with his points about the circumstances in which the police, through the ex parte procedure, are able to obtain a search warrant in circumstances in which the judge is satisfied that if notice were given the material in question would be likely to be concealed, disposed of or whatever.
I understand what lies behind my hon. Friend's remarks. I confirm what I said in my letter to the organisation that he represents about the guidance that will be given. However, we consider it necessary that this jurisdiction should remain in cases where notice would probably result in the destruction or concealment of evidence. With recognition of the sensitivity of the position, I am sure that the greater part of his misgivings can be overcome.
The hon. Member for Bethnal Green and Bow (Mr. Mikardo) said that about 600 people in his constituency would benefit from the provisions. He should multiply that figure by 10, or even 100, to take account of those whom the 600 represent. Those he mentioned hold confidential information by virtue of their trade or profession. Their clients will benefit from the provisions.
The hon. Gentleman again mentioned the justice of the peace who will, in certain circumstances, have to consider the criteria and issues. But a police officer will have to satisfy a magistrate that the warrant that he seeks should properly be given. I do not believe, and nothing that the Magistrates' Association has said, leads us to suppose that a magistrate would find himself out of his depth in considering the issues. Magistrates will realise that they must be satisfied. If the matter is left in doubt, the burden of satisfying the magistrate will not be discharged. We are dealing with an investigative process. A magistrate will not simply grant a warrant at the request of a police officer.

Mr. Mikardo: I threw a question at the Minister earlier. Does he have any information about what percentage of applications for warrants are granted?

Mr. Mayhew: I cannot give an exact answer, but the first volume of the Royal Commission's report gives a table showing that a higher proportion of cases result in material being discovered where searches have been authorised by magistrates than for any other category set out in the table. That suggests that magistrates do not lightly grant warrants. It suggests that they do their job properly because the results are, by a small margin, better than where searches are authorised by others.
I should have intervened earlier in the speech of the hon. Member for Lambeth, Central (Mr. Tilley), who was


concerned about the fact that journalistic material that may have been acquired for confidential purposes will lose its exception if it is passed from a stringer to the central newspaper office. That is not the case. The information does not have to be held continuously by the same person — it is protected, no matter at how many removes, provided that it is continuously held by somebody for confidential purposes. I can allay completely that part of his anxiety.

Mr. Snape: Perhaps the hon. and learned Gentleman can allay one of our other anxieties. He has said that information will remain protected if it is passed from one journalist to another, but will it remain protected if it is passed from a journalist to the secretary of another journalist and retained by the secretary because the other journalist is out of the office?

Mr. Mayhew: The same protection applies because the information is being held for journalistic puposes. That is why the protection is not tied to a journalist. The protection is keyed in to the purpose, and if the information is held for a journalistic purpose, that is sufficient.

Mr. Tilley: The hon. and learned Gentleman will recollect that I was concerned principally with the definition of "journalistic purpose". I understand the pitfalls in defining a journalist and I admit that the Government have avoided them. I argued that "journalistic purpose" could be used by a wide range of people other than those whom we would in common sense consider to be professional journalists.

Mr. Mayhew: So be it. It is important that confidentiality in journalism should be protected. It would be wrong to isolate that protection to the benefit of those who are professional journalists. We believe that to be right. Whether that protection is attracted will be a matter of fact to be determined in each case.
I can now tell the hon. Member for Bethnal Green and Bow that he will find the table to which I referred on page 129 in the first volume of the Royal Commission's report.
The hon. Member for Lewisham, West said that he was content with articles 13 to 16 in the new schedule which provide for the ex-parte procedure where it is thought that destruction or concealment would result. The hon. Gentleman was saying, in effect, that this is one more for the professionals. I think that I have already dealt with that assertion. It is a misconception. The important factor is not the sort of person that an individual is but the sort of confidentiality that he guards. In the Government's view there are certain sorts of confidentiality which warrant special protection. Those include the confidential relationships and the material that is used in pursuance of confidential relationships that are described in the new clause. That is a logical and sustainable distinction. I have come to realise that almost any legislative proposal can be dressed up in terms of class distinction if we put our minds to so doing. However, the new clause is not an illustration of that.

Mr. Eldon Griffiths: It is the convention of journalism that information is sent by telex from one office to another. When the information chatters in on the machine, it can

be seen by a wide range of people who wander in and out of the office, whether they be tea ladies or casual visitors. That is privileged information and it would be a peculiar situation if anyone wandering into the office could read it when the police were denied access to it. That is my first question. It is realistic.
My second question arises from a specific case—two men go to a party at which a rather notorious American visitor is present. He is rather drunk and babbles. He gives information as to the whereabouts of a wanted murderer. One of the two men at the party is a journalist and the other happens to be a carpenter. As the Bill stands, the journalist could write a note in his notebook and it would become confidential matter saved by the Bill from being pursued by the police. If the carpenter put the information down in his diary it could and would, I hope, be sought by the police. They would get a court order for it. Once again, one has the absurd circumstances of two men hearing the same information and writing it down in two different books. The police can get at it in the case of one man and not in the other.

Mr. Mayhew: I do not believe that that is absurd provided that one accepts that it is the nature of the confidential relationship that has to be considered.
In the one case there would be a confidential relationship and in the other there would be none. There would be no confidential relationship in the case of the carpenter. The journalist would have a journalistic purpose if he wished to use the information for the purposes of journalism.
If one believes—I acknowledge that this lies at the root of this particular group of new clauses—that it is important in the general good to maintain confidentiality within journalism, I cannot see that there is anything to be regarded as absurd in protection being attracted by a journalist in the circumstances that my hon. Friend posits while no confidentiality is attracted by the carpenter. I do not see that the public interest is engaged in protecting the information that the carpenter happened to write down. That rests upon an understanding of the basis of this part of the Bill.

Mr. Christopher Price: I wish to put a general point about the distinction the Minister was drawing between the professionals and the public. Supposing that a constituent of mine had correspondence with a friend who was in no way a professional that contained confidential information perhaps about extra-marital relationships that he had had over a number of years and about a number of diseases of a social kind that he had had and about which he would not like other people to know, would that constitute information gathered in confidence?

Mr. Mayhew: I am sorry, but the first part of the hon. Gentleman's interesting scenario escaped me. The point is probably dealt with by my reminding him that the protection is related to material that is acquired or created in the course of any trade, business or other occupation.

Mr. Hattersley: I did not want to pursue the Minister on this point, not least because I, too, have an interest to declare as a member of the National Union of Journalists and a working journalist, but the answer that he gave to his hon. Friend the Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Mr. Griffiths) seems to exemplify the extraordinary complication inherent in creating a special class of person.
The journalist and the carpenter are both at this rather extraordinary party of journalists, carpenters and visiting American criminals where one of the visiting American criminals divulges the whereabouts of another of his kind, and if the carpenter writes the information down the material is seizable, but if the journalist writes it down, the hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds says that the material is protected. Will the Minister confirm that the material is protected only if the jounalist wrote it down in his capacity as a journalist? If he wrote it down in some other capacity as someone who was inclined to write down pieces of ill-considered information because he was curious as to the whereabouts of American criminals, he would not be protected.
A test will be that a journalist will be acting as a journalist by profession when he obtains information which might in other contexts be seizable. I make the point in an attempt to demonstrate the pitfalls in creating a special class of person. Journalists who I know, and I include myself as a journalist, find it difficult to distinguish between the information they note for professional purposes and the information that is given to them in another capacity. How will the courts distinguish between journalists acting as journalists and journalists acting as private citizens?

Sir Albert Costain: rose—

The Chairman: Order. We cannot have an intervention within an intervention.

Mr. Mayhew: Material attracts protection by new clause 6, if it is created or acquired for the purposes of journalism.
I think we are chasing our own tails on this point. Material of this type would not be accessible under the existing law. Something written down would not be admissible in evidence as it would not constitute evidence.
If we acknowledge that journalism should attract a degree of protection for its confidentiality, a line must be drawn but not as a precise attempt to define "journalism" or "journalist". The way in which the clause is constructed shows how we must tackle the problem. It is possible with adequate ingenuity—and there is plenty of that in the House—to construct scenarios of babbling Americans at drunken parties with obsessive carpenters or walrusses, at which entertaining conundrums can be constructed.

Sir Albert Costain: What happens when a carpenter writes in a woodwork journal and becomes a journalist?

Mr. Mayhew: There will be many interesting opportunities to develop thoughts like that.
In answer to a question raised by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Burton (Mr. Lawrence), the qualification for information held in furtherance of a criminal purpose relates to legally privileged material but not in respect of the new types of excluded material. This is because the qualification was already in the Bill as it has long been part of the well-established and understood definition of legally privileged material. If it is held in furtherance of a criminal purpose, privilege is not attracted. Its absence in other cases will not, as I have already attempted to explain, make any substantial difference. Where people are engaged in criminal activities, they will be liable to arrest for the offences and to search in right of that offence. In this context, the formula in section 10 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981

is not as relevant as my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Burton thought it was. It follows that no useful purpose is served by applying the qualification to the new categories.
In so far as one purpose was to try to clarify their position under the Bill, that purpose would not have been served by stimulating fresh, unwarranted, fears. I emphasise that the drafting does not make legal material worse or better off. It is simply that the traditionally understood position there necessitated a different formulation. However, it is desirable to exclude from the obligations of a circuit judge in those circumstances the question whether something is held for a criminal purpose. That may involve very protracted arguments that may have a bearing on subsequent criminal proceedings. Therefore, if it is not necessary to import that, it should not be imported.
2.30 am
The hon. Member for Stockport, North (Mr. Bennett) fairly said that amendments (a) (b) and, I believe, (c) and, I believe, (c) to the new schedule had already been dealt with. Amendment (d) to the new schedule would elaborate the public interest test contained in subsection (5) of the schedule. It would not in any way assist the judge in applying this test. The amendment would require him to have regard to any duty of confidentiality under which the evidence in question is held. However, it adds nothing, because the schedule is all about confidentiality. In applying the public interest test, the judge is inevitably weighing considerations of confidentiality.
The hon. Member for Stockport, North invited us to consider amendment (f) in particular. It would prevent the judge from issuing a search warrant where he was satisfied that the giving of notice of an application for an order for its production was likely to result in its concealment, destruction, alteration or disposal. The amendments would, of course, defeat the whole purpose of the provision in those rare cases where the police were dealing with a professional adviser who was, himself, dishonest. I much prefer the arguments of the hon. Member for Lewisham, West in that regard.
Amendment (g) would exempt from seizure all excluded material and all special procedure material other than that specified in a warrant. This has been described as a necessary and logical consequence of the protection afforded to such material by the Government's new clauses, but it would lead to very perverse results. Excluded and special procedure material enjoy no exemption whatsoever from seizure under the present law, and the Bill confers no new powers on the police in that respect. On the contrary, clause 14 restricts present powers through its provision that seizure may not take place unless there are reasonable grounds to believe that the evidence would otherwise be disposed of.
Through new clauses 2 to 8, the Bill significantly reduces the likelihood that premises containing excluded or special procedure material will ever be searched. The reason is that material in documentary form which would at present be liable to search and seizure will attract the safeguards of the special procedure, and thus will generally be obtainable only by means of a production order. Production orders do not, of course, empower the police to search.
I am afraid that I cannot recommend that the Committee should accept amendment (g). If hon. Members have had


the stamina and dedication to listen to my explanations, they will probably accede to my wish to that none of the amendments should be accepted.

Mr. Bob Cryer: I shall be brief. I do not want to delay the Committee, because I know that it has examined the matter in some detail. I have not taken part in the debate so far, but I listened carefully to the Minister. I was less than satisfied with the reasons that he gave for rejecting amendment (d), tabled by my hon. Friend for Stockport, North (Mr. Bennett). We must spell out why we are protecting the confidentiality of journalists.
Although the Minister said that the schedule referred to the public interest and that the judge would accept that as a relevant factor, we must stress not only to judges, but to the rest of the community that public interest is involved. There is a very narrow line between protecting the narrow sectional interests of the press and the interests of journalists who are trying to provide the public—who have a right to know—with information. I favour the protection of journalists who are told to get a story or information by a proprietor and, if they do not, are subject to the threat of dismissal. By carrying out their occupation, journalists can be put under a threat when the police want disclosure of the information that they have obtained perfectly legitimately on the instruction of the proprietor.
There seems to be a distinction between that proper attitude and a press proprietor who wants to obtain information simply to boost circulation figures and beat a rival. That has nothing to do with the public interest. We recently had a classic example of a criminal case when newspaper investigations gave not a jot for the public interest. Indeed, they harmed the public interest. I refer, of course, to the Sutcliffe, or Yorkshire Ripper, case.
Relatives of the victims who had been killed so tragically and relatives of the killer alike could not move because there were queues of journalists offering them money for information about the case. It is conceivable that information could have been bought and retained by the proprietor because that could give him a circulation advantage over another paper, when it should have been disclosed for the investigation and conviction of a man who was much feared in Yorkshire where he caused such terrible tragedies.
There is a distinction between a mass-circulation tabloid pursuing a story and a small circulation journal such as the New Statesman or Time Out. Their circulations are so small as not to be an important factor compared with what The Sun, Daily Mirror or Daily Star, dipping though that part of the Matthews empire must be.
We should recognise that there is a legitimate area of practice in which a journalist should be able to use information that has been given to him in confidence. We should distinguish between that and the other practices to which I have referred. There is no harm in telling the judges who implement the legislation that, when they make their assessments, they should bear in mind the duty of confidentiality and the public interest of a free and full reporting of events.
The interests of the proprietors often blur our press. We talk of a free press in Britain, but we have none. It is owned by a tiny group of people who are politically motivated, mostly in favour of the Conservative party. Perhaps the Government are more concerned with the

proprietors than the employees in the press and they do not want, in the approach to a general election, to cause any ripples of dissension among the proprietors so that our free press will continue to use 99 per cent. of its space to attack the Labour party and speak in favour of the Conservative party.

Mr. Mikardo: The Government have another motive for mollifying the proprietors. Many of them are in the House of Lords, and the Government want to get the Bill through the other place.

Mr. Cryer: My hon. Friend is right. A number are there because the Prime Minister sent them there. Several editors—for example, Sir David English—played an undistinguished part in the Ripper case. That will help smooth the Bill's passage through the House of Lords.
In spite of the fact that these newspapers are in the hands of a tightly knit group of politically motivated people, they from time to time carry out important journalistic investigations, and we recognise that contribution. I doubt whether that accusation can be made against The Sun, which is probably the worst newspaper in the world, but from time to time the other newspapers make a serious effort.
That is where my hon. Friend's amendment would be relevant. When a newspaper made a serious effort in the public interest, and if information was held by a journalist on the basis of confidentiality to be published subsequently in the public interest, that should be taken into account by the judge.
If we repeat something already contained in the new schedule, which is what the Minister claims, it can do no harm. But if there is a scintilla of doubt and the amendment removes it, thus ensuring that judges, who from time to time have some extraordinary ways of interpreting our legislation, take such matters into account, it will be of benefit. The Minister has given no good grounds for opposing amendment (d).
Given the confused situation in which the Government have produced highly complicated legislation, it would be of benefit to give such protection to items of the public interest. I am sure that the Government recognise the distinction that I am drawing between items of the public interest and items of private circulation interest which proprietors frequently have in mind. The amendment will help a judge to make that distinction. I therefore hope that my hon. Friend, in view of the Government's lacklustre response, will divide the Committee. Although it is not my wont to vote in the early hours of the morning, on this occasion I am prepared to go into the Lobby with him.

Mr. Andrew F. Bennett: I was disappointed with the Minister's reply to my amendments (a) and (b) to new clause 8 as they have not been dealt with before, but I realise that there were many points to which he had to reply. It would not be particularly useful to vote on those amendments, but I hope that when amendment No. 153 is proposed, it will be possible to vote on amendments (d) and (g).

The Chairman: When we reach that point I shall ask the hon. Gentleman to move those amendments formally.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 8

ACCESS TO SPECIAL PROCEDURE MATERIAL

(1) Subject to subsection (2) below, a constable may obtain access to special procedure material for the purposes of a criminal investigation by making an application under Schedule [Special procedure] below and in accordance with that Schedule.
(2) Where by virtue of any enactment not contained in this Act a justice of the peace, on the application of a constable, may issue a warrant authorising a constable to enter premises and search for anything in them for the purposes of a criminal investigation—

(a) an application relating to a search for anything other than documents or other records which are special procedure material may not be made under Schedule (Special procedure) below; and
(b) an application relating to a search for documents or other records which are special procedure material may only be made under that Schedule.'.—[Mr. Mayhew.]

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Schedule

`SPECIAL PROCEDURE

Preliminary conditions
1. The power to make an order or issue a warrant under this Schedule is only exercisable if one or other of the preliminary conditions is fulfilled.
2. The first preliminary condition is that a circuit judge is satisfied on the application of a constable that there are reasonable grounds for believing—

(a) that a serious arrestable offence has been committed; and
(b) that there is special procedure material in certain premises; and
(c) that that material is relevant evidence.

3. The second preliminary condition is that a circuit judge is satisfied on the application of a constable—

(a) that there are reasonable grounds for believing that there is special procedure material in certain premises;
(b) that but for section (Access to special procedure materiali (2) above a justice of the peace would have power otherwise than by virtue of this Schedule to issue a warrant to search the premises for the material; and
(c) that it would be appropriate for a justice of the peace or judge to issue such a warrant.

Order to produce or give access to material

4. The circuit judge may make an order under paragraph 6 below if—

(a) the first preliminary condition and the conditions specified in paragraph 5 below are fulfilled; or
(b) the second preliminary condition is fulfilled.

5. The conditions mentioned in paragraph 4(a) above are that the circuit judge is satisfied—

(a) that the special procedure material would be of substantial value (whether by itself or together with other material) to the investigation in connection with which the application is made; and
(b) that other methods of obtaining it—

(i) have been tried without success; or
(ii) have not been tried because it appeared that they were bound to fail; and

(c) that it is in the public interest, having regard—

(i) to the benefit likely to accrue to the investigation if the material is obtained; and
(ii) to the circumstances under which the person in possession of the material holds it,

that the material should be produced or that access to it should be given.
(6. An order under this paragraph is an order requiring that a person—

(a) shall produce the material specified in the order to a constable not later than the end of such period not exceeding 7 days from the date of the order as the order may specify; or

(b) shall give a constable access to the material not later than the end of thai: period.

7. Where the material consists of data contained in a computer, an order under paragraph 6 above shall have effect as an order to produce the material in a form in which it can be taken away.
8. An application for an order under paragraph 6 above shall be made inter partes.
9. Where notice of an application for an order under paragraph 6 above is served on a person, he shall not conceal, destroy, alter or dispose of the material to which the application relates except—

(a) with the leave of a judge; or
(b) with the written permission of a constable, until—

(i) the application is dismissed or abandoned; or
(ii) he has complied with an order under paragraph 6 above made on the application.

Service of notices of applications for orders
10. Notice of an application for an order under paragraph 6 above may be served on a person either by delivering it to him or by leaving it at his proper address or by sending it by post to him in a registered letter or by the recorded delivery service.
11. Such a notice may be served—

(a) on a body corporate, by serving it on the body's secretary or clerk or other similar officer; and
(b) on a partnership, by serving it on one of the partners.

12. For the purposes of this Schedule, and of section 7 of the Interpretation Act 1978 in its application to this Schedule, the proper address of a person, in the case of a secretary or clerk or other similar officer of a body corporate, shall be that of the registered or principal office of that body, in the case of a partner of a firm shall be that of the principal office of the firm, and in any other case shall be the last known address of the person to be served.

Warrants to enter premises and search for special procedure material
13. A circuit judge may issue a warrant under paragraph 14 below where, on an application made by a constable, he is satisfied—

(a) as mentioned in paragraph 4 above; and
(b) either

(i) that service of notice of an application for an order under paragraph 6 above is likely to result in the concealment, destruction, alteration or disposal of the material; or
(ii) that the material is subject to a restriction or obligation such as is mentioned in sub-paragraph (ii) of section [Meaning of "special procedure material"] (2)(b) above and is likely to be disclosed in breach of it if he does not issue the warrant.

14. A warrant under this paragraph shall be a warrant authorising a constable to enter and search the premises, using reasonable force if necessary.
15. Such a warrant may authorise persons to accompany any constable who is executing it.
16. An application for such a warrant shall be made ex parte.

Costs
17. The costs of any application under this Schedule and of anything done or to be done under an order made under paragraph 6 above shall be in the discretion of the judge.' — [Mr. Mayhew.]

Brought up, read the First and Second time.

Amendment (d) proposed to the proposed schedule, in line 37, at end insert
`and, in particular, to any duty of confidentiality under which the evidence in question is held and to the public interest in the free and full reporting of events.'.—[Mr. Andrew F. Bennett.]

Question put, That the amendment be made:—

The Committee divided: Ayes 14, Noes 113.

Division No. 139]
[2.44 am


AYES


Brown, Ronald W. (H'ckn'y S)
Penhaligon, David


Cryer, Bob Dubs, Alfred
Pitt, William Henry


Dubs, Alfred
Richardson, Jo


Hughes, Simon (Bermondsey)
Sheerman, Barry


Lyon, Alexander (York)
Skinner, Dennis


Mikardo, Ian
Spriggs, Leslie






Tilley, John
Tellers for the Ayes:


Wrigglesworth, Ian
Mr. Christopher Price and



Mr. Andrew F. Bennett.


NOES


Alexander, Richard
Lloyd, Peter (Fareham)


Aspinwall, Jack
Lyell, Nicholas


Atkinson, David (B'm'th.E)
Macfarlane, Neil


Beaumont-Dark, Anthony
MacGregor, John


Berry, Hon Anthony
Major, John


Best, Keith
Marlow, Antony


Biffen, Rt Hon John
Mather, Carol


Biggs-Davison, Sir John
Maude, Rt Hon Sir Angus


Blaker, Peter
Maxwell-Hyslop, Robin


Boscawen, Hon Robert
Mayhew, Patrick


Bottomley, Peter (W'wich W)
Mellor, David


Boyson, Dr Rhodes
Miller, Hal (B'grove)


Bright, Graham
Mills, Iain (Meriden)


Brinton, Tim
Moate, Roger


Brooke, Hon Peter
Morris, M. (N'hampton S)


Brown, Michael (Brigg &amp; Sc'n)
Murphy, Christopher


Browne, John (Winchester)
Nelson, Anthony


Bruce-Gardyne, John
Newton, Tony


Budgen, Nick
Normanton, Tom


Bulmer, Esmond
Page, Richard (SW Herts)


Carlisle, John (Luton West)
Patten, Christopher (Bath)


Chapman, Sydney
Proctor, K. Harvey


Cope, John
Rhodes James, Robert


Costain, Sir Albert
Rhys Williams, Sir Brandon


Cranborne, Viscount
Ridley, Hon Nicholas


Dorrell, Stephen
Roberts, Wyn (Conway)


Douglas-Hamilton, Lord J.
Rumbold, Mrs A. C. R.


Dover, Denshore
Shaw, Giles (Pudsey)


Edwards, Rt Hon N. (P'broke)
Shepherd, Colin (Hereford)


Elliott, Sir William
Silvester, Fred


Eyre, Reginald
Sims, Roger


Fenner, Mrs Peggy
Smith, Tim (Beaconsfield)


Fisher, Sir Nigel
Spicer, Jim (West Dorset)


Forman, Nigel
Sproat, Iain


Fox, Marcus
Stanbrook, Ivor


Fry, Peter
Stevens, Martin


Garel-Jones, Tristan
Stewart, A. (E Renfrewshire)


Goodlad, Alastair
Stradling Thomas, J.


Gower, Sir Raymond
Taylor, Teddy (S'end E)


Grant, Sir Anthony
Temple-Morris, Peter


Griffiths, E.(B'y St. Edm'ds)
Thomas, Rt Hon Peter


Griffiths, Peter (Portsm'th N)
Thompson, Donald


Gummer, John Selwyn
Townsend, Cyril D, (B'heath)


Hawkins, Sir Paul
Waddington, David


Hawksley, Warren
Wakeham, John


Heddle, John
Waldegrave, Hon William


Hooson, Tom
Walker-Smith, Rt Hon Sir D.


Hordern, Peter
Wells, Bowen


Hunt, David (Wirral)
Wells, John (Maidstone)


Hurd, Rt Hon Douglas
Whitelaw, Rt Hon William


Irvine, RtHon Bryant Godman
Whitney, Raymond


Jenkin, Rt Hon Patrick
Wickenden, Keith


Jopling, Rt Hon Michael
Wolfson, Mark


Kellett-Bowman, Mrs Elaine
Young, Sir George (Acton)


Kershaw, Sir Anthony



Lamont, Norman
Tellers for the Noes:


Lang, Ian
Mr. Archie Hamilton and


Lawrence, Ivan
Mr. Douglas Hogg.


Lewis, Sir Kenneth (Rutland)

Question accordingly negatived.

Amendment (g) proposed to the proposed schedule, in line 83, at end insert
14A. Nothing under paragraph 14 above shall authorise the seizure of any excluded material or any special procedure material except that which is specified in the warrant.—,[Mr. Andrew F. Bennett.]

Question put, That the amendment be made:—

The Committee divided: Ayes 13, Noes 113.

Division No. 140]
[2.55 am


AYES


Bennett, Andrew (St'kp't N)
Cryes, Bob


Brow, Ronald W. (H'ckn'y S)
Hughes, Simon (Bermondsey)





Mikardo, Ian
Spriggs, Leslie


Penhaligon, David
Wrigglesworth, Ian


Pitt, William Henry



Price, C. (Lewisham W)
Tellers for the Ayes:


Richardson, Jo
Mr. John Tilley and


Sheerman, Barry
Mr. Alfred Dubs.


Skinner, Dennis



NOES


Alexander, Richard
Lloyd, Peter (Fareham)


Aspinwall, Jack
Lyell, Nicholas


Atkinson, David (B'm'th.E)
Macfarlane, Neil


Beaumont-Dark, Anthony
MacGregor, John


Berry, Hon Anthony
Major, John


Best, Keith
Marlow, Antony


Biffen, Rt Hon John
Mather, Carol


Biggs-Davison, Sir John
Maxwell-Hyslop, Robin


Blaker, Peter
Mayhew, Patrick


Boscawen, Hon Robert
Mellor, David


Bottomley, Peter (W'wich W)
Miller, Hal (B'grove)


Boyson, Dr Rhodes
Mills, Iain (Meriden)


Bright, Graham
Moate, Roger


Brinton, Tim
Morris, M. (N'hampton S)


Brooke, Hon Peter
Murphy, Christopher


Brown, Michael (Brigg &amp; Sc'n)
Nelson, Anthony


Browne, John (Winchester)
Newton, Tony


Bruce-Gardyne, John
Normanton, Tom


Budgen, Nick
Page, Richard (SW Herts)


Bulmer, Esmond
Patten, Christopher (Bath)


Carlisle, John (Luton West)
Proctor, K. Harvey


Chapman, Sydney
Rhodes James, Robert


Cope, John
Rhys Williams, Sir Brandon


Costain, Sir Albert
Ridley, Hon Nicholas


Cranborne, Viscount
Roberts, Wyn (Conway)


Dorrell, Stephen
Rumbold, Mrs A. C. R.


Douglas-Hamilton, Lord J.
Shaw, Giles (Pudsey)


Dover, Denshore
Shepherd, Colin (Hereford)


Edwards, Rt Hon N. (P'broke)
Silvester, Fred


Elliott, Sir William
Sims, Roger


Eyre, Reginald
Smith, Tim (Beaconsfield)


Fenner, Mrs Peggy
Spicer, Jim (West Dorset)


Fisher, Sir Nigel
Sproat, Iain


Forman, Nigel
Stanbrook, Ivor


Fox, Marcus
Stevens, Martin


Fry, Peter
Stewart, A. (E Renfrewshire)


Garel-Jones, Tristan
Stradling Thomas, J.


Goodlad, Alastair
Taylor, Teddy (S'end E)


Gower, Sir Raymond
Temple-Morris, Peter


Grant, Sir Anthony
Thomas, Rt Hon Peter


Griffiths, E.(B'ySt. Edm'ds)
Thompson, Donald


Griffiths, Peter (Portsm'th N)
Townsend, Cyril D, (B'heath)


Gummer, John Selwyn
Waddington, David


Hamilton, Hon A.
Wakeham, John


Hawkins, Sir Paul
Waldegrave, Hon William


Hawksley, Warren
Walker-Smith, Rt Hon Sir D.


Heddle, John
Watson, John


Hooson, Tom
Wells, Bowen


Hordern, Peter
Wells, John (Maidstone)


Hurd, Rt Hon Douglas
Whitelaw, Rt Hon William


Irvine, Rt Hon Bryant Godman
Whitney, Raymond


Jenkin, Rt Hon Patrick
Wickenden, Keith


Jopling, Rt Hon Michael
Wolfson, Mark


Kellett-Bowman, Mrs Elaine
Young, Sir George (Acton)


Kershaw, Sir Anthony



Lamont, Norman
TellersfortheNpr. DavidHuntand


Lang, Ian
Mr. Douglas Hogg.


Lawrence, Ivan



Lewis, Sir Kenneth (Rutland)

Question accordingly negatived.

Schedule added to the Bill.

Bill reported, with amendments.

Motion made, and Question proposed, That the Bill, as amended, be now considered.—[Mr. Garel-Jones.]

Mr. Christopher Price: I understand that the motion is debatable, and it would be proper to debate it briefly, and to consider the stage that we have reached now that


we have recommitted the two clauses and we next move to the Report stage. We have a difficulty that might be solved by putting off the consideration of the Bill until a little later. I shall spell out why I think that the motion should not be passed and we should not move to Report, because it is not the appropriate time.
The first reason is the reason that is always given at 3.7 am. The Committee has done well today. It has debated some important issues in the three groupings of proposals that we have debated. We are not at our best at this time in the morning. If we want to consider the Report stage fully and properly, it may be best to do it a little later today. The Government have allowed two more days for the Bill, and there seems to be plenty of time. There are few people who would commend the idea of carrying on with the Report stage, as the motion suggests.
The second reason. Mr. Dean — [Horn. MEMBERS: "Order."] Mr. Deputy Speaker, I apologise both to you and to the House, and can only plead the fact that it is now 3.8 am. Another reason is that the Government have come forward with what they thought were compromises agreed with the bishops, the accountants, the doctors, the Samaritans, the citizens advice bureaux — if I dare breathe those words in front of the massed ranks on the Government Benches—and the journalists. In the three substantial debates that we have had since 3.30 yesterday afternoon, it has been made clear on both sides, particularly by the hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Mr. Griffiths) and hon. Members on this side, that the compromises that the Government have made do not command the universal consent of the House and need more thought and scrutiny.
I do not blame the Government. We proceeded slowly but surely in Committee, and by doing so, by a process of festina lente, we got matters right simply by not hurrying. The danger of diving straight into the Report stage is that we shall compound the muddle that the Government have got into in the redrawn clauses in substitution for clauses 9 and 10. It would be better to step back a little, think where we are going, as the Minister of State did on many occasions in Committee, so that the Government and their patient advisers, who have sat throughout the night with us, can get together and decide what new provisions should be brought forward for Report. If we did that, when the Bill leaves this House to go to the Lords, it could be in a state which can command more general assent from each side of the House.

Mr. Cryer: Will my hon. Friend also bear in mind that this Bill had a wide response from bodies outside the House, and that it would be as well to mull over the alterations to the Bill to allow bodies both outside and inside the House to assess the changes in the Bill? Surely in any democratic process, particularly in controversial legislation such as this, we should get a response from the bodies that apparently had such an influence on the Government.

Mr. Price: As usual, my hon. Friend has put his finger on an important point. All those who were members of the Committee will agree that throughout the Committee stage all its members, including the hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds, who temporarily is not in his seat, and Opposition Members, relied heavily on the opinions of bodies outside the House of Commons. Many compromises were made at that stage. I remember when we joined forces to defeat the Government to give policemen

the right to legal representation when they were on disciplinary charges. Many compromises emerged, and they were sensible ones. If we dive straight into the Report stage at this point, there will be no time for such consultation to take place.
There is the third problem to which I briefly alluded in the motion that we considered before recommittal. The Government said that the bunch of new clauses that we have now passed will come up for consideration at the end of the Report stage, but that will produce enormous difficulties for the House, and perhaps I might set out the difficulties that I foresee if we move straight to Report.
The Bill was carefully drafted in parts. Part II contained clauses 9 and 10 entitled
Power to enter premises to search for evidence of serious offences.
and
Evidence held on confidential basis.
We have taken them out of the Bill and substituted a group of new clauses. The Bill was drafted in that way not by accident but because that was the logical way to deal with the issues.
In the original Bill clause 11 followed clause 10 and was entitled
Entry and search after arrest.
That was followed by clause 12 called "Search warrants —safeguards", clause 13 entitled
Powers of constables to execute warrants",
the important clause14—entitled "Seizure of articles" and clause 15 called "Warrants — supplementary". Clauses about arrest and detention follow clauses dealing with the powers of entry, search and seizure.
I do not see how we can sensibly discuss amendments to clauses 11 to 14 when we have only just agreed a bunch of new clauses which will be amended further. As a consequence, amendments will be needed to the later clauses which hinge so closely on to the old clauses 9 and 10.
I gave the example earlier of the link between obtaining a warrant to seize something and actually seizing it. There was great pressure in Committee to agree that it is wrong to allow the police to obtain a warrant to find stolen property and then to seize something different and perhaps trivial.
That is only one example of linkage between the battery of new clauses which should be considered with their amendments in order but which we are told cannot be considered until the end of Report. I understand that the printers are working to produce a supplementary version of the clauses which we discussed today, but we cannot sensibly consider the Bill on Report if we constantly come across matters which cannot be disposed of until we have considered in order provisions which have only just been approved.
The Government rightly wanted recommittal for the new clauses, but they should have allowed us a few days to consider the massive changes and for the Bill to be reprinted properly and coherently. Perhaps the Government did not realise the enormity of the changes that they were making. I do not see how we can proceed. It is now 3.18 am and none of us is in a state to consider such important legislation. The Bill is in such an incoherent state that we should call it a day and come back to a properly printed Bill which we can consider properly.

Mr. Hattersley: I rise to make the briefest of points and perhaps to disagree with my hon. Friend the Member


for Lewisham, West (Mr. Price). Although I share my hon. Friend's view about the undesirability of proceeding with any Bill, especially one as controversial as this, at such an hour, I do not see how we can sensibly abandon our consideration now and hope to devote the necessary time to the large number of amendments outstanding. I agree that it is an undesirable way of proceeding, but I see no alternative.
I rise, however, not to argue with my hon. Friend but to ask the Home Secretary to say something about his future intention for the timetable. We have spent 12 hours in Committee. I am sure that the Home Secretary will agree in his usual generous way — although I do not think that generosity is needed in this case—that those 12 hours have not been wasted on fractious or frivolous speeches. We have considered three groups of amendments on matters of real concern as seriously as we individually could. Opposition speeches have not been substantially longer or more frequent than Conservative speeches. Indeed, the longest speeches were made by the Minister of State; and I was grateful for them. There has been no attempt to prolong discussions unnecessarily. Nevertheless, the renewed Committee stage took 12 hours from the time that we rightfully expected and the Government intended to be devoted to the Report stage.
I do not want a long debate on this procedural motion as I wish to proceed with the amendments that we have to consider and for which the remaining time is already inadequate. I hope that the Home Secretary will add to his earlier comment about time, when he said that we had better see how we go on. We now know how we go on. After 12 serious hours which have in no way been wasted, we have lost a great deal of time that was rightfully allocated to the Report stage. How does the Home Secretary intend to compensate for that?

Mr. Whitelaw: I rise at once in response to the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Sparkbrook (Mr. Hattersley). First, I accept of course that there was no undue delay in debating the new clauses. Of course it took a long time. I accepted that. It was for that very reason that I agreed to the right hon. Gentleman's original proposal for the procedure to be followed, and I believe that it has proved to be right. As I said before, I thought that it was right to go on for a bit and I still think so now. No one in the House dislikes early morning debates more than I do, but I have suddenly got new wind. Having said nothing for a long time, I now feel very fresh and rare, far more so than I ever feel at any other time of the day. Having reached that stage, I think that we should go on for a little bit and see how we get on with a few new clauses. I cannot comment on further implications at this point, but I shall of course consider them in the proper way.

Mr. Mikardo: I wish to make an appeal to the Home Secretary. He is fresh as a daisy and so am I, but it is only old codgers like us who stay fresh in the middle of the night. I make an earnest appeal to him on behalf of all the young fellows sitting around fading like blown tulips. They simply cannot take the pace, dear Home Secretary, and we should not be so hard on them. It is selfish of us, just because we are fit and raring to go, to subject all these poor fellows who cannot stand it to a really hard time.
I do not agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Sparkbrook (Mr. Hattersley). He said that

unless we went on he could not see how we could get through the Report stage in the time available. But what is the time available? The Government have a responsibility to provide the necessary time to get through the Report stage.
Mr. Speaker's provisional selection consists of 98 groups. I appreciate that many of the amendments are Government amendments to honour promises given to the Opposition in Committee. I also appreciate that some of them are purely technical. Nevertheless, there are 98 groups of amendments, of which 82 are groups headed by a Government amendment. Therefore, the Government are responsible for well over 80 per cent. of the business on the Order Paper for the Report stage. As they are responsible for all that business, they are responsible for finding time for it.
We thought that it would be a tight fit having Report and Third Reading in three days. We now do not have three days—we have lost one day, although for a good purpose. My right hon. Friend the Member for Sparkbrook and the Home Secretary were right to say that we had a constructive recommital stage, participated in by hon. Members from both sides of the House. It was not usual procedure upstairs in Committee where Government Members are decorative mutes, not allowed by their Whips to be anything else. We had a good, lively discussion across the Floor. I do not regret the 12 hours spent on recommital, but it means that we have lost one-third of the time allocated to Report and Third Reading —and even that allocation was pretty tight for a Report stage with 98 groups of amendments.
I wish to add a further, personal point. I gave Mr. Speaker notice about 16 or 17 hours ago that I wished to raise with him a point of order on new clause 1. No doubt that information has been passed to you, Mr. Deputy Speaker. But, with all respect to you, I want a ruling from Mr. Speaker. Indeed, the point will now crop up more than once. I wish to raise it on new clause 1, which is the first opportunity on Report. However, in Committee we passed new clause 3, which contains the same offending words —although not quite identical—to those in new clause 1, and a ruling affecting new clause 1 will also affect new clause 3.
The point I wish to raise is of considerable importance, and one to which the Chair will have given some thought. The House will be interested in it. To take up such a point at four o'clock in the morning is not right. I do not know what the Home Secretary thinks that he will gain if he ploughs on now. I think that he had better reconcile himself to having to find an extra day to consider the Bill on Report. He will have to fight like fury with his Whips Office to get it, but it will have to be found in any event, irrespective of whether we plough on now.
3.30 am
There is a strong case for removing the motion presently before us so that we can go away and refresh ourselves for a start on Report in about 12 hours' time. We can make a good job of it tomorrow and perhaps sit fairly late.

Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: I have never had a great deal of trust in the usual channels, and I think that they are being rather obstinate in failing to recognise what has happened since Mr. Speaker's selection. Whatever the number of amendments, those which have been selected which are not Government amendments are very few. My


hon. Friend the Member for Bethnal Green and Bow (Mr. Mikardo) has counted them and it appears that there are only 16 groups of amendments that are not Government amendments. A substantial slice of them are Scottish amendments. Therefore, the amendments that are likely to interest the whole House form a limited group.
It is possible to talk on Government amendments if we want to do so. The Home Secretary is virtually encouraging us to do exactly that. If we are to be held in the Chamber talking on the early amendments until the later hours of the morning, the right hon. Gentleman is encouraging us to talk on each of the Government amendments. If we do that, we shall not complete the consideration of the Bill on Report in three days and he will have to find another day.
If we were to leave the Chamber now and return later to consider the new clauses, they could be dealt with fairly expeditiously. We could then move on to Government amendments, which are mainly concessions arising from debates in Committee, which could be dealt with quickly.
It is a matter for the Home Secretary, but I confess that I cannot understand what the point is tactically in going on beyond the present stage. The right hon. Gentleman would gain greater good will if he were to say now that he proposed to start the consideration of the Bill on Report later in the day. In those circumstances we could begin again with a freshness of mind, debate the new clauses and deal with the Government amendments fairly expeditiously. However, it is a matter for the right hon. Gentleman, and I can only say that if he wants to go on for the rest of the night, we can continue for this night, tomorrow night and on to Monday night without finishing the Bill. If that happens, he will still have to concede another day.

Mr. Cryer: My understanding of the arrangements made between the usual channels—a dubious method of proceeding anyhow—is that there will be three days on Report. But that will not be so, because one day has already gone. My right hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Sparkbrook (Mr. Hattersley) talked about the 12 hours of debate on the part of the Bill discussed in Committee on the Floor of the House, which took virtually a third of the three days.
It is abundantly clear that the debates in Committee —I was not present throughout, but I was in my place for a chunk of it—were concise, probing and useful, and raised some relevant factors. There has been no attempt to delay the Bill unnecessarily beyond the need to examine and argue the issues, which is the proper function of a Committee.
There have been very few Divisions. There could have been many more had there been a desire to divide. The Opposition considered a critical and responsible examination of the Bill to be proper and decided that they would vote on various issues, deciding each issue on its merits.
When my hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham, West (Mr. Price) was speaking, I raised the question of the proper consideration by outside bodies. Everyone knows that bodies such as the National Council for Civil Liberties have taken a deep interest in the Bill, and it is right that that should be so. If pin-striped Conservative Members recoil in horror at the thought that such an outside body should be encouraged to take an interest, let me say that even more Establishment-minded bodies—

Mr. Mikardo: Like accountants.

Mr. Cryer: Where can one find a more Establishment-minded group of people than accountants? Lawyers and the Police Federation have taken an interest. We know that the Police Federation has a representative here who has a special interest in the matter, but other bodies do not, and they wish to obtain information. It is not true that our proceedings are going so quickly that they cannot take into account all the changes and produce a response. Those bodies that are interested in the Bill's passage have made a speedy response and got information rapidly to Members.
People other than those connected with democratic bodies such as the NCCL want to give their considered views. We have just been debating the position of the press and Lord Matthews will want to take into account the new clauses. It may be argued that he is down the corridor in the House of Lords and can participate in the later stages, but Sir David English cannot. He is no doubt panting to get into the House of Lords. If the Daily Mail keeps up its misleading package of Tory propaganda day after day, no doubt he will, but he is not there yet. He has to earn A by subservience to the Conservative central office. If he wants to give his views, has has to give them to the Government and not as a Member of the House of Lords. That is another reason for allowing a certain modicum of time.
The Home Secretary says that he is fresh; and given the buoyancy of his comment who could deny that? He says that there is plenty of time. If there is plenty of time, there is no urgency to take the Report stage immediately. The Government believe that with an election within their province and decision they can get the Bill out of the way and have it under their belts and say that they have passed legislation that will help them in their battle for law and order, but I should have thought a more resolute approach would be better. Each stage should not be considered in a rush and at unseemly haste through the night.
We have already taken the Bill to 20 minutes to four. That is not bad for a complicated Bill which requires fairly careful assessment at each stage. A resolute approach is not one that pushes legislation through the House because one knows that one has a majoritiy and that the Whips can push Lobby fodder through whenever necessary to get the Bill passed for the sake of expediency. To the observer that seems to be what the Government are doing.
I know that the Home Secretary is anxious to respond, and I shall delay him for only a moment or two more.
Because of the facts that have been enunciated by myself and my hon. Friends, the Home Secretary should state how he proposes to deal with the Report stage, bearing in mind the need for an extra day, to fulfil the needs of the usual channels. It is just conceivable that the arrangements made by the usual channels do not take into account the process of debate whereby some additional time is needed to deal with the more complex parts of legislation, which do not always parcel out into the neat arrangements which might otherwise be made.
As the House has discussed some considerably complex arrangements, and as the Bill is important to outside bodies, a better approach would be to proceed in such a way that they could absorb the changes, give their comments and so enable the House to proceed in a more informative way. Time is in the Government's hands. If they consider the Bill to be important, they should give time to it.

Mr. Whitelaw: The last thing that I want to be is unreasonable. I shall consider what the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Birmingham, Sparkbrook (Mr. Hattersley) has said and examine the position.
It is reasonable to begin to deal with one or two of the new clauses. I wish to make a start on the new clauses. I trust that the House will enable me to do so.

Question put:—

The House divided: Ayes 99, Noes 10.

Division No. 141]
[3.40 am


AYES


Alexander, Richard
Lyell, Nicholas


Atkinson, David (B'm'th,E)
Macfarlane, Neil


Beaumont-Dark, Anthony
MacGregor, John


Berry, Hon Anthony
Marlow, Antony


Best, Keith
Mather, Carol


Biffen, Rt Hon John
Maxweil-Hyslop, Robin


Biggs-Davison, Sir John
Mayhew, Patrick


Blaker, Peter
Mellor, David


Boscawen, Hon Robert
Miller, Hal (B'grove)


Bottomley, Peter (W'wich W)
Mills, Iain (Meriden)


Boyson, Dr Rhodes
Moate, Roger


Bright, Graham
Morris, M. (N'hampton S)


Brinton, Tim
Nelson, Anthony


Brooke, Hon Peter
Normanton, Tom


Brown, Michael (Brigg &amp; Sc'n)
Page, Richard (SW Herts)


Browne, John (Winchester)
Patten, Christopher (Bath)


Bruce-Gardyne, John
Proctor, K. Harvey


Budgen, Nick
Rhodes James, Robert


Bulmer, Esmond
Rhys Williams, Sir Brandon


Carlisle, John (Luton West)
Ridley, Rt Hon Nicholas


Cope, John
Roberts, Wyn (Conway)


Costain, Sir Albert
Rumbold, Mrs A. C. R.


Cranborne, Viscount
Shaw, Giles (Pudsey)


Dorrell, Stephen
Shepherd, Colin (Hereford)


Douglas-Hamilton, Lord J.
Silvester, Fred


Dover, Denshore
Sims, Roger


Edwards, Rt Hon N. (P'broke)
Smith, Tim (Beaconsfield)


Eyre, Reginald
Spicer, Jim (West Dorset)


Fenner, Mrs Peggy
Sproat, Iain


Forman, Nigel
Stanbrook, Ivor


Garel-Jones, Tristan
Stevens, Martin


Goodlad, Alastair
Stewart, A.(E Renfrewshire)


Gower, Sir Raymond
Taylor, Teddy (S'end E)


Griffiths, E.(B'y St. Edm'ds)
Temple-Morris, Peter


Griffiths, Peter (Portsm'th N)
Thomas, Rt Hon Peter


Gummer, John Selwyn
Thompson, Donald


Hawkins, Sir Paul
Townsend, Cyril D, (B'heath)


Hawksley, Warren
Waddington, David


Heddle, John
Waldegrave, Hon William


Hogg, Hon Douglas (Gr'th'm)
Walker-Smith, Rt Hon Sir D.


Hooson, Tom
Watson, John


Hunt, David (Wirral)
Wells, Bowen


Irvine, RtHon Bryant Godman
Wells, John (Maidstone)


Jenkin, Rt Hon Patrick
Whitelaw, Rt Hon William


Jopling, Rt Hon Michael
Wickenden, Keith


Kellett-Bowman, Mrs Elaine
Wolfson, Mark


Kershaw, Sir Anthony
Young, Sir George (Acton)


Lamont, Norman



Lang, Ian
Tellers for the Ayes:


Lawrence, Ivan
Mr. Archie Hamilton and


Lewis, Sir Kenneth (Rutland)
Mr. John Major.


Lloyd, Peter (Fareham)



NOES


Bennett, Andrew (St'kp't N)
Skinner, Dennis


Brown, Ronald W. (H'ckn'y S)
Spriggs, Leslie


Dubs, Alfred
Wrigglesworth, Ian


Hughes, Simon (Bermondsey)



Mikardo, Ian
Tellers for the Noes:


Pitt, William Henry
Mr. Bob Cryer and


Price, C. (Lewisham W)
Miss Jo Richardson.

Question accordingly agreed to.

New Clause 1

POLICE OFFICERS PERFORMING DUTIES OF HIGHER RANK

'A police officer who is for the time being authorised to perform the duties of a particular rank is to be treated as holding that rank for the purposes—

(a) of this Act; and
(b) of any other Act, including an Act passed after this Act,

so far as those purposes relate to the exercise of any powers in respect of the investigation of offences or the treatment of persons in police custody.'—[Mr. Mellor.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

The Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. David Mellor): I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.: The Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. David Mellor): I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Mr. Mikardo: On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I should like your ruling and guidance about a few words in this new clause. They are the words,
including an Act passed after this Act,
That phrase appears to be in breach of our convention that a Parliament does not bind any of its successors as it seems to tell a future Parliament that this Act will apply to any Acts that it passes, whether it likes it or not.
I enter two caveats against myself. The first is that I know that this form of words, or something like it, has been used in other measures. That does not necessarily make it right and it does not necessarily follow that because something has not to been examined in the past it ought not to be examined now. I therefore hope that we shall consider it on its own merits and not feel bound to precedents.
The second caveat is that a future Parliament could always legislate to repeal those words or the entire Act. That sounds all right, but two questions arise. If it is argued that these words do not bind a future Parliament and do not necessarily apply to any Act passed after this Act, unless specifically provided for, what on earth is their purpose? Secondly, even though a future Parliament can get rid of these words by a legislative Act of its own, notwithstanding what the Bill says, it will have consciously to do so. To use a terminology that we make use of in a different context, we shall be loading on to that Parliament the necessity to proceed by way of affirmative resolution instead of by negative resolution.
We are saying to a future Parliament, "We are telling you that you must do this, and if you do not want to you must take some positive act to get out of doing it". In a sense, that binds a future Parliament. If my interpretation is right, I believe new clause 1 to be out of order because of these six or seven words. I am sure the House will be interested to hear your view, Mr. Deputy Speaker.

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Paul Dean): I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving me notice that he intended to raise this point. As he has said, there are precedents, including recent ones, for the use of such a phrase in an Act. It is, of course, true, again as the hon. Gentleman said, that Parliament cannot bind its successor. If these words are included in an Act, it is perfectly possible for them to be amended or removed by a future Act.
The hon. Gentleman will be perfectly in order in seeking a full explanation from the Minister in the debate on the new clause. I suggest that he should deal with the matter in that way.

Mr. Mikardo: Thank you very much, Mr. Deputy Speaker, for your kindness in considering the matter and for your ruling. I should like the opportunity—I do not know how it can be afforded, because of our rushed procedure—to move an amendment to the new clause to delete those words.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: At this stage I do not think that I can add to what I have said already. It would be better to proceed to the new clause. I am sure that Ministers will have heard the points that the hon. Gentleman has raised as well as the ruling that I have given, and it would be best if we now proceeded to debate the new clause.

Mr. Hattersley: I am in no way challenging your ruling, Mr. Deputy Speaker, but rather making a proposition consequent upon its acceptance. Clearly my hon. Friend could not come to a conclusion about how he should proceed on those words until he received the ruling for which he asked this morning and has just received. That is genuine, real, information that affects his conduct as well as the debate. If my hon. Friend tabled a manuscript amendment to delete the words, would that be acceptable and could it be debated? By doing so, my hon. Friend would be accepting your ruling without qualification and acting upon it, almost in the way that you recommended.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: I do not think I can give an off-the-cuff response to the reasonable suggestion that the right hon. Gentleman has made. It would be better to proceed with the debate. I shall give consideration to the point that he has put to me.

4 am

Mr. Mellor: As the House will know, the Bill provides that a number of powers which at present may be authorised by any police officer may in future under the Bill be authorised only by an officer of at least a certain rank. For example, at present any officer may take the decision to deny a detained person access to legal advice whereas the Bill sets out stringent criteria for this power and provides that it may be authorised only by an officer of superintendent rank or above.
It was always the Government's intention that powers which are reserved in this way should be exercisable by an officer of lesser substantive rank who has been duly authorised to perform the duties of the higher rank. The new clause removes any possible doubt about whether the Bill, as drafted, gives effect to this intention. As such, I commend it to the House.
I can assure the hon. Member for Bethnal Green and Bow (Mr. Mikardo) that the effect of this provision will not be to dilute the safeguards variously contained in the Bill for the authorisation only by senior officers of the resort to certain specified powers.
Making specific provision for the temporary assumption of more senior responsibilities by a junior officer is not a way of circumventing the Bill's requirements, but simply a necessary acknowledgment of long-established and necessary police practice. The procedure which is known, perhaps somewhat infelicitously, as acting up is not limited to the police service but is common in all disciplined hierarchies where specific duties are allocated to specific ranks. Where this is done, it follows that proper arrangements must be made to cover the absence of senior officers on illness, leave or for other reasons. It is for this

reason that the police regulations provide that officers assuming more senior duties should also receive the appropriate rate of pay.

Mr. Andrew F. Bennett: Can the Minister list the powers involved? There are 14 different areas. It is important to get on the record those 14 areas so that people can see that it is not a routine matter of someone acting up, as the Minister said, but that there are substantial points of principle involved.

Mr. Mellor: The hon. Gentleman has been through the Bill in Committee and he knows better than I do, although I have familiarised myself with them, the clauses in which a specified rank is given responsibility for a certain decision. I direct his attention to four at random—clause 4(6), clause 11(5), clause 30(8) and clause 30(11).
If the superintendent is absent through illness or for whatever reason, in any well-ordered police station someone has to operate as the superintendent. It is well provided for. Usually the person in a rank immediately below—the chief inspector—is made up for the purpose of carrying out the functions of the superintendent during his temporary absence. That is recognised in police regulations by enabling that individual to be paid the appropriate sum for carrying the extra responsibilities.
It is for the purposes of that limited exception only that the new clause is being put forward. It is for the avoidance of doubt that someone carrying out under the proper procedure the role of the senior officer is not excluded from acting properly within the provisions of the Bill.

Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: The Minister has talked about a junior officer acting up and being authorised to carry out other duties. Do the words
being authorised to perform the duties
mean that he must be appointed to the temporary rank by the chief constable or another senior rank in accordance with regulations, or, if the superintendent wants to devolve his duties to a chief inspector, is it enough for him to say, "I am going home. Would you look after things and carry out my duties"?
What is there in the new clause that shows that the authorisation should be done in a proper way in accordance with police regulations?

Mr. Mellor: No part of police regulations deals with acting up except in so far as provision is made for remuneration to be paid over and above the normal remuneration of a certain rank of somebody who is acting in a higher capacity. The point at issue is that there are well understood occasions when it would be proper to do this and it is on those occasions alone that an officer who was not of the required rank would be acting correctly in giving a permission or carrying out a function under the Bill which provides for an individual of a certain rank to carry that through. It is not formalised to that degree, but I suggest that where one is dealing with such a well-established principle there is no scope for the kind of problem that the hon. Gentleman foresees.

Mr. Andrew F. Bennett: When one of the 14 clauses applies to an individual and it can be seen that the person carrying that out is not of the rank specified in the Bill, how will the individual be able to tell that the officer is genuinely entitled so to act and what authority has he to prove that to the individual?

Mr. Mellor: I imagine that that is a matter that can be explained, just as many other complexities of ordinary life


are capable of being explained. I should not have thought that it would be beyond the ability of a chief inspector to point out that he is acting in the role of the superintendent in charge of the station, the superintendent not being available for some reason. After all, that being the case he would have to carry out a wide range of functions.
There are many precedents for the point that was just raised by the hon. Member for Bethnal Green and Bow going back over the last decade. It is not a matter of the greatest importance and we shall certainly reconsider whether it is worth including this part in the clause in the light of difficulties that have arisen. The purpose is not to bind Parliament in future but simply to provide that where in future there is any reference to something being carried out by a particular rank that could be done without having some kind of acting up provision. If it were the will of Parliament to change it in future, that could be done. It may be that to provide for such an unlikely contingency is not worth detaining the House with.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: I should tell the hon. Member for Bethnal Green and Bow (Mr. Mikardo) that his manuscript amendment has been selected.

Mr. Hattersley: I am always most wary when a Minister tells the House that the Government's amendment had always been proposed and intended and that it was now thought right to clarify it beyond any doubt. The best that can be said of such a procedure is that once more the Government have got their drafting wrong, and the worst that can be said is something more reprehensible than that. I do not want to deal with the most reprehensible conclusion, but I do want to tell the Under-Secretary of State something that he clearly does not understand. If it had always been the Government's intention that the acting up provision should be included in the clause, the Government never thought it right to make that clear to the Committee. Indeed, if he reads the Committee Hansard he will see that every time the new and, by some standards, unacceptable powers were discussed, we were always assured that they would be operated only when they were authorised by an officer of a specified rank.
My hon. Friend the Member for Stockport, North (Mr. Bennett) reminded the Under-Secretary of State that there was not just a single new power to be limited in the way that we are now discussing. There are 14 new powers in the Bill which, as the Bill stands at present, are used only when they are specifically authorised by an officer of a particular rank. Let me remind the hon. Gentleman of some of those which cause particular controversy and will continue to do so.
First, there is the vexed problem of the authorising of the setting up of road checks. In the three and a half sessions when this was debated in the Committee we were told time after time that our fears about this power being used improperly, unlawfully, casually or unnecessarily ought in part to be checked by the knowledge that it had to be authorised by a superintendent. What it now amounts to, as I understand it, is that it has to be authorised by a superintendent, or a chief inspector if the superintendent has gone home. That is a quite different state of affairs.
Let me take another example. One area of continued controversy which I promise the Government will haunt them long after the Bill is passed into law, if it is passed into law, is that covering the dual distasteful provisions of

the authorised taking of intimate body samples, with consent, and the authorised taking of non-intimate body samples, without consent. That, we were told when we debated it, would be approved and could be carried out only if a superintendent, the man in charge of the whole area, authorised it.
That is also the position with the intimate body search. I shall not harrow the House in the middle of the night with an account of what the intimate body search involves. The Minister seems to be urging me to do so, but I cannot gratify his wish. I simply remind him of the fact that, if a suspect does not agree to an intimate body search by a doctor, he will be subject to an intimate body search by a policeman—but only, we were told upstairs, if a man of command rank in charge of an entire division regards it as necessary and authorises it. Now it is to be done by a superintendent or, in the absence of a superintendent, by somebody else.
Under other provisions, there are duties that are reserved to officers more junior than a superintendent. The authorised entry and search of premises following an arrest, according to the Bill, has to be approved by an inspector, or, I assume now, a sergeant acting in the place of an inspector when the inspector is away. I do not in any way minimise the importance of sergeants. I am sure that sergeants in the police force, like sergeants in the army, keep the service going. What I am saying is that the confident assurance that an officer of a specific rank would have to authorise these controversial actions has been totally diluted by what the Under-Secretary of State has said and by what he now proposes.
It really is not good enough for the Minister to say to the House that the procedures by which the acting up is arranged are well known and well established and will cause nobody any concern or grief. We might be more charitably disposed towards his proposals if we were told that a chief inspector would operate as a superintendent only with the specific authorisation of the chief constable when the superintendent was sick, on leave or otherwise unavailable for a very considerable time. I am advised —and the Under-Secretary of State will, I know, be the first to tell me if I am wrong—that that is not the case. It will be done when the appropriate officer is not there to perform the task.
I must say to the Minister that simply to arrive at this time of night and blandly assure us that this is always what the Government intended and therefore there is nothing to worry about is not the way to command the confidence of the House. I hope that he will think very carefully about what the clause involves and understand that, while it may pass into law, it will cause nothing but concern and trouble for the police if it is implemented in the way that he suggests.
I hope that the hon. Gentleman will spare the House a moment to give us another word on the question that he failed to answer about the circumstances in which what he calls acting up will be authorised. To say that it is normally the case and that we all understand the proceedings is not enornously convincing. I hope that at least he will tell us when he thinks the circumstances that are regarded as necessary by the new clause are likely to operate.

Mr. Pitt: I am concerned about this matter, as is the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Sparkbrook (Mr. Hattersley). I had assumed when I read the new clause at


first that there would be a specific task of acting up, in other words that there would be a specific devolution of reponsibility on a permanent basis. Now what worries me is that I learnt that perhaps the superintendent will say to his chief inspector, "You do the job. I am going home." Alternatively, the chief inspector may casually give the duty to perform those tasks, which should be performed by him, to a sergeant.
I should like to know what the procedures are. I am an ex-soldier — only national service, but never mind. I know the procedures in the Army, and by and large they are devolved procedures unless here is a specific circumstance where a senior rank has to devolve rapidly for a specific reason to a junior rank.
I am also aware that in local government, of which I have some experience, there is some devolution of power based on an honorarium, so that the person has a specific task to perform in the absence of another person. While he is performing that task, he is paid an honorarium. Could the Under-Secretary of State be more precise? It is difficult at this late hour to absorb what appears to be an exceedingly bland new clause. When one reads it, one is worried, especially bearing in mind the assurances that were given to us by the Minister of State in Committee. I should be grateful if the Under-Secretary would give me an assurance that whatever acting up is being done, it is done on a specific and regulated basis or on a controlled basis, in the absence of a senior officer, for a specific purpose.

Mr. Mikardo: I appreciate your selecting the manuscript amendment that I tabled, Mr. Deputy Speaker. When the time comes for it to be moved, I shall do so formally, first because I said all that I had to say about it in raising a point of order and, secondly, because of the forthcoming attitude of the Under-Secretary of State, for which I am grateful.
I shall say a few words about the new clause to supplement what my right hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Sparkbrook (Mr. Hattersley) said. In an earlier debate in Committee I referred, highly appreciatively—my appreciation was sincerely felt—to a broadcast radio interview given a few days ago by Assistant Commissioner Geoffrey Dear about the police complaints board report on the damage done by some police searches of houses in Brixton. Mr. Dear said that it was all bad, horrible, and indefensible, but it is not likely to happen again because we are now ensuring that such action will be taken only under the control of senior officers, and, furthermore, we are taking steps to ensure that guidance will be given to those senior officers in respect of such action.
I do not know whether, when Assistant Commissioner Dear made that statement a few days ago, he was aware of the contents of new clause 1. I think that he probably was not because, if he had been, he would have been a little less dogmatic about safeguards being provided against a repetition of what happened in Railton road by the fact that only senior officers would be able to authorise it in future. It is clear now that, in the terms of new clause 1, somebody less than a senior officer will be able to authorise it; because any senior officer will be able to delegate his powers to one less senior.
I ask the House to bear in mind the attitude to this matter taken by the Royal Commission. It was said over and again in Committee, and earlier in our proceedings

today, that the Royal Commission made proposals for increased powers for the police that the Government have accepted and put into the Bill, and also proposed that those powers should be subject to certain safeguards, most of which the Government have omitted from the Bill.
One of the safeguards was that, in respect of each of the new powers, the Royal Commission laid down the rank of authority for action to be taken under the new power. My right hon. Friend the Member for Sparkbrook has listed four or five of those new powers, and has told us what rank the Bill proposes. Before that, there was an erosion of the proposals of the Royal Commission. In many cases the rank that is provided in the Bill as the level of authority for authorising the use of a new power is below the rank that was recommended by the Royal Commission as being the authority for the exercise of that power.
I can quote one or two examples. My right hon. Friend mentioned the discussion that we had in Committee about the authorisation for the setting up of road blocks, and said that we had an assurance that our fears could be allayed by the knowledge that their authorisation could be made only by a superintendent. However, that was not the proposal of the Royal Commission, which recommended that the authority for that action should rest only with an assistant chief constable. The Bill took one down-grading step to superintendent, and new clause 1 takes one or more down-grading steps; because there is nothing in it that says that an officer can delegate his powers to an officer who is only one rank below him. Theoretically, a superintendent could delegate his powers to a constable, although I do not suppose that it would happen. There is nothing in the new clause to prevent it from happening.
In the same way, to go over some of the examples quoted by my right hon. Friend, the commission proposed that intimate body searches should be authorised by a sub-divisional commander, but the Bill has down graded that to a superintendent. To authorise delay in notifying somebody when one is arrested, the commission suggested a level of the officer in charge of the station, and the Bill down-grades that to superintendent. Similarly, there are four other cases in which the commission proposed that the authority should be exercised by a sub-divisional commander, but the Bill has down graded that to superintendent.

Mr. Mellor: I think that the hon. Member will find that in many police forces the sub-divisional commander is often a chief inspector, so by making the authorisation level to superintendent the level is being raised, not reduced.

Mr. Mikardo: That may be right in some services, but I know of others where it is not right and where there is downgrading. In any event, in new clause 1 we now have the possibility of a further down-grading.
All the talk that we heard to allay the fears and placate — I almost said con — the Standing Committee into accepting things of which it might otherwise have been doubtful, has also deceived no less a person than an assistant commissioner of the Metropolitan police, who clearly made a statement when he was unaware of this dilution of rank or authority in new clause 1. On those grounds, we on this side do not find the clause acceptable.

Mr. Dubs: I was quite surprised to hear the Minister introduce the new clause. He did so in a somewhat


insensitive manner, bearing in mind the nature of the discussions and the assurances that we were given during four months of debate in Committee upstairs. If it is to be presented to the House now as an afterthought by the Government, it should be presented in a somewhat more apologetic way. I find this type of approach somewhat hard to stomach, after all the assurances that we had earlier that the Government were fully in command of the Bill, and that everything had been thought through and nothing had been done with undue haste.
I wonder whether the Minister will now give the House a little more information. If it is true that a police officer acts up very infrequently, if it happens once or twice a week, say, in the Metropolitan police area, most of us would say that, although the new clause is an afterthought, it represents a sensible tidying up. However, if it happens fairly frequently, surely it undermines much of the Governments argument about safeguards. There is no sense in saying that it requires a particular seniority of police officer to exercise certain responsibilities, and then to say, "Oh well, for all sorts of reasons we often must have a more junior officer in charge of the police station, and he will take over the responsibilities that we have specified in the Bill."
I hope that the Minister will tell us which of those two is correct. In other words, how often does acting up take place? How often does a more junior officer take over the responsibilities that should normally be exercised by a senior police officer? We can accept it if the Minister says that it is an isolated occurrence, but if it happens fairly often it undermines a basic facet of the Bill, and it is something that we should know before we proceed further in our consideration of the new clause.

Mr. Andrew F. Bennett: We should also ask the Minister what training the person who is acting up has had, because if he is waiting to get promotion and has had the training it is not as worrying as if he has not had the training, which in some cases will be quite considerable, for the extra duties that he would normally carry out at the higher rank.

Mr. Dubs: That is a valid point. I hope that the Minister will give us more information on the matter. Otherwise, it makes nonsense of the many assurances we have been given that the seniority of the police officer was a safeguard that the Committee should accept, because it meant that matters would be dealt with by an officer who was senior enough and who had had the experience and training that were necessary to exercise the duties itemised.

Mr. Mellor: Perhaps I may respond briefly to the debate. First, may I say to the hon. Member for Bethnal Green and Bow (Mr. Mikardo), in the spirit of reconciliation that is appropriate to 4.28 am, that we accept his amendment. To develop the point that I made during the course of his speech—I hope not unhelpfully —I accept that there are instances when, for persuasive reasons, some changes have been made to the recommendations of the Royal Commission. However, they are not all one way. The point about the subdivisional commander appears in the Royal Commission's report. In many forces he is at chief inspector level and a question

of upgrading is involved. We received some representations that we were making the requirement too strong. We chose the rank of superintendent as it is sufficiently senior to justify the provisions and to attach seriousness to them. In no sense is the proposal a derogation from that.
I hope that I can also assist the hon. Member for Battersea, South (Mr. Dubs). There is no question of the superintendent going off for the evening and someone being made up to take his place. There is no consistent pattern among the forces, but in most cases force orders make provision for the acting up procedure. It will not be an every-day occurrence, but it is difficult to say how often it will occur. How often do illnesses occur? It is certainly not a question of an officer going off for the evening with his wife and someone acting up in his absence. A long period of being absent due to illness, for example, is involved. The procedure has always been part and parcel of the police service.
It would be wrong if, in our anxiety, the issue tipped over to a root-and-branch objection to someone with the rank of chief inspector being able to discharge a superintendent's duties. We must understand that in a common sense world a senior officer may be absent for a considerable time but that it may not be sensible to promote someone permanently to that rank, although someone must discharge the duty.
I should be concerned if we were talking about someone discharging the superintendent's duty on an ad hoc basis just because he happened not to be there or, if any challenge were raised, it could be said, "That is not a good point because the officer was acting as superintendent at the time." The provision has to be more formal than that. I hope that I have made it clear that the proposal is not sinister and that it should command the support of all hon. Members.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause read a Second time.

Manuscript amendment proposed to the proposed clause, in line 4, leave out
including an Act passed after this Act".—[Mr. Mikardo.]

Mr. Whitelaw: We are prepared to accept the amendment.

Amendment agreed to.

Clause, as amended, added to the Bill.

New Clause 9

ARREST FOR FURTHER OFFENCE

'Where—
(a) a person—

(i) is at a police station in consequence of that arrest; and

(b) it appears to a constable that, if he were released from that arrest, he would be liable to arrest for some other offence, he shall be arrested for that other offence.'—[Mr. Mellor.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Mr. Mellor: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Bernard Weatheril): With this it will be convenient to take Government amendment No. 175.

Mr. Mellor: The new clause is intended to supplement clause 21, which provides that if a police officer decides that a person who has been attending a police station voluntarily should not be allowed to leave at will the police


officer must inform him at once that he is under arrest. The purpose of this is to remove any room for doubts in people's minds as to their position and their ability to leave a police station at will.
The new clause is designed to remove a similar area of potential doubt and to clarify the structure of the scheme of arrest and detention set out in the Bill. It sometimes happens that the offence for which a person is under arrest changes while he is at a police station. For instance, a person may be arrested for burglary because it appeared on the facts known to the arresting officer that that was an appropriate charge. As a result of an interview at the police station, however, the investigating officer may be satisfied that there is no prima facie case of burglary but that there is a reasonably based suspicion that the person has been handling stolen property.
The effect of the new clause will be that at the point where it appears to the investigating officer that he has grounds on which to arrest the person for a further offence but that the offence for which the person was originally arrested is no longer sustainable, he is obliged to caution the person and to re-arrest him. As the person is already in custody, that will in practice be done by informing him that he is under arrest for a further offence and telling him what the offence is. Thus, in the example that I gave, the investigating officer will inform the person that he is under arrest for handling stolen property and is not free to leave the station at will, even though he is no longer suspected of having committed the burglary for which he was originally arrested.
The clause is couched in such terms to ensure that once an individual is at the police station he should always know not only whether he is under arrest or whether he is free to leave, but the offence for which he is under arrest. It also makes it clear beyond a peradventure that it is not permissible to release the person from arrest on the burglary charge, immediately re-arrest him for handling stolen goods and turn the detention clock back to zero so that the time period for the various procedures in the Bill begins anew. I hope that this will be seen as an obvious improvement in the drafting of the Bill and as such will be acceptable to the House.
Amendment No. 175 is a consequential amendment to clause 31 and provides that if a person is already under arrest at a police station and is arrested for a further offence, the time from which his detention is calculated must be based on the original arrest and not the further arrest, for the reasons that I have already given. That ensures that however many arrests there may be there will be only one time period, which flows from the time of the original arrest and that it is from that time that all the various provisions of the Bill must be considered.
I commend the new clause and the amendment to the House.

Mr. Snape: The House will be grateful to the Under-Secretary of State for the way in which he has propounded the new clause and the amendment.
For most people, arrest is a traumatic experience. The fact that under the Bill a suspect may be arrested, taken to a police station and detained for up to 96 hours in certain circumstances therefore gave us considerable concern when we saw the new clause. Until the Under-Secretary of State gave his cogent explanation it appeared that a person could be held for up to 96 hours, then released and re-arrested for a further offence and detained again for a

similar period. The Minister's clarification of the position is most helpful. It goes a long way towards easing many of the fears and concerns that would have been expressed without the Minister's detailed explanation.
The whole business of being arrested is, for many people, a traumatic experience. The hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Mr. Griffiths), who represents the interests of the Police Federation diligently and conscientiously, might say that the new clause is useful, helpful and even essential to the detection of crime. But he will acknowledge that those prepared to confess to crimes during interrogation are not usually the hardened criminals that hon. Members want to be caught—more often than not it is the comparatively inexperienced person, often a youngster.
I do not intend to detain the House by giving examples, but I am sure that the hon. Gentleman and the Minister will acknowledge that there have been fairly well publicised cases of suspects confessing to crimes that they had not committed simply because of the interrogation procedure at police stations and the time that they were kept there.
The new clause is a welcome improvement, and we are grateful to the Minister for his explanation of it.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 10

CONSTITUTION OF POLICE AUTHORITY

'1. The following section shall be substituted for section 2 of the Police Act 1964:
2. — (1) The police authority for a police area consisting of a county, including the Greater London Council area, shall be a committee of the council of the county constituted in accordance with the provisions of this section, to be known as the police committee.
(2) The police committee for a police area shall consist of such number of members of the council or the county or Greater London Council as they may determine.
(3) The quorum of a police committee shall be such as may from time to time be determined by the council.
(4) Section 102(5) of the Local Government Act 1972 shall apply to a committee appointed under this section as it applies to a committee appointed under that section.
(5) Any proceedings by or against a committee appointed under this section shall be brought by or against the clerk of the council or town clerk as representing that committee".

2. The following section shall be substituted for section 4 of the Police Act 1946:
4. —(1) The police force maintained for a police area under section 1 of this Act shall be under the direction and control of the police authority who shall secure the maintenance of an adequate and efficient police force for the area, and to exercise for that purpose the powers conferred on a police authority by this Act.
The police authority shall prepare and publish a law enforcement policy for its area which lays down the policing practices and methods to be adopted and the proposed allocation of resources.
(2) The police authority for every such police area shall, subject to the approval of the Secretary of State and to regulations made under Part II of this Act, appoint the chief constable of the police force maintained by that authority and all other officers of the level of inspector and above, and determine the number of persons in each rank in that force which is to continue the establishment of the force.
(3) The police authority for any such police area may, subject to the consent of the Secretary of State, provide and maintain such buildings, structures and premises, and make such alterations in any buildings, structures or premises already provided as may be required for police purposes of the area.


(4) The police authority for any such police area may, subject to any regulation under Part II of this Act provide and maintain such vehicles, apparatus, clothing and other equipment as may be required for police purposes of the area.
(5) A combined police authority may, if so authorised by the combination scheme, make arrangements with any constituent authority for the use by the combined police authority of the services of officers of the constituent authority and the making of contracts and payments on behalf of the combined police authority to the constituent authority.".
3. Section 5(1) and 7(2) of the Police Act 1964 shall cease to have effect.
4. Section 12(3) of the Police Act 1964 shall be amended to leave out "ought not to be disclosed, or is not needed for the discharge of the function of the Police Authority" and substitute "cannot be disclosed or is sub judice":.—[Mr. Dubs.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Mr. Dubs: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this we shall discuss the following amendments:—

Amendment (a), in line 5, at end insert
'together with a number of magistrates equal to not less than one third of the total membership of that authority.'.
Amendment (b), in line 9, at end insert
'provided that one third of those present shall be magistrates.'.
Amendment (c), in line 20, leave out from beginning to end of line 22.
Amendment (d), in line 25, leave out from 'authority' to end of line 27.

New clause 11 — Police authority supervision of powers.
'(1) It shall be the duty of the police authority constituted under the Police Act 1964 to monitor the exercise of powers given to the police under this Act.
(2) In the proper exercise of the duty under Clause 1 the authority shall call for regular reports from the chief constable about the use of the powers by the members of his force and the numbers of complaints arising from their actions.'
(3) Where the committee consider it appropriate they shall refer any disputed use of the powers to a sub-committee to investigate.
(4) If the sub-committee are of the view that any officer has abused the powers granted under this Act, it shall refer the case to the chief constable to take disciplinary action against the officer.'.

Amendment (b), new clause 11, in line 4, leave out from 'constable' to end of line 5.

Amendment (c), new clause 11, in line 6, leave out subsections (3) and (4).

New clause 25—Accountability of the Metropolitan Police.
'(1) The Commissioner for the Metropolitan Police shall lay before Parliament an annual report on the activities of his force; and such a report shall be considered by a Select Committee of Members of Parliament representing constituencies within the Metropolitan Police District.
(2) The Secretary of State shall lay before Parliament proposals for a Metropolitan Police authority which shall include representatives of the Greater London Council, the London Borough Councils and such other local authorities as lie within the Metropolitan Police District; provided that such proposals shall not be laid until the local authorities mentioned above have been elected by a method of proportional representation.
(3) Such proposals shall include provisions to ensure that such an authority shall be responsible for the policing of the Metropolitan Police District and shall for that purpose:

(a) maintain the Metropolitan Police as an adequate and efficient police force;
(b) determine, from time to time, the general policy and operational strategy of the Metropolitan Police;

(c) act as the Receiver of the Metropolitan Police.

(4) The Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police may object to or request the deferral of the discussion at a meeting of the Authority of particular police operations if he considers that such discussion would prejudice the effectiveness of his force and if the chairman of the Authority is not prepared to accede to such objection or request the Commissioner may appeal to the Home Secretary who shall have power to reverse the decision of the chairman of the Authority.'.

Mr. Dubs: My new clause is intended to establish police authorities and to take a firm step to make police forces in England and Wales accountable to elected members of local authorities. I do not believe that the argument about accountability will go away, no matter how much consultation is established by the Home Secretary and no matter how many efforts he or the Metropolitan police commissioner make to involve London Members of Parliament to a greater extent.
There is a demand throughout the country that police forces should be accountable to locally elected persons. Until such time as that demand is met, there will be continuous agitation for change and a constant belief that police forces do not act according to the wishes of local people. The issue has been the subject of numerous discussions. We spent some time in Committee discussing an amendment based on the same principle.
The new clause provides that the area for a police force should consist of the county or, in London, of the Greater London Council area. The police committee for the area will consist of a certain number of members of the county council or, in the case of London, of the Greater London Council. They will be elected councillors, who will be in charge of the police in their area.
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The new clause goes into some detail about establishing a quorum for such a police committee, the form of its proceedings and the responsibilities of its clerks. It makes substitutions for section 4 of the Police Act 1964 for particular operations, approvals of the Secretary of State and the making of various regulations.
Those of us who have been dissatisfied for a long time with the operations of the police and who believe that democracy should be brought into police operations will wholeheartedly support the clause. Why is there increasing feeling throughout the country that we should have democratic control over the police? I know that some Conservative Members will talk about political control. We have been round this course before, and the argument is that through the Home Secretary in London we already have political control of the police.
There is nothing pejorative about the expression "political". We are all in politics. We may not like one another's politics, but we are all involved in politics and there is nothing wrong with the Home Secretary being accused of exercising political control over the police in London. We are seeking a uniform pattern of democratic control over the police in London and in other areas. We wish that democratic control to be exercised through elected people who will be answerable to the electorate every four years when local elections take place, or every year in the country councils that have annual elections. There will then be an element of democratic accountability exercised every year through the medium of the electorate when elections take place.
We are often told that there is a lack of co-operation between local communities and the police. If local people


had more sense of being able to influence policing in their areas, there would be a greater willingness to co-operate with the police. The sense of co-operation is at its worse in London, where there are no statutory police committees. In London there is a feeling of distance between local people and the police force. The local people who talk to me about policing in the area feel frustrated that they cannot influence local policies. They feel that the system is rather remote compared to the way in which they can, through the democratic process, have some influence on other policies in the area on housing, planning and highways, for example.
I am not suggesting that there is a direct analogy between housing policy and police policy, but the wish of local people to influence both is understandable and they find ,it difficult to understand why they should not have more say in the way in which policing in their area takes place. I suggest that bringing local people and the police closer together through the democratic process would increase the wish of local people to co-operate with the police. That itself would help to reduce the crime rate.
Such a policy would have another important consequence. Most of us have no understanding and no knowledge of how the police set their own priorities between, for example, tackling burglary as compared with street crime and auto crime. We have no information about how the police set their priorities, and because of that we cannot influence priorities. Constituents ask me why there are not more police officers on the beat and why more action is not being taken to deal with certain offences. All that I can do is write to the police commander to convey the views of my constituents to him. There is no sensible procedure through which the public can effect democratic control over these matters. There may be a little help through the Secretary of State's proposals to have more consultation, but that is no real substitute for accountability.
Accountability would enable people to express firmly and positively what type of policing they wish to see in their areas and give them the weapon of democratic votes at elections to enable them to push forward their views in a way in which in a democracy all views can be pushed forward.
We have been round this course on a number of occasions and I do not wish to spend more time developing the argument. I believe that people have an enormoous wish for a change in our policing and for democratic control over the police. I believe that that message is coming through loud and clear from the electorate. I feel it positively in Wandsworth among the many people to whom I talk frequently about policing. I believe that the issue will not go away. If it is not conceded by the Home Secretary this year, the demands will continue and sooner or later we shall have democratic accountability of the police. I hope that when the Home Secretary realises that something is inevitable he will move towards meeting the inevitability of the public's healthy and democratic wish.

Mr. Eldon Griffiths: It might be convenient, Mr. Weatherill, while speaking to the new clause, if I comment also upon my amendments. They seek to ensure that magistrates will be preserved on any police authority. At present, they form one third of the authority, and I am anxious that they should remain. That is the esential point that I wish to make.
I do not believe that a police authority can or should be merely one more arm of the locally elected council The police service is different from any other. The debates on the Bill, whatever else they have done, have demonstrated that the administration of justice, and the operations and control of the police are different from any other social service. I start with the proposition that we are dealing with a service whose impact on the public is entirely different from any other.
I have seen something of political control of the police in the flesh. I accept what the hon. Member for Battersea, South (Mr. Dubs) said. There is nothing odious about political control. We are in that business. I have seen political control work in the United States where lived and worked for some 16 years. "Political control" is, I suppose, an alternative to "accountability" of the police in the United States, and it leaves a great deal to be desired.
One result in too many places is that the police service is affected by the annual or quadrennial round of elections. During the run-up to an election the political masters of the police will put pressure upon them to handle the administration of law in a way that is likely to help that authority to be re-elected. That is common knowledge and there is no need for me to spread it around. I am sure that no one in the House would want to go down that road, but it is the road that has been opened up by the amendment.

Mr. Andrew F. Bennett: Is the hon. Gentleman suggesting that the Home Secretary does that with London? If he does not, why should the hon. Gentleman assume that other elected representatives will?

Mr. Griffiths: There is a difference. With great respect, the Home Secretary is not an elected local authority. He is a senior Minister responsible to the House. He has a national as well as local responsibility for policing matters. I do not suggest that we would inevitably go in the same direction as the Americans. However, it opens the door and it is the one experience that I have had of political control of the police.
Several years ago, the Police Federation walked out of the Police Council. All types of difficulties flowed from that. When the Police Federation walked out of the Police Council, many of the affairs of the Police Council were brought to a halt. The Police Federation was no longer prepared to tolerate the party politics that had been injected into the Police Council through the local authority associations. The Police Federation was not prepared to see questions about pay, pensions, status and responsibility bandied between a Conservative majority on the then county councils association, and a Labour majority on the Association of Municipal Corporations. There were many tensions and difficulties. Hon. Members know perfectly well how that state of affairs can arise and it made the task of the police virtually impossible.
Throughout Britain there are those who, according to their own lights, consider that the time has come for elected politicians to have more control, not only of general policing policies but of their operation. Some members of local authorities make no bones about the fact that they wish to have some control over police operations. I have before me the statements of several people, one of which says that the police should be agents of Socialism and democracy. Members of the National Front may say that they should be the agents of something else. Those are the views of extremists on the fringes of politics. Perhaps


hon. Members should not take them too seriously. Some people consider that the police represent power, and they wish to get their hands on that power and then use it.

Mr. Hattersley: Will he hon. Gentleman give an attribution to the first quotation? That quote is often misused by people who have no right to it.

Mr. Griffiths: I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will forgive me about the term "Socialism"? It is a late hour. I am prepared to bring in the notes. I did not come equipped with all the information. Suffice it to say, that there are those, whether they be on the far Right or the far Left, who would like to get their hands on the control of the police for political purposes—

Mr. Hattersley: I shall spare the hon. Gentleman the necessity of leaving the Chamber to look up his own quotation. It is the view of the Socialist Workers party, which stands for nothing anywhere, and cannot be elected to anything at any time. It really trivialises the debate by quoting it.

Mr. Griffiths: The right hon. Gentleman is entitled to say that. I am sorry to press the point, but he knows that there are Labour Members of some police authorities who, although they would not necessarily adopt the quotation that I used, would take the view that it is proper for elected local people to control the operations of the police. That would not be to the advantage of the country, the police or the public.
Politicians have a role to play at a local and, indeed, national level in setting the general policing policies. Perhaps the time is coming when the degree of political control over general policing policies will need to be increased. I go along with what has been said about the demand for increased accountability. The time is coming when the police will have to be seen to be more accountable. I believe that they are accountable at present, but I accept that they must be seen to be so. It is a question of how far we should go, and I believe that it is going too far to accept new clause 10.
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Subsection (2) of the new clause states that:
The police authority shall prepare and publish a law enforcement policy for its area which lays down the policing practices and methods to be adopted and the proposed allocation of resources.
That goes too far. It would import political judgments into law enforcement. Policing policy is one thing, but the act of enforcing the law is another. That is why my amendment seeks to leave out that provision.
In the following subsection it is proposed that the police authority, with its elected majority, should appoint not only the chief officer but
all other officers of the level of inpector and above, and determine the number of persons in each rank in that force which is to constitute the establishment of the force.
That takes the elected majority right into the heart of operations. It is only possible for the chief officer professionally to establish just how many inspectors or sergeants he will need in certain areas. It is entirely right that the police authority should control his budget and that in turn must have an effect on the rank structure of those involved. However, once a political authority can establish who shall be promoted from inspector to chief

inspector, from chief inspector to superintendent, and so on, it is inevitable that people will seek to please, appease, placate, and get on well with the political majority. That happens in local government, but it would be wrong for it to start in the police service, which has to deal with the administration of the law of the land.

Mr. Mikardo: Is the hon. Gentleman suggesting that that is what happens in the borough engineer's department? If not, and if borough engineers' staffs do not go posterior crawling to their political bosses for favours, why does he think that policemen will do so?

Mr. Griffiths: I am not sure that the hon. Gentleman's point about the borough engineer's department is correct. On occasion, there is probably a good deal of sucking up among officials in a department who are looking for promotion. It would be wholly wrong to place the police service, which is concerned, above all, with the administration of justice, and which must take a neutral and impartial view, in a stuation in which career prospects depended on how well those involved got on with the political party that happened to be in control of the council.
In all elected bodies, there are bound to be changes in party control. That may not happen as frequently in some authorities as it does in others, but it would be wrong for a man to establish his credentials with a strongly Left-wing authority only to find that it is replaced in the democratic process with a moderately Right-wing party. If the police service was involved in that sort of party political mechanism, it would create problems and tensions for it.

Mr. Ronald W. Brown: The danger that the hon. Gentleman is postulating is already with us, as some local authorities in London now employ only those who are of the same political persuasion as the party in power. We now see political officers wearing political badges as a sign of their affiliation to the ruling political junta.

Mr. Griffiths: The hon. Gentleman has underlined the point that I was making in a more glancing way. It is a fact that political authorities, especially those of either extreme, like their senior officers to adopt their party political colours. That is not acceptable for chief executives, borough engineers or education officers, but it is extremely serious when the administration of the law and the right of citizens to impartial treatment before the law start to be affected by party political or ideological considerations. I do not want to pursue that line or argument too far, but it was the control of the police that put the extremists into control in Germany and the Soviet Union. That is the real commanding height. Once a political party gets hold of the police force and is able to use it for its own ends, the bastion of political democracy is destroyed.
I do not dissent from the general feeling that the hon. Member for Battersea, South (Mr. Dubs) advanced reasonably. There is a case for increasing accountability. I have supported that aim in London. I welcome what my right hon. Friend is doing in a cautious, gradual but conspicuous way. It is one thing to achieve greater accountability but quite another to establish party political control of that crucial service.
The hon. Member for Bethnal Green and Bow, (Mr. Mikardo), whose contribution to the debate in Committee


earned great respect, argued that if there was greater local control there would be more public willingness to cooperate with the police. I think just the opposite.
One of the reasons why the police, with all their faults, stand so high in the estimation of the British public is that they are seen not to be party political or the creatures of local authorities. If it ever happened that the police were seen to be under the control of the local council, they would begin to slip down the scale of public esteem and favour to the point where local councils are—close to the bottom.
A small fraction of the electorate will vote in the local elections this week. Irrespective of whether we like it, local politicians, and indeed national politicians, stand less high in the regard of their fellow men than does the police service. We should not win the consent of people, especially youth, if we put the police conspicuously under the thumb of local authorities.
New clause 10 has some merit. It is essential that magistrates remain, as they provide consistency, have knowledge of the law and are not subject to electoral whims. It is essential to remove any suggestion of local politicians being able to control the advancement of policemen.

Mr. Ronald W. Brown: I should like to speak to new clause 25 as it covers the ground on which there was most agreement when we debated the Metropolitan police. My right hon. and hon. Friends and I have tried to advance a new clause which covers what the House will accept. I do not dissent from what the hon. Member for Battersea, South (Mr. Dubs) said about the need for more accountability in London. There is no argument about that. The problem is how to achieve that accountability. I still believe that the Home Secretary should continue to be the police authority in London, but we must build a structure whereby he can be responsible to this House, and through it to Members of Parliament who represent London constituencies.
Over the years, we have complained that we have been unable to influence discussion on policing in London. New clause 25 goes some way towards meeting that point. It calls on the commissioner to make an annual report to Parliament on the activities of his force, which shall be referred to a Select Committee consisting of London Members of Parliament. It also states that:
The Secretary of State shall lay before Parliament proposals for a Metropolitan Police authority",
and the new clause describes how that should be done. We are trying to illustrate the lines of communication directly from the political control of this House to the liaison committees in the community. Given that type of structure, we shall begin to get a response from the community.
I do not agree with the hon. Member for Battersea, South, who implied that everyone in London is raving mad about not being able to control the police. That may be so in Battersea, but I doubt whether it is so in other parts of London. People are simply fed up at not being able to walk the streets in safety, and they constantly demand of me, "Where are the police? Why can we not have more?".
In my contributions to police debates in the House, I have constantly drawn attention to the fact that police manning is still based on the manning levels of the 1930s when the crime rate was much lower. When we are told, "We are nearly up to the established figures", that means

the established figures determined all that time ago. We have never updated those figures to cope with the problems of today. De facto, we are far below the level that is necessary. That has been my experience of complaints from Londoners about the lack of policing.
During the past two or three years we have seen a more dynamic form of beat policing, which has had a remarkable effect. People in my constituency feel that getting to know the local bobby and being able to talk to him is of great value and is a confidence builder. We must make people confident that the police are back in control of the law-breakers in society and that they no longer come out of the station only to deal with emergencies.
We must not give credence to the concept that everyone is in a state of high dudgeon because he is not in control of the Metropolitan police. The right hon. Member for Birmingham, Sparkbrook (Mr. Hattersley) referred to the SWP. He and I could swap stories about the problems that we have had with the SWP and the IMG. We even have Mr. Knight of the Socialist Labour League, who still believes that he is of that order, although he now holds a Labour party card. He thinks that the Labour party has gone towards him and that he has not moved an inch. Many other people are closeted with him, and it is no good skimming over the problem and claiming that it does not matter.
In my own area there is a problem with the Hackney Council for Racial Equality. Since 10 January, the new police commander has tried desperately to establish contact between the police and that organisation. Recognising the complaints about the police in London, particularly in Hackney, as well as the difficulties in Hackney as a result of the tragedy that occurred, he has endeavoured to re-establish a relationship with the community. He has approached every group in an attempt to get a dialogue going. What kind of response did he get from the Council for Racial Equality? In a letter of 21 February it said:
I am writing on behalf of Hackney Council for Racial Equality Executive"—
not the council, but the executive—
who have asked that you give instructions that the local home beat officers covering the HCRE Mare Street office, the HCRE Family Centre, Rectory Road, no longer call"—
that phase is underlined—
at either of these offices unless HCRE gives a specific call to the police.
I trust this will be acted on with dispatch.
That was signed by the community relations officer. That destroyed the relationship between the beat policemen and the community in the two areas. By common consent, that relationship had proved valuable. That one letter wiped out that relationship.
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The commander felt aggrieved and sent a conciliatory letter asking the council to reconsider the situation. He was eager to hear their anxieties and was keen to make sure that the police would never close the door. He pointed out that the police wanted to be part of the community with the HCRE. The reply was:
I am in receipt of your letters of 28th February and 28th March regarding visits by the police to the premises at Mare Street and Rectory Road.
The Executive Committee of HCRE have asked me to inform you that the position remains as stated in the HCRE's original letter on this matter of February 21st.
Where is the dialogue? The police were trying desperately to continue the relationship they had


established, but the executive of the HCRE decided unilaterally to wipe out that relationship. There are councillors and people of all political persuasion on that body. Yet the working relationship which had been established has been destroyed by a few words on a piece of paper. I point out to the HCRE that it is doing no good to the ethnic communities by trying to cut itself off from the police. It is making the job of the police more difficult. I appeal to it to review its decision.
The way for the HCRE to make points on policing is to talk to the police. The police commander is young. He has not been there for donkey's years and become hidebound. He is the youngest commander in the country. He is the sort of man the HCRE should be talking to. He is the man to react to new conditions because he has been brought up in them. Yet he is being treated as though he is not worth talking to. He has a rapport with everybody. This group which feels that it represents the ethnic community is doing a great disservice to that community.
The problem could be resolved to some extent if new clause 25 were accepted by the Home Secretary. It may not be perfect. In the debate on 28 February I argued that, as well as being on the Select Committee, London Members of Parliament should be represented on the body that we have described in the new clause as the metropolitan police authority. Although that is not embodied in the new clause, if the Home Secretary felt that it should be redrafted I should be happy to withdraw it and allow the Home Secretary to do so.
This is not an attempt to be foolish or to push the Home Secretary into an area in which he does not want to go. What we have drafted is broadly what the Home Secretary has talked about and falls well within what he believes to be the parameters of accountability in London. Therefore, I hope that he will accept the principle of the new clause, even though he may wish to redraft it.

Mr. Teddy Taylor: I raise briefly a narrow but important point arising out of subsection 2(5) of new clause 10. I ask the Home Secretary whether subsection 2(5) would have the effect of depriving him and the local authority of the right to amalgamate a local authority force with a police force of a public authority that is not a local authority. If that is the case I hope that he will reject the new clause because it would be wrong if the Home Secretary were deprived of the one vehicle that he could use to safeguard the position, prospects and career structure of about 100 persons who are police officers in the port of London police authority.
I am sure that the Home Secretary will be aware that the port of London police authority is older than the Metropolitan police. Its members have the full powers of police officers and the training is exactly the same as that of outside forces. Because of the decline of the PLA, the number of police officers employed there has dropped from several hundred to only 90. Because of that, a career structure is almost non-existent and the PLA has shown a great anxiety to help the police officers who have served it well and whose presence is a major selling point for the port of London. Therefore, it discussed the position with the Essex county council which said that it would be glad to co-operate in a merger if, and only if, the Home Secretary agreed.
Essex county council showed its anxiety to help, the PLA showed its anxiety to help, but, sadly, as the Home Secretary will be aware, when I had a meeting with his noble Friend the Under-Secretary of State he said that the Home Office was not prepared to sanction such a merger. I hope that the Home Secretary will reject the clause if it will prevent him from giving further consideration to a responsibility that he has to the 90 officers in the PLA.

Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: As I drafted the new clause I can say that this part of the new clause is the same as existing law and in so far as there is power for such a combination to be carried out it is under the existing law. This paragraph is taken straight from the Police Act 1964 and does not change any part of the existing law.

Mr. Taylor: I am always interested to hear the hon. Gentleman, but I have found him to be wrong on previous occasions and I should prefer to have his assurance direct from the Home Secretary. Not only do I ask him to give that brief assurance but I appeal to him to take a personal interest in the future position of the 90 police officers who have served the PLA and London well.
I am afraid that the police in the PLA feel neglected and let down because they believe that the Home Office has simply washed its hands of their future. They attract great sympathy from the PLA and from the Essex County Council and considerable sympathy from the Police Federation, but I am afraid that the Home Office has given no sign of any interest in the future welfare and career structure of the police in the PLA.
Therefore, I hope that on this matter, in which I have declared my interest on previous occasions, the Home Secretary will be able to give me the simple assurance, first, that the new clause will not deprive him of the power to help if he wishes, and, secondly, that he will take a personal interest in the future career prospects of the PLA police.

Mr. Whitelaw: First, I think that I should reply quickly to my hon. Friend the Member for Southend, East (Mr. Taylor). The hon. Member for York (Mr. Lyon) was correct: subsection (5) does merely repeat what is already in the Police Act 1964. Therefore, it would in no way affect my right to amalgamate forces, as my hon. Friend suggested.
I know that my hon. Friend discussed the port of London police with my noble Friend Lord Elton. Up to now we have sustained the existing policy that a private force is not absorbed into the 1964 Act force unless there are overriding operationl reasons for this. I will, of course, look at it again.
I now deal with the new clause moved by the hon. Member for Battersea, South (Mr. Dubs). I accept that this is a debate of some importance, and I assure the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Sparkbrook (Mr. Hattersley) and the House that I shall seek to adjourn further consideration of the Bill when I have finished speaking, so that the rest of this debate can proceed at a more appropriate hour.
It is, of course, a debate about the accountability of the police. At the heart of it lies the relationship between the police and the public they serve, public attitudes to the police, the public's perceptions of police conduct, their legitimate concern when things appear to go wrong, and the need for the police to be called to account. The police need public support to do their job effectively, and the


maintenance of public trust rests on a day-to-day basis, on police forces keeping in tune with the needs of the community, listening and explaining and, crucially, on a satisfactory framework of law.
I have been at pains in recent months to stress how important I think it is for the police to get on with the community they serve, to have consultations with the community they serve and to work with the community they serve. Indeed, there is already a clause in the Bill which gives statutory force to consultative committees for all those purposes.
Here, however, we are debating something different —a fundamental change in the principle of policing in this country. The Government believe that the existing framework of law as enshrined in the 1964 Act is sound and can be adapted, as it has been, for consultations. We do not believe that it needs the fundamental change suggested in two of these new clauses. I shall explain why the Government and I take this particular view.
The independence of the police in enforcing the law is crucial. The police are not the agents of the Government or of local authorities. The Opposition believe that the police should be subject to control by democratically elected bodies. My answer to the hon. Member for Battersea, South, is that I think there is a difference between "control" and "influence". "Influence", I believe, implies consultation, being apprised of what is going on and seeking to influence changes. "Control", I believe, means something quite different, and it is the use of this word "control" that the Government do not believe would be right.
The police are not just another local service. The hon. Member for Bethnal Green and Bow (Mr. Mikardo), in an intervention to my hon. Friend the Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Mr. Griffiths), talked about the engineer's department, but the police are not just another local service. They are independent officers of the Crown. That is because the powers with which we invest police officers should be exercised without fear or favour and without political interference.
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The hon. Member for Hackney, South and Shoreditch (Mr. Brown) gave an example in the letter he quoted of the dangers of those who seek to exercise political interference and move in the direction of control. We are bound to take seriously what he said. Therefore, we have to look at the position of the police in exercising their power. They may be subject only to the law of the land and the lawful orders of their superior officers. In the Bill we are debating fully and carefully what powers the police should have, and the necessary safeguards. The use of those powers is subject to scrutiny in the courts on a caseby-case basis, but accountability of the courts is not enough. Much police work is not about criminal cases. That is why our constitutional arrangements must provide, and do, for the police to give a general account of their actions and answer for their stewardship of public funds and the maintenance of public trust.
The constitutional arrangements in London are different, and I shall come to those in a moment. I should like to respond to the proposal that would make a fundamental change. The hon. Member for Battersea, South and those who support him make no bones about

that. They wish to make a fundamental change that would change the balance of the present framework of the Police Act 1964.
Hon. Members seek to change also the composition of police authorities, which under their proposal would consist wholly of county councillors. My hon. Friend the Member for Bury St. Edmunds wisely tabled an amendment to retain magistrates, perhaps because he thought that in some way there was a chance that I wouold go down the road of the new clause. As I am not going down that road, the magistrates will remain. They are important. It is a pity that in some cases the magistrates are being excluded from police authorities, are not given their proper role, and sometimes do not exercise it. That is a great pity, because under the 1964 Act it is right that two thirds of police authorities should consist of democratically elected representatives.
The hon. Member for Battersea, South and his hon. Friends want police authorities to direct and control the police and to set out law enforcement policy, methods and practices. Police authorities already have a key role in devising strategy. It is sometimes alleged that they do not use sufficiently the powers that they have. If that is so, they certainly ought to, because their powers are there. They have a role to play in devising strategy. I have consistently encouraged them to develop that role, which is implicit in the terms of the 1964 Act.
The police authority has a legitimate interest in policy, because it holds the purse strings on the police budget and is responsible for maintaining an efficient force. A chief constable is accountable to his police authority for the policing of the area. Police authorities are already involved jointly with chief constables in developing local consultation arrangements which will inform and extend the dialogue on policing policy so that it can be adapted to keep in tune with local needs.
A police authority can play—and many do play—a critical role in policy matters, and it does not need additional powers to do that. If police authorities are reluctant to use their existing powers, or to develop their wider role, I am prepared to repeat my encouragement to them to do so. However, that is all on the basis of influence. What the hon. Gentleman and his hon. Friends are moving towards is a fundamental change in political control. I accept the argument about the political part of it, because if I did not it would immediately be considered that as Home Secretary I am not a directly elected councillor in London, by any manner of means, and my position is different. However, I am prepared to accept that I am, or at least try to be, or am alleged to be, a politician. Some may consider that I am not, but at least that is apparently what I have been seeking to be for the past 29 years, and I do not think that I could pretend otherwise.
It is not the political side that matters. It is the control that is crucial. The chief constable has to be controlled by democratically elected people from outside. As Home Secretary, I do not control the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis. I influence him, very properly, because that is my job, but I do not control him, and that is fundamentally the difference.

Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: The right hon. Gentleman said a little while ago that the chief constable was accountable to the police authority. The word "control" is the same as accountability. If accountability means that


the chief constable reports to, and may be influenced by the authority if he so wishes, but in the final analysis he can take the decision in violation of what the police authority says, that is neither accountability nor serious influencing.

Mr. Whitelaw: I maintain that influencing is the job of the police authority whereas controlling a law enforcement policy is not. That is the fundamental difference. Some hon. Members accept that, but then say that it would not mean that politicians would be intervening in the enforcement of the law in particular cases, because the independent prosecution system, which they also propose, and which I have shown the Government favour, would solve the problem.
I cannot accept that. The public prosecutor would be acting on the information and advice provided by the police in his area. That is why the ability of the police to enforce the law independent of political control would remain so important. Under these proposals the police authority could set out what laws the police in it's area should enforce, and how they should go about it. Therein lies the great danger. Laws are not made by Parliament to be flouted by local authorities. I should have thought that it was common ground in the House that the law must be enforced impartially.
The objectives and priorities of the police in a particular area are adjusted to changing circumstances and particular problems that arise. The overall strategy for the area, the objectives and priorities for the force, and how to make the best use of available resources are properly for discussion and agreement between chief constables and their police authorities. Police authorities can and do exercise considerable influence over the policing of their areas, and that is the right way forward.
The proposals made by the hon. Member for Battersea, South would diminish the authority of the chief constable in a number of ways. Local, democratically elected politicians would tell him what methods and procedures to follow. His professional expertise and discretion would, if they did not like it, be of little moment. The police authority would involve itself in appointments down to inspector level. I have always regarded that as an extremely dangerous proposition.
The balance in the 1964 Act has, we believe, stood the test of time. Like so many of our British institutions, it depends on reasonableness and co-operation. We continue to believe that the 1964 Act provides a satisfactory framework within which the three elements — the professional expertise of the chief officer, the interest of the local community reflected in the police authority and the national interest reflected in my responsibilities, which I carry out with professional advice from Her Majesty's inspectors of constabulary — can work together to enhance police effectiveness.
For London, the Opposition propose that the police authority for the Greater London area should be the Greater London council. They make no provision for those parts of the Metropolitan police district that fall outside the GLC area. In new clause 25 the hon. Member for Hackney, South and Shoreditch beguiles me with the proposition that the Home Secretary should remain the police authority for the metropolis. I agree with that, but of course he does not beguile me the whole way in his new

clause, because part of it suggests that the authorities that would form his composite authority would be elected by proportional representation. I could not go along with that. Therefore, I cannot accept his new clause, much as I accept part of what it contains. It would not be possible for us, in the Bill or at any time, even if we were of a mind to do so and believed that it was right, to pre-empt any consideration that any future Parliament might give to our electoral arrangements. The House knows that the Government remain committed to the present constitutional arrangements for policing in the metropolis. I made that clear in the full debate that we had on policing the metropolis on 28 February. I also made that clear in the Standing Committee. I believe that it would be a mistake if policing in the capital city moved in that direction. It would, I believe, replace the present system of community influence and professional independence with doctrinaire policies and greater political control. The dangers here would be the same as those inherent in the unacceptable proposals on the constitution of police authorities in the provinces.
The Home Secretary is police authority, not because of some historical accident but because Parliament must have a central say in the policing of the capital, and also because the scale and nature of "capital city" policing involves major pressures which are not regularly present outside. It is also relevant that the Metropolitan police carry out certain national functions. However, the national role of the Metropolitan police is not the key point. It is the sheer size of the metropolis and the fact that a great burden of work falls to the police because of its capital city functions. They lift the task of policing, and supervising that policing, to a different level from that experienced elsewhere. They rightly make the policing of the capital a special interest of this House, and therefore of the Home Secretary. Major constitutional changes in policing the metropolis would certainly confuse — and, I believe, eventually erode—the role of the House as the forum in which major issues of policing the capital should be and are addressed.
The Metropolitan police are accountable to the Home Secretary and he is answerable to this House. As hon. Members know, I have recently had discussions with London Members and Members for the outer boroughs that are associated with the Metropolitan police to make sure that I knew their views on policing London.
The Government's policy recognises the need for greater local involvement in policing in the metropolis, without going down what I emphasise again would be the dangerous road of political control. The Commissioner and I believe that the right focal point for increased involvement in developing local policing strategy is at borough and district level and below. As I said, I have been particularly concerned with hon. Members for London constituencies and with the London Boroughs Association and Outer Districts Associations. I now have a forum, which I chair, for regular discussion with the Commissioner and his senior officers with these bodies on more general policing issues. This forum provides an enhanced role for representatives of the boroughs and districts which pay the precept, both to state their views and to consider the practical issues concerned with policing the metropolis. I have also had useful discussion with many other people and other hon. Members about those problems.
The Government believe that it would not be wise to separate from the Secretary of State responsibility for the police force which, under any scheme, will remain by far the largest in the country. We maintain that the existing constitutional arrangements for policing in this country are sound. They can be used and developed, but they should not be subjected to the fundamental change that is set out in these proposals. I therefore ask the House, when it continues the debate tomorrow, to reject the new clauses.
Further consideration of the Bill adjourned. —[Mr. Major.]

Bill, as amended (in the Standing Committee and on Recommittal) to be further considered this day.

STATUTORY INSTRUMENTS, &c.

Motion made, and Question put forthwith pursuant to Standing Order No. 79(5) (Standing Committee on Statutory Instruments, &amp;c.).

CUSTOMS AND EXCISE

That the Customs Duties (ECSC) (Quota and Other Reliefs) (Amendment) Order 1983 (S.I., 1983, No. 501), a copy of which was laid before this House on 31st March, be approved.

DANGEROUS DRUGS

That the draft Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 (Modification) Order 1983, which was laid before this House on 29th March, be approved.

SOCIAL SECURITY

That the draft Supplementary Benefit (Requirements) (Longterm Rates) Amendment Regulations 1983, which were laid before this House on 29th March, be approved. — [Mr. Major.]

Question agreed to.

Domestic Glazing (Safety)

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Major.]

Mr. Michael Morris: I am not sure that the dawn of a new day is the best time to communicate clearly about safety glazing, but I shall do my best.
This debate follows a debate nearly three years ago on 18 July 1980 when I urged the Government to implement regulations on safety glazing particularly on patio doors and other large glazed areas. Certain actions were taken and I commend the Minister for that.
I am dealing with the topic again for two reasons. The first is my anxiety about the code of practice, BS 6262, and the second is the number of tragic accidents in recent weeks resulting in a number of deaths allegedly associated with certain types of double glazing. It is clear that fixed double glazing causes most concern.
Most double glazing is of enormous benefit throughout the country. It certainly conserves heat, keeps out noise and has created a highly successful major industry. I do not wish to knock or put at a disadvantage the respectable companies, a number of which have been extremely kind to me over the years in terms of making facilities available to me to enable me to visit factories. I refer to companies such as Alcan, Doulton and others. I commend the work of the Glass and Glazing Federation and the trouble that its members have taken to brief hon. Members.
I have been a proponent of the use of safety glazing in major hazardous areas and have pushed the issue over the years. If a bedroom has fixed double glazing made from laminated glass, a desperate problem is caused if someone wants to get out of the room in an emergency. I am not a small man, and I should have great difficulty getting through a sheet of laminated glass, even if a hammer was conveniently to hand. Without a hammer, I should have no hope.
Toughened glass also causes problems. Not quite the same force is needed to break it, but, as anyone who has driven a car knows, a stone can take a chunk out of a windscreen without smashing it. The majority of windscreens are made of toughened glass.
I have thought about the problem in depth in the last few weeks and it seems that there is still a problem with double glazed annealed glass, the ordinary glass used by the average householder. I say that, not because an adult would have difficulty getting through a pane of annealed glass, but small children between five and seven years of age and elderly people could have trouble getting through two panes of such glass, especially if plastic film is between the two.
I do not know the exact incidence of fixed double glazing, although I know that it is considerable. Perhaps the Minister can enlighten us with some figures. It is clear, however, that where it occurs it constitutes a major danger. In my view, the potential danger is sufficiently great for the Government to take action to ban fixed double glazing. By this I mean glazing which does not allow the window to be opened by sliding or by any other means. In this context, I look for three actions from the Government.
First, I hope that the Minister will take action to mount a publicity campaign. In is desperately important that the


public understand the dangers associated with this kind of double glazing. Secondly, will the Minister consider the possibility of banning this type of double glazing through the building regulations? Thirdly, I urge him to suggest to the Treasury that the implications for life are such that there should be special provision for a limited period of, say, a year, whereby people who have already installed fixed double glazing may obtain a 50 per cent. grant to change it to opening glazing.
That is the area of greatest concern to the public in relation to double glazing.
The other aspect, in which I have been interested for many years, relates to British Standard 6262. Here I am indebted to a number of people who have taken an interest in this over time, not least the Bletchley Timber Company in a neighbouring constituency. The men in charge of the glazing shop there knew of my interest in the matter and asked me to visit them, which I did. They wanted to point out a number of problems that has arisen in relation to BS6262.
At present, I am satisfied that BS6262 has to a large extent solved the patio door and internal glass door problem. Nevertheless, the new code is not understood by the public and at times of recession when money is tight they do not understand why they have to pay more for some types of glazing. I shall give one or two examples.
The existing code suggests that 6mm annealed glass can be used in low level exposed areas. The Royal Society for the Prevention of Accidents has done a great deal of work in experimentation and survey in this area, not least in studying the 20,000 accidents per year involving glass. It takes the view that the present proposal for 6mm annealed glass in low level areas is hazardous.
Furthermore, I have discovered that not only is it a hazard but there are a number of loopholes. I mention just one in relation to the import of Taiwanese hardwood doors, the routing on which is of sufficient depth to accommodate only 4mm annealed glass, so even the existing recommended standards cannot be met. I know that the import of these doors is the subject of an EC antidumping case, but I do not think that that is likely to meet with much success in the short term. In the meantime, hundreds if not thousands of the doors continue to be imported and installed in homes in a very dangerous way.
I mentioned earlier the appalling lack of public awareness of safety glass and when and how it should be used. A recent survey conducted by National Opinion Polls for one manufacturer showed that only 8 per cent. of women knew what laminated glass was, and that 49 per cent. knew about toughened glass. That means that half the housewives in this country are ignorant about genuine safety glass. That is a worrying figure in this day and age.
I can summarise my plea to the Minister. A frightening combination of ignorance about safety and double glazing calls for urgent Government attention. They need to mount at an early stage a substantial publicity campaign to highlight the dangers. We need to examine the building regulations to determine whether they can be amended, first, in relation to BS6262 to ensure that we comply with all its implications and, secondly, to implement some revision to accommodate the low level glass in exposed areas and some of the loopholes such as the Taiwanese

doors. With the experience of BS6262 in action, I hope that the Minister will be brave enough to make it part of the building regulations.
There is an urgent need to give thought to how to deal with what may be several thousands of houses fitted with fixed double glazing. I have explained how that is dangerous. I suspect that the general public are anxious. The Government should take urgent action to encourage people to exchange their existing fixed double glazing for some form of flexible double glazing that can be opened, and thereby provide safety and security to those asleep in their homes.

The Under-Secretary of State for the Environment (Sir George Young): My hon. Friend the Member for Northampton, South (Mr. Morris) has raised an important matter that concerns the safety of us all in our homes. He did so in a manner that was both well informed and reasonable, as one would expect of him. I hope to respond positively to some of his suggestions.
Glazing in modern housing is used for a variety of essential purposes. Where it is properly installed and used, it can be of enormous benefit to householders. In recent years there has been an increasing trend to replace existing traditional windows with double glazing or fixed glazing. My hon. Friend mentioned some of the benefits that an owner might consider when installing that type of glazing. For example, the installation of double glazing and fixed glazing can deter burglars. Noise insulation grants are paid to occupiers where traffic noise or aircraft noise levels are high. My hon. Friend mentioned thermal insulation. Double glazing conserves energy and saves heat loss.
On the other hand, serious problems can arise that can, sadly, sometimes prove fatal. Between 1973 and 1976, 76 children under 14 years of age were killed from falls from windows. Other statistics from a Building Research Establishment study published in 1981 estimated that some 16,000 accidents per year involving architectural glass took place, which required hospital treatment. Such accidents are distressing and serious. Many could have been avoided.
Recent press coverage has drawn attention to the dangers associated with the installation of some forms of modern domestic glazing. A number of recent tragic deaths have occurred in domestic fires and my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Home Department has asked for a report into the circumstances surrounding these fires. I shall return to these specific events a little later. My hon. Friend will understand that this is a fairly wide subject area with many interests concerned. There are manufacturers, installers, housebuilders, several Government Departments, local authorities, standard-setting bodies, safety organisations and consumers. I shall outline the present role of Government in the preservation of public health and safety and then consider some of my hon. Friend's suggestions in his most constructive speech.
As my hon. Friend knows, standards are laid down in the building regulations. Part K of the regulations contains a requirement that there must be a ventilation opening—usually a window—of one-fifth of the floor area in any habitable room that is not mechanically ventilated. In new house design the usual practice is to provide an opening window of an adequate size. The regulations are designed


to ensure that dwellings are adequately ventilated. If windows are fixed, then ventilation is obtained by means of louvres.
Part E of the regulations is designed to ensure that buildings are so constructed that if fire breaks out it does not spread in a manner that would endanger the life of the occupants. Section 2 of part E contains requirements relating to means of escape in case of fire for flats and maisonettes above two storeys.
The requirements state that there shall be adequate means of escape which can be used at all material times. Such means of escape consist basically of exits and internal escape routes in the building. There are no requirements for flats or maisonettes to have opening windows for escape purposes. There are no requirements in the current building regulations for special means of escape to be provided in one or two-storey homes, flats or maisonettes. In an emergency, occupants would leave through the usual exits.
To encourage unassisted escape by occupants via windows on either floor of two-storey dwellings could be hazardous in itself. Leaping from windows unnecessarily, without fire brigade assistance, is sometimes fatal.
Consideration has been given in the past to the use of windows in terms of escape requirements in the building regulations. I am aware, too, that the Scottish building regulations contain requirements for the construction of, and external access to, windows to allow escape in case of fire. These regulations do not apply to two-storey dwelling houses.
It would be possible to regulate specifically for a window opening to be provided in each habitable room in new dwellings. British standard code of practice CP3-Chapter IV, advises that one window to each habitable room should be capable of being used as an escape route. Whilst new building could be adequately controlled, a problem would arise in monitoring and enforcing the regulations where DIY activity takes place. I can shed no specific statistical light on the incidence of fixed glazing, but if there are statistics available I shall write to my hon. Friend.
The building regulations do not, at present, control the thickness or toughness of glass or the design of window frames. However, the Government play a full part in the activities of the British Standards Institution which has a code of practice that my hon. Friend mentioned —B56262 — for glazing for buildings. The code gives recommendations for the design, installation and maintenance of all types of architectural glass and plastic glazing sheet materials for the external walls and interiors of buildings.
The performance of glass is considered in terms of sound, safety, security, integrity in fire, loading, durability and maintenance. The quality and safety of glass installed in buildings is therefore important.
My hon. Friend said that he regards the standard as satisfactory for patios and indoor glass doors, but hoped for improvements and further progress. He said that he would like to see safety glazing in low level exposed areas, for example, in doors.
I agree with my hon. Friend that this is one area where young children are particularly prone to accidents and to the serious consequences that can follow. This may be one area in the code that needs to be looked at again.
The imports of Taiwanese doors and their provision to take only 4ram glass, and not safety glass, are matters

which need to be considered. I shall be grateful if my hon. Friend supplies further details in due course. I shall take up the matter in the Department and with other Departments that are involved. I shall consider the case for change against the background of the evidence presented by my hon. Friend. As I have said, BS6262 is one area that might be considered again in the light of what my hon. Friend has said.
There are many different factors which will inevitably be weighed by householders in choosing what type of window glazing to install. Safety, security, comfort and costs will figure prominently in the choice.
Some of the reasons for installing double glazing are complementary and are aimed at common objectives, for example, comfort and security. Concern has arisen recently about the fact that the installation of certain types of glazing without opening windows might create a potential hazard for occupants if a fire were to break out.
My hon. Friend has asked the Government to consider placing a ban on all fixed double glazing and to undertake a major publicity campaign to warn the public about the dangers of fixed double glazing.
While information currently available does not suggest that fixed double glazing has been a material factor in causing casualties from fire, it would be premature for me to comment on recent specific tragic events while investigations into their cause are being carried out for my right hon. Friend, and inquests are pending.
Nevertheless, my hon. Friend may wish to be reminded that my right hon. Friend announced on 21 April 1983, in reply to a question from the hon. Member for Bolsover (Mr. Skinner), that he accepted that a potential safety hazard might arise from certain types of fixed glazing, and that he was considering how this might be drawn to the attention of the public. In this context, I welcome the initiative of the Greater London council and the London Fire Brigade in mounting a television advertising campaign in the Thames Television area designed to highlight the fire safety hazards of certain do-it-yourself activities, including the possible consequences of the installation of double-glazing units which cannot be opened.
The Home Office is considering, in consultation with the fire service representative organisations and other interested parties, how publicity could best be achieved elsewhere. I hope that my lion. Friend will take that as a step in the direction that he mentioned.
I am less optimistic about the Treasury. My hon. Friend has suggested that consideration be given to the provision of a 50 per cent. grant to those wishing to change their double-glazing from the fixed variety to sliding double-glazed units. There are, as he knows, many demands upon resources in the housing field, and priorities must be given to various parts of our overall programme. The implications of recent events are not yet clear, as I have said, and my immediate reaction must be that a more cost-effective answer to the potential hazard created by he installation of some types of glazing would seem to lie in increasing the awareness of installers and householders to the risks they run if a fire breaks out and a non-openable unit has been installed.
As my hon. Friend knows, there has been a great deal of public interest in the matters that he has raised tonight, and rightly so, because safety standards in our homes must remain a high priority.
We will review our policies in the light of the reports asked for by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Home Department and what my hon friend has said in tonight's important debate. While I can give no commitment on specific measures now, I can say that the areas which we intend to study carefully are: the publicity measures that he mentioned which can draw the public's attention to the dangers from fire in the home, the

guidance which might come from the trade itself, and whether an amendment to the building regulations is required for an opening window for escape purposes in dwellings in case of fire. I hope that my hon. Friend will think that is a useful step in the direction that he has commended to the House.
Question put and agreed to.
Adjourned accordingly at eight minutes past Six o'clock am.